

PAUL I AND THE INDIAN EXPEDITION OF 1801:

MYTH AND REALITY

by

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A THESIS

IN

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## FOREWORD

A note on transliteration and dates. With the exception of the names of the members of the Romanov dynasty, all names and terms from the Russian language are transliterated according to the U.S. Board on Geographic Names system. Unless otherwise noted, all dates conform to the Gregorian calendar. The abbreviations O.S. and N.S. are Old Style and New Style, respectively. The former refers to the Julian calendar, which was eleven days behind the Gregorian calendar in the eighteenth century and twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century. The latter abbreviation refers to the Gregorian calendar.

A note on translations: Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

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## INTRODUCTION

For too long, Paul I has been dismissed by historians as a madman. At the turn of the century, one Russian historian, Aleksandr Kornilov, called Paul a "crowned psychopath" and characterized his reign

as a sudden incursion, as an unexpected squall, which fell in from without, confused everything, turned everything topsy-turvy, but was unable for long to interrupt or to profoundly alter the natural course of the ongoing process.<sup>1</sup>

Paul did have his apologists, such as Ye. S. Shumigorskiy and D. A. Milyutin. However, these writers were always a minority. The standard Russian biography is that by Nikolay K. Shil'der. The only biography of Paul in English is that by Kasimierz Waliszewski. In both of these works, Paul is portrayed as a mad despot.

Of late, there has been a renewed interest in Paul and his short reign. Works, wholly or in part, on Paul's reign have been written by Hugh Ragsdale, Norman Saul, David Ransel, Muriel Atkin and Roderick E. McGrew among others. All these authors have found Paul's impact on Russian history to be more important than previously thought.

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<sup>1</sup>Aleksandr Kornilov, Kurs istorii Rossii XIX veka, I, Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, Vol. CCI, pt. I (1912; rpt.; The Hague: Mouton, 1969), p. 58.

However, there is one event in Paul's reign which has, so far, been neglected and which deserves investigation. This event is the Indian expedition of 1801. Traditionally, it has been argued that Paul, under the influence of Napoleon Bonaparte, agreed to a joint Franco-Russian plan to invade India late in 1800. Various reasons are given to explain why the joint expedition never took place. For example, one writer makes the following claim:

This plan was not judged feasible in all probability, because, after the prolonged armistice of Parsdorf, the war with Austria diverted Bonaparte from the further pursuit of this plan.<sup>2</sup>

Instead, Paul is supposed to have decided to carry out the invasion using Russian forces alone. Toward this end, Paul ordered General V. P. Orlov, Ataman of the Don Cossacks, to invade India. It was Paul's death that halted the Cossacks' march to India.

Such is the generally accepted account. Is it correct? In order to answer this question, this study will take the following form. In the first chapter, a brief character sketch of Paul will be followed by an examination of Paul's foreign policy from the time of his accession to the throne until December, 1800. From the available evidence, we will try to determine whether or

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<sup>2</sup>V. T. Lebedev, V Indiyu, voyeno-statisticheskii i strategicheskii ocherk (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya A. A. Porokhovskchikova, 1898), p. 6.

not a Franco Russian Entente existed at that time. For this reason, particular attention will be paid to Paul's foreign policy toward France.

In the second chapter, we will examine three major sources of the traditional account for accuracy and authenticity. In this manner we will be able to make a determination as to whether or not a joint Franco-Russian plan for an invasion of India ever really existed.

Having learned whether or not there was a Franco-Russian Entente and a plan for a joint expedition to India, we will apply our findings to the period December, 1800 to April, 1801 and attempt to reconstruct what actually happened. Such are the goals of this study.

## CHAPTER I

### PAUL I AND EUROPE, 1796-1800

Paul I was born on October 1, 1754. Even by the standards of royalty, he led an abnormal childhood. His mother would later imply that he was the illegitimate son of her first lover, Sergey Saltykov. In itself, the point is moot. But, the allegation certainly had its impact on how Paul viewed himself. Another writer also points out that

It could have been to (Catherine's) advantage to allow it to be thought that Paul had in fact no rights, that his only rights came from her, and that therefore she was stealing nothing from him.<sup>1</sup>

Peter III took no interest in the boy and Catherine dared not. From the first, Elizabeth I took charge of Paul. At first she attended to him personally, but soon tired of this and left him in the care of superstitious nannies and wet nurses. The results were disastrous. Paul's health was ruined and it is probable that he was a victim of rickets.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Zoe Oldenbourg, Catherine the Great, trans. A. Carter (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), p. 327.

<sup>2</sup>W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs, Autocrats of All the Russias (New York: The Dial Press, 1981), p. 361.

When Paul was four years old, Elizabeth began to notice the signs of her neglect. A male tutor, Fyodor Bekhteyev, was appointed on October 30, 1758. He did teach the young Grand Duke to read and write. Still, Paul's real education did not begin until the appointment of Count Nikita I. Panin as Oberhofmeister on July 10, 1760. Unfortunately, many aspects of Paul's character had been affected by his early maltreatment.<sup>3</sup>

Panin has been accused of giving Paul a poor education but recent scholarship has shown this accusation to be false. Panin drew up an enlightened plan for Paul's education, which he divided into two periods. The first, ending at age 14, was designed to give the Grand Duke an elementary education. It stressed training in religion, mathematics, history, geography, astronomy, physics, art and languages. The second stage was to prepare Paul to rule. Panin described it as follows:

At the time when His Imperial Highness attains, with God's help, the age, at which He has Himself been pleased to learn all the proper studies in the usual order, then it will be very beneficial to initiate a special discussion on the wisest manner to begin straightforward governmental instruction i.e.: toward a knowledge of commerce, fiscal affairs,

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 36; Nikolay K. Shil'der, Imperator Pavel Pervyy: istoriko-biograficheskiy ocherk (St. Petersburg, A. S. Suvorin, 1901), pp. 8-9. Hereafter cited as Shil'der. David L. Ransel, The Politics of Catherinian Russia: The Panin Party (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 204-205.

domestic and foreign policy, naval and land warfare, manufacturing establishments and factories, and other sections constituting the government of His realm and the glory and power of the monarch.<sup>4</sup>

Money was set aside for books, artworks and scientific instruments. Relief from the rigor of study came in the form of drawing, dancing and cavalry exercises. Paul's lifestyle was to be Spartan. Luxury was deferred as a future reward. As Panin put it, "time enough remains in the future for flatterers."<sup>5</sup>

Panin was largely successful in his enterprise. As a result, Paul was probably the best educated ruler Russia had had up to his accession. Indeed, Panin was even able to instill in his pupil the idea of an enlightened constitutional monarchy with checks on the power of the Emperor. Peter the Great was held up to Paul as the ideal model of a true sovereign. However, in this respect, Panin's intentions backfired. He too soon forgot that Peter the Great was a ruthless despot. As one historian observed:

one day Paul would succeed to that same despotic power much distressed with what he had been taught to perceive as an intolerable deterioration of

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<sup>4</sup>Nikita I. Panin, "Vsepoddanneyshee pred'yavleniye slabago ponyatiya i mneniya o vospitanii yego imperator-skago vysochestva gosudarya velikago knyazya Pavla Petrovicha," in *Shil'der*, p. 510; (Ye. S. Shumigorskiy), "Pavel Petrovich, imperator Vserossiyskiy," *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar*, XXIIA (1897), p. 549.

<sup>5</sup>Panin, "Vsepoddanneyshee," p. 511.

the Peterine system. What motivation would he then have to restrain the powers necessary to return the state to its proper course? To rule in Peter's spirit, he needed Peter's authority.<sup>6</sup>

In 1773, Paul married for the first time to a princess of Hesse-Darmstadt who took the name Natalia Alekseyevna. His education was declared complete and he was separated from Panin. Catherine soon made it very clear that she had no intention of sharing power with her son. His personal life took a turn for the worse when Paul learned after his wife's death during childbirth in 1776 that she had been the lover of his best friend, Count Andrey Razumovskiy. Paul rebounded quickly and on October 10, 1776 he married a princess of Würtemberg. On her conversion to Orthodoxy, she took the name Maria Fyodorovna. The young couple soon began to raise a family. Two sons were born; Alexander in 1777 and Constantine in 1779. Once again, Catherine intervened. She took Alexander and Constantine to raise as she saw fit. During 1781 and 1782, Catherine allowed Paul and Maria to make a grand tour of Europe. The favorable impressions Paul made in western Europe stand in stark contrast to his reputation as a madman. However, Joseph II of Austria was

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<sup>6</sup>David L. Ransel, "An Ambivalent Legacy: The Education of the Grand Duke Paul," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, ed. Hugh Ragsdale, U.C.I.S. Series in Russian and East European Studies, No. 2 (Pittsburg: University Center for International Studies, 1979), p. 14.

correct when he wrote at the time, "It is probable that on his return the Grand Duke will find perhaps more disagreements than he had earlier before his trip."<sup>7</sup>

Rejected by his mother, Paul began to idolize the memory of Peter III. Like his father, he worshipped at the shrine of Frederick the Great, whom he met on his first trip abroad in 1772. Paul became totally enamoured of the Prussian model. With no other activities left open to him, he retired to his estates of Pavlovsk and Gatchina. There he constructed his own private world. He soon began to form his "Gatchina army"; a few battalions under his personal command. Rigorous attention was paid to such matters as the cut of the uniform and the proper method of march and drill. In time, militarism began to preoccupy him more and more.<sup>8</sup>

These experiences of his childhood and early maturity had a telling impact on Paul's personality. Born into a world in which he was exceptionally important and exceptionally vulnerable, Paul espoused his devotion to such pious principles as duty, truth, justice and order. By so doing, he was, in his own mind, invulnerable to any criticism. What he espoused for himself, he

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<sup>7</sup>Shil'der, p. 176. See also: Lincoln, Romanovs, pp. 364-371; (Shumigorskiy), "Pavel Petrovich," pp. 549-550; and Ransel, Politics, pp. 227-255.

<sup>8</sup>(Shumigorskiy), p. 550.

expected of others. This accounts for both his severity and his capriciousness. All had to be done in the prescribed manner. Any deviation would be viewed as disobedience and visited with swift and sure punishment. So long as he was able to manage his environment, Paul felt safe.

Another part of Paul's personality craved the attention and recognition so long denied to him during his mother's reign. From the Panin family, Paul had acquired an image of himself as the true heir of Peter the Great. How better to prove this than to give to Russia the blessings of peace? But on his accession, Paul's environment expanded from the confines of Gatchina and Pavlovsk to the whole of the Russian Empire. The peace and prosperity of the Empire was threatened by the French Revolution. Paul viewed it as a breakdown in the order of Europe. Thus, what threatened Europe threatened Russia. And what threatened Russia threatened him personally. Order, not necessarily legitimacy, must be restored. Thus, by the time of his accession Paul's personality was a curious mixture of intelligence and inexperience; generosity and cruelty; practicality and intransigence; paranoia and childlike dependence.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Hugh Ragsdale, "The Mental Condition of Paul," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, ed. Hugh Ragsdale, U.C.I.S. Series in Russian and East European Studies, No. 2 (Pittsburg: University Center for International Studies, 1979), pp. 17-30.

Soon after his accession, Paul declared to Europe his intention to change the course of Russian foreign policy. Russia had been at war for more than forty years. The Russian people were exhausted and peace was necessary. Nevertheless, he went on to say that,

though the Russian army will not act against France . . . the Sovereign no less than His late Mother, remains firmly attached to His allies and feels the need to oppose with all possible means the mad French republic, as it threatens the whole of Europe with the complete destruction of religion, law, property and morality.<sup>10</sup>

This new policy did not please Russia's allies nor many Russians. Both Britain and Austria tried and failed to change Paul's mind. In Russia, new court factions were formed on the basis of this new policy--i.e., a war party and a peace party. Generally speaking, those in the war party held the diplomatic posts abroad. The peace party dominated Paul's cabinet. Owing to his conception of autocracy, Paul religiously read the reports of his diplomats but rarely consulted his cabinet. Thus at first, the advantage lay with the war party.

The other two major powers, Prussia and France, attempted to take advantage of the new situation. In December of 1796, Frederick-William II informed Paul of

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<sup>10</sup> Dmitriy Milyutin and Aleksandr Mikhaylovskiy-Danilevskiy, Istoriya voyny Rossii s Frantsiyeyu v tsarstvovaniye Imperatora Pavla I v 1799 godu, I (1st ed.; St. Petersburg: Tipografiya shtab voyenno-uchenye zavadeniye, 1852), pp. 23-24. Hereafter cited as Milyutin.

his reasons for signing the Treaty of Basel with France. It allowed the Republic to occupy the left bank of the Rhine. Its secret articles ceded this territory permanently to France. Though Frederick-William asked Paul to give his "sacred word" to keep this secret, Paul responded by telling the king that these "tardy confidences" distressed him, were contrary to the duties of a member of the Holy Roman Empire, were harmful to its integrity, and threatened Europe with general disorder. As far as Paul was concerned, "confidence in politics is founded on nothing but a perfect identity of interests and principles."<sup>11</sup>

Russia's relations with France underwent a modest shift at the beginning of 1797. In January, Paul ordered his ambassador in Berlin, Stepan Kolychyov, to open negotiations for the normalization of relations between the two countries. The French were also moving in this direction. On February 25th, they asked the Prussians to contact Paul on their behalf. This note was given to Paul in April while he was preparing his coronation in Moscow. Later that month, Paul drew up instructions for

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 370. See Also: Sergey Tatishchev, "Paul Ier et Bonaparte," Nouvelle revue, XLIX (1889), pp. 234-237; and Fyodor Martens, Sobraniye traktatov i konventsiy zaklyuchennykh Rossiye s inostrannymi derzhavami, VI (St. Petersburg: A. Benke, 1883), pp. 252-253. Hereafter cited as Martens.

Prince Nikolay Repnin, the military governor of Revel. Russia was prepared to recognize the Republic and its annexation of Belgium, Nice and Savoy. In return, Paul expected France to allow the restoration of the Stadtholder in Holland. In addition, a European congress was to be convened at Leipzig to fix in detail the conditions of peace with France. Finally, Repnin was instructed to deny the Rhine to France because it would give her "the means to more easily spread evil."<sup>12</sup>

On May 3, Paul called a meeting of the diplomatic corps present in Moscow to announce his plan and to name Count Semyon Vorontsov, Russian ambassador to Britain and a member of the war party, as the head of the Russian delegation to the proposed congress. Prince Repnin and Count Nikita P. Panin were to go to Berlin and immediately begin negotiations with the French.<sup>13</sup>

Such were Paul's intentions. Unfortunately, they were of no avail. Prussia continued to cling to neutrality. After signing the Treaty of Leoben on April 18, Austria and Britain preferred to negotiate separately with the

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<sup>12</sup>Martens, VI, p. 251; See also: Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), pp. 650-651; Milyutin, I, pp. 30, 34-44; 370-371, n. 41; and Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 52-53.

<sup>13</sup>Saul, pp. 53-54; Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), p. 651; Martens, VI, p. 252.

French. Under these circumstances, Paul's plan was still-born and Repnin remained in Russia.<sup>14</sup>

Another of Paul's early diplomatic efforts concerned the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, better known as the Knights of Malta. During the last years of Catherine's reign, the Knights had been negotiating over the ownership of property on Polish lands since annexed by Russia. Their ambassador, Count Giulio Litta, had met with little success. This situation changed quickly after Paul's accession. To him, the Order represented "an ideal knightly union . . . in counterbalance to the new ideas emanating from France" and a mechanism by which the Russian nobility could be inculcated with the qualities of duty, piety, obedience and service to God and sovereign. Indeed, he thought the Order could "embrace all of the best elements of Europe and serve as a strong bulwark against revolutionary ideas."<sup>15</sup>

When viewed in this light, it is not surprising that the first treaty of Paul's reign was concluded with

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<sup>14</sup>Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de politique étrangère: Les révolutions (1789-1830), II (7th ed.; Paris: Belin Frères, 1923), pp. 150-151; Saul, p. 53; Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), p. 651.

<sup>15</sup>"Mal'tiyskiy orden," Entsiklopedichskiy slovar, XVIIIA (1896), p. 503. See also: Andrey Lobanov-Rostovskiy, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 (1947: rpt.; New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), p. 19; Saul, pp. 32-35.

the Maltese Order. By it, the former Priory of Poland became the Priory of Russia. The Russian state assumed the debts of the old priory. A generous subsidy was given to the new priory. Also, ten new commanderies were formed. Nevertheless, membership was restricted to Catholics. And while the new Grand Master named Paul the Protector of the Order, it "gave the tsar a standing with the Order that he had not sought, though he was delighted to receive it."<sup>16</sup> Thus matters remained, until the summer of 1798.

In the meantime, Paul had not given up his dream of being the peacemaker of Europe. Since the allied powers would not negotiate with France, Russia would do so alone. Kolychyov was ordered not to avoid his counterpart in Berlin on June 30th. Soon thereafter, Paul decided to recall him and appointed Nikita P. Panin as his replacement. Though a liberal in the Russian context, Panin was "a mortal enemy of all republics."<sup>17</sup> More than likely, he was appointed for two reasons. First, he was the

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<sup>16</sup>Roderick McGrew, "Paul I and the Knights of Malta," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, ed. Hugh Ragsdale, U.C.I.S. Series in Russian and East European Studies, No. 2 (Pittsburg: University Center for International Studies, 1979), p. 50; See also: Clive Parry ed. and an., The Consolidated Treaty Series, LIII (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1969), pp. 361-375. Hereafter cited as Consolidated Treaties. Saul, pp. 35-39; Lobanov-Rostovskiy, pp. 19-20.

<sup>17</sup>"Panin, graf Nikita Petrovich," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XXXIIA (1897), p. 695. See also: Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), p. 651.

nephew of Paul's mentor, Count Nikita I. Panin. Second, the Chancellor, Prince Aleksandr Bezborodko, a member of the peace party, supported Panin's appointment. This seems odd at first. The answer appears to be that Bezborodko believed that Panin's youth and inexperience-- he was only 26 and had held no important diplomatic posts-- would allow him to keep a firm handle on the negotiations. In this, Bezborodko proved to be wrong.<sup>18</sup>

Panin's instructions were set forth in two imperial rescripts dated July 16 and 19. Panin was told that although Russia was not at war with France, a break in diplomatic relations did exist. Paul wrote, "We not only do not consider it unwarranted, but rather as necessary to conclude with the French government an act or a convention of peace." But that was all. The scope of the negotiations was not to be broadened. In time, a few consuls or agents might be appointed to protect trade, "but not a legation until France's internal order has stabilized."<sup>19</sup> Paul also made it clear that he had no respect for the Republic. Only his desire for peace and to help his allies had caused him to take this step. Russia could help by being the mediator between France

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<sup>18</sup> Martens, VI, p. 252.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 254. See also: Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), p. 654.

and the rest of Europe, but she would not insist on being given this role. And although none of these conditions were to be regarded as final, Panin was to break off the negotiations if the French brought the restoration of Poland.

From the very beginning, Panin opposed a rapprochement with France. Nevertheless, he did not have his way at first. His counterpart, Antoine-Bernard Caillard, was so eager to conclude a treaty that he offered to sign one in which the name and title of the Russian Emperor were given first and which would have required France to give up revolutionary propaganda. Contrary to his instructions, Panin now insisted that France must submit to Russian mediation in Germany. He told the Frenchman that Paul had only condescended to negotiations with the Republic in order to gain this point. In addition, he claimed that "his powers were confined to taking ad referendum all the propositions of the French plenipotentiary."<sup>20</sup>

The diplomatic sparring might have continued in this desultory fashion had not news from the Ionian Islands reached St. Petersburg. On the orders of Napoleon Bonaparte, French troops had invaded the islands in the summer of 1797.

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<sup>20</sup>Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), p. 657. See also; Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française, Bonaparte et le Directoire, 1795-1799, V (Paris: Libraire Plon, 1917), pp. 216-217. Hereafter cited as Sorel.

While so doing, they had arrested the Russian consul on the island of Zante. In response, Paul ordered Panin to suspend the negotiations on September 28. A few weeks later, Panin told Caillard that the negotiations could be resumed if the French released the Russian consul and gave full satisfaction on this incident. At about the same time, Paul reacted to Caillard's draft treaty. If anything, his demands became more stringent. In particular, he now insisted that the conclusion of any treaty be contingent on the favorable outcome of the negotiations between the French and the Austrians. Under Bezborodko's influence, Paul decided not to send this order. Instead, his decision of September 28 was to remain in force. Panin informed Caillard of this on October 20.<sup>21</sup>

In the interim, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord had been appointed Foreign Minister of the Republic. His response of September 24 to Caillard's draft treaty demonstrates how divergent were the aims of the two countries. While Paul wanted only limited contact between France and Russia, Talleyrand wanted full diplomatic relations and a new commercial treaty. As far as Talleyrand was concerned, Paul's fear of revolutionary contagion was a pretense. According to him, "It would

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<sup>21</sup>Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), pp. 657-658; Sorel, V, p. 226.

require an army of propagandists in order to make a village rebel" in Russia.<sup>22</sup>

Panin sent this on to St. Petersburg. Paul's response of November 4 must have come as a surprise. Panin was ordered to reopen the negotiations as soon as Caillard gave assurances concerning the Russian consul. Soon thereafter, Panin claimed to have gained access to Caillard's private correspondence. Supposedly, the French planned to reconstitute Poland and to place Prince Henry of Prussia on its throne. It is unclear whether or not this had an impact on Paul. In any event, he ordered Panin to break off the negotiations in January of 1798.<sup>23</sup>

By January of 1798, Paul had good reason to be concerned about the political situation in Europe. Russian concern was focused primarily on the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. The articles of the Treaty of Campo-Formio allowing the French to retain the Ionian Islands had even the members of the peace party worried. The fear was that the French would use the islands as a point d'appui either to foment rebellion or to invade the

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<sup>22</sup>Tatishchev, XLVII (1887), pp. 660, 658-659.

<sup>23</sup>Tatishchev, XLVII, (1887), pp. 663-664; Martens, VI, pp. 255-256; Milyutin, I, pp. 62-63 and 692-693 n. 77; Kazimierz Waliszewski, Paul the First of Russia, the Son of Catherine the Great, trans. n.n. (1913; rpt.; Archon Books, 1969), pp. 232-233.

Ottoman Empire. In his dispatches from Vienna, Count Razumovskiy lent weight to these concerns. The French had assembled a large fleet at Toulon. One theory in Vienna had it that the fleet was headed for Albania. Another claimed its destination was Constantinople.<sup>24</sup>

Paul began to react to this information. In March, Louis XVIII was granted asylum at Mittau. That same month, Emperor Francis II had written to King Frederick-William III and to Paul seeking Russian mediation. In his response of March 16, Paul wrote,

I am fully prepared to take on my role which can only be pleasant and a solid bond between us three, if all prejudice on the idea of invasion will be entirely banished.<sup>25</sup>

In April, Paul sent Prince Repnin to Berlin to negotiate a four power alliance of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Britain. Thus by April of 1798, he had decided on war.

Paul did not wait for the negotiations to be completed before acting. In April, he ordered the Black Sea fleet to be prepared to fight the French if they appeared near Constantinople. He also offered to help the Sultan with Russian troops. Understandably, the Sultan declined this offer of his new found friend.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Milyutin, I, p. 82; Saul, pp. 57-58.

<sup>25</sup>Milyutin, I, p. 388, n. 73; Waliszewski, p. 224.

<sup>26</sup>Milyutin, I, p. 83, 89-91, 420, n. 105; Saul, pp. 58-60.

Meanwhile, the negotiations in Berlin were making no progress. It soon became apparent, even to Paul, that the Prussians would not budge from their neutral stance. Paul ordered Repnin to go on to Vienna. But before his departure, he was to tell the Prussians the following:

It is not Our intention to provoke the King of Prussia into a rupture with Us; but in case of his openly adhering to the French or assisting them, We will be compelled to extreme measures, by attempting to make a diversion in His domains.<sup>27</sup>

Two days later on July 26, this decision was confirmed in a note to the Austrian ambassador.

All this concern over French designs in the eastern Mediterranean was soon justified. The Toulon fleet's destination was Egypt. On his way there, Napoleon stopped and captured the island of Malta. This was not done by chance. As early as May of 1797, Bonaparte had had his eye on this strategically important island. Its capture was essential if the French were to maintain communications between France and Egypt. Thus, Napoleon's actions are clear enough.<sup>28</sup>

What has been unclear for a long time is Paul's reaction to the island's capture. The usual interpretation is that the island's capture caused him to reverse his foreign policy and declare war on France. However,

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<sup>27</sup>Martens, VI, p. 259.

<sup>28</sup>Bourgeois, II, pp. 164-165.

as previously shown, Paul had already decided on war with France long before news of Malta's capture reached St. Petersburg on July 23. What happened was that the news of the capture quickened the pace of events. Thus on July 24, Whitworth, the British ambassador, was told that Paul wanted "the reestablishment of the general tranquility . . . and not the restoration of the French monarchy."<sup>29</sup> For this, Paul was ready to take an active role. Troops were mobilized and the Black Sea fleet was put under the command of Vice-Admiral Fyodor Ushakov. He was ordered to go no further than "Egypt, Candia, the Morea, and the Venetian Gulf."<sup>30</sup> No mention was made of Malta.

While Paul did not react militarily to the capture of Malta, he did react. From what we now know, it appears that Count Giulio Litta orchestrated a careful campaign to convince Paul that Malta had fallen due to treachery and that the Papacy would accept his election as Grand Master of the Order. On September 6, a protest and a manifesto, both probably written by Litta, declared the present Grand Master to be guilty of treason. On the twenty-first, Paul ratified the deposition of the Grand Master in his

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<sup>29</sup>Piers Mackesy, Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798-1799 (London: Longman, 1974), p. 35; Saul, p. 62.

<sup>30</sup>Saul, p. 65.

capacity as Protector. He emphasized that the Order's constitution would remain unchanged and that St. Petersburg was only "at present . . . the chief place of assembly of the Order."<sup>31</sup> Then on November 7, Paul was elected Grand Master. Still, he did not accept this election until three weeks later. At that time, he declared that as Russian Emperor he did not pretend "to any right or advantage able to bring injury or prejudice to the other powers."<sup>32</sup>

What did Paul expect to gain by his election as Grand Master? The answer is to be found in his ideological outlook. It will be remembered that he valued the Order as an institution through which the Russian nobility could be rejuvenated and as a bulwark against revolutionary principles. But as matters stood, only Catholics could become knights. This effectively barred the majority of the Russian nobility. As Grand Master, Paul could change the rules of eligibility; something he could not do as Protector. As soon as he was elected Grand Master, he proceeded to do just that. Thus, we see that Paul's response to the capture of Malta was bound up with his ideological beliefs and aspirations. It did not cause

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<sup>31</sup>Consolidated Treaties, LIII, p. 389; *ibid.*, pp. 388-389; McGrew, pp. 51-55.

<sup>32</sup>Consolidated Treaties, LIII, p. 392. See also: McGrew, pp. 56-60.

him to declare war on France.

Between August of 1798 and January of 1799, the Second Coalition was formed. It is beyond the scope of this study to give an account of the negotiations and the treaties which resulted from them. As Russia already had a treaty of defensive alliance with Austria, we need only mention that by the Convention of St. Petersburg Russia and Britain became formally allied.

One of the most important points covered by this Convention dealt with Malta. It is now clear that there was no misunderstanding on the status of the island. Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, himself possessed a copy of a rescript from Paul regarding the joint occupation of the island. Also, the Admiralty later gave orders to British forces in the Mediterranean acknowledging this point. Numerous other examples could be cited. These should suffice. Unfortunately, they did not suffice for Paul.<sup>33</sup>

On paper, the Second Coalition appeared to be a formidable alliance. In reality it was a mariage de convenance. Britain sought to overthrow Jacobism in

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<sup>33</sup>Macksey, pp. 57-58; Saul, pp. 73-74; Christopher Lloyd, ed., The Keith Papers, Selected from the Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith, II, Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. XL (London: N.R.S., 1950), p. 159; Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore, IV (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1905), p. 419. Hereafter cited as Dropmore.

France. Austria sought new opportunities for expansion in Italy. Paul sought European equilibrium out of his fear of French expansionism. This divergence of purpose was complicated further by the very structure of the alliance. While Russia was allied to the other two powers, neither Britain nor Austria were allied to each other. This was due to Austria's refusal to repay a British loan. Their only link with each other was through St. Petersburg. Britain needed a continental ally able to directly menace France. Austria needed British ships and money. Russian troops were of help to both powers, but in the final analysis they were expendable. Thus Russia was not needed for her army or because her allies shared Paul's objectives, but for the formation of the alliance itself. When this set of circumstances ceased to exist, so did the alliance.

Suvorov's early victories in Italy seemed to belie any such view. Indeed, his victory at Novi in August of 1799 seemed to portend the final abasement of France. But even before this victory had been won, the basic differences in the objectives of Russia and Austria in Italy had surfaced. All through the summer of 1799, attempts were made, especially by the British, to keep the alliance intact. However, Russo-Austrian relations had become no better. At the end of July, Paul released Suvorov from all obedience to Francis II. This decision was reiterated

in August.<sup>34</sup>

For various reasons, it was decided that Suvorov be transferred from Italy to join another Russian army under the command of General Rimskiy-Korsakov at Geneva. Suvorov protested to no avail. Paul agreed to this plan and the Austrians' purpose was achieved. The Archduke Charles of Austria was ordered to leave Switzerland immediately, leaving Rimskiy-Korsakov exposed to the French. General Massena attacked and defeated the Russians before Suvorov had time to make the planned juncture. Afterwards, Suvorov had no choice but to retreat through the Alps. As one historian writes, "the whole story forms an instructive commentary on paper strategy and Coalition campaigns."<sup>35</sup>

All this took place in September of 1799. The news did not reach St. Petersburg until the following month. Paul's reaction was swift. In a tone of suppressed rage, he wrote to Francis II and blamed Rimskiy-Korsakov's defeat on Austria. Austria had sacrificed the interest of Europe to "projects of aggrandizement." Paul had ignored the secretive actions of the Austrian foreign minister

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<sup>34</sup>Waliszewski, p. 281; Milyutin, III, p. 466, n. 341. See also: Saul, pp. 126-128.

<sup>35</sup>A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, I (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1922), p. 286.

out of regard for Francis II. No longer. He continued:

From this moment I abandon Your interests, in order to occupy myself exclusively with mine and those of my allies . . . in order that the triumph of evil not be assured.<sup>36</sup>

In December, Paul began to show signs of relenting. At the end of that month, the coup de grâce was delivered to the alliance when the Russian flag was removed from the town of Ancona by Austrian troops. Though the Austrians eventually apologized, it was too late. Paul would have nothing more to do with Francis II.<sup>37</sup>

In the meantime, the British and the Russians had attempted a joint invasion of Holland late in 1799. The invasion, far from fulfilling the sanguine hopes of the British, proved to be a fiasco. After three indecisive battles an armistice was signed on October 18. But though the seeds of dissension were sown by this defeat, Paul's break with Britain was not directly related to it. At this time, there were no major points in contention between the two powers. Rather, it was an accumulation of minor incidents coupled with the collapse of the Austrian alliance that led to the collapse of the alliance with Britain.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Milyutin, IV, p. 388, n. 238.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., V, pp. 155-159; Saul, p. 138.

<sup>38</sup>See Milyutin, V, chps. LXVII-LXXI; John W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1915), chps. XXIII-XXIV.

In the wake of these events, new leadership came to the fore in St. Petersburg. Bezborodko had died in April of 1799. On October 6, Count Fyodor Rostopchin was appointed the head of the College of Foreign Affairs. On the same day, Count Nikita P. Panin was appointed Acting Vice-Chancellor, immediately under Rostopchin. These two men were representative of a double current in Russian foreign policy at that time. Rostopchin advocated a policy of peace with France. Panin advocated the exact opposite. This policy dispute was mirrored by a mutual personal antipathy. Why Paul appointed two men of such conflicting views is not clear. Perhaps he wanted to assemble the most talented men in St. Petersburg at a critical time.<sup>39</sup>

The influence of the double current soon became apparent in Paul's foreign policy. On October 26, 1799 in a rescript to Semyon Vorontsov, Paul set forth his reasons for the break with Austria. Russian and British forces alone were not strong enough to subdue France. Under the influence of Panin and the war party, Paul proposed an alliance with Prussia. This alliance was needed to stop Vienna "from executing its intention of seizing Piedmont, Genoa, and the Three Legations, in lieu of restoring these lands to those to whom they belong by

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<sup>39</sup>Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), p. 253; Saul, p. 136.

right."<sup>40</sup> If the King of Prussia were to agree to an alliance, Paul was prepared to send him aid "in order to deliver Italy from the rapacity and boundless ambition of the House of Austria."<sup>41</sup> In such a case, neither Russia nor Britain should object to the King making some acquisitions on the Rhine. Paul envisioned an alliance of Russia, Britain, Prussia, the Porte, Sweden and Denmark that would put Austria in her place and was "capable of giving the law to all of Europe."<sup>42</sup>

If such an alliance could be formed, Paul believed that Austria would be forced to give up her expansionist policies in Italy. Still, this policy was not risk free. Seeing herself unable to carry on without Russian aid, Austria might make peace with France to "assure herself of the possession of the conquered lands."<sup>43</sup> However, it remained to be seen whether France would consent to this once she learned of "the order given to My troops to return to Russia."<sup>44</sup>

Next, Rostopchin's influence surfaced. Notwithstanding her resources and resolve, Britain could not fight France "eternally, if the internal position of France or the inclination of the English ministry tends toward peace."<sup>45</sup> Should the British decide to make peace

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<sup>40</sup> Dropmore, IV, p. 32.      <sup>41</sup> Ibid.      <sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.      <sup>44</sup> Ibid.      <sup>45</sup> Ibid.

with France, this would cause Paul no problem. Indeed, he would prefer "to see, England at peace with France rather than the Court of Vienna if the conditions of peace were the following."<sup>46</sup> Here Paul proposed a settlement reminiscent of that worked out at the Congress of Vienna. The only major difference was "the establishment of the statum quo ante bellum in Italy."<sup>47</sup> As to his own position, Paul wrote:

Properly speaking, my position against France is such, that having been an auxiliary power against her in the course of the war and having abandoned the alliance I return to my previous position and do not have need to deal directly with her. I will be the last one in Europe to recognize her as a republic, and not before this is done by England. You are acquainted with the orders that I gave in 1797 to Count Panin, and why these negotiations with Cailard [sic] were broken off.<sup>48</sup>

Thus if France could not be beaten militarily, Paul was ready to negotiate with her once more. Nevertheless, he would insist on his own terms, as in 1797.

This remarkable document was a clear portent of things to come. Paul wanted to contain France. Added to this was a concern to contain Austria as well. The second goal clearly had priority. To achieve this goal, Paul gambled that he could retain Britain's support. Thus by withdrawing his troops from Italy, he believed he could isolate Austria and perhaps force her to come to terms with him. Paul was wrong on this score.

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid.    <sup>47</sup>Ibid.    <sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

Instead of negotiating with the French, the British wanted to continue the war. If Paul had any doubts, they were dispelled in February of 1800. In his dispatch to Whitworth of the eighth, Grenville declared that Britain would only "support that Power (i.e., Austria) which alone continues to act offensively and vigorously against the irreconcilable Enemies of His Majesty & of the General tranquillity of Europe."<sup>49</sup>

Even had Britain refused to make an open choice, Paul had already begun to show signs of dissatisfaction. Only four days after Grenville's dispatch was written, Paul formally requested that Whitworth be recalled. The British ambassador was partly to blame for this. He kept Olga Zherbtsova, the sister of Platon Zubov, as his mistress. Further, he filled his dispatches with diatribes against Paul. Rostopchin learned of this and showed them to Paul. When Whitworth became aware of this, he filled his dispatches with fulsome praise of Paul only to write his true feelings in invisible ink!<sup>50</sup>

The waters were muddied even more by a dispute over the treatment of Russian troops wintering in the Channel islands. This in turn led to a dispute over the

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<sup>49</sup> John Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 125-126.

<sup>50</sup> Saul, pp. 139-140.

subsidy payments due Russia. But these points soon became moot. Paul ordered Vorontsov to leave Britain. The Russian ambassador resigned instead and in June was allowed to remain in Britain. Kolychyov, who had replaced Razumovskiy in Vienna, was recalled in April of 1800. Finally on June 8, Whitworth was ordered to leave St. Petersburg forthwith. For all practical purposes, the Anglo-Russian alliance had ceased to exist.<sup>51</sup>

After the collapse of the Anglo-Russian alliance the scene shifted to the Baltic. Ever since the imposition by Britain of her rules of maritime blockade, the neutral powers had disputed the British policy of search and seizure on the high seas. Reacting to this policy, Denmark adopted the policy that the flag covers the goods. Of course, the British objected to this policy and one violent clash had taken place in December of 1799. On July 25, 1800, a second and more violent clash took place between a British vessel and the Danish frigate La Freja. The Danish ship was towed to London. As a result of this incident, the Swedes and the Danes appealed to Paul. Early in August, the Danes proposed to the British that Paul be allowed to mediate their dispute. The British

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<sup>51</sup>Martens, IX, pp. 4-7; Saul, pp. 140-141; Shil'der, pp. 468-469; Semyon B. Okun', Ocherki istorii S.S.S.R. konets XVIII-pervaya chetvert' XIX veka (Leningrad, 1956), pp. 104-105.

declined. Simultaneously, the Swedes and the Danes appealed to Paul to support neutral rights.<sup>52</sup>

Paul responded by inviting these powers to form a second Armed Neutrality. When news reached St. Petersburg on September 4 of the sending of a British squadron to Copenhagen, Paul responded by placing a temporary embargo on British ships and goods in Russian ports. These measures were rescinded six days later when news reached St. Petersburg of the signing of an Anglo-Danish Convention on August 29. This apparent success encouraged the northern powers and by December of 1800 Prussia, Sweden and Denmark had all signed separate treaties with Russia.<sup>53</sup> The Second Armed Neutrality had been created.

At this juncture, Maltese affairs intervened. It will be recalled that the Convention of St. Petersburg called for Malta to be garrisoned jointly by troops from Britain, Russia and Naples. It had been taken for granted that Russian troops would take part in the siege. This had not happened for a variety of reasons including serious supply problems and the Russian commander's own

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<sup>52</sup> Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, II (1892: rpt.; New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 26; Hugh Ragsdale, Détente in the Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and the Russians (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), p. 76.

<sup>53</sup> Consolidated Treaties, LV, pp. 411-437; Martens, VI, pp. 286-294.

procrastination. Though the British military had bitterly complained of the lack of Russian assistance, the government itself still intended to return the island to the Order of Malta as late as April of 1800. This attitude changed after the La Freja incident and on August 1, 1800 new orders were drawn up for Malta. According to them, if the French surrendered before the arrival of the Russians the British troops alone were to occupy the island. If the Russians arrived earlier, they might have to be permitted on the island. However, they were to be discouraged as much as possible from landing.<sup>54</sup>

Thus matters stood when Malta fell on September 5. Contrary to the Convention of St. Petersburg, Malta was occupied solely by the British. This news reached St. Petersburg at the end of October, 1800. Paul reacted swiftly. The embargo was reimposed. All payments to British merchants were stopped and their goods and warehouses seized. Over 300 British ships were trapped in Russian ports and their crews arrested and marched inland. Guards were placed at the front doors of the homes of British merchants in St. Petersburg. Forty ships were to be made ready. Should the British attack in the

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<sup>54</sup>Saul, pp. 129-131; Ragsdale, Détente, p. 77; Dropmore, VI, pp. 200, 207.

meantime, the seized ships and goods were to be burned.<sup>55</sup> In addition, a commission was established by the College of Commerce to liquidate all debts owed by British merchants. According to one historian, this "left no doubt as to the existence of a powerful body of opinion in the College of Commerce which was hostile to the British merchants."<sup>56</sup>

Paul also pressured the northern powers to follow his lead. He made it clear to them that he would view any unwillingness to respond to his request as an affront. Finally, a one hundred-twenty thousand man army was being assembled "for the protection of the shores of the Baltic Sea and for descent operations against England."<sup>57</sup> By December of 1800, Britain and Russia were practically in a state of war.

On November 9, 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte became the

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<sup>55</sup> Polnoye sobraniye zakonov rossiysikoy imperii, XXVI, (St. Petersburg: Tip. II otdel. subst. yego Imp. vel. kants., 1830), no. 19,660. Hereafter cited as P.S.Z. Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 77-78.

<sup>56</sup> P.S.Z., XXVI, no. 19,667; David Macmillan, "Paul's Retributive Measures of 1800 Against Britain: The Final Turning-Point in British Commercial Attitudes towards Russia," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, VI, no. 1 (1973), p. 73.

<sup>57</sup> Hugh Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?: The Evidence of Neglected Archives," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, Hugh Ragsdale ed., U.C.I.S. Series in Russian and East European Studies, no. 2 (Pittsburg: University Center for International Studies, 1979), p. 81; Okun', p. 107.

undisputed ruler of France. His first move on the diplomatic front came when he attempted to make peace with Prussia in that same month. When this failed, Bonaparte prepared for war. His first step was his famous Christmas letters to George III and Francis II.<sup>58</sup> Conspicuous by its absence was any letter to Paul. Indeed on the very same day, Napoleon wrote to the commander of the Polish Legion telling him that the Poles were "always present in my thoughts."<sup>59</sup> Given the circumstances, this could only be interpreted as an insult to Paul. Thus, we see that Napoleon had no thought of a rapprochement with Russia in the first days of his regime.

Paul too was looking to Prussia. As we saw above, a serious reevaluation of Russian foreign policy had taken place in October of 1799. In the rescript of October 26, Paul had ordered "Baron von Krudener, recalled from Copenhagen, to remain in Berlin, and to have there a correspondence with my ministry, without taking upon himself any official capacity."<sup>60</sup> This was an official

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<sup>58</sup> Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, Correspondance de Napoleon Ier, ed. J. P. B. Vaillant et al., VI (Paris: Henri Plon and J. Dumaine, 1861), nos. 4445, 4446, 4452. Hereafter cited as Corres. de Nap.; Harold Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 4452.

<sup>60</sup> Dropmore, VI, p. 33.

pretext. Krudener was in Berlin to obtain a treaty of offensive alliance between Russia and Prussia for the defense of northern Europe. If the Prussians demanded that indemnities be designated in advance, Krudener was to "flatter the dominate passion of the Court of Berlin in offering an enticement to its cupidity."<sup>61</sup>

Count Panin, whose scheme this was, clarified Krudener's instructions in a private letter of November 3, 1799. Panin told him that his mission was "one of such importance that on its success will perhaps depend the future security of Russia."<sup>62</sup> Panin would do all he could to help Krudener. However, much depended on who drew up Krudener's instructions. After all, Panin had Rostopchin to contend with. Even more depended on Paul. The Emperor read the diplomatic dispatches with much haste and thus could not be expected to remember all relevant matters. If Krudener had any disagreeable communications to make, he should send them to Panin in a confidential letter.

From the foregoing, one might be led to believe that Paul still wanted to continue the struggle against France. This is not the case. First and foremost, Panin's comments should be taken with a large grain of

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<sup>61</sup>Martens, VI, pp. 264-265.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 265.

salt. After all, the new policy toward Prussia was his own brainchild. As one writer notes, "the authors of this combination themselves did not believe it realizable. But, it furnished them a plausible pretext for renewing diplomatic relations with Prussia."<sup>63</sup> In addition, there was Krudener himself. He has been described as "one of the most savage Gallophobes in the Russian diplomatic service."<sup>64</sup> Almost assuredly, Panin chose him for just this reason. Panin held similar views on Republican France. If we read between the lines, Panin's private letter was an attempt to keep as much control as possible of the negotiations in Berlin. By controlling the flow of information from Berlin, he could nip in the bud any signs of Franco-Russian rapprochement.

Paul's attitude toward France was different. Besides his rescript of October 26, we have other evidence of this. On December 3, 1799, he wrote to Count de Viomesnil, the commander of his troops then in Britain, in terms that make it appear that he saw Bonaparte as the man who might tame the Revolution.<sup>65</sup> Still, he remained cautious. Later in January of 1800, he would

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<sup>63</sup>Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), p. 254.

<sup>64</sup>Waliszewski, p. 225.

<sup>65</sup>Robert Meynadier, "Un plan de l'Empereur Paul de Russie," La Revue de Paris, Year 27, VI (1920), pp. 193-194.

write to Suvorov the following: "There is effected in France a change of which I must await the results with patience and without exhausting our forces."<sup>66</sup>

Rostopchin too saw in Bonaparte a new opportunity for Russian foreign policy. After the eighteenth of Brumaire [November 9, 1799], he wrote to Suvorov on December 4, 1799 as follows:

It is now very important to know, what turn the new tyrannical republican government will take and what Bonaparte will want, if he remains alive; of the two he is sure to choose one: to be a Cromwell or to raise the King on the Throne; for a man of this distinction, his life being marked by military and political deeds, and being the conqueror and ruler of Egypt, will not want to be the tool of a nobody like Sieyes or any other similar niggard.<sup>67</sup>

From all this, we see that the men in charge of foreign affairs in Russia had differing opinions on France. Panin wanted to continue the struggle. Rostopchin saw in Bonaparte a man with whom he might deal. Paul's attitude seems to have been somewhere between these two extremes. On the one hand, he sought an alliance with Prussia. On the other, he saw the possibility of "order" being restored in France. Only time would tell which eventuality would best serve his interests.

Up to this point, we have seen that Napoleon was hostile to Russia. The man who saw what was going on in

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<sup>66</sup>Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), p. 260.

<sup>67</sup>Milyutin, V, p. 494, n. 122.

Russia and was able to take advantage of it was Talleyrand.

Sometime before April of 1799, a certain Monsieur Guttin presented a memorandum on foreign policy to the Directory. Essentially, it called for a Franco-Russian alliance based on a partition of the Ottoman Empire. In April, Talleyrand, then Foreign Minister, reacted to this scheme negatively. As far as he was concerned, Russia would not participate in a partition of Turkey because she would not at all want to share with France what she wanted only for herself.<sup>68</sup>

Nevertheless, Monsieur Guttin did not give up writing memoranda. "A half-month before the 18th of Brumaire,"<sup>69</sup> he presented another memorandum similar in every respect to the previous one of April. According to him, France's foreign policy had been flawed up to then.

It has served only to alarm the powers which have seen in the French Republic only the enemy of all old governments. . . . It is not with our neighbors that we can hope for a frank and durable reconciliation.<sup>70</sup>

If France could not come to an understanding with her neighbors, then she should look elsewhere. What she

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<sup>68</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 23-24, 26.

<sup>69</sup>Aleksandr Trachevskiy, ed., Diplomaticheskaya snosheniya Rossii s Frantsiyey v epokhu Napoleona I, I, Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, Vol. LXX (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasyulevich, 1890), p. xiii. Hereafter cited as Trachevskiy.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 647, n. 35.

needed was an alliance with a great power so geographically situated that it had nothing to fear from France.

Russia is incontestably in this position in respect to us, under all political and commercial relationships its alliance is the only one which can lead the French government to the goal that it ought to desire, a durable, advantageous and stable peace. . . . We will content ourselves with observing that these two powers united will dictate the law to all Europe.<sup>71</sup>

The failure of past attempts by the French government for a rapprochement with Russia had been due "to bad measures and to the clumsiness of the agents which it has employed."<sup>72</sup>

Guttin based his plan on a partition of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Poland would have Grand Duke Constantine as its king, the borders it had after the first partition and the constitution of 1793. To insure against a reunion with Russia, a constitutional law prohibiting this would be passed. Russia's reward for entering into the alliance would be "the left side of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, . . . (and) some islands in the Mediterranean a long time the object of their ambition."<sup>73</sup> These would serve as outlets for Russian commerce in Asia and southern Europe. France would receive the right side of the Straits as well as a boundary of the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. Austria would be driven out of Italy. In her place, small republics would be established. Holland and Switzerland would retain the pro-French regimes. Supported

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 648.

by Russia, France would keep Egypt and take possession of the Ionian Islands, Crete, Samos, Cyprus and Sicily. Of more importance to this study is the following:

Russia, from its possessions in Asia and on the Caspian Sea, will be able to assist the army which (France) would have in Egypt and concert with France to carry the war into Bengal. Persia torn by different usurpers and for such a long time since the theatre of most cruel revolutions, would only be able to put up a feeble and useless resistance to the Russian armies which would demand a passage through her lands.<sup>74</sup>

As for the other powers, Austria, in return for her losses in Italy and Poland, would be allowed to reestablish the ancient kingdom of Hungary and annex to it "some parts of European Turkey."<sup>75</sup> Prussia in return for her losses to Poland, would receive Silesia, Mecklenburg, Hamburg, Lübeck, Weimar, Hanover, Bremen and Münster.<sup>76</sup>

Guttin did not get an immediate response to his second memorandum either. The first hint of a change in attitude is evidenced in a conversation between Talleyrand and the Prussian ambassador on January 5, 1800. Talleyrand asked if Prussia had the means to make Russia realize that, by inciting war against France, she had only helped to aggrandize Austria. The King of Prussia should mediate the peace between France and Russia. He concluded by saying, "I charge you for the moment to transmit to your court our desires and our dispositions on reconciling

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

ourselves with Russia."<sup>77</sup>

Others had and would propose a rapprochement with Russia. However, the next solid step in this direction came late in January of 1800. On the twenty-first of that month, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand with regard to a general peace. To attain this objective, Napoleon still thought to look to Prussia. More specifically, he hoped to take advantage of Britain's quarrel with the neutral powers.<sup>78</sup>

In his reply, Talleyrand proposed a different course of action. France, he said, could not count on Prussia. For five years, she had sought such an alliance in vain. Prussia had done her best to avoid it. And though Berlin had not allied herself with any of the other powers, this was because she was hoping to wait until all the others had exhausted themselves. She could then step in and pick up the pieces. Instead, Talleyrand proposed that France turn to Russia. Russia was the heart of the last coalition. It had only been the fear of displeasing Paul that had made Austria and Britain even listen to French overtures. Except for the abortive attempt in 1797, France had completely missed the opportunity of opening direct negotiations with Russia. Such an attempt would be very difficult. Still, the rewards would be

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<sup>77</sup>Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), p. 758.

<sup>78</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 4542.

substantial. Talleyrand's old friend, the Count de Choiseul-Gouffier, was then at the Russian court.

Talleyrand had heard that he wanted to return to France.

I do not doubt that, in hope of again seeing his country, he will willingly employ his prestige, his talents, in order to detach the court of Russia from its present engagements and to lead it to a negotiation with France.<sup>79</sup>

Unfortunately for Talleyrand, Choiseul-Gouffier was no longer in Paul's good graces. Still, there were other French émigrés at St. Petersburg who were. As we shall see, Talleyrand was to have no difficulty in locating them.

By this time, Krudener had arrived in Berlin. In his first conversation with Count Christian Haugwitz, Krudener was told of Talleyrand's remarks of January 5. Haugwitz offered the good offices of the Prussian government in a mediation. In a dispatch of January 28, Krudener informed Paul that the Prussians wanted to open negotiations on this and other topics. On the margin of this dispatch, Paul wrote the following:

As to the measures to take, I do not ask for better than of agreeing with the King at every nascent opportunity; as to a rapprochement with France, I will not ask for better than of seeing her come to Me and especially as a counterweight to Austria.<sup>80</sup>

Panin's reaction was quite different. On February 10, he declared in a letter to Krudener,

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<sup>79</sup>Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), pp. 759-760.

<sup>80</sup>Martens, VI, pp. 267-268; Milyutin, V, pp. 253, 493, n. 120.

I have already declared that my hand will never sign a treaty with France except after the reestablishment of the monarchy or for a general peace settlement in which all our allies will be included.<sup>81</sup>

In addition, he told Krudener that Russia would abstain from all energetic measures against Austria. Otherwise, she might be forced to come to an accommodation with France.

Rebuffed in Berlin, Bonaparte and Talleyrand began to seek other means of making contact with Russia. By May of 1800, François de Bourgoing, the French minister at Hamburg, reported that a certain Monsieur de Bellegarde had been sent to him by General Beurnonville, the French ambassador in Berlin. In Berlin, Bellegarde had offered to serve the new regime in return for being allowed to return to France. It turned out that Bellegarde was in Russian employ and was just returning from a mission to Italy. Further, he was a friend of Rostopchin and had connections with the Grand Duke Constantine. On May 15, Bourgoing reported that he found nothing wrong with Bellegarde's proposal and was going to initiate it.<sup>82</sup>

On May 23, Bourgoing reported that he had learned from an "authentic source" that Paul wanted to form a

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<sup>81</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, p. 35. See also: Tatishchev, XLIX (1889), pp. 765-766; Martens, VI, p. 268; Milyutin, V, p. 254; Waliszewski, p. 340.

<sup>82</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, p. 34.

coalition against Britain. Three days later, he reported a conversation with the Swedish ambassador in which the latter stated that his sovereign agreed with Paul and that Denmark had been persuaded to be ready "immediately to close the Baltic to the tyrant of the seas."<sup>83</sup>

In his reply of June 8, Talleyrand reported that this news agreed with all the other information concerning Paul's disposition. As attempts to reach Russia through Prussia and Denmark were useless, he ordered Bourgoing to watch for "some good means near the court of Russia, as much for a good knowledge of the strength of its resolutions as also for stimulating them in the sense that is favorable for us."<sup>84</sup>

Napoleon was not slow to react to this new information. On June 1, he wrote to Talleyrand saying, "It is very important to have someone in Russia. The Ottoman Empire cannot long endure, and if Paul I turns his gaze in that direction our interests are mutual."<sup>85</sup> Three days later, he noted Talleyrand's own proposal on having an agent in St. Petersburg and stressed its importance. He continued,

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<sup>83</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. xvi.

<sup>84</sup>Ernest Daudet, Histoire de l'émigration pendant la Révolution Française, III (Paris: Libraire Hachette, 1907), pp. 155-156.

<sup>85</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 4860.

It is necessary to give Paul some marks of consideration, and that he know that we wish to negotiate with him. . . . I leave to your judgment to see whether it will not be appropriate that our chargé d'affaires in Hamburg or some other town make general and flattering overtures to Paul.

See about getting a party and of having an agent in Petersburg.<sup>86</sup>

Bourgoing had not been idle. On June 23, he proposed a new gambit. Paul might be indirectly cajoled

by taking in regard to the (Russian) prisoners of war humanitarian measures, perhaps even allowing them to return to their country alleging that they might suffer from an extended stay in a climate so different from their own.<sup>87</sup>

Four days later, Bourgoing gave Talleyrand information of more immediate importance. According to Bellegarde, one

could reach Paul I by means of his favorite, formerly his barber, Kutaysov, who is enamoured of a French actress, Mme. Chevalier. She has spent some time in Hamburg. . . . She is very greedy, it is said, but her lover satisfies all her whims, and without a doubt she would place a high price on her political services. Nevertheless, I have thought that one could attempt to sound her out through the Frenchman (Bellegarde). I have the means of corresponding with him and I am going to try this course without delay.<sup>88</sup>

Who were Madame Chevalier and Kutaysov? Kutaysov was a Turk. He was captured as a boy during the storming of Bender in 1770. Presented to Catherine by Prince Repnin, Kutaysov was given in turn to Paul. Paul had

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., no. 4873.

<sup>87</sup> Daudet, III, p. 156. See also: Waliszewski, p. 343.

<sup>88</sup> Daudet, III, pp. 158-159. See also: Ragsdale, Détente, p. 34.

him trained as a barber. An adroit manipulator, Kutaysov soon learned to play on Paul's personality with consummate skill. After his accession, Paul named his former barber successively, valet de chambre, Master of the Wardrobe, Master of the Hunt, baron, count and Grand Equerry. This last honor he received on January 20, 1800. By this time, he had given up his menial duties and was occupying the rooms of the favorite.<sup>89</sup>

Madame Chevalier--her Christian name is not known--was born in Lyon in 1774. A singer and an actress, she made her debut in that city in 1791. The following year she married Pierre Chevalier. He was the maître de ballet and the first dancer of the Lyon theatre. In 1793, he had been an associate of Collot d'Herbois and had been accused of being one of the cruelest instruments of the Terror. Soon thereafter, Madame Chevalier, her husband and her brother left for Paris. They remained there until late in 1795. From Paris, they moved to Hamburg. There Madame Chevalier had her usual success on the stage "while her husband augmented the resources of the ménage in

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<sup>89</sup>Daudet, III, p. 161; Shil'der, pp. 222, 252, 290, 346, 350, 383, 400; Waliszewski, p. 139; Nikolay Sablukov, "Reminiscences of the Emperor Paul I of Russia: From the Papers of a Deceased Russian General Officer," Eclectic Magazine, II, nos. 5 and 6, n.s. (November and December 1865), pp. 522 and 714 respectively.

prostituting his wife and running a gambling house."<sup>90</sup> The Chevaliers stayed in Hamburg until early in 1798. Prior to this, she "had probably been admired" by Prince N. B. Yusupov.<sup>91</sup> The latter had been sent to Paris to recruit new members for the Imperial Theatre. Due to his influence, Madame Chevalier received an advantageous offer to come to Russia. She, her husband and her brother left Hamburg and arrived in St. Petersburg in April of 1798.<sup>92</sup>

Before her departure, Madame Chevalier made contact with Barras and promised to supply him with political information on Russia. She caught Paul's eye for the first time at a performance at Pavlovsk in June of 1798. She appears to have had a brief affair with him or as another source puts it she "enjoyed the personal favor of the Emperor Paul."<sup>93</sup> Her husband was made a maître de ballet and her brother was hired as a dancer. After her affair with Paul, she became Kutaysov's mistress. Kutaysov rented a palace for her next to that of Paul's new mistress.

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<sup>90</sup>Roman d'Amat, "Chevalier-Peycam," Dictionnaire de biographie française, VIII, (1959), col. 1074; Daudet, III, p. 162.

<sup>91</sup>Robert-Aloys Mooser, Annales de la musique et des musiciens en Russie au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, III (Geneva: Mont Blanc, 1951), p. 755.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>"Sheval'ye-Peykam," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XXXIX (1903), p. 351. See also: Mooser, III, p. 716; Amat, "Chevalier," col. 1074.

Chevalier made full use of her position and sold her influence to the highest bidder.<sup>94</sup>

This does not exhaust the list of political intriguers of which we must take note. Yet another woman of intrigue was known under the name of Madame Bonneuil. A commoner of exceptional beauty, she used it to gain her ends. Her first notable exploits took place in Madrid in 1796. Late in 1797, she attempted to use the influence she had gained over the Duke d'Havre, the Bourbon's representative in Madrid, to obtain an audience with Louis XVIII. Her attempt failed. Three years later she turned up in St. Petersburg. Once again, she tried to see Louis XVIII; now in Mittau. After hearing of the substance of her scheme, Louis is reported to have remarked, "This project is a romance and the woman an adventurous slut."<sup>95</sup>

But by this time, Madame Bonneuil was after bigger game. In St. Petersburg, she met Madame Chevalier, whom she may have known earlier in Paris. Through her, she met first Kutaysov and then Panin and Rostopchin. Both men were attracted to her. Her choice fell upon Rostopchin. He must have enjoyed her company a great deal for he allowed her to talk politics and even introduced her to

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<sup>94</sup>Sablukov, "Reminiscences" (December 1865), p. 714; Mooser, III, pp. 716, 756.

<sup>95</sup>Daudet, III, p. 222. See also p. 221.

Paul. Paul is said to have found her very charming.<sup>96</sup>

These people have been discussed at some length because there is reason to believe that all three of them were attached to Rostopchin's faction at court. Rostopchin admitted as much when he wrote to Semyon Vorontsov on April 9, 1800 as follows:

I am suspected by several ministers as being imbued with revolutionary principles because I used to be intimate . . . with Count Kutaysov, who is under the thumb of a Frenchwoman named Chevalier, whose husband is supposed to be a violent jacobin.<sup>97</sup>

Thus by making contact with Chevalier, Bourgoing had opened a direct channel to Rostopchin and perhaps to Paul himself.

On July 4, 1800, only two days after his return from Italy, Napoleon decided to use his direct channel to St. Petersburg. He ordered Talleyrand to prepare a diplomatic note to the Russian government offering to turn over Malta to Paul as Grand Master should the French be forced to evacuate it. On July 19, he ordered Talleyrand to take his lead from an article on the Russian prisoners which had appeared that day in the Moniteur. It was to be sent via Hamburg or Copenhagen and placed "en main propre au ministre russe."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., pp. 225-226.

<sup>97</sup>Waliszewski, p. 137.

<sup>98</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, nos. 4965, 4966.

Following his new instructions, Talleyrand composed his note. It contained no mention of Malta. Instead in a tone dripping with unctiousness, he offered to return the Russian prisoners without any conditions because they were "little acclimated to this country, the stay in which could be harmful to them."<sup>99</sup> The First Consul made this offer out of esteem for the Russian Emperor since the British and the Austrians refused to exchange their French prisoners for these brave Russians. Thus, Panin need only inform the French "which route His Imperial Majesty desires, that his troops take and follow in order to return to his Empire."<sup>100</sup>

It was decided that Bourgoing should give the note to Count Ivan Murav'yev, Russia's minister at Hamburg. But, Murav'yev would have nothing to do with the Frenchman. Bourgoing finally learned that Murav'yev was afraid to accept the note without Paul's permission. Still, the Count had sent the gist of it on to St. Petersburg.<sup>101</sup>

Of more importance, Bourgoing learned through Bellegarde that Panin was an Anglophile and thus hostile to France. Talleyrand should be trying to make contact with the more moderate Rostopchin.

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<sup>99</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 1.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 653, n. 49.

You have been obliged to prefer official means. It will be perhaps possible for me to employ one even more efficacious by reaching Prince Rostoptshchin [sic] through the correspondent whom I have had the honor of making known to you in my dispatches (i.e., Bellegarde). It is this that I am going to attempt.<sup>102</sup>

Not satisfied with these measures, Talleyrand tried to make contact through Berlin. One of the Russian prisoners, Major Sergeyev, was released and given a copy of the note of July 29 and another dated August 26. The latter offered to surrender Malta to Paul as Grand Master. Sergeyev was stopped in Berlin by Krudener. Nevertheless, Krudener sent the notes on to St. Petersburg.<sup>103</sup>

It will be recalled that in late February of 1800 Count Panin had successfully blunted the first attempts of the French in Berlin. In the meantime, he had attempted to obtain an alliance with Prussia. On July 28, Russia and Prussia signed a treaty of defensive alliance. Both Panin and Paul hoped to expand this to a secret treaty of offensive alliance. More specifically, Paul called for a joint Russo-Prussian armed mediation between France and the allies.<sup>104</sup> The objectives of this mediation were: 1) to keep France from abusing her dominate position in Italy, 2) to contain Austrian designs, 3) to maintain the

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<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 654, n. 49.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., no. 2.

<sup>104</sup>Martens, II, pp. 269-280, 284; Ragsdale, "Bonaparte's Fool," p. 79.

political existence of the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia,

4) to ascertain what could be saved in Germany and 5):

to employ in all these aspects our combined mediation for a general, stable and permanent peace, that would end humanity's plagues, and which would be able to guarantee in the future the securing of nations.<sup>105</sup>

This was the situation when the new French overtures reached St. Petersburg. Paul's reaction came in a rescript to Krudener of August 18. The Russian was to negotiate with Beurnonville.

In particular, I charge you to observe a complete sincerity in all your relations, both with the Prussian ministry, and with the French plenipotentiary; declare to him directly and simply My orders. Veracity, disinterestedness and strength can speak loudly and without subterfuges.<sup>106</sup>

Some historians have interpreted this as proof of Paul's enthusiasm for a renewal of relations with France. This would be a mistake. For example, the Prussian ambassador reported in July that the French overtures had been badly received and had been the cause of the joint mediation mentioned above.<sup>107</sup> Another point concerns the offer to return the Russian prisoners. This was supposed to have been a master stroke which melted Paul's hard heart.

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<sup>105</sup> Hugh Ragsdale, ed., "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Paul I from the Former Prussian Archives," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, VII, no. 1 (1973), p. 107.

<sup>106</sup> Milyutin, V, p. 266.

<sup>107</sup> Ragsdale, "Bonaparte's Fool," p. 79.

The truth was quite different. For instance, Bourgoing reported on August 1 that the Russian prisoners who had managed to escape and return to Russia on their own had been badly received also. "It will thus be possible that the offer to return to Paul I all the Russian prisoners . . . might not appear very alluring to him."<sup>108</sup> This was confirmed more than a month later. On September 13, Krudener told Beurnonville that the return of the prisoners had been accepted on the condition that they give "their word of honor to in no wise bear arms against France."<sup>109</sup> In this same interview, Krudener informed Beurnonville that while Paul would receive a letter from Bonaparte, a rapprochement between the two powers could only be had if Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of Bavaria, Naples, Sardinia and Würtemberg. In short, Paul was prepared for better relations with the French as soon as he received an earnest of their good faith. This the French had not yet done.

Nevertheless, Paul's foreign policy options were diminishing. Panin had once again carried the day, but at the price of negotiations with the French. As previously illustrated, events in the Baltic were leading to the formation of the Armed Neutrality. The attempts at

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<sup>108</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. 654, n. 50.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., p. 655, n. 53.

joint mediation were in vain. By October of 1800 it had become clear to Paul that the Prussians still would not budge from their neutral stance.<sup>110</sup> Russian foreign policy was at a crossroad.

It was at this point that two memoranda were prepared for Paul. One was by Panin. The other was by Rostopchin. Panin's called for a renewed alliance with Austria. Because of Rostopchin's opposition, Paul never saw it. We are concerned only with Rostopchin's memorandum.<sup>111</sup>

Written early in October of 1800, this memorandum called for a veritable revolution in Russian foreign policy. According to Rostopchin, Russia could easily have both Sweden and Denmark in her thrall. Spain was supine before France. Portugal was of no consequence. Piedmont and Naples owed their continued existence to Russia. The Pope was submissive. The Porte was "a hopeless invalid; to whom the doctors do not want to tell anything concerning his condition."<sup>112</sup> Austria awaited "like a criminal, with trembling, the judgment of her fate

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<sup>110</sup>Martens, VI, pp. 285-286.

<sup>111</sup>Trachevskiy, I, pp. 658-659, n. 5.

<sup>112</sup>Fyodor V. Rostopchin, "Zapiska grafa F. V. Rostopchina o politicheskikh otnosheniyakh Rossii v poslednia mesyatsy Pavlovskago tsarstvovaniya," Russkiy arkhiv, I (1878), p. 104.

by Bonaparte."<sup>113</sup> Prussia continued to play her waiting game. Though Britain was triumphant on the sea, she had not been able to maintain any of her continental alliances. She needed peace for the sake of her commerce.<sup>114</sup> In short, all these powers wanted peace.

Even so, they secretly harbored envy and malice toward Russia. What was the alternative? Rostopchin's answer was peace with France. After ten years of barbarism, France was submitting herself to the rule of Bonaparte. His ego and his avidity for glory would make him desire peace. Through it, he would set the seal on his rule in France, obtain the respect of the French people and gain a respite to use for military preparations against Britain. He did not fear fighting Britain on land. As for Austria and Prussia, he had exhausted the former and the latter was in his thrall. Thus, "he remains fearful only of Russia."<sup>115</sup>

This conclusion was proved by Napoleon's recent conduct toward Paul. The First Consul had attempted to make contact with Russia through the Prussians and the Danes as well as "other persons, having access, in order to enter into negotiations and, producing a rapprochement, to alter the hostile position of Russia toward France to

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<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., pp. 104-105.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 105. See also pp. 104-106.

friendliness."<sup>116</sup> This was the real reason for the return of the prisoners from France and for the offer to restore Malta.

But how was a new alliance with France to be realized? Rostopchin planned to base in on a partition of the Ottoman Empire. Russia would take Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldavia.<sup>117</sup> Prussia would receive in consolation Hanover and the bishoprics of Paderborn and Münster. France would retain Egypt.

Greece with all the islands of the Archipelago will be established after the example of the Venetian islands as a republic, under the protection of the four powers. . . . But for now, the Greeks themselves will come under the scepter of Russia.<sup>118</sup>

Nevertheless, Russia should proceed cautiously with this new policy so as not to arouse Britain. Instead, the first step would be a revival of the Armed Neutrality. "Bonaparte will find this a powerful means to harm England."<sup>119</sup> Once the Armed Neutrality was concluded, Rostopchin would feign to be in disgrace and go secretly to Paris to negotiate directly with Bonaparte. He did not doubt that the First Consul would agree to his proposals.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>117</sup> Rostopchin's use of the term "Romania" is not clear.

<sup>118</sup> Rostopchin, pp. 108-109. Contrary to Ragsdale, Détente, p. 38.

<sup>119</sup> Rostopchin, p. 109.

From there, he would go to Vienna. "I am positive that the Roman Emperor along with his ministry will be delighted over the partition of Turkey like a ruined man over an unexpected winning of the grand prize at a lottery."<sup>120</sup> This accomplished, Rostopchin would return to St. Petersburg. Paul is supposed to have approved this memorandum.<sup>121</sup>

Rostopchin's memorandum called for a sweeping change in Russian foreign policy. What was the source of his inspiration? From what we now know it must have been French. Bourgoing had established contact with the Russian minister via Bellegarde, Chevalier and perhaps Bonneuil. In itself, this proves nothing. However, the program given in his memorandum bears an uncanny resemblance to Guttin's memorandum of October, 1799. It would appear that Napoleon and Talleyrand were flattering the Russian minister's cupidity in a bid for his support. On the other hand, Rostopchin probably thought that he was using his French contact to further his own political career.

Nevertheless, it is one thing to propose and quite another to dispose. The conventional wisdom is that Paul approved the memorandum.<sup>122</sup> However, there is

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<sup>120</sup>Rostopchin, p. 110.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., pp. 109-110.

<sup>122</sup>For example see Deutsch, pp. 17-19; Shil'der, p. 413; Trachevskiy, I, p. xxi. More works could also be cited.

evidence to suggest that Paul did no such thing. Early in 1889, the Duke de Broglie published a poor French translation of the memorandum in the Revue d'histoire diplomatique. He had obtained it from the grandson of Baron Fain, one of Napoleon's secretaries. He claimed not to know the author of the document. In the following issue, Aleksandr Trachevskiy identified Rostopchin as the author and noted that the Russian text had been published in Russkiy arkhiv in 1878.<sup>123</sup> In 1922, Emile Bourgeois related that General Fain, the Baron's grandson, had brought the memorandum to him some time after 1889. It appears that the Duke de Broglie failed to mention a note on the document. According to it, the document was a translation made in Moscow in 1812 of a Russian document found in Rostopchin's house. Rostopchin was then Governor of Moscow. After its translation, it had been given to Napoleon and then sent on to Paris. A copy was made for this purpose.<sup>124</sup>

It might be argued that all these points are moot since the original was in Russian. After all, there would

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<sup>123</sup> Duke de Broglie, "La politique de la Russie en 1800 d'après un document inédit," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, III, no. 1 (1889), pp. 1-2; Aleksandr Trachevskiy, "L'Empereur Paul et Bonaparte, Premier Consul," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, III, No. 2 (1889), pp. 281-286.

<sup>124</sup> Ragsdale, Détente, p. 119.

be only one Russian version. Alas, this is not so. Nikolay Shil'der cites the memorandum in his biography of Paul. In a footnote he wrote:

Count Rostopchin's memorandum was published in the collection: Pamyatniki novoy russkoy istorii, V. Kashpirev ed.--St. Petersburg, 1871; Vol. I, p. 102. . . . A second time, Count Rostopchin's memorial was published (from another copy) in Russkiy arkhiv in 1878.<sup>125</sup>

It might be argued that, though the memorandum was published twice, the text was the same. This does not appear to be the case. When one compares the quotations given by Shil'der to the text in Russkiy arkhiv, they agree in most instances. However, there is one major exception. Shil'der cites Paul's approval of the memorandum as follows: "I approve of your plan wholly, I desire, that you will proceed toward its implementation. God grant that it be so!"<sup>126</sup> The text in Russkiy arkhiv is given as follows: "Approving of your plan, I desire that you will proceed toward its implementation. God grant that it be so."<sup>127</sup>

At first glance, these sentences appear to be identical. They are not. The first begins with the first person singular of the verb aprobovat', i.e., aprobuyu. The second sentence begins with the gerund aprobuya. The first is one complex sentence. The second

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<sup>125</sup> Shil'der, p. 413, n. 1.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 413.

<sup>127</sup> Rostopchin, p. 110.

is really one complex sentence and one simple sentence. Of more importance, the first contains an expression, "wholly," in Russian two words vo vsyom, that the second does not. Thus, there can be little doubt that there exists more than one Russian text.

If this is true, from which text did the French translation derive? Here is Paul's statement of approval given in that text: "J'approuve votre plan en tout point et désire que vous le mettiez à exécution. Dieu veuille que cela soit ainsi."<sup>128</sup> From this, it appears that it derives from the text published by Kaspirev and cited by Shil'der. As for the second, it "was preserved in a copy in the papers transmitted . . . by the son of Count Rostopchin."<sup>129</sup>

Given all this, the assertion made by most historians that Paul approved the memorandum seems little short of ludicrous. Are we to believe that Rostopchin submitted both a copy and the original and that Paul annotated both of them at the same time? For example, Panin wrote the following on April 28, 1799:

The Sovereign reads all the dispatches, but with such rapidity, that it is impossible even with the very best memory in the world, that he can recall all the circumstances, worthy of his attention.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Broglie, p. 3. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>129</sup> Rostopchin, p. 103. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>130</sup> Martens, VI, p. 266.

It hardly seems likely that Rostopchin would risk Paul's wrath by giving Paul two copies of the same memorandum; one of which was to be annotated solely for Rostopchin's convenience. And how was Paul's handwriting authenticated? And if only one of the Russian versions was authentic, how could both claim to be annotated by Paul? Or if only one set of annotations is a forgery, which one are we to choose?

Is the whole memorandum a forgery? No. We know this because Rostopchin wrote a letter to Semyon Vorontsov in June of 1801 advocating the same basic approach to Russian foreign policy. If there is any forgery, it would involve only Paul's approval.<sup>131</sup>

This conclusion has indirect corroboration. At no time during the remainder of his reign did Paul take any documented step to implement the Rostopchin memorandum. There was no change in the friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire and certainly no mention of its partition. Given all this evidence, it may be safely concluded that, while Rostopchin did indeed compose the memorandum, Paul never approved it.

If Paul followed neither the advice of Panin nor of Rostopchin, what did he do? The answer is hinted at in the Rostopchin memorandum. There Rostopchin recommended

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<sup>131</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. 660, n. 58; Ragsdale, Détente, p. 119.

that someone be sent "to negotiate with Bonaparte on the satisfaction of the five points."<sup>132</sup> What were these five points? On October 8, six days before Paul supposedly approved Rostopchin's memorandum, Rostopchin had drawn up the following note. It deserves to be quoted in extenso.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, having taken cognizance of the letters written to His Vice-Chancellor, Count Panin, has ordered me to make known to the First Consul that good concord with my Master can only be established by the fulfillment of His desires, already declared to General Beurnonville.

1. The return of the island of Malta with its dependencies to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of which the Emperor of All the Russias is the Grand Master.

2. The reestablishment of the King of Sardinia in his domains, as they were before the entrance of the French into Italy;

3. The integrity of the domains of the King of the Two Sicilies;

4. Of those of the Elector of Bavaria, and

5. Of those of the Duke of Würtemberg.<sup>133</sup>

As we see, Paul was repeating his demands of the past months.

Two days later, Paul decided to up the ante. Outwardly, it was a response to Talleyrand's notes of July 19 and August 26. Paul ordered General George Magnus Sprengporten to go to France and accept the return of the Russian prisoners. From there, he was to go to Malta with

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<sup>132</sup>Rostopchin, p. 109. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>133</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 4.

these troops. In addition to these orders, Sprengporten was given an order which the Finn was to read to any French ministers he might meet. It explained that Paul had left the Second Coalition,

As soon as it was apparent to him, that the views of these powers tended toward aggrandizements, that his loyalty and disinterestedness was not able to permit; and as the two respective states of France and the Russian Empire by their distant separation would never find themselves in circumstances of mutually harming each other, they could also, unite and in the constant maintenance of a good concord, prevent the others, through their desire to dominate and to aggrandize themselves, from succeeding in wronging their interests.<sup>134</sup>

This has been interpreted by some historians as an attempt by Paul to implement Rostopchin's memorandum.<sup>135</sup> Instead, these instructions should be viewed in the context of the note of October 8. Sprengporten was to assure France of the sincerity of Paul's offer. Besides this, Paul had other reasons for this move. As we know, Paul had been trying without success to implement the Convention of St. Petersburg. After the events of the summer of 1800, the British had decided to occupy the island of Malta alone. Though this had already occurred, Paul would not learn of it until the end of October, 1800. Thus, the sending of Sprengporten to Paris would be either a means of pressuring the British to comply with the treaty or an end run, as it were around them. Viewed in this light,

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid., no. 5.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.

Sprengporten's mission was a carefully constructed ploy and not a "contradiction."<sup>136</sup>

Though Paul's own intentions may have been clear to himself, they were not so to Napoleon and Talleyrand. At the end of September, Napoleon noted the news of Paul's first embargo against the British and complained that Bourgoing had not informed him soon enough of this. In his instruction of October 3 to General Beurnonville, Talleyrand declared that Bonaparte had reviewed the history of the negotiations of 1797. As far as he was concerned, the question had not changed. The project of a treaty drawn up at that time by Talleyrand was once again to be used as the basis of these negotiations. If the Russians demurred, they were to be assured that, as soon as a preliminary treaty of peace was signed, the other topics of the negotiations could then be discussed. Austria should be limited to the Adige river in Italy. If Malta should fall, Russia and Naples should make sure that the island did not fall into the hands of the British. Beurnonville was to make vague remarks on the importance of the "Venetian islands" and Egypt. In regard to the latter, the Turks could certainly not defend it if the British took it. Finally, once peace was established, Russia and France could curb the pretensions of the

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<sup>136</sup>Waliszewski, p. 349.

British concerning neutral rights.<sup>137</sup>

In Berlin, the negotiations between Beurnonville and Krudener continued. On October 13, the former dutifully fulfilled his instructions. Krudener was just as dutiful in his reply. He agreed that the British should not be allowed to take Malta. If this happened, they "would threaten the whole of the East from this formidable point."<sup>138</sup> Concerning Vienna, "the cupidity of the Austrians by now requires no proof."<sup>139</sup> He went on to say,

Of course, our concern--is not to let any power extend itself beyond the bounds threatening the general welfare. . . . The Emperor Paul took up arms for this, in order to not allow the destruction of this equilibrium.<sup>140</sup>

Now that the French government appeared more reliable, "nothing could be easier, since the two governments are in agreement."<sup>141</sup> When these comments are stripped of their diplomatic niceties, they reveal that such was not the case.

A new element was added to the diplomatic situation with the arrival of Sprengporten in Berlin on October 30. He had his first meeting with Beurnonville

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<sup>137</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 5118; Trachevskiy, I, pp. 656-657, n. 54.

<sup>138</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. xix.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid.      <sup>140</sup>Ibid.      <sup>141</sup>Ibid.

on November 1. Beurnonville immediately expressed his satisfaction at finding an "open door to the most intimate rapprochement of the two powers."<sup>142</sup> The First Consul had established a government that was "firm, purified of the principles of propaganda, and with authority in the hands of one man."<sup>143</sup> Sprengporten replied by repeating Paul's reasons for abandoning the Second Coalition and telling the Frenchman that now was the time for France to seek Paul's good will. Only Russia had the power to balance the interests of both sides. He went on to say,

that the articles to which His Majesty attaches the price of his friendship were known to (Beurnonville) through the notes addressed to M. Talleyrand; that the First Consul has only to explain himself on this subject in a precise manner in order to settle matters accordingly.<sup>144</sup>

At this point, Beurnonville demurred and said that the note had been sent to Paris and should arrive there that day or the next. Besides if Sprengporten went to Paris, "all these objects could be arranged in a quarter of an hour with the First Consul."<sup>145</sup> So ended the first encounter of Sprengporten and Beurnonville.

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<sup>142</sup>Nikolay Shil'der, Histoire anecdotique de Paul Ier, trans. D. Benkendorf (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1899), p. 160.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid., pp. 161-162.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., p. 165. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

The next took place on November 13. Immediately, Beurnonville described France and Russia as the two powers "which, in touching the extremities of the globe, are destined to dominate it."<sup>146</sup> He had been given full and ample powers to negotiate. Sprengporten replied that, while he had been instructed to declare his master's desire for the reestablishment of a stable and permanent concord, France's recent invasion of Tuscany was not reassuring. And what of the negotiations at Lunéville? Why was Count Cobentzl still in Paris? For that matter, how would France obtain peace with Britain? Beurnonville replied that, together with Spain, France would form a fleet to carry an army to Ireland. It was for the northern powers to do the rest and Britain would be defeated. The British would be driven from the Mediterranean. In their hands, Malta would negate all the advantages "that the Empire of Russia united with France could hope to derive from the opening of the Dardanelles and the possession of Egypt."<sup>147</sup> Beurnonville urged Sprengporten to go to Paris. So ended the second and last encounter of Sprengporten and Beurnonville.

But even while Beurnonville had been assuring the Russians of his country's good intentions, there had not yet been any response to the note of October 8 from

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., pp. 171-172.

Talleyrand. It finally materialized in the form of a note verbale dated November 7. This was sent to Berlin and Krudener was informed of its contents on the twentieth. Krudener passed it on to St. Petersburg in a dispatch of the same date. According to it, Talleyrand's proposal was as follows: 1) A treaty of peace between France and Russia, 2) Russian recognition of the Rhine as the French border, 3) The domains of the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Würtemberg on the right bank of the Rhine were to be guaranteed by both powers, 4) Prussia and the other German powers would be compensated by a secularization of ecclesiastical estates agreed upon by France, Russia and Prussia, 5) France was to maintain the inviolability of the Kingdom of Naples and agreed to fix the boundaries of the Papal States, and 6) France would restore the King of Sardinia, but would annex Savoy and retain Novara as an earnest of the King's good faith.<sup>148</sup>

This offer was not well received by Paul. He took the view that, since Talleyrand's reply was a note verbale, it was not official. In rescript of December 2, he ordered Krudener "not to enter into new negotiations with Beurnonville for the time being, as the answer to the dispatch had not been received from Paris."<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup>Milyutin, V, pp. 268, 499-500, n. 136.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., p. 499, n. 135.

Meanwhile in mid-December, Beurnonville had arranged to meet Krudener. On the receipt of this rescript, Krudener suddenly "fell ill." When the Frenchmen called on him, Krudener told him frankly that he was authorized to conduct negotiations "as soon as he received a written reply from Talleyrand."<sup>150</sup>

While these negotiations had been taking place, Sprengporten had left Berlin on November 21. It seems that all the attention paid to him by the French had gone to his head. After his arrival in Brussels, he met with General Clarke on December 10 and 13. He bragged that the idea to form a garrison for Malta from the Russian prisoners had been his. More importantly, he claimed he would soon receive full powers to negotiate a treaty of peace from St. Petersburg. He railed against the British and praised Bonaparte as a genius. In turn, Clarke called on the northern powers to close the Sound. Prussia, he claimed, would furnish the necessary troops. The combined efforts of Russia and France would close the Mediterranean to the British.<sup>151</sup>

It was probably under the influence of these negotiations that Talleyrand and Napoleon decided to act.

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<sup>150</sup> Trachevskiy, I, pp. xxiii-xxiv. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., nos. 7 and 8, pp. 662-664, n. 63; Shil'der, Histoire, pp. 181-185.

Sprengporten was nearing Paris. The only cloud on the horizon was the persistent Russian demand that the "five points" be accepted. A decision was made. On December 20, Talleyrand ordered Beurnonville to content himself only with ordinary discussions in view of Sprengporten's impending arrival. That same day Sprengporten arrived in Paris. On the twenty-first, he dined with Talleyrand.<sup>152</sup> That same day Talleyrand wrote to Rostopchin that "the bases referred to in the note of His Excellency, have appeared just and proper in every respect and the First Consul adopts them."<sup>153</sup> That same day Napoleon wrote his first letter to Paul.<sup>154</sup> He must have believed his goal had been attained.

Meanwhile, the picture was far different in St. Petersburg. Rosenkrantz, the Danish ambassador, reported on December 5 that Talleyrand's response of November 7 had been deemed unsatisfactory. Rostopchin told the Dane that Russia would sign no agreement with France until all of the five points had been met. On December 13, Rostopchin told Rosenkrantz that Paul was

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<sup>152</sup>Shil'der, Histoire, pp. 185-186; Trachevskiy, I, p. xxiii.

<sup>153</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 10.

<sup>154</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 5232.

persuaded that Bonaparte is not in good faith . . . (and) that it would not accord with the dignity of the Emperor to seek the friendship of Bonaparte, who, until now has not offered any security, any proof of sincerity.<sup>155</sup>

Paul's attitude was soon to undergo a slight modification. The man responsible for this was Rosenkrantz. After the events of the summer of 1800, he began to evince a growing concern over Denmark's exposure to attack from Britain. As early as November, he urged Panin that Russia should ally itself with France. As might be expected, Panin did not receive this suggestion with much enthusiasm. But on November 27, he was relieved of his post and ordered to go to his estates. Rosenkrantz brought the subject up again in an interview with Rostopchin on December 13. The latter promised to inform Paul of this proposal. It seems likely that this plea tipped the scales. It could not have been the news of the acceptance of the five points. This did not take place until December 21. Thus, it must have been Rosenkrantz's plea which caused Paul to write his first letter to Napoleon on December 30.<sup>156</sup>

As we can now see, the traditional interpretation of Paul's foreign policy has been found lacking on many counts. We know that there was no Franco-Russian Entente

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<sup>155</sup>Ragsdale, "Bonaparte's Fool," p. 83.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

at the end of December, 1800. The importance of this finding is clear. If there was no Entente at the end of 1800, how likely is it that Paul and Napoleon agreed upon a plan to invade India by January 24? We know that on this date Paul ordered the Don Cossacks to prepare for this invasion.<sup>157</sup> Could Russia and France have come to such an agreement in so short a time? If the answer is no, then what is the basis of this interpretation and what actually did happen? The following chapters will attempt to answer these questions.

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<sup>157</sup>Shil'der, p. 417.

## CHAPTER II

### THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT AND ITS SOURCES

In his history of Russia, the eminent French historian, Alfred Rambaud, gave the following account of the Indian expedition of 1801. Early in 1801, Paul and Napoleon decided on a great scheme to overthrow British power in India. At that time, France occupied Egypt, had garrisons in southern Italy and agents in Arabia and India. In turn, Paul annexed the Kingdom of Georgia. These preliminaries accomplished, the two rulers decided to invade India by two routes. On the first, a Russian army, under the command of General Bogdan Knorring, was to set out for the Upper Indus via Khiva and Bukhara. However, in a series of letters that "abound in contradictions," Paul ordered General V. P. Orlov-Denisov, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, "to go from the Don to the Volga, from the Oural to the Indus, from the Indus to the Ganges . . . and he entrust(ed) the Ataman besides with missions to Khiva and Bukhara."<sup>1</sup> This plan was obviously initiated.

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<sup>1</sup>Alfred Rambaud, Russia, II, trans. L. D. Lang, with a supplementary Chapter by G. Willets (New York: Co-operative Publications Society, n.d.), p. 139.

In his memoirs, Adrian Denisov relates that he assembled eleven regiments of Cossacks, crossed the ice of the Volga and reached the left bank of that river in March of 1801. It was there that he received the news of Paul's death.

In the meantime, the other expedition was to be composed of a combined Franco-Russian army. Each country would send 35,000 men. On Paul's insistence, General André Massena was appointed the commander of the combined army. The French forces would march from the Rhine to the Danube. In ships furnished by Austria, they would sail to the mouth of the Danube. Arrived there, they would embark on Russian ships and sail to Taganrog. Disembarking there, they would go up the Don to Pyatiizbyanki, cross the Volga at Tsaritsyn and descend the river to Astrakhan. There, they would embark on Russian ships and sail across the Caspian Sea to Astrabad, where the Russian forces would be waiting for them. The combined army would then march to India via Herat, Ferah and Kandahar.<sup>2</sup>

With variations in detail, this account has been widely accepted by most historians for over a century. After a long and careful study of the evidence, it may be concluded that this account is incorrect and based on faulty evidence. In this chapter, three major sources of the traditional account will be examined for authenticity and accuracy. Where there are inaccuracies, an

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 140.

attempt will be made to identify their sources. The three sources discussed in this chapter are: 1) Paul's rescripts to Ataman Vasiliy P. Orlov, 2) the posthumous memoirs of Count Curt von Stedingk and 3) a pamphlet by a "M. de Hoffmanns," published in Paris in 1840.

At first glance, Paul's five rescripts to the Ataman Orlov would seem to hold no problems for the historian. They were first published in October of 1849 in the Russian periodical Syn otechestva. They were published again in 1859 in Donskiy vedomosti. In 1861, they appeared in Istoricheskiy sbornik. Pyotr Karatygin published them in Russkaya starina in 1873. They were also published in Sbornik materialov po Azii in 1886. Besides periodicals, they appeared in such books as Milyutin's history and Shil'der's biography. The former was published in 1853 and the latter in 1901.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Paul I, Emperor of Russia, "Spiski s sobstvennoruchnykh vysochayshikh reskriptov Gosudarya Imperatora Pavla I atamanu voyska donskago, generalu ot kavalerii Vasiliyu Petrovichu Orlovu-Denisovu," Syn Otechestva, Bk. X (October 1849), pp. 1-4; A. A. Barotskiy, "Proyekt ekspeditskiy v Indiyu, predlozhennykh Napoleonom Bonaparte imperatoram Pavlu i Aleksandru I v 1800 i v 1807-1808 godakh," Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii, Bk. XXIII, (St. Petersburg, 1886), pp. 52-54; Pyotr P. Karatygin, "Proyekt russko-frantsuzskoy ekspeditsii v Indiyu 1800 g.," Russkaya starina, VIII (1873), pp. 409-410; Milyutin, V, pp. 508-510, n. 157; see Shil'der, pp. 417-418. I was unable to obtain a copy of the text from Istoricheskiy sbornik. My information on this is from Karatygin, p. 410, n. 1.

This is by no means the complete publishing history of these rescripts. Yet in all the time since their first publication in 1849 up to the present, no one has compared the various texts and their differences. These can be divided into three categories: 1) differences in capitalization, spelling and punctuation, 2) differences in dates and sequence of the rescripts, and 3) differences in the meaning of certain sentences and the absence of sentences. For the sake of brevity, we will discuss the latter two points only.

Dates are peculiarly the province of history. One would think that in this aspect the traditional account would be correct. Not so. Rambaud quotes passages from the rescripts and gives the following dates: A January 12/24, B January 12/24, C January 13/25, D February 7/19. Rambaud does not cite the fifth rescript.<sup>4</sup> His source is the article in Russkaya starina. There the same dates are given for the four rescripts cited. The last is given as E February 21/March 5.<sup>5</sup>

If we turn to the fifth volume of Milyutin's history, we find the following: A January 1/13, B January 12/24, C January 13/25, E February 2/14, D February 7/19. The reader will note two differences. First, A is dated

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<sup>4</sup>Rambaud, Russia, II, pp. 138-139.

<sup>5</sup>Karatygin, pp. 409-410.

January 1/13. Second, E is dated February 2/14 and is placed before D. Immediately, we are faced with two discrepancies in date. How are we to rectify this?

In a footnote on page 508, Milyutin wrote:

"These rescripts were published in Syn otechestva, 1849, in the 10th book."<sup>6</sup> If we turn to this publication, we find the following dates: A January 12/24, B January 12/24, C January 13/25, E February 2/14, and D February 7/19. Thus, one discrepancy is dealt with. Milyutin's date of 1/13 of January for A is a misprint.<sup>7</sup>

But what of the different dates given for E? Happily, there is a way to settle this problem as well. Nikolay Shil'der also cites these five rescripts in his biography of Paul. In a footnote on page 417, he gives his source as follows: "Voyenno-uchennyy arkhiv. Otd. no. 982. (five autographed orders of Paul to General of the Cavalry Orlov 1st concerning the campaign to India in 1801)."<sup>8</sup> The ultimate source of two of the other three other versions is unclear. The version given in the Sbornik materialov po Azii is supposed to be based

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<sup>6</sup>Milyutin, V, p. 508.

<sup>7</sup>Aleksandr Trachevskiy cites this article, Milyutin's text and Karatygin, yet fails to note any of these differences. He gives the same dates as Milyutin, V, pp. 508-510. Trachevskiy, I, p. 676, n. 83.

<sup>8</sup>Shil'der, p. 417, n. 1.

on materials from the archives of the Don Cossacks. As for the other two versions, one appeared in 1849 and the other in 1861 and again in 1873. In all three cases, they appeared in periodicals, without clear reference to the originals. Hence, of all the texts available to us, Shil'der's must carry the most authority.

Concerning dates and sequence, Shil'der gives the following: A January 12/24, B January 12/24, C January 13/25, E February 2/14 and D February 7/19.<sup>9</sup> This sequence confirms that published in Syn otechestva and Milyutin. The dates given by the other writers are found to be incorrect. Therefore, having made our point on the dates and sequence of these five rescripts, we will label them as follows: A = I, B = II, C = III, E = IV, and D = V.

Nevertheless, this does not exhaust the information to be gleaned from these rescripts. If we compare the text as given by Karatygin to that in Shil'der, we find several glaring differences. In no. I, the entire third sentence is left out by Karatygin. It reads as follows: "Their establishments in India are best for this."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 417-418 and p. 418, n. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 417; Karatygin, p. 409. The Sbornik materialov po Azii gives a slightly different version of this sentence. In most other respects, it agrees with Karatygin. Thus, what is said of Karatygin applies to it. Any differences will be noted in the appropriate note.

In a postscript at the end of no. I, Paul writes that his maps go only as far as the "Amu-darya River."<sup>11</sup> Karatygin gives this as the "Amur River." The latter now forms the border of northern Manchuria with Russia! The former is the correct term.

In no. II, there is a more important discrepancy. In the text given by Karatygin, Paul orders the Cossack Ataman as follows:

The objective is to completely destroy everything, to free the oppressed sovereigns and to put these lands in the same dependence to Russia as they are to the English and thus to divert the trade to us.<sup>12</sup>

The same passage is given by Shil'der as follows:

The objective is to completely destroy everything, to free the oppressed sovereigns and by kindness to bring them in the same dependence to Russia as they are to the English, thus diverting the trade to us.<sup>13</sup>

Surprisingly, such a difference in meaning between these two passages is accomplished by the substitution of a single word. In the first passage, the Russian words represented by those underlined are: zemlyu privest'. In the second passage, the Russian words represented by those underlined are: laskoyu privest'.<sup>14</sup> The first

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<sup>11</sup>Shil'der, p. 418; Karatygin, p. 409.

<sup>12</sup>Karatygin, p. 410. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>13</sup>Shil'der, p. 418. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>14</sup>Karatygin, p. 410; Shil'der, p. 418.

implies conquest. The second implies persuasion. This may seem a minor difference. Appearances can be deceiving.

In rescripts nos. III and IV--i.e. those dated January 13/25 and February 2/14--there are discrepancies in the placement of postscripts. In the version given by Karatygin, no. III has no postscript. According to Shil'der, the postscript reads as follows: "Take as many men with you as possible."<sup>15</sup> It will be recalled that rescript no. IV was mistakenly dated February 21/March 5. This error is compounded further. Karatygin adds the postscript just cited to the postscript assigned by Shil'der to no. IV. Thus, Karatygin has the postscript to no. IV read as follows: "Take as many men as possible. Concerning the infantry, follow your own judgment--but it is better not to take any at all."<sup>16</sup> Shil'der gives only the second sentence as the postscript to no. IV.

As to no. V, both Karatygin and Shil'der give the same text.<sup>17</sup>

From this cursory examination of the printed texts of these rescripts, it is clear that the text given by Karatygin--and more importantly the one most often cited

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<sup>15</sup>Shil'der, p. 418.

<sup>16</sup>Karatygin, p. 410. Sbornik materialov po Azii has only the first sentence.

<sup>17</sup>Shil'der, p. 418; Karatygin, p. 410.

by scholars--is highly defective. Why? Without knowing who the authors of the articles in the Donskiy vedomsti and the Istoricheskiy sbornik are, we can only speculate. It may be theorized that these two articles were published in 1859 and 1861 respectively. This was only a few years after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. Russia was still militarily weak. She could not afford to gratuitously offend a power such as Britain. Thus, the censor may have decided to remove the reference to the English establishments in the text given by Istoricheskiy sbornik. And what of the other changes? Here speculation breaks down. There would appear to be no logical reason for the rearrangement of the postscripts and the change in sequence and dates. But in Russia, the censor has never had to have a good or logical reason for his dictates. Perhaps it satisfied the vanity of some bureaucrat to edit the words of a once all-powerful Tsar. Whatever the reason, it is clear the Karatygin's text is defective. Thus in this study, we shall consider the text as given by Shil'der to be the only authoritative one.

In 1965, John W. Strong published an article on the Indian expedition of 1801 in the seventh volume of the Canadian Slavonic Papers.<sup>18</sup> In that article, he

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<sup>18</sup>John W. Strong, "Russia's Plans for an Invasion of India in 1801," Canadian Slavonic Papers, VII (1965), pp. 114-126.

accepts both the plan published in the memoirs of Count Stedingk and the more elaborate plan published in the pamphlet of M. de Hoffmanns as genuine. Though de Hoffmanns did not divulge his source, he claimed to have based his study on documentary evidence. What could that evidence have been? According to Strong, "the only known and conclusive documentary evidence on which de Hoffmanns could have based his research is a brief note by Count Stedingk."<sup>19</sup> Strong goes on to say that it is "unlikely" that de Hoffmanns' article is "pure invention." Therefore, "it would appear that he must have had further material available with which to corroborate and expand the outline left by Stedingk."<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the document given in Stedingk's memoirs is entitled "Esquisse du plan de campagne contre les établissements anglais de l'Inde . . ." <sup>21</sup>--i.e., "A Rough Sketch of the Plan of the Campaign Against the English Establishments in India." Strong concludes from this that Stedingk's original papers contained the complete plan. But, Stedingk's memoirs appeared in 1845; five years after the appearance of de Hoffmanns' pamphlet. Strong postulates that de Hoffmanns could have had Stedingk's original papers and thus could have based his pamphlet on

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Count Magnus Frederick Ferdinand Bjornstjerna, ed., Mémoires posthumes de feldmaréchal Comte de Stedingk, II (Paris: Arthus-Bertrand, 1845), p. 6.

them. He goes on to write, "The dilemma faced by anyone working on this problem is whether or not to accept de Hoffmanns' unsubstantiated evidence."<sup>22</sup> Dilemma indeed! Strong's solution is to see if the evidence "fits logically into the general atmosphere of relations between France and Russia . . . from December, 1800, to March, 1801."<sup>23</sup> He concludes that it does.

Such is Strong's argument for the authenticity of these two sources. It is accepted by several modern historians.<sup>24</sup> It can be demonstrated that this conclusion is incorrect. We could review the diplomatic relations of Russia and France as Strong does. We will examine this subject in the final chapter, and will now focus on the problem of the Stedingk "papers." After all, if it can be proved that these "papers" do not exist, then Strong's case falls apart.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the de Hoffmanns pamphlet does not derive from the Stedingk document. One would assume that, if both accounts are derived from the same original papers, the two plans would agree on all points. Such is not the case.

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<sup>22</sup>Strong, p. 116.      <sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>For example, see Patricia K. Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 40; Alan Palmer, Alexander I, Tsar of War and Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 41, 424-425.

According to de Hoffmanns, the French troops would march from the Rhine to the Danube and descend that river to the Black Sea. From the mouth of the Danube, the French troops would sail, in Russian ships to Taganrog. Thence, they would march via the Cossack stanitsa of Pyatizbyanki to Tsaritsyn on the Volga. At Tsaritsyn, they would embark on boats and sail to Astrakhan at the river's mouth. There, they would await the return of the Russian ships that had already transported the Russian army to Astrabad. They would be transported there as well. Then the combined army would set out for India via Herat, Ferah and Kandahar. The entire trip from the Danube to Astrabad would take 75 days. The march to India would take another 45 days.<sup>25</sup>

The account given in Stedingk's memoirs, while similar, disagrees with this version on several points. According to it, the combined army was to be assembled at Astrakhan and then transported together across the Caspian Sea. The trip from France, not the Danube, to Astrabad would take 80 days, not 75. The march from Astrabad to India would take 50 days, not 45. The total

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<sup>25</sup> (Karol B. A. Hoffman), Mémoire de Leibnitz, a Louis XIV, sur la conquête de l'Égypte, publié avec une préface et des notes, par M. de Hoffmanns, suivi d'un Projet d'expédition dans l'Inde, par terre concerté entre le Premier Consul et l'Empereur Paul Ier, en mil huit cent (Paris: Édouard Garnot, 1840), pp. 40-42. The attribution of authorship will be explained in due course.

number of days for the entire expedition would be 130, not the 120 days given by Stedingk. Finally, General Massena, the victor at Zurich, would have been given the overall command of the expedition, according to Stedingk. De Hoffmanns makes no mention of this last point.<sup>26</sup> How can both documents be based on the same papers if they differ on so many points?

Strong avoids this question by claiming that the document given in Stedingk's memoirs is a condensed version of the original. But what does Count Bjornstjerna, the editor of Stedingk's posthumous memoirs, have to say? According to him, Napoleon sent Duroc to St. Petersburg soon after the signing of the Armed Neutrality. From Napoleon, there originated,

Chimerical plans of the invasion of British India.

It is with this goal that General Duroc was sent to St. Petersburg. We have found in the papers of Baron Stedingk the plan in question, which we reproduce here as being little known in its details.<sup>27</sup>

Note that Bjornstjerna at no time implies that he has abridged the document in question. He simply reproduces it. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that any other papers exist. If they did, why would they have not been published? If they did not what could have been the source of Stedingk's information?

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<sup>26</sup>Bjornstjerna, ed., II, pp. 6-7.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 6. The emphasis is mine.

This last question can be answered. Between 1828 and 1838, thirteen volumes were published in Paris under the title Mémoires tirés des papiers d'un homme d'État sur les causes secrètes qui ont déterminé la politique des cabinets dans les guerres de la Révolution (depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1815). As one historian notes, the "authorship of this work has been hotly disputed; also its dependability."<sup>28</sup> The seventh volume of this work appeared in 1828. This fact is important because Count Stedingk did not die until 1836.<sup>29</sup> This work was a very popular and widely read book. Thus, it is quite possible that the Count could have read it. On page 497 of volume seven, there is a very interesting passage. It is reproduced below and compared with the Stedingk version.

Mémoires tirés

A French army 35,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Massena, shall be moved from France to Ulm, whence with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

Stedingk document

A French army of thirty-five thousand infantrymen, with all the material of its light artillery, will proceed from the frontiers of France to Ulm, with the consent of Austria, there it will find boats, and will sail out from there on the Danube.

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<sup>28</sup> Sydney S. Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France, A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797, II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 1024.

<sup>29</sup> "Stedingk," Grand dictionnaire universel, XIV (n.d.), p. 1074.

Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok; thence it shall move to Tzaritzin on the Volga, where it will find boats to convey it to Astrakhan.

There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea, from Astrakhan to Astrabad, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

The march from the frontiers of France to Astrabad will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army to the banks of the Indus, by the route of Herat, Ferah and Candahar.

Arrived at the Black Sea, a Russian fleet will transport it as far as Taganrok, whence it will go to Tzaritzin, on the Volga, where, provided with boats, it will re-embark in order to descend the river as far as Astrakhan.

There, a Russian army of thirty-five thousand men, fifteen thousand of them infantrymen, ten thousand cavalymen and ten thousand Cossacks,\* provided with large trains of artillery, will unite with the French army, to which it will furnish the necessary horses for its artillery and its transport.

The combined army will be transported by the Caspian Sea from Astrakhan to Astrabad, where depots of munitions of all kinds necessary for the army will be established.

This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabad is estimated at approximately eighty days, and it will need another fifty days in order for it to reach the right bank of the Indus with the body of the army, whence the march will proceed through Herat, Ferah and Candahar; in all, one hundred-thirty days of march or transport for the French troops, who will be, as well as the Russians under the principal command of General Massena (according to the express request which the Emperor Paul had made for him.)

Paul afterwards  
agreed to increase  
the Cossacks to  
50,000.<sup>30</sup>

\*Paul had already  
ordered the mustering of  
50,000 Cossacks for this  
expedition, when he died.<sup>31</sup>

From a glance, it is obvious that these two passages agree paragraph by paragraph. The only exception is the reference to General Massena. This appears in the first paragraph in the Mémoires tirés and appears in the last paragraph of the Stedingk document. Other than that, there is not a single factual difference between the two passages. Each paragraph contains the same facts and each has a similar phraseology. Thus, we conclude that the source of the Stedingk document published in 1845 is the passage in the Mémoires tirés published in 1828. In short, it may be proposed that the Stedingk "papers" never existed save in Mr. Strong's imagination.

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<sup>30</sup>Unfortunately, this work was unavailable. This passage is taken from Walter K. Kelly, The History of Russia, From the Earliest Period to the Present Time, II (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1855), pp. 190-191. This same passage is given also in a slightly different translation in: Archibald Allison, History of Europe, From the Commencement of the French Revolution in M.DCC.LXXXIX to the Restoration of the Bourbons in M.DCCC.XV, IV (5th ed.; London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1843), pp. 537-538, n. 1. This seems to be corroborated by another source. Andrés Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, II, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Vol. CXV (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), pp. 190-191, n. 1, gives exactly the same version as that in Stedingk and the Mémoires tirés. He does not cite the source of his information. However, he did make use of the Mémoires tirés. See: Muriel, II, pp. 187, 247. Thus, it is clear that the text cited is correctly given by Kelly. The last sentence quoted in the Mémoires tirés column comes from Kelly's text.

<sup>31</sup>Bjornstjerna, ed., II, pp. 6-7.

It might be argued that the case presented above is based on circumstantial evidence. This is true. But so is that of Mr. Strong. Which of the two arguments is the more compelling? In philosophy, there is a dictum known as Occam's Razor. According to it, the way to choose between two competing explanations is to choose the one with the fewest assumptions. Mr. Strong assumes that Stedingk possessed the original papers on which de Hoffmanns based his account. He further assumes that these papers came into de Hoffmanns' possession four years after Stedingk's death. He further assumes that by 1845 these papers were in Bjornstjerna's possession. Finally, he also assumes that Bjornstjerna decided to give only an abridged version of the original papers. That makes four assumptions.

On the other hand, there is the alternate explanation provided here. We assume that either Stedingk or Bjornstjerna<sup>32</sup> noted the passage in the Mémoires tirés and

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<sup>32</sup>Bjornstjerna was the son-in-law of Stedingk. He was also Swedish ambassador to London from 1828 to 1846. He wrote two books on India. The first was Det Brittiska riket i Ostindien, 1839. The second was Théogonie, philosophie et cosmogonie des Indous, 1843. Thus, he had the knowledge of India and might have been the forger. See also: "Bjoernstjerna (Magnus-Frédéric-Ferdinand)," Grand dictionnaire universel, II (n.d.), p. 782; "Bjoernstierna (Magnus-Frédéric-Ferdinand)," Nouvelle Biographie générale, VI (1853), cols. 152-153; and "Bjoernstjerna (Magno Frederico Ferdinando)," Enciclopedia universal ilustrada, VIII (n.d.), p. 1039.

slightly altered it. It was then published in the Mémoires posthumes in 1845; seventeen years after it appeared in the Mémoires tirés. This explanation seems more logical and contains fewer assumptions than that of Mr. Strong. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we conclude that the Stedingk document is a slightly altered version of the passage in the Mémoires tirés and that Stedingk or Bjornstjerna are the two most likely people to have done this. The Stedingk "papers" never existed.

If there were no Stedingk "papers" were the authors of the Mémoires tirés the originators of this version? The answer is no. In 1827, one year before the appearance of the seventh volume of the Mémoires tirés, the fourth volume of Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon Buonaparte was published in Paris. On pages 375 and 376, is an almost identical description of a Franco-Russian plan to invade India. There are some slight differences between this version and that given by Stedingk. For instance, Scott says the combined army would take 45 days instead of 50 days to reach India from Astrabad.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, it is remarkably similar in most aspects to the version given by Stedingk and in the Mémoires tirés.

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<sup>33</sup> Sir Walter Scott, The Life of Napoleon Buona-  
parte, Emperor of the French; with a Preliminary View of  
the French Revolution, IV (Paris: Treuttel and Würtz,  
1827), pp. 375-376.

Are we to conclude that Sir Walter Scott is the originator of this version? Again, the answer is no. All during the 1820s, there was widespread talk in the British and French press of a Russian invasion of India. This was especially true after the Russo-Iranian War of 1827-1828 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829.<sup>34</sup> What is the origin of this idea? This question will be examined in detail later in this chapter.

The fourth and final source material which we must discuss is the Mémoire de Leibnitz, a Louis XIV, sur la conquête de l'Égypte, publié avec une préface et des notes, par M. de Hoffmanns, suivi d'un Projet d'expédition dans l'Inde, par terre, concerté entre la Premier Consul et l'Empereur Paul Ier, en mil huit cent, published in Paris in 1840. This work has been the basis of the majority of accounts dealing with the Indian expedition of 1801. For example, Allen McConnell, in his short but excellent biography of Alexander I, unknowingly makes reference to the plan first outlined in this pamphlet.

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<sup>34</sup>For a discussion of English public opinion on this point, see: John H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), Chapters III and IV. For French public opinion, see: Raymond T. McNally, "The Origins of Russophobia in France 1812-1830," Slavic Review, XVII (1958), pp. 173-189.

Even more detrimental for Russia, but less harmful to Britain, was the wild plan for a campaign by 20,000 Don Cossacks through Khiva and Bukhara to conquer India. In reply to Bonaparte's practical questions, Paul I assured him that the Ottoman Porte's attitude was of no concern, that there was adequate shipping, that Astrabad was not a barren land but had open and spacious roads, plentiful water, grass, and rice, and so on. All this was fantasy.<sup>35</sup>

So it was! But not for the reasons Mr. Allen McConnell gives. As with the Stedingk document, there is good reason to believe that the de Hoffmanns pamphlet is a forgery.

Since we have concluded that there were no Stedingk "papers," the de Hoffmanns pamphlet could not have been based on them. In turn, this means that Mr. John Strong's thesis concerning the pamphlet's authenticity must also be incorrect. We have also seen that the Stedingk document appears to predate the de Hoffmanns pamphlet. After all, we have traced its origins to the 1820s. Finally, we have noted the various differences between these two versions. Given all this, there is no reason to give a point by point rebuttal of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet. Instead, we shall concentrate our efforts on finding out who M. de Hoffmanns might have been and what his reasons might have been for publishing a forgery in 1840.

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<sup>35</sup>Allen McConnell, Tsar Alexander I, Paternalistic Reformer (pbk. ed.: New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1970), pp. 48-49. Compare this passage with the Objections and Responses in (Hoffman), pp. 53-56.

The first thing that strikes a historian investigating this topic is the title of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet. In English, it reads as follows: Leibnitz's Memoir to Louis XIV, on the Conquest of Egypt, Published with a Preface and Notes, by M. de Hoffmanns, Followed by a Project of an Expedition to India, by Land, Concerted Between the First Consul and the Emperor Paul I, in Eighteen Hundred. The "Leibnitz" in question turns out to be Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, the German philosopher and mathematician who lived from 1646 to 1716. From 1666 to 1673, Leibniz was in the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mainz. In 1672, he learned that Louis XIV intended to invade the Netherlands. In an attempt to divert Louis' attention from Europe, Leibniz composed his Consilium Aegyptiacum. This work was based on an immense amount of research. The "memoir" cited in the title of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet is actually a short summary of the Consilium Aegyptiacum in the form of a letter to Louis XIV. The letter and a summary of the Consilium were obtained on Napoleon's orders by General Édouard Mortier during his occupation of Hesse-Kassel in 1806.<sup>36</sup> It may have been filed in the archives of

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<sup>36</sup>"Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von," New Columbia Encyclopedia (4th ed.; 1975), p. 1554; Foucher de Careil, "Leibniz (Godefroi-Guillaume, baron de)," Biographie universelle, XXIV (n.d.), p. 7; "Mortier (Édouard-Adolphe-Casimir-Joseph)," Grand dictionnaire universel, XI (n.d.), p. 597.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. Thus, the title of the pamphlet is misleading.

Leibniz's letter can be divided into three parts: 1) the proposal of a French conquest of Egypt, 2) the consequences of a French war with Holland, and 3) the advantages and disadvantages of both policies.<sup>37</sup> Scholarly footnotes explain allusions in the text of the letter and the whole is preceded by an introduction of eleven pages.<sup>38</sup> As far as this part of the pamphlet is concerned, the modern historian could have no objections.

What arouses one's suspicions is the treatment the author gives to the second part of his pamphlet: i.e., the "Project of an Expedition to India." On page iv, the reader is greeted by the following enigmatic statement:

As I do not wish to deceive anyone on the source of my materials, nor to compromise, by my silence, honorable friends, I believe it necessary to declare here that I owe only to my own researches the knowledge and the mastery of the documents that I publish.  
de Hoffmanns 39

Further, in reading the introduction, one finds only a few cursory remarks on Napoleon and none at all concerning Paul or Russia.<sup>40</sup> On page 38, we find the following statement:

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<sup>37</sup> (Hoffman), pp. 1-20, 20-25, 25-35.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. v-xv.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. iv.      <sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. xiii-xv.

Memento  
 The Attempt Against the Life of the First Consul,  
 the 24th of December 1800,  
 and  
 The Tragic Death of the Emperor Paul I,  
 the 24th of March 1801  
 were the fatal results of the Project of expedition  
 to India.  
 It is known from where the blows emanated.<sup>41</sup>

The clear implication of this statement is that the responsible party was Britain. Finally, the author treats his second document in a different manner from that of the first. Not one explanatory, or indeed any, footnote appears in his presentation of the second document.<sup>42</sup> In short, while the author treats his first document in a scholarly manner, he does not do so in regard to the second document.

The obvious question is "why"? The answer of this study is that the second document is a forgery. Why else would the author refuse to give his sources? Why else would he revive the old charges made by Napoleon?<sup>43</sup> Why else would he refuse to subject the document to the same scholarly treatment that he had given to the first? The author gives no answers to any of these questions save his silence. He asks us to accept his account on faith. In short, we are dealing with propaganda and not history.

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 39-51.

<sup>43</sup>See Rambaud, II, p. 141.

If indeed we are dealing with propaganda, the question then becomes one of determining what motives someone in 1840 would have had in resurrecting the story of a Franco-Russian plan to invade India. In other words, who had the motive, the means and the opportunity to carry out this hoax? The pamphlet itself gives us very little to go on. No doubt this was the author's intention. All we know is that it was published in Paris in 1840. Its author gave his name as M. de Hoffmanns. From his treatment of the materials, he would appear to have had some skills as a scholar. That is all we know for a certainty. If this were all the evidence we could obtain, our search would end before it had begun.

Fortunately, we have another source of information. In 1845, the book Inde was published in Paris. The first part of this work was written by Adolphe Philibert Dubois de Jancigny. In a footnote beginning on page 105 and running to page 110, he reprinted the entire text of the pamphlet's second document. If this were all that he had done, his work would be of no use to us. However, at the end of his footnote, he added the following:

We take these curious details which one can read in a very important brochure bearing this title: Mémoire de Leibnitz . . . , and concerning which we owe the opportune communication to the obligingness of the author.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Adolphe Philibert Dubois de Jancigny and Xavier Raymond, Inde (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1845), p. 110, n. 1. The emphasis is mine.

The importance of this statement is obvious. Dubois de Jancigny knew the author of the pamphlet. Further, the author pointed out his pamphlet to Dubois de Jancigny while the latter was writing his own book. The question then is when and where did Dubois de Jancigny write his own book?

Adolphe Philibert Dubois de Jancigny was born in Paris in 1795. He fought in the final campaigns of the Empire and was dismissed with half-pay in 1817. In that year, he set out for the Orient. For the next twelve years, he remained in British India studying the language, institutions and customs. He returned to France in 1829. However, in 1830, he was forced to return to India because of family interests (debts?). Soon thereafter, he became aide-de-camp to the King of the Oudh. He remained in this post until 1834; when he returned to Europe on a mission for the King. His mission completed, he settled in Paris. In 1840, his military rank was regularized and he was appointed military attaché to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beginning in January, 1840, he published a series of articles on British India and China. With these he attracted the attention of high government officials. In April of 1841, he was sent on a mission to China from which he did not return until 1846.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Jean Paul Faivre, L'Expansion française dans le Pacifique de 1800 à 1842 (Paris: Nouvelles Editions

This biographical sketch presents the historian with a problem. Dubois de Jancigny left France for the Far East in April, 1841. He did not return to France until 1846. His book, Inde, was published in 1845. How could the book be published while he was in the Far East? The answer is actually quite simple. A careful reading of the text reveals the fact that Dubois de Jancigny wrote his portions of the book before he left France in April, 1841.<sup>46</sup> Indeed on page 147, the publishers note that they had waited "more than two years" for his return. They then decided to have the work completed by Xavier Raymond.<sup>47</sup> Thus, it is clear that Dubois de Jancigny wrote his portion of Inde while in Paris. As to the date of composition, we are less certain. However, on page 138, he makes a reference to the "month of January past (1841)."<sup>48</sup> Thus, it would appear that the text was written between January and April of 1841.

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Latines, 1953), pp. 387-395; S. J. Delmont, "Dubois de Jancigny (Adolphe Philibert)," Dictionnaire de biographie française, XI (1965), cols. 988-989; "Dubois de Jancigny (Adolphe Philibert)," Grand dictionnaire universale, VI (n.d.), p. 1316; "Dubois de Jancigny (Adolfo Filiberto)," Enciclopedia universal ilustrada, XVIII (n.d.), pp. 2311-2312.

<sup>46</sup>Dubois de Jancigny and Raymond, Inde, pp. 75, 105.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 147; Denis, "Dubois," col., 885.

<sup>48</sup>Dubois de Jancigny, Inde, p. 138, n. 1.

All these facts may appear to be no more than mildly interesting minutiae. In reality, they are very important data. We know that the de Hoffmanns pamphlet was published in Paris in 1840. We now know that Dubois de Jancigny wrote his portion of Inde in Paris between January and April of 1841. When this information is coupled with his reference to the "author" of the pamphlet, we are able to draw the conclusion that M. de Hoffmanns was in Paris at the same time Dubois de Jancigny was writing Inde. Thus, we should center our search on Paris if we want to seek the identity of the pamphlet's author.

Before looking for the pamphlet's author, it would be useful to narrow the scope of our search even more. After all, the entire population of Paris, even in 1840, makes a staggering number of suspects. The time and place as well as the overall thrust of the pamphlet provides some clues. In general, its subject is the political situation in the East.

What was the diplomatic situation in the East in 1840? What might be termed a double crisis was well underway in Syria, Persia and Afghanistan in 1840. The crisis had its origins in 1831 when Muhammed Ali, the ruler of Egypt, invaded Syria and hoped to become the new Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. In December of 1832, his army defeated that of Sultan Mahmud at Konya, less than 150 miles from Constantinople. The Sultan appealed to the

British for aid. However, this was the time of the first great Reform Bill. In addition, the British faced diplomatic crises in Belgium, Portugal and Italy. France had just gone through a revolution of her own. Besides, she had helped to train the Egyptian army and was sympathetic to Muhammed Ali. From November, 1830 through September, 1831 Nicholas I of Russia had been preoccupied with crushing the Polish Rebellion. However, by 1832, his hands were free. The Sultan was faced with the possibility of being dethroned by Muhammed Ali. He turned to the only power who would then come to his aid: Russia. In July, 1833, the Porte and Russia signed the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, providing that: 1) the Porte pledged to close the Straits to the warships of all powers in time of war, 2) Russia guaranteed the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire and 3) Russia promised the Porte military assistance should the need arise. Further, by the Convention of Kutahia, Mahumud had to cede Syria to Egypt. As one historian writes, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi "had the effect of making Russia the guarantor of the Turkish Empire and marked the height of her influence in Constantinople."<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 85; David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914 (London: Methuen and Co., 1977), p. 34.

The Sultan was by no means satisfied with this situation and in April of 1839 his armies attacked those of Muhammed Ali in Syria. The Turks were soundly defeated and their entire fleet deserted and sailed to Alexandria. At this point, Mahumud died and was succeeded by the sixteen-year-old Abdul Mejid. The Ottoman Empire appeared to be on the verge of collapse. This situation appeared to be tailor-made for Russia to further tighten her grip on Constantinople.

But this time, Britain was not distracted and immediately proposed that Constantinople be defended by the combined powers. Nicholas objected and tried to invoke the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Austria sided with Britain and Russia was forced to yield. By December, Russia had agreed to let the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi lapse in 1841. In addition, the closure of the Straits became a part of the general law of Europe. This was to Russia's advantage as it helped to isolate the Causasian tribes she was then fighting. Further, all the major powers except France adhered to this settlement. Thus, one of Nicholas I's most cherished goals, the isolation of France, was achieved. Muhammed Ali was forced out of Syria by the British and was allowed to become the hereditary ruler of Egypt instead. All this was accomplished by November of 1840.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>Gillard, pp. 60-61; Jelavich, pp. 90-91.

The other major area of crisis was in Persia and Afghanistan. Partly under the influence of the Russian ambassador, Count Simonich, the Shah of Persia laid siege to Herat in 1838. The British viewed this with alarm for two reasons. First, Herat was of great strategic importance. Anyone who wanted to invade India would most likely use it as point d'appui. Second, a Persian victory under Russian aegis would greatly increase Russian influence in the region and deal a blow to British prestige.

Things were even more complicated by the political situation in northern India and Afghanistan. The British had been expecting some move on the part of the Russians toward India and had sought alliances with the neighboring powers as a result. They had succeeded in the Sind in 1838. They were also allied to Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab. This left only Dost Muhammed, the Khan of Kabul. The complication concerned Ranjit Singh's conquest of Peshawar in 1834, which until then had been under Afghan control. It was Dost Muhammed's policy to regain it. The problem was that, by supporting Dost Muhammed, the British would lose the support of Ranjit Singh and vice versa.<sup>51</sup>

Faced with this dilemma, the British sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul. He arrived there in September of 1837,

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<sup>51</sup>Gillard, pp. 47-49.

but all he could offer Dost Muhammed was the restraint of Ranjit Singh. When this became apparent, Dost Muhammed turned to a Russian agent sent to Kabul by Count Simonich, Captain I. V. Vitkevich. With Burnes' departure in April of 1838, the field was left to Vitkevich. He promised Dost Muhammed full Russian support. This debacle, coupled with the Persian siege of Herat, seemed to presage the rise of Russian power and influence on the Indian frontier.<sup>52</sup>

The British reacted by occupying Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf and demanding that the Shah give up the siege of Herat. After the failure of an all-out assault planned by Russian officers, the Shah withdrew. Eventually, he gave in to the British demands in 1841.

In the meantime, the British also decided that military action was needed in Afghanistan. In the spring of 1839, they invaded that country. By the end of the summer, Dost Muhammed had fled and the British had installed their own puppet as the Khan of Kabul and Kandahar. By this time, the Russians had repudiated the actions of Simonich and Vitkevich. Nevertheless, in an attempt to regain their prestige, General V. A. Perovski was ordered to take Khiva. The campaign took place during the winter of

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<sup>52</sup>William Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan (1837-1907), Illinois Studies in the Social Studies, Vol. XXI, no. 4 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1937), pp. 10-13.

1839-1840. Owing to the intense cold, the breakdown of the supply train, especially the loss of most of the camels, and the constant harassment by nomadic tribesmen, Perovskiyy was forced to return to Orenburg long before he reached Khiva.<sup>53</sup>

Up to this point, a direct clash between Russia and Britain had been possible. After the Russian debacle before Khiva, the British appeared to have carried the day. But in November of 1841, the British position in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. The British agent was killed and the garrison at Kabul set out for India in January of 1842. Most never made it, as they were massacred by the Afghans. The British returned in September, 1842, but withdrew again in December of that year.<sup>54</sup>

Given this description of the political situation in the East, what can be said concerning the de Hoffmanns pamphlet? First, it appeared at a time of great tension between Britain and Russia. Since it was written in Paris, we might suppose that its author was French. But this supposition is hardly likely. The pamphlet talked of Franco-Russian cooperation in the form of a joint invasion of India. Russophobia was on the rise in France as well

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-19; Gillard, p. 54; "Khivinskiye pokhody 1839-40 i 1873 g.," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XXXVII (1903), pp. 187-188.

<sup>54</sup> Gillard, pp. 54-55.

as Britain. And as we have seen, Nicholas I was hostile toward France. It goes without saying that an Englishman would not have portrayed a Franco-Russian invasion of India in such a manner. • Therefore, it would appear that the pamphlet could not have been written as a positive piece of propaganda. That is, it would not have been written as an approval of a Russian invasion of India. Instead, it must have been intended to embarrass Russia and alarm Britain at a time when both countries were drifting towards war.

Still, it might be argued that the reference to the supposed British involvement in the assassination of Paul I and the attempt on the life of Napoleon contradicts this conclusion. It might do so if this document were genuine. But since we have good reason to believe that it is a forgery, we must look for another explanation. First, the reference would have been popular with most French readers and thus would have given the pamphlet credibility in their eyes. Second, such a statement would tend to authenticate the pamphlet by reverse logic. After all, the British reader might reason that the author would not needlessly insult the British if he wanted them to act against the Russians. If the reader did so, he might not be tempted to look beyond the pamphlet. Thus, we conclude that the pamphlet was a piece of anti-Russian propaganda designed to incite British and French public

opinion against Russia.

The author of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet was not the only purveyor of anti-Russian propaganda at this time. In his book Russie, Jean Marie Chopin--the former secretary to Prince Aleksandr Kurakin, who was briefly Foreign Minister during Paul's reign and later ambassador to France under Alexander I--wrote the following in 1838:

In a work composed from the documents collected by the agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is given at length the plan which Peter I had conceived for the aggrandizement of his empire; and if one follows the march of Russian policy since this monarch, one will recognize that the cabinet of Petersburg has not changed masters.<sup>55</sup>

Chopin then goes on to give a brief résumé of the "plan." Though he does not identify the "work" from which he obtained his information, it is clear from a comparison of the texts that the "work" is the infamous Des progrès de la puissance russe by Charles Lesur. The latter has been rightly called "one of the most influential works in the entire history of Russophobia."<sup>56</sup>

Again, this might be mildly interesting, but what has it to do with our topic? Actually, much. It has been known for some time that Lesur based his "résumé" on a

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<sup>55</sup>Jean Marie Chopin, Russie (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1838), p. 245, n. 1.

<sup>56</sup>McNally, "Russophobia in France," p. 173; Charles L. Lesur, Des progrès de la puissance russe, depuis son origins jusqu'au commencement du XIXe siècle (Paris: Chez Fantin, 1812), p. 178.

memorandum submitted to the Directory in 1797 by Michel Sokolnicki. For long, it was thought that he was the author of the so-called Testament of Peter the Great.<sup>57</sup> Others claim the Chevalier d'Eon was its author.<sup>58</sup> The most recent scholarship suggests that the Testament had no single author. Instead, it can be traced in various forms back to the seventeenth century. What makes this important for this study is the following statement:

Whenever East European political émigrés (whether Hungarian, Ukrainian, or Polish) and members of the French Foreign Ministry met, the specter of the apocryphal 'plan of Peter I' raised its head.<sup>59</sup>

Now the Testament is manifestly a piece of anti-Russian propaganda. We have postulated that the de Hoffmanns pamphlet is one also. If the former was composed in part, by émigrés, then the latter might also have been propaganda. Therefore, it is possible that the author of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet was a Hungarian, Ukrainian or Polish émigré. Given the date, the last choice appears to be the best.

Why? The fact is that in 1840 there was a large Polish émigré community in Paris which was violently

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<sup>57</sup> Paul Blackstock, Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political Intrigue Among Nations (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp. 26-29.

<sup>58</sup> Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 16-17; and "d'Eon de Bomon," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XIX (1894), p. 661.

<sup>59</sup> Orest Subtelny, "'Peter I's Testament': A Reassessment," Slavic Review, XXXIII (1974), p. 677.

anti-Russian. We have already alluded to the cause of this situation above. In November of 1830, the Poles rebelled against Russian rule. The rebellion was not finally crushed until September of the following year. By December of 1831, the Polish émigrés in Paris had split into two factions: the Aristocratic and the Democratic.

One man closely tied to the Democratic faction was Leonard Chodzko. Born in 1800, he had studied at the University of Vilna. In 1819, he became Prince Michael Oginski's secretary. In 1826, he settled in Paris. During the July Revolution of 1830, he was aide-de-camp to the Marquis de Lafayette. One Polish historian, Szymon Aszkenazy, conjectured "that Chodzko was the link between the Paris underground authorities and the Warsaw conspiracy."<sup>60</sup> Chodzko also served both on Lafayette's Franco-Polish Committee and the Permanent National Committee, the umbrella organization of the Polish émigrés in France. But by the end of 1831, it was under the control of the Democratic faction. Thus, it is clear that Chodzko was a member of the Democratic faction.

Though active in liberal politics, Chodzko is remembered today for his work as a scholar. Soon after his arrival in Paris, he began to write works on Polish

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<sup>60</sup>Marian Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770-1861 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 165.

history and literature. Some were substantial works. Others were clearly propagandistic in nature. For example, in 1834, he published a work entitled Grande carte historique et géographique des agrandissements de la Russie de 1682 à 1834. What makes this of more than passing interest is that two years later another work important in the history of Russophobia was published. Its "editor" was Theodore Frédéric Gaillardet. The work was entitled Mémoires du chevalier d'Eon. This book was the first to give the full "text" of the Testament. In writing on the origins of the Testament, one modern historian says the following:

What had been (Gaillardet's) motives in 1836 for publicizing the 'Testament?' It is possible that the idea of reviving it may have emanated from a group of Polish émigrés anxious to sound the alarm at the unhindered expansion of the Russian Empire, which had recently engulfed the kingdom of Poland. . . . [T]he person to draw [Gaillardet's] attention to the 'plan' may well have been Leonard Chodzko, the chief link between the Polish emigration and the French radical movement.<sup>61</sup>

There is circumstantial evidence to back this claim up. For example, one of Chodzko's more substantial works was La Pologne historique, littéraire, monumentale,

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<sup>61</sup>L. R. Lewitter, "The Apocryphal Testament of Peter the Great," Polish Review, VI, no. 3 (1961), pp. 39-40. See also Ferdinand Denis, "Chodzko (Leonard Boreyko)," Nouvelle biographie générale, XII (1854), col. 348; A. Krebs, "Gaillardet (Theodore Frédéric)," Dictionnaire de biographie française, XV (1882), col. 108.

pittoresque, et illustrée, ou scènes historiques, monnaies, médailles, costumes, armes, châteaux, églises, cultes, chants, légendes, traditions populaires, finances, industrie, commerce, poésie, beaux-arts. The second volume of this three volume work was published in 1839. In it, Chodzko published the Testament. His source was Gaillardet. Thus, we see that the Democratic faction of the Polish émigré community in Paris was involved in disseminating anti-Russian forgeries.<sup>62</sup>

From all the foregoing, the reader might be led to conclude that Chodzko was the author of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet. He was a historian. He was in Paris in 1840 and 1841. He was involved in attempts to publish anti-Russian forgeries. Unfortunately, this is not enough. No one has ever linked his name with the de Hoffmanns pamphlet. Further, we must remember that Chodzko was tied to the French radicals. The de Hoffmanns pamphlet portrays Napoleon as "expiating his sins on the high rock of St. Helena."<sup>63</sup> This phrase seems to imply the acceptance of the Napoleonic legend. The liberals of France did not accept the legend at this time. Indeed, they were

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<sup>62</sup>"Chodzko," Grand dictionnaire universel, IV (n.d.), p. 168; Denis, "Chodzko," col., 348; Eugene Schyler, Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia: A Study of Historical Biography, II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884), p. 514.

<sup>63</sup>(Hoffman), p. xiv.

hostile to the memory of Napoleon.<sup>64</sup> Chodzko would have shared these views. In short, he or another member of the Democratic faction was not likely to have been the author of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet.

If the Democratic faction of the Polish emigration did not produce the pamphlet, what of the Aristocratic faction? The very personification of this faction was Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. Scion of a great Polish aristocratic family, Czartoryski was sent in his youth to the court of Catherine II, soon after the third and final partition of Poland. In St. Petersburg, he met Alexander and became his life-long friend. Czartoryski was Russian Foreign Minister from 1804 to 1805 and helped to organize the Third Coalition against Napoleon. After its failure, he did not regain his influence with Alexander until 1815. In that year, he helped his friend create the Kingdom of Poland at the Congress of Vienna. He eventually became disillusioned and joined the Rebellion in 1830. After the collapse of resistance in Poland, Czartoryski escaped to the free city of Cracow on September 26, 1831. The following day Russian troops invaded the city. With the help of the Austrian consul, he crossed over to Galicia under the assumed name of George Hoffman. From there, he made

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<sup>64</sup>Pieter Geyl, Napoleon For and Against, trans. O. Renier (1949; 3rd prt.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 35-36.

his way to London via Leipzig. He remained in Britain until 1832; attempting to have the issue of Poland raised in the House of Commons. Later that year he left for France and finally settled in Paris in 1833.<sup>65</sup>

In 1834, Czartoryski decided to set up a Polish Government in Exile. He was recognized by his supporters virtually as King of Poland. From his headquarters at the Hotel Lambert, Czartoryski went about the business of establishing Polish emissaries in all the capitals of Europe. He had close ties with the British Foreign Office and good relations with the French Foreign Ministry. Emissaries were also active in Tehran and had contacts reaching Kabul, Bukhara and Khiva. One of Czartoryski's adherents was admitted to the British diplomatic service and sent to Turkey as a military advisor. In addition, contacts were established with Romanian patriots and with Polish soldiers sent to Caucasia to serve in the Russian Army.<sup>66</sup>

According to one historian, the "strategy underlying Czartoryski's diplomacy was to make the Polish

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<sup>65</sup>W. F. Reddaway et al., The Cambridge History of Poland, II (Cambridge: University Press, 1941), p. 315; Adam Gielgud, ed., Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and His Correspondence with Alexander I, II (1888; rpt.; Orono, Minne.: Academic International, 1968), pp. 316-336; Kukiel, pp. 192, 209.

<sup>66</sup>Kukiel, pp. 227, 230-231, 235, 239; Reddaway, II, pp. 315, 319.

question a central issue of the two main problems agitating Europe, namely the Near Eastern question and the rise of Liberalism."<sup>67</sup> Even before he had established himself at the Hotel Lambert, Czartoryski had passed on a memorandum to Lord Palmerston in May, 1833 with his views on Russian policy. According to Czartoryski, Russia was responsible for encroachments and threats in Poland, Belgium, Turkey, Germany, Spain and Portugal. In addition, he wrote of "Russian preparations for future interventions in India."<sup>68</sup> In 1835, he arranged for David Urquhart to publish in the Portfolio Russian diplomatic documents left in the Belvedere Palace by the Grand Duke Constantine in 1830. Czartoryski himself had smuggled these papers out of Poland. In 1836, he knew of and gave money to finance Urquhart in the famous Vixen incident. This almost led to war between Russia and Britain. Also in 1839, Czartoryski held talks with Palmerston, in which, among other topics, he pointed to the Russian danger to India. The following is characteristic of his comments on this occasion. "By leaving Russia to act as she pleases, you expose to the greatest dangers the independence of the Asiatic States, and you own dominions in India."<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Reddaway, II, pp. 319-320.

<sup>68</sup>Kukiel, p. 229.

<sup>69</sup>Gielgud, II, p. 341; Kukiel, pp. 235-238, 240-241; Gleason, Russophobia, p. 177.

During the diplomatic crises of the late 1830s and the early 1840s, Czartoryski sought on each occasion to unite the western powers against Russia in hopes of re-opening the Polish question. When in 1840 Palmerston sided with Austria and Russia against France and Muhammed Ali, Czartoryski "did all he could to prevent it, by trying to persuade British statesmen and British public opinion of the necessity of coming to terms with France and to convince those in France of the necessity to compromise."<sup>70</sup> As we already know, he failed in this. Indeed, as one historian writes, "nothing Czartoryski undertook in the diplomatic field turned out advantageously for Poland."<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, we see in this policy that Czartoryski raised the specter of the Russian threat to Turkey and India in an attempt to influence British foreign policy.

From the above, it would appear that if any one group had a motive for publishing the de Hoffmanns pamphlet, it was Czartoryski's. We might even jump to the conclusion that Czartoryski himself was the author of the pamphlet. After all, he did use the pseudonym "George Hoffman" in 1831. He had the motive. Such a publication would be in line with his policy goals. He was in Paris in 1840. Against this argument are two points. First,

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<sup>70</sup>Kukiel, p. 242.

<sup>71</sup>Reddaway, II, p. 320.

none of his biographers mention him being connected with this pamphlet or any other forgery of the time. Second, the author of the pamphlet clearly states he owes to his "own researches the knowledge and the mastery of the documents."<sup>72</sup> This would imply that he did the research himself. If the Prince had been engaged in this kind of research himself, it is difficult to see how he could have kept this a secret. It might be argued in turn that a secretary could have done all the research. In reply, we say that if a secretary could have done the research, then he could have written the entire pamphlet. This would obviate any risk to Czartoryski as well. If this is the case, we must ask whether there were any of Czartoryski's subordinates who could have been the author of the pamphlet.

If we turn to Manfred Kridl's A Survey of Polish Literature and Culture, we find the following statement:

The conservative or aristocratic party headed by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, had few writers during the first decades of the great exile. The most notable were Karol Sienkiewicz and Karol Hoffman, whose work fell rather in the field of history, where they collected valuable material.<sup>73</sup>

Marian Kukiel writes that this Hoffman was "a distinguished political writer and historian, one of Czartoryski's

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<sup>72</sup> (Hoffman), p. iv.

<sup>73</sup> Manfred Kridl, A Survey of Polish Literature and Culture, trans. O. Scherer-Virski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 317. The emphasis is mine.

ablest collaborators."<sup>74</sup>

Karol Boromeusz Alexander Hoffman was born in the province of Mazovia in 1798. He studied law in Warsaw. There he joined secret societies and became involved in revolutionary politics. As a result, he came under the suspicion of the Russian government and was barred from all civil service jobs. In 1825, he started a legal journal entitled Polska Themida. Two years later, he published a translation of the works of Franklin. In 1828, the Russian government declared him eligible for a civil service post. In that year, he was appointed an advisor to the Bank of Poland. He maintained this post until the outbreak of the rebellion. Immediately thereafter, he published in several languages a work entitled Die grosse Woche der Pole. In 1831, he was made a director of the Bank of Poland and sent abroad to negotiate a loan. He was in Dresden, Saxony when the last resistance was crushed. His next work was written in Polish and published in Warsaw in 1831. It was entitled (in English) A Glance at the Political State of the Kingdom of Poland under Russian Domination, 1815-1830. According to one source, it was based on "the secret papers abandoned in Warsaw by the Russian government."<sup>75</sup> These papers seem

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<sup>74</sup>Kukiel, p. 220.

<sup>75</sup>Victor Rosenwald, "Hoffmann (Charles Alexandre),"

to be those left by the Grand Duke Constantine in the Belvedere Palace and published by Czartoryski and Urquhart in the Portfolio. Thus, even at this early date, Hoffman was attached to Czartoryski.

Hoffman remained in Dresden until 1832; apparently to translate his last work into French. Later that year it was published in France. In the meantime, he was forced to leave Dresden on the demand of the Russian government. He moved to Paris and immediately attached himself to Czartoryski's party.<sup>76</sup> By this time, he had married Klementina Tanska, who became an important writer in her own right.<sup>76</sup> She died in 1845. Hoffman remained in Paris until 1848, during which he published at least three more books. In 1848, he returned to Dresden where he remarried and worked on the Polish journal Czas. In 1869, he published a work entitled History of Political Reform in Ancient Poland. He died there on July 3, 1875.<sup>77</sup>

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Nouvelle biographie générale, XXIV (1858), col., 898; Kukiel, p. 330.

<sup>76</sup>Bronislas Chlebowski and Manfred Kridl, La littérature polonaise au XIXe siècle (Paris: Institut d'études slaves de l'Université de Paris, 1933), pp. 57-59.

<sup>77</sup>"Gofman (Karl Aleksandr Hofmann)," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, IX (1893), p. 451; "Hoffmann (Charles Alexandre)," Dictionnaire universel des contemporains (1880), p. 945; "Hoffmann (Charles Alexandre)," Grand dictionnaire universel, IX (n.d.), p. 327; Rosenwald, "Hoffman," col., 898.

Given what we now know about the de Hoffmanns pamphlet and about Karol B. A. Hoffman, is it reasonable to conclude that the latter forged the former? Yes, it is. With the caveat that our case is still circumstantial, let us try to make a coherent picture of our evidence.

As we saw above, the political situation in the East in 1840 did not bode well for Czartoryski and his followers. It was his policy to unite himself with France and Britain against Russia. Under normal circumstances, the Eastern crisis of 1840 would have served his purposes. But Palmerston decided to ally himself to Russia and Austria in an attempt to free the Porte from Russian tutelage and to save it from Muhammed Ali. France, normally anti-Russian, would not cooperate because Muhammed Ali was her client. Czartoryski attempted to reconcile France and Britain, but failed. If he could not reconcile these two powers, the next best thing would be to break up the mariage de convenance between Russia and Britain.

It is here that Karol B. A. Hoffman probably entered the picture. It will be recalled that Czartoryski had good relations with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hoffman was a scholar in his employ. What could have been more natural than to allow him access to the diplomatic files? It will be recalled the Leibniz's letter to Louis XIV and the outline of the Aegyptiacum Consilium was brought to France in 1806. It is possible

(and here we speculate) that these papers were filed in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the other papers for the year 1806. If this is so, then it tells us that Hoffman's studies concerned the Napoleonic era. Further, it would mean that he would have seen other Napoleonic documents of the era of Tilsit and Erfurt. While studying these documents, he probably found the Leibniz letter by chance. Having seen Napoleon's correspondence in 1807 concerning a joint Franco-Russian expedition to India, he may have decided it would be possible to produce a more convincing version of the supposed Franco-Russian plan of 1801. Further, the Leibniz letter would be a perfect means to disguise his forgery. After all, the best lie is a half truth. How better to lend authenticity to a forgery than to associate it with a genuine document? It is our contention that this is exactly what Hoffman did. More than likely, he then got Prince Czartoryski's permission to publish his pamphlet. As a means of throwing suspicious readers off the track, he did not give his Christian name and slightly changed the spelling of his surname. As the source of his detailed information, he had: 1) his fertile imagination, 2) the contacts that the Poles had in Caucasia, Persia and Turkey and 3) the Napoleonic documents.

All of this sounds logical and fits in with the facts as we know them. Still, it would be better to have

some kind of hard evidence to back up our scenario.

Luckily, we do have such hard evidence. Recently, Muriel Atkin investigated the facts surrounding the de Hoffmanns pamphlet and came to the same conclusion that the pamphlet was a forgery. For instance, at the end of the pamphlet, there are a set of "Objections and Responses." Presumably, the "Objections" are Napoleon's and the "Responses" are Paul's.<sup>78</sup> According to Ms. Atkin, these "Objections and Responses" bear a very strong resemblance to a conversation between Alexander I and Caulaincourt recorded in the latter's report to Napoleon of January 21, 1808. Ms. Atkin writes as follows:

In the first document, Alexander and the questioner expressed concern about the great distance of the proposed invasion route, the fact that the route crossed a number of deserts, and the likelihood that the expedition would encounter serious opposition from Central Asian tribesmen. The answers were similar as well. Caulaincourt and his counterpart in the forged report stated that the length of the route would not be an insurmountable obstacle. The respondents in both accounts were confident that a Franco-Russian force would be superior to any Asian army; as for the hazards posed by the deserts, they both used virtually the same terms; the land in question was not desolate, on the contrary, it was well watered by rivers with food and forage found in abundance.<sup>79</sup>

Thus whoever the author of the pamphlet was, he most likely based his forgery on this document. Now Caulaincourt's

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<sup>78</sup> (Hoffman), pp. 53-56.

<sup>79</sup> Muriel Atkin, "The Pragmatic Diplomacy of Paul I: Russia's Relations with Asia, 1796-1801," Slavic Review, XXXVIII, no. 1 (1979), p. 73.

report was in the Foreign Ministry archives in 1840. While we cannot conclusively prove that Karol Hoffman saw it, he would have had entré into the archives as a protégé of Czartoryski. In short, Hoffman had the motive, the means and the opportunity to bring off this forgery. We therefore conclude that Karol B. A. Hoffman is the author of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet.

One point remains to be cleared up and our discussion of the de Hoffmanns pamphlet will be complete. So far, we have given no explanation for the appearance of the "Project" in Dubois de Jancigny's book or why Hoffman would contact him. The explanation is straightforward. Dubois de Jancigny was a military attaché to the Foreign Ministry in 1840. He might well have met Hoffman there. The pamphlet was probably published by this time. It probably caused an initial stir but eventually the interest waned. Moreover, a pamphlet, while useful, would have only a limited audience. From Dubois de Janicgny's articles in the Revue des Deux Mondes, Hoffman would have known of his expertise. From their personal contacts, he might have learned of the upcoming publication of the book Inde. A book has a much better circulation and lifetime than a pamphlet. How better to 1) reach a wider audience, 2) preserve the plan, and 3) further authenticate it by its appearance in Dubois de Jancigny's book? Of course, Hoffman would not have known of Dubois' mission to the

Far East and would not have counted on the delay in publication. Nevertheless, the "plan" was finally published in the book in 1845. With this, we have accounted for all the facts.

We have now looked at three important sources of the traditional account of the Indian expedition of 1801. It might be concluded that we have exhausted our topic. Such is not the case. It will be recalled that we concluded our discussion of the Stedingk document by promising to return to the topic of the origins of the idea of a Russian invasion of India held in the 1820s. As we have seen, both the Stedingk document and the de Hoffmans pamphlet are merely variations on the same theme. The question is, who was the original composer of this theme? Or if there is no composer, who was the orchestrator?

In her excellent article, Ms. Atkins states that a certain D. Hopkins, a resident of the British East India Company in Bhagulpore, published a book in 1808 entitled The Danger to British India from French Invasion and Missionary Establishments. In this work, Hopkins claimed that France had been behind Paul's attempt to invade India. Only the Russian emperor's timely death and his son's recall of the Cossacks had prevented the rendezvous of the Russians with the French. Barring accounts in the newspapers, this is one of the earliest references to a Franco-Russian invasion of India. Are we to conclude that

Hopkins is the originator of this story? No. Ms. Atkin writes that "an accumulation of circumstantial evidence convinced some people that a Franco-Russian attack on India was plausible and had in fact been attempted."<sup>80</sup> Thus, if we agree with Ms. Atkin's statement, as does this writer, then the story has no one originator.

If, then, no one was solely responsible for originating this story, who was responsible for popularizing it? Here we are on much firmer ground. We have traced the story to the 1820s. It was at this point that the different works that would give rise to the Napoleonic legend were first being published. Of these, three are important for our purposes; 1) O'Meara's Napoleon in Exile, which appeared in 1822, 2) Las Cases' Mémorial de St. Hélène, which appeared in 1823, and 3) Napoleon's Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France, which also appeared in 1823.<sup>81</sup>

Let us first look at what Napoleon himself wrote concerning Paul and the Indian expedition. For instance,

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 72-73.

<sup>81</sup>O'Meara's work was not available. To compensate, I have used John S. C. Abbott, Napoleon at St. Helena (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855), and Vol. XXXII of the Corres. de Nap. Both of these contain extracts from O'Meara; Count Emmanuel Las Cases, Mémorial de St. Hélène, I, II, ed., A. Fugier (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1961); Corres. de Nap., XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

Napoleon gives the following as one of the reasons why the British decided to invade Egypt in 1800.

Everything augered that the peace was going to be signed at Lunéville between France and Austria. Each day the connections became more intimate between the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg. The report ran that the correspondence of Paul I and the First Consul had as its topic to march a half-French and half-Russian army from the Caspian Sea toward the Indus.<sup>82</sup>

Once again, Napoleon referred to a correspondence between himself and Paul when he related the arrival of General Sprengporten in Paris. The relevant passage goes as follows:

Attacked from different directions by so many, Paul was carried away and turned all the fire of his imagination, all the ardor of his desires toward France. He sent a courier with a letter, in which he said: 'Citizen First Consul, I do not wish to write to you at all in order to enter into a discussion on the rights of man or of the citizen; each land governs itself as it pleases. Anywhere where I see at the head of a country a man who knows how to rule and to fight, my heart is drawn to him. I write to you in order to make known to you the discontent that I have against England, who violates all the rights of nations and who is never guided except by its egotism and its interest. I wish to join with you in order to put an end to the injustices of this government.' . . . Soon the correspondence between the Emperor Paul and the latter (Napoleon) became daily; they treated directly on the most important interests and on the means of humbling English power.<sup>83</sup>

Such is Napoleon's own account.

Las Cases reports a conversation on the same incident on August 10, 1816 as follows:

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<sup>82</sup>Corres. de Nap., XXX, pp. 141-142.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., pp. 474-475.

The Emperor said that he and Paul had been on the best of terms together. . . . Paul wrote him frequently and at great length: his first communication had been curious and original. 'Citizen First Consul, he wrote to him in his own hand, I do not discuss at all the merit of the rights of Man; but when a nation places at its head a man of great merit and worthy of esteem, it has a government, and France has henceforth one in my eyes, etc. etc.'<sup>84</sup>

Las Cases reports yet another conversation. This one took place on November 11, 1816. Napoleon had referred to his assumption of power after 18 Brumaire and then went on to say that,

This was a singular spectacle that of seeing the old cabinets of Europe unable to judge the importance of such a change, and to continue to conduct themselves with unity and concentration, as they had done with the multitude and the dispersion. What is no less remarkable, is that Paul, who has passed for a fool, was the first who, from the depths of Russia, appreciated this difference; while the English ministry, reputed so skillful and so very experienced, was the last. I leave to the side the abstractions of your Revolution, Paul wrote to me, I adhere to a fact, it suffices me; in my eyes you are a government, and I speak to you, because we understand each other and I can treat with you.<sup>85</sup>

Such is the account given to Las Cases.

Finally, we will give two selections from O'Meara. On February 14, 1817, he reports Napoleon to have said the following:

If Paul had lived, he said, there would have been peace with England in a short time as you would not have been long able to contend with the united northern powers. I wrote to Paul to continue building ships,

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<sup>84</sup>Las Cases, II, p. 124.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., pp. 542-543. The emphasis is Las Cases's.

and to endeavor to unite the north against you; not to hazard any battles, as the English would gain them, but to allow you to exhaust yourselves, and by all means to get a large fleet into the Mediterranean.

I asked Napoleon if he thought Paul had truly been insane? Yes, during the last days, responded Napoleon, I thought that he had lost a part of his reason. At first, he was strongly prejudiced against the Revolution, and all the persons who had had a part in it; but I ended by changing his opinion and made him return to more reasonable sentiments. If Paul had lived, you would have already lost India. We had made together the project of seizing it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent 30,000 good troops, and he an equal number of the best Russian soldiers and 40,000 Cossacks. I would have furnished a sum of 10 millions in order to cooperate in the purchase of camels and the things necessary for crossing the desert. We were to have both asked the King of Prussia to agree to the passage of my troops across his domains; he would have quickly consented to it. I had at the same time made the same request to the King of Persia, which would certainly not have been refused, although the negotiations were not entirely concluded; but they would have succeeded, because the Persians were desirous to profit by it themselves. My troops would have arrived at Warsaw, where the Russians and the Cossacks would have joined them. From that city, our united troops would have set out toward the Caspian, where they would have embarked, or perhaps they would have continued their journey by land, following the circumstances.<sup>86</sup>

In another conversation dated May 22, 1817, O'Meara reported Napoleon to have said the following:

I think that you will see that the Russians will either invade and take India, or enter Europe with four hundred thousand Cossacks and other inhabitants of the deserts, and two hundred thousand real Russians. When Paul was so violent against you, he sent to me for a plan to invade India.<sup>87</sup>

Such is the account given by O'Meara.

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<sup>86</sup>Abbott, pp. 533-534; *Corres. de Nap.*, XXXII, pp. 323-324.

<sup>87</sup>Abbott, pp. 559-560.

From these passages, we see that Napoleon talked often of Paul and the supposed attempt to invade India in 1801. There are, of course, contradictions between the various accounts. But this is not important. What is important is that with these accounts Napoleon gave substance to the assumptions of men like Hopkins. Napoleon did this knowing full well it was false. This should not be surprising. While on St. Helena, he rewrote large portions of history. Finally, given these accounts, people such as Scott, the authors of the Mémoires tirés, and Hoffman, could flesh out the story and give it an air of verisimilitude. But whether they did this consciously or unconsciously, they were all directed by the dead hand of Napoleon.

Having looked at three important sources of the traditional account, it should be clear that it was based on faulty information. The texts of Paul's rescripts to Vasilii Orlov were corrupted. The versions of the Franco-Russian invasion of India given by Stedingk and Hoffman were both forgeries, ultimately deriving from Napoleon. But if the traditional account is incorrect, what did actually happen? The answer to this question will be the theme of the third and final chapter of this study.

### CHAPTER III

#### PAUL I, NAPOLEON AND THE INDIAN EXPEDITION OF 1801

General Sprengporten arrived in Paris on December 20, 1800.<sup>1</sup> The next day Talleyrand sent a note to Rostopchin accepting the five points as "just and proper in every respect."<sup>2</sup> Napoleon followed suit with a letter of his own to Paul that same day.

On the evening of the 21st, Sprengporten dined with Talleyrand and repeated Paul's instructions of October 10. Talleyrand replied and, as soon as Paul gave someone full powers to negotiate a treaty of peace, France would reciprocate. The negotiations could take place in Paris, Berlin or St. Petersburg. The domains of the Kings of Sardinia and Naples would be restored. However, the latter must refrain from attacking the French army. France wanted Russia to join her in limiting Austria to the line

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<sup>1</sup>Contrary to Strong, p. 118. Mr. Strong uses Shil'der, Histoire anecdotique as his source. While he cites the dates correctly, he fails to note the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars.

<sup>2</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 10.

of the Adige river in Italy. A new republic centered on Milan would be created "in order to take the place in the balance of Europe which the Venetian Republic had."<sup>3</sup> The First Consul invited Russia to send a commissioner to Italy to help France "organize" the new republic. If Paul still insisted that Würtemberg and Bavaria be indemnified, this would require the participation of Prussia in the negotiations. As for Malta, France would do all that was necessary to return the island to Paul, its Grand Master, "as circumstances demand the cooperation of the Republic on this subject, and in the new republic which would be erected in Italy."<sup>4</sup> Concerning the Ionians, it appeared "just that France should guarantee their constitution along with His Majesty the Emperor of Russia."<sup>5</sup> Finally, Talleyrand stated that France's retention of Egypt would suit the interests of both countries in the Mediterranean. France offered to give trading posts for Russian commerce in the East.<sup>6</sup>

The next day, December 22,<sup>7</sup> Talleyrand took

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<sup>3</sup>Shil'der, Histoire anecdotique, p. 187.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 188-189.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Some authorities state that Sprengporten had his audience with Napoleon on the twenty-first. Trachevskiy, I, p. xxvi; Ragsdale, Détente, p. 21.

Sprengporten to meet Napoleon. The First Consul praised Paul effusively and complained of Austria's ambitions in Italy. He declared that for a long time he had wanted Paul's mediation at Lunéville. However, the Austrians had opposed this. France and Russia should make peace and unite "through it and on the same level the interests of the two powers geographically created to be closely allied."<sup>8</sup> Napoleon apologized for the slowness with which France had responded to Rostopchin's note of October 8. He hoped this would not be misinterpreted by Paul. Talleyrand's reply of December 21 would demonstrate the First Consul's desire to "yield all that which can be agreeable" to Paul.<sup>9</sup> Napoleon then declared, "Your sovereign and I are called upon to change the face of the world."<sup>10</sup> When Sprengporten began to ask questions, he was told later by Talleyrand that the answers would be given "in a special letter of the First Consul to His Imperial Majesty."<sup>11</sup>

The "special letter"<sup>12</sup> was dated December 21.

It is vintage Napoleonic bombast:

Yesterday I saw with great pleasure General Sprengporten. I have charged him to make known to Your Imperial Majesty, that out of political considerations, as out of esteem for You, I desire to see

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<sup>8</sup>Shil'der, Histoire, p. 190.      <sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>10</sup>Sorel, VI, p. 88.      <sup>11</sup>Shil'der, Histoire, p. 191.

<sup>12</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 5232; Trachevskiy, I, no. 9.

promptly and irrevocably united the two most powerful nations of the world. . . . Twenty-four hours after Your Imperial Majesty will have charged someone, who has His complete confidence and who is the agent of His desires, with His special and full powers, the continent and the seas will be at peace. For when England, the Emperor of Germany and all the other powers will be convinced, that the wills as well as the arms of our two great nations reach for the same goal, their arms will fall from their hands and the present generation will bless Your Imperial Majesty for having halted the horrors of war and the discords of factions.

If these sentiments are partaken of by Your Imperial Majesty, . . . I believe it will be suitable and worthy, that simultaneously the boundaries of the different states be fixed, and that Europe find out, on the same day, that peace is signed between France and Russia, and of the reciprocal engagements, that they contracted in order to pacify all states.

This conduct, strong, frank and loyal, will displease a few cabinets, but it will bring together the approbations of all peoples and those of posterity.<sup>13</sup>

Such is Bonaparte's letter. When it is stripped of its bombast and hyperbole, we find that he wants peace with Russia. But what kind of peace does he want? We must turn to Talleyrand's note of December 21 for the answer. There we read that

the wish of the First Consul is that the affairs of Germany and Italy, those which concern the general freedom of commerce and the rights of neutrality be dealt with by a common accord between Russia and France.<sup>14</sup>

At that moment, Joseph Bonaparte was still negotiating with Count Cobentzl at Lunéville. Under the blows of Marengo and Hohenlinden, Austria was being forced toward a separate peace with France. Once this was accomplished,

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 10.

France would have only Britain to deal with. Peace with Russia would help Napoleon with both these powers. In the case of the former, he could use it to obtain further concessions. In the case of the latter, he could isolate Britain. These were Bonaparte's real motives. As Albert Sorel wrote, "to the lever which (Napoleon) disposes of he needs a fulcrum. He believes to have found it, it will be Russia."<sup>15</sup>

It will be recalled that, up to mid-December, Paul had found the French response unsatisfactory. It was only under the influence of the Danish ambassador that Paul decided to modify his policy. Thus, on December 30 (nine days after Napoleon's letter), Paul wrote a letter of his own to Napoleon. It deserves to be quoted in extenso:

Monsieur le Premier Consul. It is the duty of those to whom God has entrusted the power of governing peoples, to think of and to occupy themselves with their well-being. I propose to You to this end to agree between ourselves upon the measures of ending and making an end of the evils, which have desolated Europe completely for eleven years. I do not speak of the rights of Man, nor the principles of different governments, which each land has adopted. We seek to return to the world the repose and calm, of which it has so much need and which seems to be so consistent with the immutable laws of the Eternal. I am now ready to listen to You and to converse with You. And I believe it to be all the more founded in right to suggest and to say to You, that I was distant from the struggle, in which even so I have participated, this has been only as a faithful auxiliary of those, who

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<sup>15</sup>Sorel, VI, p. 105.

have not been so to me. You know already and will yet find out what I offer, what I desire, but this is not all, I invite you to reestablish along with me the general peace, which if We want it, could hardly be taken from Us. Enough is said to You to make You appreciate my fashion of thinking and my sentiments. . . . My plenipotentiary Kolitcheff is going to follow this letter.<sup>16</sup>

This letter is very different from the version given by Napoleon in his memoirs.<sup>17</sup> Fyodor Martens expresses yet another important point:

However, if one compares Bonaparte's letter of 9(21) December with the Tsar's . . . of 18(30) December . . . , one would not know how to refrain from ascertaining a notable difference in the tone of the latter. Paul is conscious of himself as an Emperor by the Grace of God and treats Bonaparte as a usurper and as an adventurer.<sup>18</sup>

Hugh Ragsdale perceptively notes that Paul's letter was "a conspicuously guarded and tentative gesture in which Paul's scruples show up like sensitive sores."<sup>19</sup> Thus, if we subject Paul's letter to the same test as Napoleon's, we find that it boils down to a tentative proposal to negotiate and that is all.

If this were all the documentary evidence we had, we might not know Paul's true intentions. Luckily, this is not the case. Paul had decided to send Stepan A. Kolychyov to Paris. We have already met Kolychyov in the

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<sup>16</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 11.

<sup>17</sup>See above: Chapter II, p. 125.

<sup>18</sup>Martens, XIII, p. 251.

<sup>19</sup>Ragsdale, "Bonaparte's Fool," p. 85.

course of this study, first as the ambassador to Berlin and later as the ambassador to Vienna. At this time, he held the title of Privy Councillor. On January 20, 1801, Paul would appoint him Vice-Chancellor, obviously a measure to improve his standing in Paris.<sup>20</sup>

Paul's first set of instructions to Kolychyov were dated December 31, 1800. In them, Kolychyov was told that Paul's desire was to "render peace to Europe desolated for 11 years by the flame of war."<sup>21</sup> This was the reason for the mission to Paris. He had full powers to sign all that would be necessary. Once in Paris, Kolychyov was to begin the negotiations immediately with Bonaparte. Paul went on to say that "in concluding an arrangement based on the following articles . . . you will in no wise make a mystery (of them) from the moment of your first interview."<sup>22</sup>

What were these "articles?" First, Paul called for the abasement of Austria, convinced "that the repose of the rest of Europe depends on it."<sup>23</sup> Next, he agreed to allow France the Rhine as its western frontier. The princes losing territory as a result of this change would

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<sup>20</sup>Shil'der, p. 423, n. 2.

<sup>21</sup>Paul I, Emperor of Russia, "Instruction secrète donnée par l'Empereur Paul 1er au conseiller privé actuel Kalitscheff," Russkiy arkhiv, II, no. 12, (1874), co. 961.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., col. 962.

be indemnified from the hereditary lands of the House of Austria. The King of Naples was to retain "his domains, such as they were before the war."<sup>24</sup> Sardinia, Bavaria and Würtemberg were to be indemnified by the secularization of ecclesiastical estates. Further, French troops had to be evacuated from their domains. France had to formally guarantee that the island of Malta would be returned to Paul as Grand Master of the Order. This was to be part of any negotiations with Britain. In addition, France was "to invite all her allies to concur to the same goal with her."<sup>25</sup> The French must evacuate Egypt and return it to the Porte "in order to preserve it from the English."<sup>26</sup> Paul took special interest in the Pope and wished to see him established in Russia rather than "to see him at the mercy of intrigues and of the other powers."<sup>27</sup> Concerning trade, Napoleon was to be given a free field so long as the opening of it was to be reciprocal. Once peace was established with Britain, France had to accede to the Armed Neutrality. When all these conditions had been fulfilled and formally agreed to, then, and only then, would Paul recognize the French Republic and would be ready "to communicate directly with her."<sup>28</sup> Finally, Paul would in no wise discuss Poland.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., col. 963.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., col. 964.

From this quick glance, we can see that Paul had not been seduced by Bonaparte. Still, if we compare these instructions with the note of October 8, we see that Paul had made significant concessions. First, he now agreed to the French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. Next, he accepted the fact that Sardinia, Bavaria and Würtemberg would have to be indemnified rather than keep their domains intact. The acceptance of the principle of indemnification meant that he would have to agree to significant changes in the German constitution. He still insisted on the territorial integrity of Naples. The Pope was to be given consideration as well. Nevertheless, his hauteur with regard to France and its parvenu ruler remained unchanged. France had to give back Egypt to the Porte. There was to be no discussion of Poland. After all these conditions were met, he would recognize the Republic. Thus, we see that Paul had shifted his position, but he had not become Bonaparte's dupe.<sup>29</sup>

Even before he received Paul's first letter, Napoleon began to make use of "l'alliance russe." During the latter half of 1800, Bonaparte's controlled press had made much of the commonality of interest between France and Russia. A book, entitled De l'état de France à la

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<sup>29</sup>For an example of this interpretation, see Adolphe Thiers, Histoire du Consulat (Paris: Lheureuz et Cie, 1865), pp. 175-179, 230-231.

fin de l'an VIII, was published in November of 1800.

Written by Talleyrand's trusted lieutenant, the Count d'Hauterive, it "proposed that Europe substitute for the traditional policy of balance of power a kind of league of continental states under the hegemony of France."<sup>30</sup>

It also talked of a potential partition of Turkey in tones reminiscent of Guttin and Rostopchin.

The "alliance russe" was also being used to great effect on Austria. On December 13, Talleyrand wrote to Joseph Bonaparte at Lunéville, "It would seem to me that the presence of General Sprengporten ought to give some warning to M. de Cobentzl."<sup>31</sup> This strategy was successful. On December 23, Cobentzl informed his master that the "cajoleries between Paul I and Bonaparte render the latter all the more recalcitrant to accord us good conditions."<sup>32</sup> On December 31, Cobentzl finally gave in and informed Joseph that he was ready to negotiate a separate peace.<sup>33</sup>

In the meantime, Napoleon kept the pressure on relentlessly. On January 2, 1801, he sent a message to the Legislative Corps calling for more stringent terms

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<sup>30</sup> Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807, trans. H. F. Stockhold (1965; 5th ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 95.

<sup>31</sup> Ragsdale, Détente, p. 62.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.      <sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 60-63.

against Austria. That same day, he spoke to his entourage as follows:

France can only ally herself with Russia. This power reigns over the Baltic and the Black Sea, she has the key to Asia. The Emperor of such a nation is truly a grand prince. . . . If Paul is singular, he has at least a mind of his own.<sup>34</sup>

Soon thereafter, Cobentzl and Joseph came to terms at Lunéville. The compromise they reached called for Austria to give up all claims to territory west of the Adige river. In return, France would allow the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Finally, both countries renounced the policy of secularization as a means of indemnifying those princes who lost their domains.<sup>35</sup>

At this point, Paul's letter of December 30 arrived in Paris on January 20, 1801. That same day Talleyrand wrote to Joseph as follows:

There is no real guarantee against Austria except in the entire right bank of the Adige and in a part of the Apennines, so that the war can be recommenced with advantage, if the Emperor or the King of Naples allow themselves to be influenced by the English. . . . The French Republic cannot pass over silently the indemnities of the hereditary princes!<sup>36</sup>

It stretches the bounds of credulity to believe that Talleyrand was concerned about the welfare of these

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<sup>34</sup>Antoine C. Thibaudeau, Mémoires sur le Consulat de 1799 à 1804 (Paris: Baudouin Frères, 1827), p. 383.

<sup>35</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 63, 82.

<sup>36</sup>Sorel, VI, p. 95. The emphasis is mine.

princes. It would appear that Paul's letter had encouraged the French to raise their demands.

This is confirmed in Napoleon's letter to Joseph of January 21. In part, it reads as follows:

Yesterday a courier arrived from Russia, who had done the journey in fifteen days; he brought me a very friendly letter from the Emperor's own hand. This courier met, at four leagues from Petersburg, an officer sent by M. de Sprengporten and who was carrying a letter of mine to the Emperor, more or less in the same style.

In four or five days I expect a Russian plenipotentiary.

The Russian attitude is very hostile toward England. You will easily see that we must not be over-hasty, for peace with the Emperor is nothing compared with an alliance that would master England and keep Egypt for us.<sup>37</sup>

Austria was to be kept behind the Adige. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was not to be restored. Joseph would not discuss the Pope, the King of Naples nor the King of Sardinia. Baron Johann A. Thugut, the Austrian Foreign Minister, must be desposed for good and all.

Besides, it is difficult to make terms for Germany except with Paul I. . . . Continue with the protocol . . . but sign nothing for ten days, by which time we shall be in agreement with Paul.<sup>38</sup>

If Joseph had any doubts over the sudden shift in policy, they were dispelled by a letter from Talleyrand of January 24. According to him, the reason was "our fresh relations

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<sup>37</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, no. 5315.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

with Russia and the well-known sentiments of Prussia."<sup>39</sup>

Thus, to all outward appearances, a Franco-Russian Alliance seemed a foregone conclusion.

Of course, we know that such was not the case.

How honest were Napoleon and Talleyrand being with Joseph?

Pierre Lanfray claimed:

This cordial understanding, of which (Napoleon) boasted so much, rested upon nothing but a falsehood. . . . This much-boasted diplomatic manoeuvre was then in reality a very hazardous scheme, which could be of no use but as a provisional expedient.<sup>40</sup>

As illustrated in the first chapter, Napoleon had begun by accepting the traditional hostility toward Russia. It was Talleyrand who directed his attention to Russia in January, 1800. At about the same time, they had come across Guttin's memorandum.<sup>41</sup> We have already noted some striking similarities between this memorandum and that of Rostopchin. Napoleon's policy in regard to Russia also shared some striking similarities to this memorandum. In turn, the Guttin memorandum is very similar to the Testament of Peter the Great. There is good reason to believe that Talleyrand and Napoleon<sup>42</sup> believed in the Testament. Thus, they would

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<sup>39</sup> Pierre Lanfrey, The History of Napoleon the First, II, trans. n.n. (2nd ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1894), p. 87.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>41</sup> Sorel, VI, pp. 29-31.

<sup>42</sup> "Lesur (Charles Louis)," Biographie universelle, XXIV (n.d.), p. 349; Lewitter, p. 41.

tend to interpret Russian foreign policy in this light.<sup>43</sup>

It might be argued that, even if they had believed in the Testament, both men would have been quickly disabused of this notion by Paul's actions. There is, however, a flaw in this argument. It is true that Napoleon had better information concerning Paul and his foreign policy than his opponents. But France had had no formal diplomatic relations with Russia since 1793 and thus no firsthand knowledge of events there. Most of the information received in the West could be made to fit into the schema of the Testament. Thus, an amalgam of ignorance, garbled information and wish fulfillment accounts for the misinterpretation of Paul's foreign policy by Napoleon and Talleyrand.<sup>44</sup>

Meanwhile, events had moved forward in St. Petersburg. On January 10, Paul added "articles secrets" to Kolychyov's instructions of December 31. Paul demanded as a sine qua non that France obtain the recognition of Paul as Grand Master by Spain. If all went well in the negotiations, France should promise "to make a diversion on the coasts of England, in case the latter manifests designs against Russia."<sup>45</sup> Paul offered, through a separate negotiation, either a new commercial treaty or a renewal of

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<sup>43</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 9-23.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 120-121; *Corres. de Nap.*, VI, no. 5201.

<sup>45</sup>Paul I, "Instruction," col. 964.

that of 1786 "with the necessary modifications and changes that time and circumstance have occasioned."<sup>46</sup> Kolychyov was to encourage Bonaparte to take the title of King and make it hereditary in his family. Finally, Kolychyov was to insist on the suppression of clubs, the Polish Committee and all groups in France "which occupy themselves with the spread of democratic and philosophic principles with the consent and the protection of the French government."<sup>47</sup>

These instructions have been interpreted in the past as proof that Paul had fallen under Bonaparte's spell. The article encouraging Bonaparte to become King especially lends itself to this interpretation. But this is only so at first glance. Paul did indeed want Napoleon to proclaim himself King. He went on to say why:

I regard this decision on his part as the sole means of obtaining for France a stable government and of converting the revolutionary principles which have armed all Europe against her.<sup>48</sup>

This statement is in complete agreement with Paul's views on autocracy. And as far as Bonaparte is concerned, we know that as early as December, 1799, Paul had begun to look at him as the man who might tame the Revolution.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., col. 965.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., col. 966.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., col. 965. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>49</sup> See above: Chapter I, p. 37.

Finally, Paul ordered Kolychyov not to lose sight of the fact that Russia's foreign policy was to bring peace to all Europe. By recognizing France as a republic or Bonaparte as King, Paul intended to remove from Austria, Britain and Prussia the means of being successful in their systems of aggrandizement. As he put it, "I prefer to allow a single Hydra to exist than of seeing born and tolerating many."<sup>50</sup> Once again, we see that Paul was not Bonaparte's dupe.

We have seen how Napoleon exploited his rapprochement with Russia to put pressure on Austria. This was by no means the only use he made of it. In his letter to Joseph of January 21, Napoleon had stated that an alliance with Russia "would master England and keep Egypt for us." It might be unclear how an alliance would "master England" for France. The answer lies in a combination of factors. First, the belief existed in France "that England's economy, and consequently her credit depended on exports, and that the hardest blow one could strike would be to deprive her of France, her best customer."<sup>51</sup> This idea dated from 1793. The Directory had forbidden the importation of any British goods and by a law of January 18, 1798 threatened to seize any neutral vessels which

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<sup>50</sup>Paul I, "Instruction," col. 966.

<sup>51</sup>Lefebvre, Napoleon, pp. 41-42.

submitted to British regulations. As a result of these harsh measures, the neutral powers had deserted France and the policy had failed.<sup>52</sup>

Another factor was the precarious position of the British economy in 1800-1801. In 1799 and 1800 England suffered from depression. Wheat was already in short supply. Between 1800 and 1802, Britain would import 28,000,000 bushels of grain. In 1801, the four pound loaf of bread, which had sold at the pre-famine price of 3d., would sell for 1s. 10d.; an almost eightfold increase in price. By April 25, 1801, wheat would sell for 18s. 10d. per bushel. In all, the government would spend twenty-three million pounds on grain for 1800 and 1801. This, in turn, put additional strain on the cash reserves of the Bank of England. There is a certain irony in all this. French economic policy was crafted so as to deny Britain any markets for her manufactured goods. This policy would be slow to take effect. But the means to be used to carry out this policy would also keep Britain from importing the wheat she most desperately needed.<sup>53</sup>

If these conditions had been confined, as they had

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<sup>52</sup> Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, II, trans. J. H. Stewart and J. Friguglietti (1957; 2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 216-217.

<sup>53</sup> Jacob Bronowski, William Blake and the Age of Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 43; Lefebvre, Napoleon, pp. 108-109.

been in 1798 and 1799, to a strictly Anglo-French economic war, Britain would not have been in such trouble. This time, the situation was exacerbated by Paul. As we saw in the second chapter of this study, he had reimposed an embargo on all trade with Britain. British goods had been confiscated, all payments to British merchants had been stopped and a commission had been established to "liquidate" their debts.<sup>54</sup> Paul had immediately put pressure on his allies to follow suit. Since Britain relied on the Baltic countries for a substantial portion of her grain and naval stores at that time, Paul's measures were most telling.

As we have already noted, Napoleon had been watching these events carefully. He had learned from the mistakes of the Directory. In November, 1800, he ordered Talleyrand to declare that France would not treat with Britain until she recognized neutral rights.<sup>55</sup> On January 20, 1801, he put pressure on the Senate of Hamburg "to close their port to the English, or to bring upon themselves the whole displeasure of the French Government."<sup>56</sup> That same day, an order was issued to all French vessels "to be ready to give aid and assistance to all Russian vessels."<sup>57</sup> Talleyrand was to inform Sprengporten that

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<sup>54</sup>P.S.Z., XXVI, nos. 19660, 19667.

<sup>55</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, nos. 5191, 5208.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., no. 5311.      <sup>57</sup>Ibid.

this was done in reaction to the British Order in Council of January 14, which they had issued in reaction to Paul's embargo. It placed an embargo on all Russian, Danish and Swedish vessels. Napoleon, said Talleyrand, did not want Russia "to suffer from two sides at once."<sup>58</sup> The First Consul knew that the Emperor of Russia already considered himself at peace with France and that only "the great distance which separated the two empires retard[ed] the signature of the treaty."<sup>59</sup> Special couriers had been sent to Holland, Spain and Genoa to encourage these governments to take similar actions.<sup>60</sup> Sprengporten dutifully forwarded this information to St. Petersburg.<sup>61</sup>

We see in these steps a policy taking shape. The references to Holland, Spain and Genoa are especially revealing. Unlike his predecessors, Napoleon was thinking in terms of a continental blockade. He had little control over affairs in the Baltic and the most he could do there was to encourage Paul and the other northern powers.<sup>62</sup> This policy had closed the Baltic to the British. Napoleon had more influence in the English Channel and the Mediterranean. France, Holland and northern Italy were under his

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid.      <sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., no. 5310. The emphasis is mine. See also: Mahan, II, p. 53.

<sup>61</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 15.

<sup>62</sup>Corres. de Nap., VII, no. 5492.

direct control. Spain would do as she was told. The only gaps in this system were Portugal, Naples and northern Germany. Soon, Napoleon would be pressuring Spain to act against Portugal.<sup>63</sup> A French army was already marching toward Naples. Murat, its commander, was telling the Neapolitans that they must rely on Paul to be their mediator, but Naples would have to shut her ports to the British first.<sup>64</sup> In northern Germany, especially Prussia, Napoleon needed Paul.<sup>65</sup> In Russia, Rostopchin had argued in favor of a continental blockade:

Bonaparte will find (the Armed Neutrality) a powerful means to harm England and to compel her either to renounce her illegal maritime claims or, by declaring war on all Europe, to not have in all the seas another harbor like Gibraltar.<sup>66</sup>

Thus, it appeared that Napoleon was well on the way to "mastering England."

Bonaparte also wanted to "save Egypt." Here the problem was more difficult. In stopping the continent's trade with Britain, he was relying on his armies. Indeed, this policy was a direct testimony of France's weakness on

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., no. 5335.

<sup>64</sup>Augustus Paget, ed., The Paget Papers: Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Paget, I (London: William Heinemann, 1896), p. 307; *Corres. de Nap.*, VII, no. 5337.

<sup>65</sup>*Corres. de Nap.*, VI, no. 5311.

<sup>66</sup>Rostopchin, p. 109.

the high seas. Nevertheless, Napoleon had an answer. If he could not fight the British ship for ship, he would seek to disperse their ships to different parts of the globe.

Since his return to France, Bonaparte had been seeking to reinforce and resupply the army he had left in Egypt. Several attempts had been made in 1800 to slip the Brest Squadron past the British blockade in 1800. These efforts had failed.<sup>67</sup> Napoleon had offered to include Britain in the negotiations at Lunéville if Britain would allow him to resupply Malta and Egypt. The British would only agree to this "armistice" if France promised not to carry more than two weeks worth of provisions to Egypt. Bonaparte agreed if he could send six frigates direct to Egypt without landing at Toulon. The British declined this offer.<sup>68</sup> If he were to reinforce and resupply his troops in Egypt, Bonaparte would have to do two things: 1) weaken the British blockade of French ports and 2) weaken the British fleet of Admiral G. K. Keith in the eastern Mediterranean.

As early as July, 1800, the First Consul had been

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<sup>67</sup>André Auzoux, "L'Expedition d'Égypte en 1801: Les projets de Bonaparte et Ganteaume," Revue historique, CLIV (January-April 1927), pp. 189-200; Fletcher Pratt, The Empire and the Glory, Napoleon Bonaparte: 1800-1806 (New York: William Sloane Assn., Inc., 1949), pp. 105-106.

<sup>68</sup>Bourgeois, I, p. 214.

thinking of just such a strategy. According to Andrés Muriel, Napoleon had met with the Spanish admiral, José Mazarredo, soon after his victories in Italy. He and Mazarredo had talked of "a thousand projects." Among these were the reconquest of Trinidad, an expedition to India, or the Cape of Good Hope, and a landing in Britian. Mazarredo was not sanguine about any of these proposals. The most promising one seemed to him to be the expedition to the Cape. For his part, "Bonaparte wanted to seize from the English a bargaining chip for which they would make sacrifices at a Congress after the peace."<sup>69</sup>

No decision was made at that time. However, it is clear that Napoleon had not given up this idea. In January, 1801, he wanted to send a joint Dutch-French expedition to the Cape. Not many days later, he sent frigates to St. Domingo and Guadaloupe.<sup>70</sup> As early as December, 1800, he had conditionally approved sending three frigates to "the islands of Africa."<sup>71</sup> On January 13, the same day he talked of the joint expedition to the Cape, Napoleon asked his Minister of Marine, Pierre Forfait, for information on Madagascar. Forfait's report was deemed insufficient eight days later.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Muriel, II, p. 208.

<sup>70</sup>Corres. de Nap., VI, nos. 5285, 5326.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., no. 5233.      <sup>72</sup>Ibid., nos. 5284, 5316.

By this time, Napoleon was pressuring the Spanish to help him in those various naval ventures. On January 27, he went into more detail. Talleyrand was to write to Lucien Bonaparte, then ambassador to Spain, to inform him that since the reception of the letter from Paul, France's relations with the northern powers were on the best footing. The influence of Russia and France would decide Prussia and Britain would not have "any communications with the continent."<sup>73</sup> France, Spain and Holland should take advantage of this situation "by striking some blow which would change the aspect of the war."<sup>74</sup> The fifteen Spanish vessels then harbored in Brest could be used for this purpose. As for Mazarredo, he "does not at all have my confidence."<sup>75</sup> These fifteen vessels could act together with French and Dutch vessels "in accordance with the operations the English will attempt in the Baltic."<sup>76</sup>

The peace, continued Napoleon, appeared to be fixed on the continent. This would free numerous armies which could be assembled at various ports in France and Holland. Combined with the naval forces of the three powers, and coordinated with the movements of the northern powers, they could undertake the following: 1) an expedition to Ireland, 2) one to Brazil and India, 3) one to the West Indies, and

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid., no. 5327.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

4) many in the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean, the British could be decoyed to the coasts of Egypt or the Black Sea to allow the invasion of Minorca. In any event, Britain would soon find herself "menaced in the Archipelago by the Russians, and in the Northern seas by the coalesced powers" and so would be faced with the "impossibility of keeping for long a strong squadron in the Mediterranean."<sup>77</sup>

Four days earlier, the Brest squadron had slipped past the British blockade and set sail for Egypt. This was but the first step in Napoleon's plan to reinforce Egypt. Another force was being assembled at Rochefort. In this case, the plan was for it to combine with Spanish ships at Ferrol and Cadiz. From there, they would sail to Otranto; a port on the southeastern tip of Italy. There they would embark troops and sail for Egypt.<sup>78</sup> The Spanish were reluctant to take part in this plan. Nevertheless, Napoleon urged them on and wrote on February 4 that "the English will not be able to keep a strong squadron in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic, (and) in the seas of the North and Brest."<sup>79</sup>

In March, Napoleon initiated two more naval schemes.

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Thiers, Consulat, pp. 254-255; Mahan, II, pp. 58-63; Pratt, pp. 105-106.

<sup>79</sup> Corres. de Nap., VII, no. 5336.

The first of these he had inherited from the Directory in the form of flat-bottomed gunboats. On March 4, he asked Forfait about the possibility of assembling them at Boulogne. Three days later, he considered appointing Admiral La Touche-Treville to command them. Two weeks later, he complained to Forfait that not enough had been done. Nevertheless, by that time, some 276 gunboats had been located in the harbors of France and Holland. In the meantime, he had confirmed the appointment of La Touche-Treville.<sup>80</sup>

The second of these two schemes involved sending ships to the Indian Ocean. On March 13, Napoleon sent the following order to Forfait:

Order Brigadier Houdetot to leave immediately for Rochefort.

Order also two or three officers who can fix the attention of the public on a project of an expedition to India.<sup>81</sup>

Was Napoleon seriously considering an invasion of Britain and an expedition to India? Concerning the former, public opinion in Britain was certainly affected by the preparations at Boulogne. However, the truth is that this was yet another scheme to tie down a part of the British

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., nos. 5438, 5452; H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England: The Story of the Great Terror, I (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1908), pp. 160-161; Pratt, pp. 252-253.

<sup>81</sup> Corres. de Nap., VII, no. 5460.

fleet. Ships devoted to the policing of the Channel could not be sent to the Mediterranean. Indeed, in August, 1801, Nelson would try unsuccessfully to destroy the gunboats. But by that time they had already served their purpose.<sup>82</sup>

What of the expedition to India? We have cited the entire text of Napoleon's order above. Why did Napoleon want to "fix the attention of the public" on an expedition to India? And why do so in Rochefort, a seaport? We can only guess. However, it is reasonable to assume that this was yet another scheme to divert British ships. Why? On February 20, Napoleon had ordered Joseph Fouche to insure that the newspapers did not report "the different movements which our squadrons are executing."<sup>83</sup> Why shroud these movements in secrecy and make this project public? The answer is that a seaport like Rochefort would have its quota of British spies. Any publicity campaign of this sort would be learned of by the British. Once again, Napoleon was attempting to divert British ships from the Mediterranean.

We have dwelled at some length on Napoleon's exploitation of his rapprochement with Russia. What

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<sup>82</sup>Wheeler and Broadley, I, pp. 162-179; Pratt, pp. 174, 255-256; Gustav Roloff, Die Orientalpolitik Napoleons I, Deutsche Orientbücherei, Vol. XVI (Weimar: Gustav Kieperheur, 1916), pp. 36-37.

<sup>83</sup>This is not in the *Corres. de Nap.* My source is Thiers, p. 255, n. 1.

relevance does this have for this study? The answer is two-fold. First, it shows that Napoleon was completely cynical with regard to his relations to Paul. Second, what could be done on the high seas might also be done on land. On January 2, Napoleon had publicly declared that Russia had the "key to Asia." Thus, if he could use Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish ships against the British, he might be able to use Russian troops against the British in India.

It might be argued that this is no more than mere conjecture. Perhaps. However, on January 16, the Danish ambassador reported the following conversation with Napoleon:

While talking the other day with the First Consul about the probability of war between Russia and England, (Napoleon) expressed the opinion that the Emperor of Russia could not attack England more damagingly or with more advantage than by sending from the Caucasus an army of 100,000 men across Persia to fall on the English in India. . . . It is certain that the execution of this project has very seductive charms for the Court of Petersburg, and like a good Dane, I prefer that the Russians turn their attention toward the Orient rather than toward the West, [so] I strongly urged Bonaparte to recommend to Paul the expedition against the English in India. There are many reasons for preferring to see the English attack the Russians in the Black Sea rather than in the Baltic without molesting us.<sup>84</sup>

Thus, only eight days before Paul ordered the Don Cossacks to set out for India, Napoleon was thinking of approximately the same thing.

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<sup>84</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, p. 80.

Faced with this evidence, are we to conclude that Paul and Napoleon were planning a joint expedition to India after all? Are Hoffman and Strong right? To find out, let us examine once again events in St. Petersburg.

Four days after giving Kolychyov his second set of instructions, Paul received Bonaparte's first letter on January 14. Paul replied that same day. He acknowledged the receipt of this letter and "the report of my General Sprengporten."<sup>85</sup> Kolychyov would leave soon "furnished with instructions, which will demonstrate my sentiments to You and will respond to the different points of Your letter."<sup>86</sup> Paul declared that he desired the peace of Europe, "which we can certainly bring about."<sup>87</sup> However, he did not want to interfere by specifying the boundaries in Italy and Germany, "in order to avoid the consequences that this involves."<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless, the agreement of the two greatest nations in the world would certainly influence Europe in a positive manner. "And I am ready to do it."<sup>89</sup>

This letter, like that of December 30, is a formal and cautious document. Paul does not want to go into specifics. Instead, Kolychyov would be furnished with instructions. These "instructions" are clearly those of December 31 and January 10. If there was a warm personal

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<sup>85</sup> Trachevskiy, I, no. 12. <sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. <sup>88</sup> Ibid. <sup>89</sup> Ibid.

relationship between Paul and Napoleon at this time, then this letter cannot be used as evidence of it. There is certainly not the remotest mention of India.

Kolychyov left St. Petersburg on January 16.<sup>90</sup> He would not reach Paris until almost seven weeks later. In the interim, Sprengporten remained the only authorized Russian representative in France. We have seen how the French did their best to flatter his ego. This policy was not restricted to purely diplomatic matters. All the way from Brussels to Paris, Sprengporten had been greeted by crowds and delegations. In Paris, he and his suite were given sumptuous quarters, and all was paid for by the French government. Wherever they went in Paris, Russian officers were greeted with applause. At the Italian opera, a work featuring Peter the Great as its protagonist was performed. When Sprengporten attended it, verses were sung in honor of Paul I.<sup>91</sup>

Napoleon and Talleyrand did not remain idle either. Toward the end of December, 1800, the latter invited Sprengporten to intervene in the talks at Lunéville saying, "It is extremely desirable, that your Emperor were good enough to become involved somewhat in all this, in order to finally attain the longed for peace, in accordance with

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid., no. 28. See also Milyutin, V, p. 273.

<sup>91</sup>Milyutin, V. pp. 269-270.

his interests."<sup>92</sup> At about the same time, the Batavian Directory offered to return its Russian prisoners, while it sought to renew diplomatic relations with Russia. On December 31, Sprengporten wrote to Paul that,

It is unquestionable that this courtesy, not at all like the Batavian character, is but the result of the influence of the French government, which, in all ways, seeks to manifest its desire for a rapprochement.<sup>93</sup>

In a short time, Sprengporten's enthusiasm for France and its new ruler had become complete. His reports to Paul were filled with the praises of the First Consul. Sprengporten had become so chummy with Bonaparte, reports Bourrienne, that he let Bonaparte read Paul's letters to him.<sup>94</sup>

Reports of Sprengporten's behavior may have reached St. Petersburg late in January, 1801. On January 25, Rostopchin wrote to the Finn that the Emperor was pleased to accept the Batavian offer. The General would take care of this task also. However, at about this same time, he also wrote, "His Majesty directs me to acquaint you that the prisoners of war are your sole concern and that you are to return to Russia with all speed when your mission

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<sup>92</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. xxvi.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 665, n. 64.

<sup>94</sup>Louis A. F. Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, I, ed. R. W. Phipps (1836; New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1885), p. 315.

is concluded."<sup>95</sup> On January 20, Paul had himself sent a secret rescript to Kolychyov. It deserves to be quoted in extenso:

[Secret] Gospodin Vice-Chancellor Kolychyov. Desiring that in the thrust of Our negotiations with the French government, Our views appear always disinterested and salutary, We think it necessary to declare Our will to you, that anyone employed in the negotiations with Bonaparte not take anything, neither from him, nor gifts in the name of the government, nor money, nor jewels, extending this to all subordinates now and in the future. Paul.<sup>96</sup>

Still, Paul was not totally displeased with Sprengporten. On January 23, he cautiously wrote, "After the news that you give me of the sentiment of the First Consul, I do not see anything that could obstruct the accomplishment of our mutual projects."<sup>97</sup> The very next day, Paul ordered the Don Cossacks to set out for India.<sup>98</sup>

Up to this point, we have seen no evidence of a secret correspondence between Paul and Napoleon. Neither have we seen a plan for a joint expedition to India. We have seen that, in all his dealings with Napoleon, Paul gave no sign of being the First Consul's dupe. None of his letters to Napoleon can be interpreted as referring

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<sup>95</sup> Waliszewski, p. 360; Trachevskiy, I, p. 665, n. 64.

<sup>96</sup> Trachevskiy, I, no. 14.

<sup>97</sup> Ragsdale, Détente, p. 49.

<sup>98</sup> Shil'der, p. 417.

to any expedition. The only piece of secret correspondence that we have seen orders Kolychyov not to take any favors from Bonaparte. On the other hand, we have seen that Napoleon was preparing to send naval contingents to the Indian Ocean. Further, on January 16, he talked of a Russian expedition to India. Finally, we have Paul's reference to "our mutual projects" of January 23. If there was no plan of a joint expedition to India, how do we explain these apparent inconsistencies?

The first thing to be said on this score is that the inconsistencies are indeed apparent, but are not real. For example, we have seen above that Napoleon's plans to send ships to the Indian Ocean were but a part of his overall scheme to divert the British navy from Egyptian waters. Paul's reference to "our mutual projects" would be no more than a reference to the negotiations for peace and the restoration of the status quo in Italy and Germany. But what of Napoleon's remark concerning a Russian expedition to India? Let us examine more closely just what he did say. According to the Danish ambassador, the First Consul "expressed the opinion that the Emperor of Russia could not attack England more damagingly or with more advantage than by sending 100,000 men across Persia to fall on the English in India."<sup>99</sup> Note first that Napoleon

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<sup>99</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, p. 80. The emphasis is mine.

expressed an "opinion" on the matter. He did not say that he was actually planning to do anything of the sort. Second, the Emperor of Russia was to carry out this scheme. Once again, there is no mention of French cooperation. Third, the force was to be composed of 100,000 men. As we shall see, Paul sent only about a fifth of this number on the expedition. Fourth, the route was to be across Persia. This is similar to Guttin's remark in his memorandum. However, the Don Cossacks went nowhere near Persia. As stated above, Napoleon's comments simply prove that he was thinking of the possibility of using Russian troops against India.

But how could Napoleon hope to cajole Paul into sending Russian troops to India, when he had not even reestablished full diplomatic relations with Russia? We have related above how the French established secret contacts with Rostopchin through the instrumentality of Kutaysov, Madame Chevalier and Madame Bonneuil. In his Historia de Carlos IV, Andrés Muriel wrote the following:

Bonaparte, with his astuteness and cleverness, did not miss the chance of deriving benefits from these favorable dispositions (of Paul). He immediately won over the two persons who had major influence with the Emperor of Russia, that is, over Rostopchin and Kutaysov. As to the first, who manifested great ambition and desires to distinguish his Ministry of Foreign Affairs by a complete shift in the political interests of Europe, convinced that this was the way to immortalize his name, Bonaparte promised him, through a cunning Frenchwoman, Madame Bonneuil, that he would support him with all his power if an alliance was signed between the two nations. As to the other,

who did not have such lofty aspirations and contented himself with money and women, he won him over by means of his chamberlain, who was seduced by an actress, also a Frenchwoman, called Madame Chevalier, who was not slow in gaining access to the master.<sup>100</sup>

Muriel's assertion is intriguing and would explain much if true. There is evidence that his assertion was based on fact.

About six weeks after Paul's death, Madame Bonneuil, now calling herself the Countess of Biston-Bonneuil, turned up in Berlin. She went to see the French ambassador, Beurnonville, there to have her passports visaed. While at his residence, she told him that she had been Rostopchin's lover and Panin's close friend. She claimed to have used her influence for the benefit of the French government. Beurnonville later reported that "she flattered herself to have given Paul I, as well as Rostopchin, advice useful to Russia at the same time that it was advantageous for France." Beurnonville would have considered her story no more than a tissue of lies had she not shown him "Rostopchin's portrait and forty or fifty letters that he had written to her."<sup>101</sup> In short, Bonaparte had the access and the means to influence Paul.

Are we to conclude that Madame Bonneuil was the channel by which a secret correspondence was carried on

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<sup>100</sup>Muriel, II, p. 190.

<sup>101</sup>Daudet, II, pp. 230-231.

between Paul and Napoleon? This seems unlikely. She did not produce any letters by Paul or Napoleon. Instead, she gave "useful advice to Paul I, as well as Rostopchin." Given what we know of Paul's personality, it is highly unlikely that she would have told him that she was working for Bonaparte. Finally, the authentic letters we do possess give no hint of a secret correspondence. What seems most likely is that Madame Bonneuil played the part of an agent provocateur. Through her, Bonaparte hoped to influence Rostopchin and ultimately Paul himself.

If Madame Bonneuil did indeed try to influence Rostopchin and Paul to send a Russian expedition to India, there ought to be some kind of hard evidence of this. Unfortunately, we do not possess any of the letters referred to by Beurnonville. We do possess Rostopchin's memorandum. There are two references to India in it. They read as follows: "Although (England's) conquests and acquisitions in India are important, still with all of this she needs peace without which commerce is a gamble."<sup>102</sup> And again: "England will retain by force her colonial possessions in India and will remain for a long time (God willing, it will not be forever!) the premier maritime power."<sup>103</sup> On the surface, this does not appear to confirm our hypothesis.

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<sup>102</sup>Rostopchin, p. 105.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

However, surfaces can be deceiving. As we know, Rostopchin's memorandum bears a striking resemblance to that of Guttin. The only basic differences between them concern Poland and the sending of a Russian expedition to India via Persia. Guttin raises both of these points. Rostopchin does not. Nevertheless, Rostopchin was familiar with the idea of a Russian invasion of India via Persia. In his letter of June, 1801 to Semyon Vorontsov, Rostopchin referred to Georgia as a point d'appui against the Ottoman Empire and a commercial center for trade with India.<sup>104</sup> Three years later, in 1805, he wrote to his friend Pavel Tsitsianov, then commander-in-chief in the Caucasus. Once again, he returned to his scheme for a partition of the Ottoman Empire between Russia, France, Austria and Prussia. As in the past, Britain would not willingly consent to this. He lamented the fact that Paul's invasion had not been fully carried out. His policies might have been implemented by it. They still could be. Thus, it would be necessary "to send 50,000 men under your command across Persia to India and there destroy from top to bottom the English possessions."<sup>105</sup> Clearly, Rostopchin was attracted to this idea.

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<sup>104</sup>Atkin, Russia, p. 47.

<sup>105</sup>Alfred Rambaud, "Le comte Rostopchine d'après une correspondance nouvellement publiée," Revue des Deux Mondes, XIV, 3rd Period, 46th Year (April 15, 1876), p. 845.

If this is the case, why did he not recommend this policy to Paul in 1800? We can only speculate. It is likely that, while using Madame Bonneuil, he did not want to be used by her. She was proposing a Russian invasion of India to aid her masters in France. Rostopchin was more interested in a partition of Turkey. Apparently in 1800, he viewed an invasion of India as a distraction from, rather than a means of, achieving this goal. Hence, he did not recommend it.

Concerning Paul, there are various interpretations of his decision to invade India. They range from comments on his sanity to the Marxist view that the expedition was undertaken to establish a route for Russian commerce via Bukhara and Khiva.<sup>106</sup> Paul did mention economic concerns in his second rescript to Vasilii Orlov of January 24, 1801.<sup>107</sup> But while these interpretations are appealing, they tend to view Russian foreign policy as being developed in complete isolation from all outside factors. It is our contention that Paul's decision to invade India was a response to the deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations after the collapse of the Second Coalition. Thus a well placed remark by Madame Bonneuil on the vulnerability of the British in India would have been well received by Paul at that time.

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<sup>106</sup>Okun', p. 107.

<sup>107</sup>Shil'der, p. 418.

Why would such a suggestion from Madame Bonneuil be so convincing to Paul? To answer this question, we must examine Russo-Indian relations prior to Paul's reign.

The earliest known contact between Russia and India took place from 1466 to 1472 when the Tverian merchant, Afanasiy Nikitin, travelled via the Volga, the Caspian Sea, Persia, and the Arabian Sea to southern India.<sup>108</sup> Though we possess no evidence of any other such journeys, "this does not at all mean that no one else had taken such journeys."<sup>109</sup> India next surfaced during the reign of Vasiliy III (1505-1533). In 1520 and 1525, an Italian soldier of fortune from Genoa, Paolo Centurione, tried, without success, to establish a trade route between Europe and India via Russia.<sup>110</sup> In 1532, a supposed ambassador from the Great Moghul arrived in Moscow. Vasiliy seemed singularly unimpressed.<sup>111</sup> Finally, during the latter half of the sixteenth century, the Muscovy Company tried to

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<sup>108</sup>V. N. Peretts, "Nikitin," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XXI (1897), p. 78.

<sup>109</sup>M. N. Pokrovskiy, Russia in World History, Roman Szporluk, ed., Roman Szporluk and Mary Szporluk, trans. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 70.

<sup>110</sup>William Forster, England's Quest of Eastern Trade (London: A. & G. Black Ltd., 1933), p. 23, n. 1.

<sup>111</sup>David Druhe, Russo-Indian Relations, 1466-1917 (New York: Vantage Press, 1970), pp. 20-21.

implement Centurione's idea. They finally gave up in 1582.<sup>112</sup> Such were Russia's earliest attempts to contact India.

It was not until the reign of Aleksey I (1645-1676) that serious attempts were made to establish commercial and diplomatic relations with India by the Russian government. In all, four missions were sent. Only one reached Indian territory. This took place in 1676 when the Russian envoy arrived in the then Indian frontier city of Kabul. All attempts to establish any kind of relations proved futile and the Russian envoy was eventually forced to leave. Thus, all Aleksey I's attempts ended in failure.<sup>113</sup>

During the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725), fresh attempts were made to establish relations with India. In 1695, a mission was sent and this one was finally successful. Even so, nothing changed. It was not until the latter half of Peter's reign that the Emperor seriously attempted anything with regard to India. As with so many of his projects, Peter took his cue from the imperialist policies of his Western European mentors. For the first time in Russian history, military force was used in an attempt to expand commercial and diplomatic relations with

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<sup>112</sup>Forster, pp. 24-45.

<sup>113</sup>Druhe, pp. 30-42.

India. In 1716, Peter took his first step in this direction when he tried to conquer Khiva. Had his soldiers been successful, Peter planned to send a diplomatic mission to India via the Amu-Darya River. Peter had also sent an embassy to Persia that same year. Part of the envoy's instructions called for him to find out if any rivers from India flowed into the Caspian Sea.<sup>114</sup>

Unfortunately, Peter's army was destroyed by the Khivans. And though his envoy in Persia had negotiated a favorable treaty, he urged Peter to declare war on Persia at the first opportunity. Peter followed his advice and later in 1721 he declared war on Persia. There were two basic reasons for this decision: 1) the desire to seize the silk producing provinces of Persia, and 2) the desire to use this area as a point d'appui for commercial relations with India. After two campaigns, Peter gained his objectives. However, these conquests of 1722 and 1723 were not permanent. In 1732, Russia ceded these areas back to Persia. Of more importance, was the precedent set by Peter of using military means to establish commercial relations with India.<sup>115</sup>

From the death of Peter the Great until the reign of Catherine II, Russian interest in India remained at a low level. One notable exception to this situation was

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., pp. 43-51.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. 51-55.

the formation of the Russo-Indian Company in 1750. However, after two attempts to send caravans across the Central Asian deserts failed, the Company ceased to exist.<sup>116</sup> It was not until the last years of the reign of Catherine that any events merit our attention. In 1791, Anglo-Russian relations deteriorated in a dispute over Russia's capture of the Black Sea port of Ochakov from the Ottoman Empire. For a time, it appeared that the two countries might go to war. During this period, two men, Prince Karl Heinrich Nikolas Otto Nassau-Siegen and M. de Saint Genie proposed that Catherine send a Russian army down the Volga; across the Caspian Sea; across Central Asia; down the Amu-Darya River to Balkh; and across the Himalayan Mountains to Kashmir. Once in India, a manifesto was to be issued in Catherine's name proclaiming the reestablishment of the Moghul Empire. According to Nassau-Siegen, the Russians would have no problems crossing Central Asia. As for the inhabitants of India, they would welcome the Russians as liberators. Catherine is said to have seriously considered this plan. However, tensions soon eased between Britain and Russia and the raison d'être for the plan vanished. In addition, as long as he lived, Prince Potyomkin ridiculed this plan. Nevertheless, the idea had been mooted.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-61.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., pp. 70-71.

Under the influence of her last favorite, Platon Zubov, Catherine decided to invade Persia in 1796. Command of the expedition was given to Valerian Zubov, the favorite's younger brother. According to one source, the objective of what the elder Zubov called his "Oriental Project" was "to conquer the whole of Anterior Asia up to Tibet."<sup>118</sup> Valerian Zubov had nearly 30,000 men under his command. He marched along the western coast of the Caspian Sea followed by the Russian Caspian flotilla. Another 8,000 troops under the command of Count Ivan V. Gudovich were already in Georgia. The plan was for the Russian forces to rendezvous at Tiflis and then march to Isphahan. Though some earlier victories were won, this was due more to the absence of the Persian army than to Zubov's skill as a commander. By November, 1796, the Russians had made their rendezvous and were camped on the Mogan steppe near the confluence of the Aras and Kura Rivers. Supplies were short due to mismanagement and a lack of boats. In addition many were tied down in garrison duty. Even worse, the Persian army had returned from its campaign in Khorasan. An attack was planned for the spring of 1797. Thus, the situation had all the signs of an impending disaster. At this point, Fortune intervened.

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<sup>118</sup>N. Vasilenko, "Zubov, Valerian A.," Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, XII (1894), p. 704.

On November 17, 1796, Catherine II died and Paul I acceded to the throne. Immediately, the new Emperor ordered the recall of Zubov and his troops. Not long thereafter, Shah Aga Muhammed Khan was murdered on June 17, 1797. By that time, all Russian forces had been evacuated.<sup>119</sup>

Such were Russo-Indian relations before the reign of Paul I. Given this information, it is not hard to understand why Paul, like his mother, might have been receptive to the suggestion of a Russian invasion of India. But whatever the ultimate source of his decision, Paul took the first step toward an invasion of India late in January, 1801. Some days prior to his rescripts of January 24, Paul talked with General Matvey I. Platov on the feasibility of an expedition to India. Previously, Paul had suspected Platov of being involved in a conspiracy, the nature of which is not clear. Platov had been arrested in 1797 and exiled to Kostroma. Since the latter half of 1800, he had been incarcerated in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. Now, in January, 1801, Platov was summoned from his cell to an audience with the Emperor. Paul asked the Cossack his opinion on an invasion of India. Since Platov was

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<sup>119</sup>I. Radozhiskiy, "Istoricheskoye izvestiye o pokhode Rossiyskikh voysk v 1796 godu v Dagestan i Persiyu pod komandayu Grafa Valeriana Aleksandrovicha Zubova," Otechestvennyya zapiski, XXXI, nos. 87-88 (June & August, 1827), pp. 127-168, 226-314.

firmly resolved not to return to prison, he approved the idea. What makes this incident interesting is the fact that Paul discussed the invasion with Platov before issuing his orders to Orlov. In any event, Paul was satisfied and Platov was appointed chief assistant to the Host Ataman. He immediately set out for the Don.<sup>120</sup>

Even so, Platov was not given command of the expedition. Instead, on January 24, Paul sent two rescripts to Host Ataman Vasiliy Petrovich Orlov and ordered him "to gather all forces at the assembly points" in order to set out on a "secret expedition" to India.<sup>121</sup> Paul informed Orlov that the British were preparing to attack him and his "allies--the Swedes and the Danes."<sup>122</sup> He was ready to receive them. However, it was necessary to attack the British "in the very place, where a blow to them can be most telling, and where they least expect. Their establishments in India are best for this."<sup>123</sup> From Orlov's location, Cherkassk, to Orenburg was a one month's march.

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<sup>120</sup>Batorskiy, "Proyekt," p. 59, n. 1; Yevgeniy Tarle, Bonaparte, trans. J. Cournos (New York: Knight Pub., 1937), p. 116; W. P. Cresson, The Cossacks: Their History and Country (New York: Brentano's, 1919), pp. 176-177, 180-182. Some historians have incorrectly assumed from this incident that Platov was given command of the entire expedition. For example, see: Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 236.

<sup>121</sup>Batorskiy, p. 53.

<sup>122</sup>Shil'der, p. 417.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

From there to India was a three months' march. Thus, from Cherkasssk, to India via Orenburg was a four months' march. "I entrust entirely this expedition to you and your force, Vasiliy Petrovich."<sup>124</sup> Orlov was to assemble his force, the Don Cossacks, and begin the march to Orenburg. From there he was to go "by any or all of three routes you prefer, with artillery, directly through Bukhara and Khiva to the Indus River and to the English establishments lying on it."<sup>125</sup> Because the troops of this country, the sepoys, were similar to the Cossacks, Orlov's possession of artillery would give him an "absolute advantage" (he thought). The Ataman was to prepare everything for the campaign. Scouts were to be sent out to reconnoiter the route. Paul declared, "all the wealth of India will be Our reward for this expedition."<sup>126</sup>

Nevertheless, Paul wanted to be fully informed on the progress of the expedition. First, the troops were to be assembled at the stanitsas. Once this was done, Orlov was to inform Paul and "wait for the order to advance to Orenburg."<sup>127</sup> Arriving there, Orlov was to "again wait for another (order)--before going farther."<sup>128</sup> This expedition would crown all the Cossacks with glory, earn them Paul's personal favor, win riches, open up trade and

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

"strike a blow to the enemy in his very heart."<sup>129</sup> Paul enclosed all the maps that he had. In a postscript, he added, "My maps go only as far as Khiva and the Amu-darya River, beyond this it will be your concern to obtain information on the English establishments and on the Indian people, subject to them."<sup>130</sup>

Later that same day, Paul sent a second rescript to Orlov. He reminded the Ataman that India was ruled by one principal sovereign, i.e. the Moghul, and many less powerful ones. The British had commercial establishments on the lesser princes' lands, obtained by money or force. Orlov's objective was

to completely destroy everything, to free the oppressed sovereigns and by kindness to bring them in the same dependence to Russia as they are to the English, thus diverting the trade to us.<sup>131</sup>

The following day, January 25, Paul sent Orlov a third rescript. In this one, Paul enclosed "a new and detailed map of all India."<sup>132</sup> Orlov was to remember that Russia was at war only with the English. Therefore, he was to "be at peace with all those, who do not aid them."<sup>133</sup> While marching through the lands of the native princes, the Ataman was "to persuade them of the friendship of Russia."<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid.      <sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 418. See Chapter II, p. 80.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.      <sup>133</sup> Ibid.      <sup>134</sup> Ibid.

From the Indus, the Cossacks were to march "to the Ganges, and from there on to the English."<sup>135</sup> While passing through Central Asia, Orlov was to "occupy Bukhara, in order that the Chinese do not take it themselves."<sup>136</sup> In Khiva, he was to free "some thousands of Our imprisoned subjects."<sup>137</sup> If Orlov needed infantry, it would be sent after him, "but in no other way would it be possible to send them."<sup>138</sup> It was better that the Cossacks accomplish their mission alone. In a postscript, Paul added, "Take as many men with you as possible."<sup>139</sup> Finally, Paul ordered the State Treasurer that "the necessary amount of money is to be a loan from the State Treasury, which must be returned by General of the Cavalry Orlov 1st from the spoils of this expedition."<sup>140</sup> On the basis of this order, 1,670,285 rubles and one-quarter kopeck was provided. Paul must have been sanguine of success.

Such were Paul's plans for the invasion of India. Most historians have leveled various charges against Paul's orders and at the expedition itself. Most of these can be dealt with as the story unfolds. Three of these criticisms merit special attention and will be dealt with separately. They are: 1) Paul sent the Cossacks over territory of which he had no maps, 2) Paul's reference to the possibility

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Batorskiy, p. 56.

of the Chinese taking Bukhara has no basis in fact, and  
3) Overall, Paul's orders were contradictory. We will discuss each of these criticisms in turn.

At first glance, it does appear absurd to order an army to march across uncharted territory. However, the absurdity disappears on closer examination. The plain fact of the matter is that Paul did not have any maps of the territory between Khiva and India for the very good reason that no such maps existed! Indeed, the area in question would not be fully mapped until the end of the nineteenth century. And if it be argued that to send an army across uncharted territory is madness, then we would have to consider the British mad as well. In reality, sending an army across uncharted territory was not an unusual step for a major power to take in 1801. The British believed that they would have to use their troops in India to stop an invading army before it reached the subcontinent. Yet, they possessed no maps of the north-western frontier, the region considered the most likely route for an invasion of India.<sup>141</sup> Thus, this criticism turns out to be completely unjustified.

With regard to Paul's reference to the Chinese, one historian writes, "Where the tsar acquired this idea is a complete mystery, because at that time there was no

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<sup>141</sup>Atkin, "Pragmatic Diplomacy," p. 69.

danger of Bukhara drifting under Chinese influence."<sup>142</sup>

Looking ahead to China's history in the nineteenth century, it is easy to conclude that a nation already in decline would offer no threat to Bukhara. However, Paul did not have the luxury of 20-20 hindsight. The decline of imperial China was by no means apparent to either Europeans or the the Chinese themselves.<sup>143</sup> Indeed, during the reign of the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, large areas of Asia were annexed by the Chinese Empire. The most recent example of this was the conquest of Nepal in 1790-1791. One historian cites two reasons for this policy. One was security. The other was that

the Chinese may actually have noticed the efforts that were being made by the European powers, especially Russia and England, to divide Asia among themselves, and accordingly they made sure of their own good share.<sup>144</sup>

Also, during the last decade of Catherine II's reign, Russo-Chinese relations, though quiet, had been strained. In 1785, a Russian merchant claimed that a Chinese army of twenty thousand men was stationed near Kuldzha in Sinkiang. People in Siberia were talking of

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<sup>142</sup>Strong, p. 124.

<sup>143</sup>Frederic Wakeman Jr., "High Ch'ing 1683-1839," in Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, ed. J. B. Crowley (New York: Harcourt Brace and World Inc., 1970), pp. 1-27.

<sup>144</sup>Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China, trans. E. W. Dickes (1948; 4th rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 296.

the possibility of war. Still, the government in St. Petersburg was not eager for war and in 1789 the governor-general of Irkutsk was dismissed for allegedly trying to provoke one. What makes all this of interest is that Paul would later exonerate him.<sup>145</sup>

One last piece of evidence concerns Russia's relations with Tashkent. In 1794, the ruler of Tashkent sent a letter to the commander of the Siberian Line. The result was the sending of a Russian embassy to Tashkent in 1796. One of the topics brought up by the ruler of Tashkent was Russian protection against China in case of war. In 1797, the Russians returned home and brought with them envoys from Tashkent. In St. Petersburg, they once again requested "Russian protection should China attack Tashkent."<sup>146</sup> Paul gave no formal commitments on this point. The fact was stressed that Russo-Chinese relations were good at that time and that China would not start a war. However, "should China attack, the Tsar would intervene on behalf of Tashkent."<sup>147</sup>

Given all this information, we see that at the

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<sup>145</sup> Clifford M. Fowat, Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's Trade with China and Its Setting, 1727-1805 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 309-311.

<sup>146</sup> Yu. A. Sokolov, "The First Russian Embassy to Tashkent," abrd. trans., Central Asian Review, VII, no. 4 (1959), p. 332.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 333.

turn of the century China was viewed as and gave the impression of being a strong and dynamic power. She had annexed large portions of Asia and as recently as 1791 had conquered Nepal. There had been some tension between Russia and China during the last years of Catherine's reign. Paul was familiar with this situation and had exonerated a man who had favored war with China. He might well have heard the rumor concerning the Chinese army in Kuldzha. Finally, he had had at least one Central Asian Khanate ask for protection from Chinese attack. Under these circumstances, we can see that there is no "mystery" as to the source of Paul's remark.

Finally, let us deal with two examples of "contradictions" in Paul's rescripts. For example, Paul tells Orlov that "all the wealth of India will be Our reward (to you) for this expedition."<sup>148</sup> In another rescript, he orders Orlov to "be at peace with all those who do not aid" the English.<sup>149</sup> On the face of it, this does appear to be a contradiction; but only if we take Paul literally. For instance, Napoleon is supposed to have issued the following proclamation to the Army of Italy in March, 1796:

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<sup>148</sup>Shil'der, p. 417.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., p. 418.

Soldiers, you are naked and starving. The Government owes you much; it can give you nothing. . . . I will lead you into the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces and great cities will be in your power.<sup>150</sup>

Are we to believe that Napoleon planned to hand over the entire Po valley to his soldiers? Of course not. This is but one example of his hyperbole. Paul's remark is yet another. Thus, it does not contradict his order for Orlov to be at peace with the other Indian princes.

Another "contradiction" concerns Paul's order "to free the oppressed sovereigns and by kindness (laskoyu) bring them in the same dependence to Russia as they are to the English."<sup>151</sup> Notice that Paul states this is to be done by kindness. As we noted in chapter two,<sup>152</sup> this language does not imply conquest. In his rescript of January 25, Paul wrote, "be at peace with all those who do not aid (the English); thus passing through their lands try to persuade them of the friendship of Russia."<sup>153</sup> How are we to reconcile this persuasion with putting these newly liberated sovereigns in dependence to Russia?

The answer to this apparent contradiction can be found in the pages of this very chapter. It will be

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<sup>150</sup>Corres. de Nap., I, no. 91.

<sup>151</sup>Shil'der, p. 418.

<sup>152</sup>See above, chapter II, p. 80.

<sup>153</sup>Shil'der, p. 418. The emphasis is mine.

recalled that, when Prince Nassau-Siegen proposed his plan of invasion of India in 1791, he claimed the Indians would welcome the Russians as liberators.<sup>154</sup> Paul had referred to the princes as "oppressed sovereigns." In his second rescript of January 24, he wrote, "the English possess on those princes' lands their own commercial establishments obtained either by money, or by arms."<sup>155</sup> Like Nassau-Siegen, Paul viewed India as ripe for rebellion against the English. The British wars with Tipu Sultan could be used to justify this point of view,<sup>156</sup> whether or not it was correct is not the issue. If this is what Paul believed, then his references to "kindness" and "friendship" are understandable.

But even if this is so, it still might be argued that Paul proposed to change one form of oppression for another. In a sense, this is true. However, Paul would not have viewed the matter thus. And as far as the British were concerned, we may be very certain that they did not regard their expanding empire in India as the spread of oppression. Clearly, we are talking about imperialism. Today, it is quite fashionable to speak of the subjugation

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<sup>154</sup> See above, p. 169.

<sup>155</sup> Shil'der, p. 418.

<sup>156</sup> Fortescue, Britis Army, IV, pt. 2, pp. 711-714.

of non-white, non-Christian peoples in hushed tones of righteous indignation. The plain truth is that in the nineteenth century the superiority of white civilization and Christianity was taken for granted by all Europeans, and by all white Americans for that matter. Of course, Paul would view himself and his country as being superior to Britain. From this point of view, one could argue that the change in masters in India would be favorably viewed by the inhabitants. If such an argument is accepted, then the "apparent" contradiction ceases to exist. Paul may be judged naïf, but not inconsistent. And if he be judged hypocritical, then the British must also be so judged.

Just two days after his third rescript to Orlov on January 17, 1801, Paul wrote his third and final letter to Napoleon. In this letter, he returned to an idea he had expressed in his secret instructions to Kolychyov of January 10.

It is not appointed to me to tell You what You should do, but I cannot but suggest to You, whether it will not be possible to produce something on the coasts of England, which at the moment, when she sees herself isolated, can produce a result to make her repent of her despotism and of her arrogance.<sup>157</sup>

The letter's timing is interesting. Writing only three days after his initial orders to Orlov, Paul wants Napoleon to "produce something on the coasts of England."

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<sup>157</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 16.

One might conclude that Paul viewed the expedition to India in the same light. For example, Semyon Okun' writes that,

the haste with which Paul implemented the preparations for the campaign through Orenburg was dictated by the necessity to demonstrate ascendancy over England. Paul reckoned that this would provoke a governmental crisis and lead to the fall of the Pitt ministry; hostile in its attitude toward Russia.<sup>158</sup>

Paul's first rescript to Orlov supports this view to a certain extent. Orlov is ordered to assemble his troops and wait for the order to advance to Orenburg. Once there, he is to "again wait for another one--before going farther."<sup>159</sup> One could argue from this that Paul hoped to influence British policy by a show of force rather than an actual invasion. After all, we have noted several instances in this study where Paul used maneuvers and the threat of force as a part of his diplomacy. But while this interpretation is tempting, it cannot be completely correct. We have already noted that Paul expected Orlov to return from India with enough spoils to repay the Treasury for the cost of the expedition. Also, Paul shrouded his orders in secrecy. According to Princess Dariya Lieven, Paul dictated Orlov's rescripts to her husband in his study. The courier received these rescripts there and left immediately. Further, Paul forbid Prince Lieven to

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<sup>158</sup>Okun', p. 107.

<sup>159</sup>Shil'der, p. 417.

reveal a single word of these rescripts to anyone. "The all-powerful Pahlen was even ignorant of it."<sup>160</sup> If this is true, then Paul did not intend a mere demonstration. Instead, he wished to present the British with a fait accompli. What his letter to Napoleon tells us is that he considered the Indian expedition on a par with the proposed landings in England. This would be consistent with the interpretation that the expedition was part and parcel of his European diplomacy.

On the same day that Paul wrote his last letter to Napoleon, Rostopchin in his capacity as Foreign Minister prepared further instructions for Kolychyov. In the main, they dealt with Malta and Egypt. Kolychyov was "to strive persistently . . . until settling . . . the particular point concerning the return of Malta to His Imperial Majesty, as Grand Master."<sup>161</sup> With regard to Egypt, the Emperor took a personal interest in it, "both for maintaining the interests of his ally, the Sultan of Turkey, and for annihilating the view of England for the conquest of Egypt, as well as the whole commerce of the Mediterranean and Red Seas."<sup>162</sup> France must evacuate Egypt. As for the British, it was necessary to make sure that they were

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 493, n. 1.

<sup>161</sup> Trachevskiy, I, no. 18.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

nowhere in Egypt. Paul would not tolerate this because "this land must be returned as before to the sole control of the Porte."<sup>163</sup> Rostopchin himself believed that should the British land in Egypt, they would have to destroy the French army immediately or "their campaign will be a failure."<sup>164</sup> If they were successful, they would be difficult to remove, owing to their command of the seas.<sup>165</sup> However, Paul would not tolerate this and was prepared to use force if necessary to drive the English out of Egypt.<sup>166</sup>

Concerning other matters, Kolychyov was to resist any attempt by the French to obtain the return of émigrés should Naples make peace with France. If this happened, it would serve "as a clear proof of the continuation of the system of undermining order in well-established lands."<sup>167</sup> In Prussia, they were nervous and the present negotiations were forcing them to expect anything from Russia. For now, Paul was content to give verbal assurances "in obtaining a general peace satisfying to Prussia in Germany."<sup>168</sup> Such were Rostopchin's instructions.

At about this same time, January 30th to be precise, Paul issued a proclamation declaring the annexation

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<sup>163</sup>Ibid.      <sup>164</sup>Ibid., no. 17.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.      <sup>166</sup>Ibid., no. 18.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid., no. 17.      <sup>168</sup>Ibid., no. 18.

of Georgia.<sup>169</sup> One modern historian writes that "the preparations for the formal annexation of Georgia were related to the planning" of the expedition.<sup>170</sup> As we saw above, the expedition was a response to the political situation in Europe. Paul's rescripts to Orlov make clear that the invasion route was to be from Orenburg via Bukhara and Khiva to India. This is hardly the route to Georgia. Besides, the de Hoffmanns pamphlet called for the French and Russian armies to be shipped across the Caspian to Astrabad. Again, Georgia is not involved.<sup>171</sup> The reason for the annexation of Georgia was the kingdom's weakness. On the other hand, Paul did not seek expansion for its own sake. Only one day prior to his first rescripts to Orlov, Paul had written to his agent in Tiflis as follows: "Do not seek to make acquisitions other than those who willingly seek my protection. It is better to have allies who are interested in alliance than untrustworthy subjects."<sup>172</sup> Clearly, the annexation of Georgia had nothing to do with the expedition to India.

In the meantime, Paul's rescripts had reached Orlov

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<sup>169</sup>P.S.Z., XXVI, no. 19721, 19770.

<sup>170</sup>Saul, p. 149; Rambaud, II, p. 138; Cresson, p. 179.

<sup>171</sup>(Hoffman), p. 41.

<sup>172</sup>Atkin, "Pragmatic Diplomacy," pp. 63-64, 67-68.

at the beginning of February, 1801.<sup>173</sup> As soon as he received the first of these, Orlov ordered "that all available subaltern officers, sergeants, clerks and the sons of subaltern officers were to be on review, as well as all active Cossacks, not excluding those occupied in stanitsa duties."<sup>174</sup> The only exceptions were the infirm, the lame and the injured. These numbered no more than 800. Each Cossack "to the last one"<sup>175</sup> was to appear in six days with two horses, a gun, a lance and a month and a half's worth of provisions.<sup>176</sup> In addition, Orlov ordered the ruler of a local Kalmyk ulus to assemble everyone who could carry arms, adults and minors, at the village of Saloskiy by February 27. Orlov warned the Kalmyk ruler that "in the contrary case you will be held responsible."<sup>177</sup>

During this period, Orlov was contacted by General Ivan V. Lamb, Vice-President of the College of War; Vasiliy

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<sup>173</sup>This is evident from Paul's rescript of February 14, 1801. In it he makes reference to "your (i.e., Orlov's) report of the 23rd of January" O.S. Shil'der, p. 418, n. 1.

<sup>174</sup>Batorskiy, p. 55.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>Contrary to Aleksandr Kornilov, p. 71, who states that the Cossacks were to take "a double complement of horses."

<sup>177</sup>Batorskiy, p. 55.

S. Lanskiy, Governor of the Samara guberniya; Major-General N. N. Bakhmetev, Governor of Orenburg; Prince V. N. Gorchakov, Inspector of the Kharkov inspectorate; Prince Lieven, Paul's Adjutant-General; and Procurator-General Pyotr Kh. Obol'yaninov, responsible for the affairs of the provisioning department. Preparations were pushed forward as rapidly as possible. Bakhmetev sent a map of the Kirghiz steppes and of Khiva and Bukhara to Orlov. In addition, he purchased camels and recruited doctors to take part in the campaign. Orders were sent to the Saratov and Samara guberniyas to prepare supplies of food and forage for the Cossacks.<sup>178</sup>

At the same time these events were occurring, Paul took further actions against the British, as discussed previously.<sup>179</sup> Apparently, British merchants had tried to circumvent these measures by becoming Russian subjects. On February 6, a decree was issued allowing the merchants to become Russian subjects. However, their goods would still be sequestered and they would still have to pay their debts according to the rulings of the liquidation commission.<sup>180</sup> On February 16, Paul informed Kolychyov that the British had placed an embargo on Russian, Swedish and

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<sup>178</sup>Ibid., pp. 55-56.

<sup>179</sup>See above, Chapter I, pp. 33-34.

<sup>180</sup>P.S.Z., XXVI, no. 19733.

Danish ships and had declared war on Russia. As soon as this was confirmed, he would respond. As the Armed Neutrality was the best means of constricting British commerce and of rendering them more docile, Paul ordered Kolychyov to speak to the First Consul and to make him see the good that would result if the French government, together with that of Spain, was to obtain the adherence of Portugal and the United States to the Armed Neutrality.<sup>181</sup>

In addition to these actions, two more were taken on the twentieth and the twenty-first of February. In response to Bonaparte's order of January 10, Paul ordered that "relations with this Power (France) via commerce be allowed as before the decision to cancel this prohibition."<sup>182</sup> On the twenty-first, Paul turned the screws even tighter on the British by prohibiting all Russian exports to Prussia. This was done on the grounds that they could be reexported from Prussia to Britain.<sup>183</sup>

During this same period, Paul sent two more rescripts to Orlov. On February 14, he acknowledged the receipt of a report from the Ataman dated February 4. Apparently, Orlov had inquired whether or not infantry

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<sup>181</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 20.

<sup>182</sup>P.S.Z., XXVI, no. 19745.

<sup>183</sup>Ibid., no. 19747.

were to be included in the campaign. In a postscript Paul wrote, "Concerning the infantry, follow your own judgment but it is better not to take any at all."<sup>184</sup> Five days later, Paul wrote again to Orlov. This time the Tsar enclosed a new line of march. It would enhance the Ataman's map and explain it. Paul went on to say, "the expedition is extremely urgent and the sooner done the better it will be."<sup>185</sup> In a postscript, Paul added, "With this line of march, I still do not want to tie your hands."<sup>186</sup>

In Cherkassk, Orlov continued his hectic preparations. Soon after he received the map of India sent with Paul's rescript of January 25, he gave secret orders to a certain Captain Denezhnikov. These orders required much. Captain Denezhnikov was to: 1) Find out what was the best route over the steppes to Khiva, Bukhara and beyond to India. In particular, were there any rivers? If so, how wide were they and did they have fords? Were there wooded areas and settlements near these rivers? What kind of people lived in these settlements? 2) How far apart were the rivers? And what about small streams and wells? Did these have water at all times? How many wells were there? How much water did they have and how many horses and camels

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<sup>184</sup>Shil'der, p. 418, n. 1.

<sup>185</sup>Ibid.      <sup>186</sup>Ibid.

could they serve? How deep were these wells? Was it possible to dig new wells if there was not enough water? If there were people living near these wells, what kind were they? Or, were the wells adequate only for small merchant caravans? 3) Over the whole route to Khiva and beyond, what was the terrain like? Was it stoney or sandy? How wide were these different terrains? Could horses travel over such terrains? Also, were there valleys with grass on this route? If so, how large were they? 4) Beyond Orenburg, was it possible to obtain food from the local inhabitants? If so, what kind and how much? Could food be bought? If so, how much would it cost? If the local inhabitants would not take money, what items would they take in barter and which would be the most useful for this? and 5) Concerning the different nomad bands, were they all in agreement? How far apart were they? Was each branch ruled by mirzas? And taking all this into consideration, what type of people lived there? What were their qualities and how numerous were they?<sup>187</sup>

In order to gather all this information, Orlov ordered Denezhnikov, along with Ensign Dolgapyatov, to set out for Orenburg immediately. On approaching Orenburg, Denezhnikov was to talk with merchants who traded with Asians to get the required information. He was not to

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<sup>187</sup>Batorskiy, pp. 56-57.

mention the expedition so that word would not spread. Besides, the local inhabitants had nothing to fear since it was not directed against them. Once in Orenburg, the Captain was to go to the local commander (Bakhmetev?) and tell him everything. The local commander was to obtain the necessary information and give it to Denezhnikov. He was to be told it was for Orlov as per the orders of the Emperor Paul. Having obtained the information, Denezhnikov was to return as soon as possible and meet Orlov on the march. If the Captain could not obtain the information for the whole route to India, then he was to get it at least as far as Khiva. If this were not possible, Denezhnikov was to find several merchants in Orenburg who were trustworthy, traded with the Asians in this region and had property in Orenburg. He was to send one of these with one of his Don Tatars, disguised as a local inhabitant, to get the information for the route to Khiva. They should be back in Orenburg by the beginning of April. Denezhnikov was not to wait for them, but was to return immediately. Instead, Ensign Dolgapyatov would wait for their return. Such were Orlov's orders to Denezhnikov.<sup>188</sup>

These orders demonstrate the haste with which the preparations for the expedition were made and the lack of information Orlov had on the route beyond Orenburg. What

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., pp. 57-58.

makes this ironic is that, on January 12, 1801, the College of Commerce published a document concerning Russian trade with India, Bukhara and Khiva. Among other things, it discussed the route which Orlov proposed to take as follows:

The present unimportant trade, carried on from Orenburg by dry land to Khiva, Bukhara and India is not only caused by the distance of the journey, the difficulty of transporting the goods, and of the arid steppes all along the way, but also by the extreme danger from robbery as practiced by the Kirghiz-Kazakh nomads of the Lesser Horde and by the Karakalpak; all this uniting to make for great discomfort and inconvenience.<sup>189</sup>

There is no evidence that this information was ever made available to Orlov.

The haste with which Paul's orders were executed is also confirmed in another source; the memoirs of the Cossack Adrian K. Denisov. Denisov had taken part in Suvorov's Italian campaign. On returning to the Don, he had been appointed by Orlov to a post in the Host chancellery. In his memoirs, he states that when Paul's orders arrived in Cherkassk, Orlov ordered him to "hurry to the designated stanitsas and, assembling the military Cossacks of these stanitsas, (to) hurry with them to the town of Saratov, on the Volga."<sup>190</sup> After giving the necessary orders and sending others by special messengers, Denisov set out himself for Nizhe-Chirskaya stanitsa.

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<sup>189</sup> Druhe, p. 94.

<sup>190</sup> Adrian K. Denisov, "Zapiski donskago stamana Denisova," Russkaya starina, XII (1875), p. 239.

There his parents and daughter lived. He stayed there for nine or ten days and raised a force of nearly a thousand men. The designated stanitsas that Denisov mentions were: 1) Buzulutskaya, 2) Medveditskaya, 3) Ust-Medveditskaya and 4) Kachalinskaya.<sup>191</sup> After a heartfelt good-bye to his family, Denisov wrote,

I hurried to other stanitsas, where finding everything already prepared, the regiments were assembled and sent one after the other. Then, I hurried to the last stanitsa of the Don Host, being on the Buzuluk river, through which all the regiments, still to be looked at and inspected had to pass.<sup>192</sup>

By this time, Orlov had done all he could in Cherkassk and he left for one of the assembly points on February 28.<sup>193</sup>

One day earlier in Paris, Bonaparte finally decided to answer Paul's three letters. He began by noting that Kolychyov had not yet arrived in Paris. In a reference to Paul's request for a landing on the English coast, he mentioned the gunboats and claimed that he would assemble an army in Brittany "which will be able to embark on the Brest squadron."<sup>194</sup> Turning to Italy, he informed Paul of the presence of Murat's army on the borders of Naples. He had asked the King of Naples to close his ports

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<sup>191</sup>Batorskiy, p. 59.

<sup>192</sup>Denisov, "Zapiski," p. 239.

<sup>193</sup>Batorskiy, p. 59.

<sup>194</sup>Corres. de Nap., VII, no. 5417.

to the British. Marquis Gallo had arrived in Paris with full powers to negotiate along with the representatives of Austria and Britain. Unfortunately, the Neapolitan diplomat's instructions made no mention of Russia. He "will have to procure for himself other powers."<sup>195</sup> King Ferdinand IV should know "full-well that he owes the retention of his domains only to the protection of Your Majesty."<sup>196</sup>

Ten French vessels had been sent from Toulon to Cadiz. There Spain was assembling a fleet so that, should the circumstances arise, "these squadrons can combine with that which Your Majesty has in the Black Sea."<sup>197</sup> However, for all to go well, it was necessary that France and Russia each occupy a port in southern Naples.

Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador, had presented a note "by which it appears" that Prussia would close the Elbe and the Weser to British commerce. Could not Paul allow Sprengporten and his troops to occupy Hanover until the general peace? If so, France would furnish them with "all the military supplies, of which they will have need."<sup>198</sup> If Paul should insist on this, the British would be cut off from Northern Europe. French troops in Bordeaux could be sent to force Portugal to close her ports. With those of Naples and Sicily closed

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

as well, "then the English will not have any communication with Europe."<sup>199</sup>

Concerning Egypt, the British were attempting a landing there. "The interest of all the Mediterranean powers, as well as those of the Black Sea is, that Egypt be retained by France."<sup>200</sup> The Suez canal could easily be rebuilt.<sup>201</sup> By it the commerce of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean could be joined, and through it, the commerce of the north could go to the south. If Paul wanted to attach his name to a grand enterprise, then he should intervene with the Porte with regard to Egypt. "In the treaty of peace, which has been concluded between France and Austria, Your Majesty will have seen, that all has been calculated in order to be able to fulfill all his desires."<sup>202</sup> Lastly, the First Consul awaited "with impatience monsieur de Kolitschew."<sup>203</sup> This letter arrived in St. Petersburg on March 26, three days after Paul's death.

Such is Napoleon's letter of February 27. How close was it to reality? In the section dealing with the

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<sup>199</sup>Ibid.      <sup>200</sup>Ibid.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid. Napoleon was referring to the ancient Suez canal. See also: "Suez Canal," The New Columbia Encyclopedia (4th ed.; 1975), p. 2646.

<sup>202</sup>Corres. de Nap., no. 5417.

<sup>203</sup>Ibid.

gunboats, we have seen that while Napoleon would make some preparations, they were intended as decoys. Concerning Italy, Napoleon took an even more cynical stance. Contrary to the five points of October 8, he was using his troops to force the King of Naples to sign a separate peace. Ferdinand IV had sent Marquis Gallo to negotiate for him in Paris under Kolychyov's mediation. When Gallo refused to immediately agree to the closing of Naples' ports to the British, Napoleon seized upon the fact that Gallo's instructions did not specifically mention the Russians. This explains the reference in Napoleon's letter. In fact, Napoleon wanted Gallo out of Paris before Kolychyov's arrival. Almost the same story was repeated with the representative of the King of Sardinia.<sup>204</sup> As concerns the closure of the Elbe and the Weser, this was consistent with the continental blockade Napoleon was attempting to implement. His remarks on Egypt appear to be made with the Testament of Peter the Great in mind. Clearly, Napoleon was ignorant of Paul's true intentions on Egypt. His remark about the Treaty of Lunéville is yet another lie. The five points had called for the inviolability of Würtemberg and Bavaria. The Treaty of Lunéville called for each country to lose territory on

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<sup>204</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 128-130.

the left bank of the Rhine.<sup>205</sup> Finally, we can add that there is not the remotest mention of India in this letter.

From our examination of this letter, it is clear that Napoleon wanted to exclude Paul from Italy. If this is so what did he really want from Paul? As we know, the Treaty of Lunéville dealt with both Italy and Germany.

According to one historian,

Bonaparte wished to involve the Russians in only one of these areas, but to exclude them from the other.

It was in Germany that he was not only willing to accept Russian assistance with the peace settlement, but was even anxious to secure it.<sup>206</sup>

Whatever Napoleon's ultimate motivations may have been, he was clearly worried that Kolychyov had still not arrived in Paris. On March 2 Lucchesini reported as follows:

The news of Kolychyov's entry into France arrived here in time to stop the departure of a letter from the First Consul to the Emperor of Russia full of bitterness at the delay that had attended the trip of the Vice-Chancellor. Gen. Sprengporten had done all he could to stop this letter.<sup>207</sup>

Clearly, Kolychyov had arrived just in time.

In all, Kolychyov's journey had lasted 48 days. He arrived in Paris on March 5.<sup>208</sup> Four days after his

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<sup>205</sup>Consolidated Treaties, LV, pp. 477-495.

<sup>206</sup>Ragsdale, Détente, p. 127.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>208</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. xxxvi. Contrary to Strong, p. 118.

arrival he wrote to Paul. According to the Vice-Chancellor, Bonaparte's sole end was to wage war. This was necessary to keep the armies and the generals occupied and to maintain the public's enthusiasm for the new regime. He continued,

Notwithstanding the extraordinary honors and spoken assurances, it appears, that in the rapprochement of France with Russia there is not the least sincerity.<sup>209</sup>

For example, the French had demonstrated their contempt for Paul's protection of Ferdinand IV by forbidding Gallo to enter into negotiations with them. They refused to remove their army from Naples in order to force the King to conclude an unseemly peace.

Concerning this, I did not fail to make myself understood by Talleyrand in very strong language. Beyond this, it is clearly the desire of the government to embroil Russia in a costly war not only with England, but with the Porte itself.<sup>210</sup>

Through this policy, Bonaparte hoped to isolate Russia and thereby "weaken and humiliate the state (i.e., Russia) which is the only one able to preserve the balance of Europe."<sup>211</sup> Concerning Egypt, it appeared that Bonaparte would never give it up. As a French possession, it was consistent with his designs on the Porte. Talleyrand had dropped hints of the benefits for Russian commerce in

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<sup>209</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 22.

<sup>210</sup>Ibid.      <sup>211</sup>Ibid.

Egypt. He had also suggested that General Sprengporten's men be used against England.<sup>212</sup>

That same day Kolychyov also wrote to Rostopchin. He repeated many of the same points.

In general, I am doubtful of the success of my mission. There is here an unbounded ambition since the abasement of Austria and since our rupture with England.<sup>213</sup>

How could Russia expect to reach an acceptable agreement with a government which depended on the continued existence of one man? France sought to embroil Russia with the whole world and to embarrass her perhaps by reviving troubles in Poland. "I beg you . . . to withdraw me from here as soon as possible; I see everything in black and I am sick of it."<sup>214</sup> General Sprengporten was full of zeal, but he did not have common sense. His enthusiasm for France had led the government to believe that Russia had need of it.

It is necessary with the men who govern here, to be firm and yield nothing, least of all to enter into their views. It is necessary to demand respect from them and only to believe them when they fulfill their promises, because it is necessary never to forget that they aim at dominion everywhere, by flattering us and that they only want us as an instrument in order to deceive us and to better attain the end, which they propose for themselves. Their intention is to embarrass us and to subjugate Europe; finally they know that they cannot attain this except by encumbering us.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup>Ibid.      <sup>213</sup>Ibid., no. 23.

<sup>214</sup>Ibid.      <sup>215</sup>Ibid.

Kolychyov's fears proved to be well-founded.

Having discussed both Paul's and Napoleon's foreign policy in some detail up to this point, we need not describe these negotiations in great detail. Talleyrand and Bonaparte wanted France and Russia to sign a treaty of peace first. Afterwards, the two countries would discuss the details of a general European peace. On the other hand, Kolychyov was faithful to his instructions and declared that the details must be worked out first. Afterwards when all Paul's demands had been met in full, Russia would sign a peace treaty with France.

Even more disturbing for the French was the fact that Kolychyov insisted that they evacuate Egypt. The Russian also brought up the subject of Naples and Sardinia. He protested the presence of French troops in the Neapolitan ports and insisted that his instructions called for Russian mediation of the peace between France and Naples.

The French reaction was what one would expect. Egypt had been purchased with the purest of French blood. France would not even discuss the possibility of returning it to the Porte. As to Naples, Talleyrand gave the same excuses we have mentioned above. As to Sardinia, the First Consul might be willing to do something for the King out of consideration for Paul. However, there was to be no discussion of restoring him to all of his domains. As for the Russian mediation of the peace, this soon became a

moot point when Naples signed a peace treaty with France on March 28.<sup>216</sup> After months of misunderstandings, the true positions of both powers had finally become clear.

The only problem with this was the French would not or could not, believe that Kolychyov was only carrying out Paul's instructions. On the same day as the signing of the peace with Naples, Bonaparte turned in frustration to Sprengporten. His mission completed, Sprengporten was preparing to leave.<sup>217</sup> Invited to dine at Malmaison, the Finn was treated to one last dose of Napoleonic charm. Napoleon declared he was ready to make sacrifices. However, he was concerned about Italy and Egypt. He would sign a treaty of peace. Indeed, no one wanted one more sincerely than he. It would be in conformity with the five points. However, Egypt was another matter. He would not voluntarily give it up,

This colony is the prize of the purest blood of France. . . . It is the only possession through which France might one day be able to counterbalance the enormous maritime power of the English in India.<sup>218</sup>

Napoleon had little to refuse Paul. But if the Emperor deigned to think of the grand interests of which he had spoken, Paul would see that the interests of France and

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<sup>216</sup>Ibid., nos. 24, 25, and 28-43.

<sup>217</sup>Martens, XIII, pp. 255-259.

<sup>218</sup>Trachevskiy, I, no. 44.

Russia were the same. Could the Turks oppose their two countries? France and Russia could do as they wished and share the lucrative commerce of the sea to the exclusion of England. And if the English wanted war, then Russia and France would give it to them. After all, it was also in Russia's interests to humble England. France and Russia could effect a landing in England by means of a diversion. By sending a diversion to Ireland, French forces in Belgium and Holland could fall suddenly on England. "I think that if I could have the means of conversing with (Paul), we should have soon ended by settling jointly our measures."<sup>219</sup> Such was Napoleon's conversation of March 28 with Sprengporten.

From this conversation, we see that Paul and Napoleon were still far apart. Of more importance, we see that the reference to India is conditional. Egypt might be a counterbalance to British power in India. Again, Napoleon says that, if he could have the means, then he and Paul should have soon agreed on some kind of joint action. In both cases, the statements are conditional. In other words, the possibility of joint action could exist, but was not yet a reality.

In the meantime, events were coming to a head in St. Petersburg. Already, the conspiracy, which would

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

take his life, was closing in on Paul. Perhaps through the scheming of its members, Rostopchin was dismissed on March 4.<sup>220</sup> After negotiations with the Prussians, Paul dictated an "ultimatum" on March 14. It called for the following: 1) Bavaria was to receive Salzburg, Bamberg, Württemberg and Berchtesgaden, 2) Würtemberg was to receive the New Palatinate, Münster and Hildesheim, 3) Denmark was to receive Hamburg, and 4) Prussia was to occupy Hannover and close the Elbe and the Weser to British commerce. On the fifteenth, Paul declared that Sweden should receive Lübeck. The bishop of that city could be compensated with Bremen or the principality of Verdun. When it appeared that Denmark was not prepared to act, Paul recalled his ambassador from Copenhagen on the eighteenth.<sup>221</sup> On the twenty-third, he sent the following rescript to Baron Krudener, the Russian ambassador in Berlin: "Declare Sir to the King that if he does not wish to make up his mind to occupy Hannover you have to quit the Court in 24 hours."<sup>222</sup> Orders were sent to Kolychyov, telling him to invite Bonaparte to send troops to occupy Hannover if

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<sup>220</sup> According to Shil'der, pp. 480-482, Rostopchin was dismissed for having falsely attributed a letter to Nikita Panin.

<sup>221</sup> Trachevskiy, I, nos. 26-27, xxxix-xl and 672, n. 78.

<sup>222</sup> Shil'der, p. 487.

Prussia would not.<sup>223</sup> Both Denmark and Prussia hastened to comply with Paul's "requests." That same day, Paul forbid all exports from Russia without his express approval.<sup>224</sup> It was the next to last order he would ever give. A few hours later he would be assassinated.

In the interim, the final preparations had been made by the Don Cossacks. On March 8, Orlov gave the order for the Cossacks to depart for the four assembly points "with all possible haste."<sup>225</sup> If a commander had not yet arrived, the senior ranking officer was to take temporary command and set out for the assembly point. March 9 was named as the last day for all regiments to arrive at the assembly points. The force consisted of 41 regiments, 2 companies of mounted artillery, 500 Kalmyks and a full complement of officers. In all, this amounted to 22,507 men.<sup>226</sup> Platov commanded the first echelon, which consisted of 13 regiments. Major-General Kuzin commanded the second echelon, which consisted of 8 regiments. Major-General Bokov commanded the third echelon,

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<sup>223</sup>Trachevskiy, I, p. 672, n. 78.

<sup>224</sup>P.S.Z., XXVI, no. 19775.

<sup>225</sup>Batorskiy, p. 58.

<sup>226</sup>Philip Longworth, "Transformations in Cossackdom: Technological and Organizational Aspects of Military Change 1650-1850," in G. E. Rothenburg, B. K. Kiraly and P. F. Sugar et al, eds., War and Society in East Central Europe, II, East European Monographs, no. CXXII (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 460-461.

which consisted of 9 regiments. Denisov commanded the fourth echelon, which consisted of 11 regiments.<sup>227</sup> The two companies of mounted artillery<sup>228</sup> had 12 mortars and 12 cannons and were commanded by Colonel Karpov. Along with Orlov, they travelled with the first echelon.<sup>229</sup>

On March 12, Orlov received a sixth and final rescript from Paul. In it, Paul wrote, "I declare my satisfaction to the troops for the readiness and the punctuality in performance of their duty." He concluded by wishing them "a fortunate campaign and success with God's help."<sup>230</sup> That same day, the Cossacks set out for Orenburg. On the thirteenth, Orlov reported that the regiments were travelling 20 to 26 miles a day.<sup>231</sup>

The timing and the haste in the planning of the expedition soon began to have their effects. Sub-zero temperatures, snow storms and the extremely poor state

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<sup>227</sup>Batorskiy, p. 59; Denisov, p. 240.

<sup>228</sup>There is some confusion on the number of men in the two companies of mounted artillery. At one point, Batorskiy implies that there are 500 men in each company. Later on he writes that the "2 companies of mounted artillery consist of 301 men." Batorskiy, p. 59.

<sup>229</sup>For the mortars they took 960 shells, 120 cannonballs, and 360 canisters of grapeshot. For the cannons they took 1,080 cannonballs and 360 canisters of grapeshot. Batorskiy, p. 59.

<sup>230</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-61.

<sup>231</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

of the roads made progress difficult and assured that the echelons advanced at different rates. The artillery hardly moved at all. Ironically, an early thaw added to the Cossacks' troubles and occasioned numerous changes in the planned line of march. Denisov described the situation as follows:

In that year in those places, the snow was still plentiful, but at that time it began to thaw. Small areas of standing water were formed from the melting snow of the larger streams, and we made our way for long in water, rather than seeing a good way for the snow was suffused with water.<sup>232</sup>

The most important consequence of this thaw was that the Volga would soon clear itself of its covering of ice. Unfortunately, the thaw also effected the Cossacks' ability to obtain sufficient food and forage. One supply commissar, Terenin, only found the Cossacks by asking the local inhabitants. One commander reported that his regiment was short of the following supplies it was entitled to: 46 bushels of groats, 4,483 bushels of oats, and 8,797 bales of hay. Another commander spent 5,376 rubles of his own money to buy supplies for his men. He had not received the money allotted by the Treasury for the fifteenth, sixteenth, the seventeenth or the eighteenth of March. Several commanders simply abandoned some horses due to the lack of forage.<sup>233</sup> Nevertheless, Orlov reported on

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<sup>232</sup>Denisov, p. 240.

<sup>233</sup>Batorskiy, pp. 60-61.

March 30 that the first two echelons had made it across the Volga. The first had reached the Irghiz river. The third echelon had just finished crossing and the fourth was approaching the Volga. The pace of the first was now nineteen to twenty-five miles a day.<sup>234</sup>

It is with the fourth echelon, i.e., Denisov's, that the most famous incident of the expedition is associated. For instance, Strong writes, "One entire regiment crashed through the ice and drowned."<sup>235</sup> Strong cites Denisov as the authority for this statement. However, when we turn to the appropriate page, we find a different story. Denisov relates that he hurried to the Volga, stopping only at night. He reached the river near the town of Vol'sk with the first three regiments and stopped at a frontier settlement late in the day. It rained a little and he worried that the Volga ice would break up before he had a chance to cross.

I ordered the regiments to be ready to cross early and ordered the village elder, that all male peasants able to work, were to be ready with ropes. Of these, we found about three hundred men.<sup>236</sup>

Waking up before dawn, Denisov asked his orderly if there was any frost. When the response was that it

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<sup>234</sup>Ibid., p. 60; Okun', pp. 107-108.

<sup>235</sup>Strong, p. 125.

<sup>236</sup>Denisov, p. 240.

was raining, Denisov immediately issued orders for the regiments to set out for the crossing. He himself arrived there first. The regimental commanders were right behind him. Though the ice had not cracked, it had begun to melt near the banks and sank a few feet<sup>237</sup> when stepped on.

Notwithstanding that the ice was not trustworthy, I decided to try to go across the Volga. The peasants with ropes, were to be placed across the whole of the Volga, five men to a spot, with the addition of a few Cossacks, with them, so that they were to be grouped near some of the horses or men who fell through and could help them. Forty men, mostly Cossacks, led the horses onto the ice, all of which fell through not far from the bank. But as they took precautions not one of them drowned. All the horses, were pulled out and returned to the bank.<sup>238</sup>

At this point, all could have been lost. Denisov noticed the effect this had had on his men. He knew that the wider the river was, the stronger the ice would be in the center. He ordered that his own horses, of which there were nine or ten, be brought forward. They were led out onto the ice. Though they fell through at first, they were pulled out. When they reached deeper water, the ice was sufficiently strong. He then ordered that the horses be brought to a gallop. When he saw that the horses had made it halfway across the river without mishap, he

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<sup>237</sup>Ibid. Denisov actually wrote, "the ice moved and sank a few sagen." A sagen is equal to about seven English feet. It is clear from the context that Denisov did not mean to be taken literally.

<sup>238</sup>Ibid.

ordered the regiments to cross immediately.<sup>239</sup>

Near the other bank, the ice again proved to be weak. Still, in these three regiments, somewhat more than 700 horses fell through the ice,

But not one of them drowned. Only one Cossack accidentally fell and hit himself on the head, resulting in a few hours of unconsciousness. But he soon regained consciousness and carried on bravely.<sup>240</sup>

After finding quarters for these three regiments in a nearby village, Denisov sent orders for the other eight regiments to hurry to the Volga and get across before the ice thawed completely.<sup>241</sup> This was done. Such is Denisov's account of the Volga crossing.

Nevertheless, the hardships the Cossacks endured and the toll it took should not be underrated. At about this time, Orlov wrote in one of his reports as follows:

From the number of troops in the campaign, of the following, some have money. They have spent it on food. Others, borrowing one from another, are in debt. The rest, not having money and not able to borrow, divide up the provisions carried off from fights. Through this some were brought to exhaustion, but others, having lost everything, collapse and are abandoned. Of such, there are a great number.<sup>242</sup>

Orlov went on to say that to date, of the 41,424 horses with which the campaign had been begun, only 564 had been withdrawn due to exhaustion and another 322 had been rejected as useless. Nevertheless, no men had been lost yet.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>239</sup>Ibid., pp. 240-241.

<sup>240</sup>Ibid., p. 241.

<sup>241</sup>Ibid.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid.

<sup>243</sup>Ibid.

Such was the condition of the Don Cossacks at the beginning of April, 1801.

In Europe, events came rapidly to a head. Britain declared war on Russia and sent a fleet to the Baltic. Under Nelson's command, they defeated the Danes at Copenhagen and after some delays set out for Revel. There Nelson planned to sink the Russian Baltic fleet. He arrived there on May 7 and learned of Paul's death.<sup>244</sup>

In Paris, the negotiations had not moved from their impasse.<sup>245</sup> Then, on April 12, Napoleon learned of Paul's death.<sup>246</sup> Five days later, Lucchesini wrote the following:

The news of the death of Paul has been a veritable thunderbolt for Bonaparte. On receiving it from Talleyrand, he uttered a cry of despair, and he has given himself up to the idea that the death has not been a natural one, the blow originating in England. He believes he has lost his strongest support against her, for he had hoped to find in Paul what Frederick II found in Peter III.<sup>247</sup>

Napoleon was wrong on these points. As we know, Paul was not his dupe. Georges Lefebvre makes another and more important point.

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<sup>244</sup>Mahan, II, pp. 41-57.

<sup>245</sup>Trachevskiy, I, nos. 45-55.

<sup>246</sup>Corres. de Nap., VII, no. 5522.

<sup>247</sup>Deutsch, p. 21.

Bonaparte, who had refused Italy to Austria (it would have assured the peace), was not about to hand that country over to Russia. Nor was he about to deliver to her the Grand Turk. How then was Bonaparte to win over Russia to his side without in effect granting her anything: . . . A choice had to be made.<sup>248</sup>

Paul's death removed this necessity. Thus, ironically, though Napoleon fulminated long and loud about Paul's death, he benefited from it as much, if not more, than did the British.

On April 6, a messenger overtook Orlov at the frontier settlement of Mechetniy on the Irghiz river.<sup>249</sup> He immediately stopped and administered the oath of allegiance to Alexander I. Denisov was stopped near an Old Believer monastery not far from the Volga. He did the same as Orlov. The following day was the beginning of Orthodox Easter. On that day, Orlov declared to the Cossacks "God and the Emperor pity you and allow you to return to your homes and children."<sup>250</sup> Orlov himself did not return to the Don until May 14. The regiments, however, returned between April 29 and May 7.<sup>251</sup> They had travelled over 1,036 miles in two months. So ended Paul's expedition to India.

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<sup>248</sup>Lefebvre, Napoleon, p. 108.

<sup>249</sup>Contrary to Druhe, p. 79, and Cresson, pp. 183-185, who would have us believe that the Cossacks had reached the steppes beyond Orenburg.

<sup>250</sup>Batorskiy, p. 61; Denisov, p. 241.

<sup>251</sup>Batorskiy, p. 61.

Finally, we must ask if the expedition was a judicious and reasonable use of Russian power? Above, we have attempted to show that the expedition had a certain logic of its own in the context of Paul's foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is clear that the expedition was hastily and sloppily prepared. The Cossacks endured many hardships just to reach the Irghiz river. Given Orlov's ignorance of the territory beyond Orenburg and what we know today about that area, it appears that the Cossacks would never have made it to India. Even if they had reached India, under the circumstances they could never have accomplished their mission. Viewed in this light, it is clear that the expedition was a signal failure.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

Having completed our study of the Indian expedition of 1801, what have we learned?

In the first chapter, Paul I was presented as a complex man with a multi-faceted personality. He was not the one dimensional "madman" of past accounts. His unusual childhood and his ensuing wait to attain power go far to explain the high value he placed on abstract values and intricate ceremony. Nevertheless, he was a man of some parts in the field of diplomacy. His desire to withdraw Russia from the entanglements of Europe and focus on domestic affairs was sound. The story of how he became interested in the Order of Malta is consistent with his personality. A close examination of his adherence to the Second Coalition demonstrates that his chief consideration was French expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean and the concomitant spread of revolution. Malta played no appreciable role in this process. We have seen that the breakup of the Second Coalition was due to the irreconcilable goals of Austria, Britain, and Russia. Malta did play an important part in the ensuing breakdown of

Anglo-Russian relations; but only as a catalyst which intensified and reinforced an already well developed trend. And as concerns the so-called Franco-Russian Entente, we found that no such agreement existed at the end of 1800. It is true that after the breakup of the Second Coalition Paul returned to his previous desire for a rapprochement with France. However, Paul's intentions were quite different from those of Napoleon and Talleyrand. As illustrated above, France and Russia were far from being close allies in December, 1800.

In the second chapter, we examined three major sources of the traditional account of the Indian expedition. Our findings can be stated briefly. In the first case, all but one text of Paul's rescripts to General Orlov were defective. Only the text reproduced by Nikolay K. Shil'der proved to be trustworthy. The Stedingk document and the de Hoffmanns pamphlet were both forgeries. The latter was composed by the Polish émigré historian Karol B. A. Hoffman. Finally, it was concluded that both these forgeries were ultimately derived from the Napoleonic myth as composed on St. Helena. Thus, it can be seen that the so-called Franco-Russian Entente and the so-called Franco-Russian plan for a joint invasion of India never existed.

In the third chapter, we saw that a close examination of the evidence revealed that Napoleon and Talleyrand did in fact try to manipulate Paul. Their immediate

objectives were to impose the Treaty of Lunéville on Austria and to bring Britain to her knees through a continental blockade. In both of these enterprises, they used their "perceived" entente with Russia to force concessions from these two powers that they would otherwise have been unable to obtain. Paul, on the other hand, was seeking a rapprochement with France in order to pave the way for a general peace settlement in Europe. The divergence of these policies and the fact that neither party was fully aware of the true objects of the other can be ascribed to two reasons: 1) the relative lack of any formal diplomatic relations between Russia and France, and 2) Napoleon's insistence on interpreting Russian foreign policy in terms of the Testament of Peter the Great. Clearly, Napoleon cynically used his temporary rapprochement with Paul for his own ends. Further, it is evident that he had no knowledge of the expedition to India. From our study, it is clear that Paul's decision to invade India was part and parcel of his quarrel with Britain. Insofar as it put pressure on Britain--as Paul's proposal to Bonaparte to do "something on the coasts of England" was designed to do--it was tangentially connected to Paul's negotiations with France. At most, Bonaparte may have influenced Paul to invade India through the agency of Madame Bonneuil et al. Concerning the expedition itself, we found that while it had a certain logic of its own, it was poorly organized

and executed and would have in all probability been a signal failure.

Such are the conclusions. However, there is one final point which must be discussed. Having looked at Franco-Russian relations from this new perspective, those of 1801 to 1812 take on a new meaning. During those years, Napoleon would return again and again to the themes of 1800-1801. Examples that come to mind are the use of the idea of a partition of the Ottoman Empire, the proposal to invade India of February, 1808, the use of the continental blockade and the Tilsit alliance which incorporated all these ideas into a system. In his discussion of Napoleon's army, Georges Lefebvre remarks that Napoleon's ideas about the conduct of war were formed during his first campaigns in Italy.<sup>1</sup> A similar argument can be made with regard to Napoleon's foreign policy toward Russia. The ideas the Corsican formed from his brief encounter with Paul--his first encounter with Russia--clearly had a deep impact on his subsequent relations with Alexander I.<sup>2</sup>

Does this mean that we have found some magical key which unlocks all the mysteries and intricacies of Napoleonic foreign policy? Hardly! As Georges Lefebvre

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<sup>1</sup>Lefebvre, Napoleon, p. 231.

<sup>2</sup>For a full discussion of this topic, see: Ragsdale, Détente, pp. 130-141.

has pointed out, Napoleonic foreign policy was, more than anything else, a state of mind. Napoleon

was a realist in execution only. There lived in him an alter-ego which contained certain features of the hero. . . . His greatest ambition was glory. . . . He was an artist, a poet of action, for whom France and mankind were but instruments. . . . That is why it is idle to seek for limits to Napoleon's policy, or for a final goal at which he would have stopped: there simply was none.<sup>3</sup>

One modern historian has noted that "the contemporary closest to Paul in his view of political culture was Napoleon Bonaparte."<sup>4</sup> This observation has much to offer. As we saw, Paul's foreign policy was formed with regard to abstract ideas. In this sense, he too was a "realist in execution only." When looking at his reign, one could argue that he brought about his own destruction by his refusal to let go of his glorious abstractions. Napoleon too brought about his own destruction by his refusal to give up his own glorious visions. This is not a new condition in the history of human affairs. It is as old as man himself. One man, writing near the end of the first century of the present era, made this point well. It is with his words that we close this study.

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<sup>3</sup>Lefebvre, Napoleon, pp. 66-67.

<sup>4</sup>McGrew, "Knights of Malta," p. 66.

The man who is completely wise and virtuous has no need of glory, except so far as it disposes and eases his way to action by the greater trust it procures him. A young man, I grant, may be permitted, while yet eager for distinction, to pride himself a little in his good deeds; for (as Theophrastus says) his virtues, which are yet tender and, as it were, in the blade, cherished and supported by praises grow stronger, and take the deeper root. But when this passion is exorbitant, it is dangerous in all men, and in those who govern a commonwealth, utterly destructive. For in the possession of large power and authority, it transports men to a degree of madness; so that now they no more think what is good, glorious, but will have those actions only esteemed good that are glorious.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Plutarch of Chaeronea, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden et al. and rev. by A. H. Clough (1864; New York, n.d.), p. 960.

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