

MANNHEIM'S "INTELLECTUAL" AND SIMMEL'S
"STRANGER"--A DILEMMA OF MANNHEIM'S
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nature of the Dilemma

The sociology of knowledge has been defined as " . . . that branch of sociology which studies the relation between thought and society."¹ In general, it concerns the relationship between ideas and the social factors which are influential in the creation of ideas.

Interest in the relation between mental products and existential influence stems from the common realization that man's thoughts are somehow related to his social environment as typified by the adage, "A man is a product of his times."² From this interest a subdiscipline has arisen and become known as the sociology of knowledge.

Chroniclers often cite Karl Marx as one of the first sociologists of knowledge even though the discipline did not exist at the time of Marx's writing. Because he was among the first to posit the economic and class determination of ideas, he is often discussed as the founder of what was to become the German school of the sociology of knowledge.³

¹Lewis A. Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge," International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, ed. by David Sills, VIII (Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 428.

²J. J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge (The Beacon Press, Boston, 1951), p. 3.

³Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Houghton Mifflin Co., The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1960), p. 413.

From his influence arose the one considered by many as the culmination of that school, Karl Mannheim.

Although Marx greatly influenced the ideas of his successors such as Lukacs, Spranger, Lederer, Dilthey, and Scheler, there were divergent strains emanating from the core of Marx's thought. This was true of Karl Mannheim; although he shared the basic belief that man's ideas are related to the economic base of society, he differed in many respects with Marx. However, both Marx and Mannheim believed that ideas are determined by the social and economic forces from which they arise. This shared belief created a problem with which all sociologists of knowledge have had to deal. T. B. Bottomore stated it precisely: "For if all propositions are existentially determined and no proposition is absolutely true, then this proposition itself, if true, is not absolutely true, but is existentially determined."⁴ Stated otherwise, each sociologist of knowledge has had to deal with the following questions:

- (1) What is truth?
- (2) How may we distinguish between ideas which are true and those which are false?
- (3) How are the theorists' own ideas valid if all ideas are existentially determined?⁵

⁴T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," British Journal of Sociology, VII (1956), p. 55.

⁵Hans Speir, "The Social Determination of Ideas," Social Research, XIV (May, 1938), p. 190.

This latter question has continued to plague the sociology of knowledge until the present. Each theorist has had to justify the validity of his ideas while he simultaneously criticized other ideas as determined by economic and social factors. It is the intention of this thesis to consider Mannheim's manner of dealing with this problem through his conception of the "intellectual."

From the influence of Marx and the German school of the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim became aware of the necessity to exempt the theorists's own ideas from economic determinism or else invalidate his own thought. To solve this dilemma Mannheim stated that certain individuals within the society could obtain objectivity and freedom from such determinism by totally involving themselves in a shared perspective with all interest groups within the society. This individual was the "intellectual" whose perspective was not that of the free-floating intellectual (the solution offered by Mannheim's predecessors). The "intellectual" was objective by virtue of his total perspective gained by involvement in all socially determinate forces of society.

Mannheim's "intellectual" has met with a barrage of criticism, ranging from concern over lack of clarity to criticism of the ambiguity of his terminology.⁶ It is

⁶Kurt Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge: Emphasis on an Empirical Attitude," Philosophy of Science, IV (1943), pp. 104-116.

the purpose of this thesis to explore Mannheim's conception of the "intellectual" and to extend the scope of the conception to dispel the objections of Mannheim's critics, as well as to more broadly define the nature of the conception. To do this, a comparison will be drawn between the "intellectual" and the "stranger" as conceived by Georg Simmel. From such a comparison a synthetic conception of the "intellectual" will be perceived. Through this comparative process the shortcomings of Mannheim's conception will be shown and solutions proposed.

Since it is impossible for this study to discuss Karl Mannheim without also considering the sociology of knowledge, a brief treatment of the nature and scope of that field will be helpful. It is equally difficult to consider either Mannheim or the sociology of knowledge without considering the relation of both to Karl Marx. For this reason attention will be given to both Marx and the sociology of knowledge before comparing the "intellectual" and the "stranger."

The Sociology of Knowledge

Karl Mannheim and the sociology of knowledge are almost synonymous; it is extremely difficult to discuss one to the exclusion of the other. It is equally difficult to understand Mannheim's "historicism" without considering his epistemological conception of truth, knowledge, and access to knowledge. For these reasons, it is worthwhile for this study to inquire briefly into the sociology of knowledge, its definition, distinctiveness, and implications

for the thought of Mannheim.

Problem of Definition

The concept of a sociology of knowledge has developed only recently but, nevertheless, only after a long period of groping with the problem of man's social determination. It was only in the early twentieth century that efforts to establish a systematic study intensified, and by the 1930's an evident peak of interest had been reached. Since then there seems to have been waning interest in the study per se with renewed interest in America during recent years.

Efforts to define the scope and subject matter have resulted in confusion and frustration; therefore, the sociology of knowledge must almost be defined in terms of the individual theorist's conception. Interest was originally stimulated by the differences in what passed for "knowledge" among different societies. Assuming the psychic and physiological unity of man, the only explanation for this difference (excluding geographical factors and accident) is the difference in social organization of each society. For this reason Coser's definition posits the content of study: "The sociology of knowledge may be broadly defined as that branch of sociology which studies the relation between thought and society."⁷ In general terms it concerns the relationship between thought or mental productions and the cultural or social factors

⁷Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge," p. 428.

influencing them.

It is the specific interpretation of these factors that has accounted for so much confusion in the past. Translating Wissenssociologie as "sociology of knowledge" is an immediate source of ambiguity. The term was first employed by Max Scheler to explain the existence in some societies of particular thought patterns not appearing elsewhere. The verb wissen was translated into the English as "to know" (having only one connotation) while there are several German verbs expressing knowledge (erkennen, verstehen, etc.) "Wissen, taken as a whole, means science, whereas 'knowledge' includes at one and the same time the simple act of presenting an object to the mind (erkennen), whether or not it be thoroughly intellectualized (wissen)."⁸ "Knowledge" for Scheler and the German school meant more precisely "scientific" knowledge. Nonetheless, this typifies the variety of definitions which have been offered. It is just such a variety of conceptions that has kept the sociology of knowledge marginal as a concept.

Nature of the Sociology of Knowledge

The sociology of knowledge is generally concerned with the social determination of ideas or " . . . the relation between knowledge and the social setting."⁹ Each sociologist of knowledge has had to deal with these questions:

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 4.

- (1) What are the conditioning social factors of ideas?
- (2) What are the ideas conditioned?
- (3) What is the precise means by which the facts of social existence determine the ideas of human knowledge?¹⁰

The conditioning social factors or "existential"¹¹ bases which influence or determine ideas have been inconsistently defined and employed by most theorists. Even the types of factors have varied from psychological or social to economic and materialistic. The same factors have sometimes varied with the same theorist or were ambiguously employed. Not only do these "conditioning variables" differ among theorists, but they are often vaguely or ambiguously defined so that their meaning is either misconstrued or so inexact as to be worthless for investigation.

Similar ambiguity has typified the conception of "knowledge," or "mental factors." It will be seen that each theorist has had a unique conception of the term ranging from everything perceptible to the senses to mass opinion. Since there are so many definitions and understandings of the term even among epistemologists themselves, it is small wonder that it has been so variously construed.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹It should be indicated that the term used in this context refers only to those factors related to social existence rather than its connotation of the philosophical "existentialist" school.

The most recurrent question is the relationship between ideas and the conditioning social factors. The possibilities are almost limitless, ranging from slight influence to total determination. Maquet well stated the problem:

The point of view characteristic of the sociology of knowledge is the consideration of mental productions insofar as they are influenced by social factors. Here again the term 'influence' must be taken in a broad sense. It connotes all the degrees of conditioning which can exist between two variables from simple correspondence up to the most mechanistic determinism.¹²

It is the ambiguity in "degree of influence" which is responsible for much criticism of the sociology of knowledge.

It is upon the basis of the amount of influence upon ideas that Werner Stark has categorized the sociologists of knowledge. One group contains those theorists who believe that thought transcends societal limitations and exists in an absolute realm. Ideas, according to Stark, are selected for each socio-historical period and " . . . thinking means participation in eternal pre-existent ideas. If these ideas are to become active in the world, they must ally themselves to a social movement seeking appropriate ideas."¹³ The second division includes those theorists who maintain that there is an interdependence between mind and society, in which societal structure influences both the form and

¹²Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 5.

¹³Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 476.

content of ideas, but can reciprocally be influenced and shaped by these ideas. The third division made by Stark includes those theorists who saw a determinate, causal relationship between the social structure and ideas. This etiological determinism operated in only one direction; social structures determine ideas but the converse never occurs.

The most precise distinction among the types of relationships between ideas and social structure has been made recently by Robert K. Merton:

How are mental productions related to the existential basis?

- a. causal or functional relations: determination, cause, correspondence, necessary condition, conditioning, functional interdependence, interaction, dependence, etc.
- b. symbolic or organismic or meaningful relations: consistency, harmony, coherence, unity, congruence, compatibility (and antonyms); expression Strukturzusammenhang, structural identities, inner connection, stylistic analogies, logicomeaningful integration, identity of meaning, etc.
- c. ambiguous terms to designate relations: correspondence, reflection, bound up with, in close connection with, etc.¹⁴

Thus, Merton enlarges the scope of existential influence to include many factors previously not considered.

Each sociologist of knowledge has had a unique conception of the relation between ideas and social factors,

¹⁴Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1968), p. 456.

but all have agreed that the relationship exists. This has been particularly true of the German school of the sociology of knowledge. In general, each theorist of this school has agreed upon the deterministic nature of the social basis. Each would also be grouped into the first of Stark's categories by the shared belief in a transcendent realm of ideas and truth. Indeed, these two characteristics unite all theorists of this school and forms the common basis of belief.

Theorists of the French and American schools have expanded the range of factors considered by the sociology of knowledge. Merton's "Paradigm" contains the range of factors considered by all sociologists of knowledge:

1. Where is the existential basis of mental productions located?
 - a. social bases: social position, class, generation, occupational role, mode of production, group structures (university, bureaucracy, academies, sects, political parties), "historical situation," interests, society, ethnic affiliation, social mobility, power structure, social processes (competition, conflict, etc.).
 - b. cultural bases: values, ethos, climate of opinion, Volkgeist, Zeitgeist, type of culture, culture mentality, Weltanschauungen, etc.
2. What mental productions are being sociologically analyzed?
 - a. spheres of: moral beliefs, ideologies, ideas, the categories of thought, philosophy, religious beliefs, social norms, positive science, technology, etc.
 - b. which aspects are analyzed: their selection

(foci of attention), level of abstraction, presuppositions (which are taken as data and what as problematical), conceptual content, models of verification, objectives of intellectual activity, etc.¹⁵

Since these factors have been so variously construed, criticism has stated that there is hardly a distinctive field of study.¹⁶ For this reason, many recent theorists have labored to redefine the sociology of knowledge, its nature, and the range of its investigation.

Sociology of Knowledge and Related Fields

A common source of confusion among sociologists of knowledge has been the failure to distinguish among several related fields, especially among ideology, the history of ideas, philosophy of history, and epistemology. Failure to correctly distinguish among them has been another area in which clarification is sorely needed.

Some theorists have seen the problems inherent in such ambiguity and have drawn sharp distinctions between ideology and the sociology of knowledge. Ideology has a pejorative connotation and a disparaging use which distorts or severs contact with reality. As Werner Stark said, "The sociology of knowledge deals with the formation of a specific world-view, the doctrine of ideology with its deformation; the former is concerned with a positive,

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶R. H. Coombs, "Karl Mannheim, Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge," Sociological Quarterly, VII (1938), p. 230.

the latter with a negative phenomenon."¹⁷ Further, ideology is usually associated with interest groups to the detriment of other groups. These interests function either to subjugate segments of society or to maintain the existing power structure.

If and in so far, then, as a man entertains an idea or system of ideas in the psychological origin of which some selfish or sectional interest or desire has played a part and which would have been different if that interest or desire had not entered in, his thought is said to be characterized as problematic, or . . . ideological.¹⁸

This essay is concerned only with such a distinction and not ideology itself.

Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge

The history of ideas is a recording of the predominant intellectual productions or "styles" of thought during a given time period, while the philosophy of history involves interpretation of the motivating forces of historical development.


Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is the most closely related to the sociology of knowledge and possibly the most often confused of the related areas. In this necessary distinction it has been indicated that sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between ideas and the conditioning social factors, while epistemology deals with the nature, definition, limitations, and approach

¹⁷Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 48.

¹⁸Ibid.

to knowledge. The former makes no evaluation about the type of knowledge, only how it is related to its existential bases. Epistemology evaluates the validity of knowledge. In the words of De Gré, " 'Knowledge' in the context of gnosis-sociology (sociology of knowledge) is a non-evaluative term and carries with it no implications as to the truth or falsity of that knowledge."¹⁹

The sociology of knowledge and epistemology are bound together in the fact that they are both concerned with knowledge, but the manner in which they are concerned separates the two. Knowledge, by definition, must be knowledge of something and if it is true knowledge, this must be the knowledge of truth. Access to reality corresponds to the type of knowledge involved as well as the criterion for truth. Royce's diagram will illustrate what is meant:²⁰

Type of Knowledge	Path to Knowledge	Criterion of Truth	Ultimate Reality (truth)
Rationalism	Thinking	Logical/illogical	
Intuitionism	Feeling	Insight/no insight	
Empiricism	Sensing	Perception/misperception	
Authoritarian-ism	Believing	Ideology/delusion	

¹⁹Gerard De Gré, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Truth," Journal of the History of Ideas, II (1941), p. 112.

²⁰Joseph R. Royce, The Encapsulated Man (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), p. 57.

For each type there is a corresponding path to knowledge as well as a criterion by which validity is established. The nature of reality is certainly not the same for everyone, but the importance for this discussion is the shared belief that an ultimate reality exists. There is not, however, an agreement on one exclusive type or path to knowledge in a given society. Rather there is a predominance of one type at a particular period, but many or all other types may simultaneously exist. The determination of why one predominates over others is one of the principle aims of the sociology of knowledge.

Knowledge and truth may be the same in a society. When those things which pass for knowledge are unintentionally separated from reality, it is delusion.

Location of reality in the metaphysical realm varies with the temporal and spatial organization of a given society. For example, as Mannheim and Marx showed, the ruling class seeks its reality in the past to justify its present position, while those classes now without power look to the future. So it is not always the historical location in time that determines a society's location of reality, but rather the time period in which the society's outlook is placed. But the important point for this discussion is that although the sociology of knowledge does not consider questions of epistemology explicitly, each theorist has had a unique epistemological and metaphysical perspective from which his theory originated and

which is implicit in all his ideas.

The sociology of knowledge would possibly never have come into existence if it were not for the writings of Karl Marx. The problem of intellectual exemption was first considered by Marx and his ideas were influential in the formulation of Mannheim's "intellectual" concept. For this reason, a discussion of Marx's contributions to the sociology of knowledge will set the stage for the problem with which Mannheim was later to deal.

CHAPTER II

MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF THE INTELLECTUAL

In considering Mannheim's greatest contribution to sociology which was the sociology of knowledge, it will greatly clarify his conceptions to view them in relation to his predecessor and prototype, Karl Marx. Although Marx did not consider knowledge as an independent field of investigation, his conception of ideology and the social determination of ideas greatly influenced Mannheim's thought. For this reason, a special consideration of Marx's contributions will be undertaken to both clarify and indicate the depth to Marx's thought.

Marx has become known as the founder of Wissenssociologie of the German school of the sociology of knowledge. Although the term itself was only later coined by Max Scheler, it was Marx who first dealt with the social determination of ideas. Early in his career, Marx noted the dependence of other philosophical thought upon the social and historical setting. In the German Ideology he wrote: "It has not occurred to any of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings."¹

¹Irving M. Zeitlin, Marxism: A Reexamination (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967), p. 6.

Marx's Ontology

Marx's conception of the social determination of ideas is based upon his ontological conception. Economics and man's productive nature underlie all social structure and social relations. Upon these substructures is juxtaposed social consciousness, and from this consciousness arises the production of ideas. Cutting through each level of this conception run the influence of means of production and of consciousness.

Marx postulated three means of production: land, labor, and capital. Possession or lack of these means is the basis of class division and inevitably leads to class conflict over the means of production. The means of production, then, determine the class conflict which is the " . . . law of human life,"² for control of the forces of production means control of the involuntary will of man. Thus, society becomes stratified: as competition for control of productive forces continues, a separation into two groups is inevitable; those who have access to the forces of production and those who have not. These groups are not always the same (e.g. bourgeoisie, aristocrats, etc.); the controlling group (ruling class) varies with the society's stage of development. Marx elaborated this conception in his Critique of Political Economy:

²Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: The New American Library, 1956), p. 188.

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their mental powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society--the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life . . . In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society.³

Social Determination of Thought

Upon this economic and class-conflicting substratum is based man's social consciousness and thought. As Marx said, "Consciousness (or thought) is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men existed at all."⁴ Social consciousness corresponds to the economic substructure of society, and this social existence is responsible for man's consciousness. In the Critique of Political Economy he later stated: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness."⁵ In another place Marx stated,

³Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1911), p. 12.

⁴Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. by Lewis Feuer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 247.

⁵Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 12.

"Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process."⁶

Marx's Conception of Ideology

In the German Ideology Marx concluded the link between the formation of ideas and the economic base.⁷ He reasoned that if man's consciousness (thought) depends upon his social existence and this in turn is determined by the economic forces of society, it follows that ideas are the products of material forces of society. From this, the economic and social determination of ideas, comes Marx's conception of ideology. It is class position that determines one's thoughts and, hence, social class determines ideas.

In the Ideology of Capitalism Marx wrote:

The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas; i.e. the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same time its dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that, in consequence the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are, in general, subject to it.⁸

Ideology is the distortion of ideas to further the ruling class interests. Truth and reality are gained by compatibility of one's class with the appropriate means of

⁶Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, p. 247.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, ed. by T. B. Bottomore (London: Watts and Co., 1962), p. 78.

production. Ideology arises from class conflict in which the ruling class (bourgeoisie) distorts reality and truth to further its own selfish interests. Since the bourgeoisie (capital means of production) exploits the proletariat (labor means of production), his activities conflict with the appropriate productive forces and his ideas become ideology. Marx explained:

The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men developing their material production . . . alter, along with their real existence, their thinking, and the products of their thinking.⁹

Ideology is the intentional manipulation of thought by the ruling class which both thinks and controls the material forces which determine thought. But although thought is determined by economic class, there are intellectual specializations within the ruling class:

. . . so that within this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active conceptualizing ideologists, who make it their chief source of livelihood to develop and perfect the illusions of the class about itself) while the others have a more passive and receptive attitude to these ideas and illusions, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up ideas and illusions about themselves.¹⁰

The ideas of the ruling class, therefore, become

⁹Ibid., p. 247.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

illusions and misconceptions of reality to further working class exploitation. This self-delusion, since it is promulgated by only a group within that class, may create conflict among both the other members of the ruling class and the laboring class if the delusions become too far removed from the reality of the appropriate material forces of production.

But Marx never formulated a theory of the intellectual.¹¹ Marx only indicated his existence as a perpetrator of the ideology of the ruling class without clearly defining his nature. It may be inferred in this context, however, that the intellectual was deeply rooted in the interests of the group with which he was affiliated. In this sense, the intellectual's ideas were subject to the same economic determinism of all other class members. He was different from them only in his ability to attach himself to a class other than his own.

Exemption of Intellectuals

The ideas created by the intellectuals at first would seem to be subject to existential determination. In the Communist Manifesto Marx explained why intellectuals joined the socialist movement: ". . . a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised

¹¹Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1969), p. 53.

themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole."¹² So it would seem that a total perspective could be gained by the intellectual even though he was affiliated with a particular socio-economic class. In the historical development of societies, according to Marx, the revolutionary intellectual is able to stand above existential determination and gain a total perspective of the situation. He stands " . . . with Promethean exceptionatism against the whole materialistic conception of history."¹³

Yet Marx apparently believed that the intellectuals of his time were motivated by forces other than economic, but which were nonetheless affiliated with the interests of a particular group.¹⁴ The English Fabians, for example, were above all, " . . . making their own leadership secure, the leadership exercised by the educated."¹⁵ This authoritarianism of the intellectual hardly seems free of personal motivation and group interests. Marx's conception of the intellectual was bound to the historical process from which the revolutionary intellectual emerged to lead the proletariat. Rather than exempting the intellectual from

¹²Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), p. 34.

¹³Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals, p. 53.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁵Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953), p. 537.

existential determination, he perceived the intellectual to be allied with the only class whose ideas were rooted in the economic basis of society. Through this affiliation with the proletariat, the intellectual gained access to truth since all bourgeois thought was not based upon truth and was ideological.

But Marx and Engels did not solve the problem of the intellectual, they rather " . . . met the dilemma by choosing not to discuss it."¹⁶ It remained for their successors to debate the solution; it remained an enigma until the time of Mannheim.

From Marx to Mannheim

Between Marx and Mannheim came a series of theorists, each furthering Marx's conceptions to include a greater variety of existentially determining factors upon the creation of mental productions. Immediately after Marx came Wilhelm Dilthey and this conception of historicism which implies the relativity of knowledge and truth to the historical situation. Edward Spranger viewed differing Weltanschauungen arising about differing value systems of a society. Rudolph Eucken later formulated a transcendent realm of reality by which the validity of a society's predominant Weltanschauung might be judged. Then Georgy Lukacs widened the Marxian existential base to include relations among social classes and means of production.

¹⁶ Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals, p. 54.

But it was Max Scheler who most nearly approached the magnitude of Mannheim's thought. By postulating the cultural selectivity of available world-views, he foreshadowed the historical relativism of Mannheim. A detailed discussion of his ideas is unnecessary; it needs only be stated that Gurvitch considered Scheler the greatest of Sorokin, Mannheim, and Scheler.¹⁷ It was Scheler who first coined the term "sociology of knowledge," and it was his thought that greatly influenced Mannheim.

All these theorists were aware of the problem of exempting the intellectual from existential determinism. Each of them handled the dilemma in a manner which failed to satisfy their critics or chose to ignore the problem as Marx had done. Such was the legacy of Mannheim and the background upon which he was to construct his conception of the "intellectual."

¹⁷ Georges Gurvitch, "Sociologie de la Connaissance et Psychologie Collective," L'Annee Sociologique, I, Series 3 (1949), p. 465.

CHAPTER III

KARL MANNHEIM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

It was stated earlier in this paper that each sociologist of knowledge possessed a unique metaphysical and epistemological conception which was implicit in his theory. This was true of the ideas promulgated by both Marx and Mannheim. As was discussed in the preceding chapter, Marx believed in a transcendent realm of truth located in the economic and productive forces of society. Mannheim's metaphysical conception has been criticized as "historical relativism" in which there is no absolute truth and every proposition is relative to the historical situation.¹ Since the conception of the "intellectual" is based upon Mannheim's epistemology, an understanding of his metaphysical perspective is imperative for this discussion. Before this is undertaken, however, it is necessary to point out the relationship of his ideas to those of Marx.

Mannheim and Marx

Marx's gift to Mannheim is greater than that of a mere influential predecessor. Had it not been for Marx's original postulation of class determination of ideas, there could very likely have developed no sociology of knowledge. But his influence was more than that; as Salomon declared: "Mannheim transformed Marx's sociological

¹Helmut R. Wagner, "Mannheim's Historicism," Social Research, XIX (1952), p. 104.

debunking of all social modes of thinking from the absolute stand of his own dogmatism into a sociology of knowledge in which all positions are relative to their specific situation and perspective."²

Mannheim and Marx agreed on the "ideological" analysis of thought systems and the primacy of social factors, but they disagreed upon the following:

- (1) The proletariat class consciousness claim to possess the monopoly of 'adequate' knowledge.
- (2) Mannheim's accent upon 'genuineness' of one's orientation rather than the 'adequacy'.
- (3) Mannheim's belief that a better society might be achieved by non-revolutionary means.

Mannheim undertook to generalize from the Marxists to " . . . transform into a general tool of analysis what for Marx had been primarily a means of attack against his adversaries."³

It will be recalled that Marx's conception of class-determined thought involved manipulation or falsification of ideas by the exploitative class. The "thinkers" of the ruling class maintained the status quo by distorting the mental conception of reality (ideology). The working class had access to "true reality" (underlying absolute knowledge) because their activities were congruous with

²A. Salomon, "Karl Mannheim," Social Research, XIV (1947), p. 353.

³Lewis A. Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge," International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, ed. by David Sills, VIII (Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 430.

the appropriate forces of production and hence, the realm of truth.

Mannheim proposed that ". . . all ideas, even 'truths' were related to, and hence, influenced by the social and historical situation from which they emerged."⁴ To this degree he was an historical determinist, but he labored to refute that distinction. He, in fact, attempted to unite this school of thought with the Marxist doctrine of economic determinism.

From Marx, Mannheim also derived the class determination of ideas, but he went far beyond class to include an individual's group affiliation as the etiological factor. Since each person is a member of many groups within a social class, Mannheim did not negate the influence of the group, but he rather extended the range of determination. The problem then is one of deciding which group is most influential in determining the individual's Weltanschauung.

It is only through exploring the variety of group formations--generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups--and their characteristic modes of thought that there can be found an existential basis corresponding to the variety of perspectives and knowledge which actually obtain.⁵

Thus, man's multi-group membership determined his outlook.

Mannheim further shared with his predecessors of the

⁴Ibid., p. 429.

⁵Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 72.

German school the belief that knowledge existing in any particular socio-historical setting was the result of small interest groups. As Marx visioned the "intelligentsia" of the ruling class and Scheler saw the "leaders of culture," so Mannheim saw the "elite" as selecting and creating the mental productions of a group.

It was through the social structure that the elite gain the power of selection of ideas. For different structural forms there correspond differing power groups; for totalitarian societies the predominant institutions controlled thought and mental productions, while in the liberal-democratic society, it is the cultural elite who are responsible. Mannheim designated six types of elites: the political, the organizing, the intellectual, the artistic, the moral, and the religious.⁶ So it was that he correlated social structure and mental productions; as the former changes so does the latter, although the degree of correspondence is never specified.⁷

Ideas, Existential Factors and Their Relationship

Mannheim defined the sociology of knowledge as
 " . . . a theory of the social or existential conditioning

⁶Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Co., The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 417.

⁷It should be pointed out that one of Mannheim's greatest weaknesses as a sociologist of knowledge was his consideration of only political structure rather than the total social structure.

of thought."⁸ It was previously noted that there are three factors involved in any such definition:

- (1) The ideas or mental productions.
- (2) The socially influential factors.
- (3) The relationship between the two.⁹

Mannheim considered each of these factors in a unique way. Thought or ideas reflected the pragmatic influence of behaviorism. Just as epistemological questions of validity were established in terms of historical "relationism" or appropriateness to the historical situation, so was thought itself the result of interaction.¹⁰ As James and Mead had shown in symbolic interaction theory, reflective thought occurs only when social, goal-directed activity is hindered. The same was true for Mannheim; challenge to one's social position was cause for justifying and rationalizing one's right to the position. From Hegel and Marx came the application of the dialectic; as a group rises to power in the social structure another group arises in opposition. From this opposition, thought is generated. Thus, thought is the result of both social factors and the historical period.

Knowledge was " . . . any product of reflective thought,

⁸Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge," p. 430.

⁹J. J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 9.

¹⁰Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, p. 417.

as distinct from intuition or immediate experience."¹¹ It was communicable knowledge. In an effort to exclude " . . . everything that is bound up with particular personalities and that which can be proved only to narrow social groups with common experiences . . . "¹² Mannheim believed the conception of "knowledge" to extend to all mental productions. Questions of epistemological validity were pertinent only in the socio-historical context: all thoughts, for Mannheim, were relative to the historical period and the interests of the group.¹³

These, then, are the existential factors determining thought and ideas: the group and the historical period.

As Maquet said:

What is the social factor which plays the role of independent variable and which influences thought? It is the group. More exactly, it is, on the one hand, the situation of a group in society and in history and, on the other hand, the objectives and necessities of its collective action.¹⁴

This conception goes beyond the class determination of Marx or the "group mind" of Scheler to include " . . . gen-

¹¹T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," British Journal of Sociology, VII (1956), p. 56.

¹²Karl Mannheim, "The Origins of Conservative Thought," Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 85.

¹³Kurt Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory," Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. by Llewellyn Gross (White Plains, New York: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959), p. 576.

¹⁴Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 28.

erations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, schools, etc."¹⁵ Mannheim included competition as a force which was the ". . . intellectual expression of struggling for power."¹⁶

What passes for knowledge at a given time and place was not limited to ideas in Mannheim's theory. A person's world-view, the content of his thoughts, and the form of his mental structure were all influenced by these existential factors.¹⁷

The relationship between mental productions and the existential base was a determinism perhaps less rigidly conceived than Marx but nonetheless, deterministic. In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim distinguished between two divisions of the sociology of knowledge, one being the theory of the social determination of knowledge and the other the "epistemological consequences of the sociology of knowledge."¹⁸ As Maquet said: "We may say that the domain of qualitative knowledge (for Mannheim) . . . is socially determined in its form, in its content, in all its aspects."¹⁹

¹⁵Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 269.

¹⁷Mannheim, "The Origins of Conservative Thought," p. 85.

¹⁸Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 266.

¹⁹Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 31.

Ideology and the Sociology of Knowledge

Mannheim meticulously and laboriously distinguished between these two concepts. The former was seen to emerge through dialectical historical development manifested in the irrational will of the group. The forces of history are irrational, said Mannheim; men do not plan their progress, it is expressed by the unconscious "will" of the group. It is in this way that ideology is created; just as the individual only comes to master his social existence by adjusting his personality or "self-concept" to contrasting social beings, so a group only examines itself after confrontation with opposition. Hegel's dialectic manifests itself in an opposing force which requires the group to rationalize and justify its position in the social structure. In this way ideology begins. The dominant group (as Marx's "ruling class") which has recently arisen to its position has not previously needed to define or justify its right to authority. Upon the challenge by another group, however, it is stimulated to create myths, ideas, histories, in short, ideological systems grounded in the past to justify and perpetuate its existence.²⁰ In this way, ideology is removed from the historical reality since the conditions favoring ascendancy of one or another group are impartial and the group's position is viewed as natural and proper.

²⁰Mannheim, "The Origins of Conservative Thought," pp. 53-110.

It is only through change or threat of change that thought is stimulated.

The theory of ideology preceded the sociology of knowledge per se. Since the former is primarily concerned with the debunking of the thought of one's adversary rather than studying the thought content itself, it could only be considered as a parallel field of study rather than necessarily the precursor of the sociology of knowledge.

It was Mannheim's role to make such a distinction between ideology and the sociology of knowledge. He divided ideological concepts in three ways:

- (1) Distinction between "particular" and "total" conceptions; the former assuming the unintentional distortion of certain aspects of thought and the latter considers the entirety of thought as ideology.
- (2) Distinction between "special" and "general" conceptions. The former involves exposing the existential determination of the ideas of one's opponent, while the latter posits all knowledge of all groups as ideological.
- (3) Distinction between "evaluative" and "non-evaluative" conceptions. The former reveals attempts to further political aims by ideological distortion while the latter studies ideologies themselves to determine their origins.²¹

Mannheim proposed two different research strategies for analyzing these evaluative and non-evaluative conceptions. One approach was to everywhere show that thought is determined by social factors, and the other

²¹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1968), p. 547.

is to attempt to expose the views of one's adversaries as socially determined while maintaining that one's own position is based upon absolute, infallible knowledge. To establish such a perspective one may distinguish between relativism and relationism.²² The former is the predication of all knowledge upon a subjectively established principle while the latter is the epistemological validity of truth in relation to the historical process.

Mannheim stated that one moves from the realm of ideology to that of the sociology of knowledge when he comes to study the general-total-non-evaluative conception of ideology. Thus, he employed the term "perspective" to mean ". . . the subjects' whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and social setting."²³

Reality and Truth

To understand Mannheim's exemption of the intellectual from existential determinism, it is essential to understand the nature of "true knowledge" in his conception.

Reality was the historical period in Mannheim's conception, all else was ephemeral and changing.²⁴ This was his manner of reconciling the absolute of Scheler and the historical relativism of Spranger. As Maquet said in speaking of Mannheim:

²²Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 41-85.

²³Ibid., p. 53.

²⁴Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory," p. 578.

History is a metaphysical reality. Since it is absolute reality, it has a normative value. In this thinking, the historic situation of a group means the position which is assigned to it in the evolution of time and from which the group draws, as it were, its value in regard to absolute reality.²⁵

History itself displays a kind of order passing through different stages, ranging from horde solidarity, through the stage of individual competition, to man at the stage of super-individual group solidarity.²⁶ The existence of this historical period as a transcendent reality was substantiated by Stark: ". . . he (Mannheim) draws in effect a distinction between the intro-mental mirrorings of reality (which change from age to age) and the extra-mental reality itself (which, of course, is always the same)."²⁷ As Mannheim himself said:

The essence and actual existence of Hellenism do not dissolve themselves into the various 'perspectives' opened up by successive generations of historical scholarship. It is, in fact, 'given', as a 'thing-in-itself' . . . We are justified in positing this real being of the object in se . . .²⁸

Truth is a conception of Mannheim's closely related to that Wolff has called the "metaphysical premise" of the

²⁵Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 29.

²⁶Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, p. 417.

²⁷Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1968), p. 11.

²⁸Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. by Paul Kecsmeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 105.

sociology of knowledge.²⁹ Contained within this premise is a dual conception of reality, one relative and the other absolute. It is the former conception that characterizes Mannheim's usage. Wolff further distinguishes between "existential" and "scientific" truth,³⁰ the former a "being in truth" and the latter an "empirical truth" which makes no statement about ultimate reality. Mannheim's "truth" corresponds to both as Wagner indicated: "Truth, then, (for Mannheim) is said to be existential; it means . . . 'being in truth' rather than 'speaking the truth'."³¹ Truth was also conceived as pragmatic, it was by aid to man's adjustment that knowledge was judged as true or untrue. Adler said:

Truth in this absolute sense is judged in terms of adequacy to the historical stage. Views that help man to adjust in the present are true; adjustment (for Mannheim), however, remains undefined.³²

Truth was found in the historical situation; to be out of contact with history was false knowledge. Kecsmeti postulated only one kind of truth for Mannheim; " . . . that is, a communion with and participation in, the real trends and forces of history. To be out of touch with the basic

²⁹Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory," p. 578.

³⁰Ibid., p. 579.

³¹Wagner, "Mannheim's Historicism," p. 104.

³²Franz Adler, "The Range of the Sociology of Knowledge," Modern Sociological Theory, ed. by Becker and Boskoff (New York: The Dryden Press, 1957), p. 411.

trend is to miss the truth; identification with the basic trend will guarantee true knowledge."³³

Mannheim further distinguished three distinct criteria of truth:

- (1) The transcendent, ontological criterion of truth; every proposition must be accepted as truth if it corresponds to reality, to being.
- (2) The formal or logical conception of truth: every proposition must be accepted as truth if its thought . . . conforms to logical norms.
- (3) The psychological criterion of truth; every proposition accompanied by a feeling of evidence must be accepted as truth.³⁴

Approach to Knowledge

Although Mannheim believed there to be a proper approach to knowledge corresponding to what was accepted as knowledge in the historical situation,³⁵ intuition and social participation were the paths to true knowledge.

Quoting Kecsmeti:

. . . genuine knowledge of historical and social phenomena was possible. According to him (Mannheim), participation in the social process enables one to discover truth of deep human import. In Mannheim's approach, the productivity of social participation as a source of knowledge plays a more important role than the limitations which participation in the social process put upon knowledge.³⁶

³³Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 15.

³⁴Mannheim, "The Origins of Conservative Thought," p. 11.

³⁵Ibid., p. 87.

³⁶Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 1.

This criterion of social participation has been the source of much criticism. For this reason, the next chapter is devoted to the problem of the "intelligentsia" and the means by which access to true knowledge is attained while detachment from the social situation is maintained.

CHAPTER IV

MANNHEIM'S "INTELLECTUAL" AND THE EXEMPTION FROM DETERMINISM

In Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia he defined the sociology of knowledge as:

. . . investigation through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence thought. This may pass . . . into an epistemological inquiry concerned with the bearing of this interrelationship upon the problem of validity.¹

It was stated earlier in this paper that each sociologist of knowledge possessed an epistemological and metaphysical conception which was implicitly expressed in his theory. Mannheim's location of ultimate reality in the historical period was such an implicit expression and is very closely bound to his treatment of the dilemma of the intellectual. Since no question of validity or objectivity can be discussed without considering also the question of truth, it is important to understand Mannheim's metaphysical orientation and the charges of "historicism" and "historical relativism" for which his ideas have been criticized.²

It was Mannheim's belief that all knowledge was influenced by social factors, but only those ideas which met the criterion of truth for that historical situation

¹Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1936), p. 267.

²Helmut R. Wagner, "Mannheim's Historicism," Social Research, XIX (1952), p. 304.

were actually true. The mere presence of ideas which pass for knowledge in a socio-historical situation does not substantiate the truth of the ideas. Because he extended social determination to include all ideas, Mannheim was labeled an "historical relativist" as well as an "historicist."

To save himself from charges of total relativism, Mannheim declared that certain "socially unattached intellectuals"³ could gain access to truth and objectivity not by detachment from social influences but rather by immersion in all socio-economical influences. In this chapter the idea of the "intellectual" will be explored in addition to Mannheim's conceptions of historicism and historical relativism for their relations to the social determination of intellectual thought.

Mannheim's Historicism

"Historicism" has been defined as ". . . the conception that the history of anything sufficiently accounts for its nature or values."⁴ It thus, makes no assertion about epistemological validity of thought or ideas, only that their existence in the historical period is justified by the past. Mannheim saw this as an intellectual force underlying the very basis of socio-cultural reality.

³Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 155.

⁴Funk and Wagnalls, Standard Dictionary of the English Language, I (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1965), p. 599.

Historicism itself was not an absolute reality but merely another world-view subject to the dynamic reality of the historical period. As Mannheim stated in his discussion of historicism:

All this does not mean that we should accept historicism as something given, as a fate which we cannot alter, as a higher and hostile power: historicism is indeed itself a Weltanschauung and hence is going through a dynamic process of development and systematization.⁵

Yet critics of Mannheim have accused him of basing his entire epistemological system upon historicism. Helmut Wagner stated: "In other words, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is more than a sociology of social thought. It is a historicistic theory of 'knowledge' in the service of an idea directed toward basic social change."⁶

Historical Relativism

From such statements as the above it would seem that Mannheim believed that all ideas and thought were relative to the historical situation. This conception, known as historical relativism is the basis for much criticism of Mannheim's thought. For if all knowledge is relative to the historical period and history is a process of constant, inevitable change, it would appear that there can be no absolute truth.

This criticism of historical relativism led Mannheim

⁵Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. by Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 85.

⁶Wagner, "Mannheim's Historicism," p. 304.

to his statement that although history is a process of constant change, there is an ordering principle through which history develops and through activity which is congruent with this principle, absolute truth is possible.

As Mannheim stated:

Historistic theory fulfills its own essence only by managing to derive an ordering principle from this seeming anarchy of change--only by managing to penetrate the innermost structure of this all-pervading change.⁷

It has been stated earlier that all thought and ideas grew out of group affiliation and the historical period. In only one form of thought (scientific) is validity found in a realm other than the socio-historical.⁸ All other knowledge was relative to the "perspective" of the individual and this was determined by one's location in the socio-temporal structure.⁹ As Mannheim himself stated: "If it be once granted that thought is always bound up with a position in the social order, it is only consistent to suppose that the tendency towards a total synthesis must be embodied in the will of some social group."¹⁰ Martindale clarifies this position: "All the rest of our knowledge (popular, traditional, religious, philosophical, and qualitatively scientific) is class-based, having purely

⁷Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 86.

⁸See previous chapter's discussion of Criteria of Truth.

⁹Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p.415.

¹⁰Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 153.

practical validity."¹¹

This question of validity of knowledge is the distinction between ideology and the sociology of knowledge which was made by Mannheim. The truth and objectivity gained by participation in the social forces of a particular historical period was what Mannheim termed "relationism" as distinguished from "relativism." This conception is at the center of the controversy regarding the exemption of the "intellectual" from either group or historically relative ideas and influence.

Since all thought is group determined, it would seem that only those who are unaffiliated with a class can obtain objectivity and true knowledge. In this conception Mannheim was influenced by the proposed solution of Alfred Weber who posited the possibility of a "socially unattached intelligentsia" which was related to no class and hence, free of influence. But this did not solve the problem for Mannheim. As Kecsmeti said:

. . . his (Mannheim's) purpose was not to demonstrate the inescapability of relativism and skepticism, but rather . . . that in spite of certain relativist conclusions, genuine knowledge of historical and social phenomena was possible.¹²

Thus, he rejected the "free-floating intellectual" which his predecessors had offered. To declare the social

¹¹ Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, p. 415.

¹² Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 1.

determination of only some ideas would be an undermining of Mannheim's entire theory. It remained for him to seek another answer to the criticism; that answer was his conception of the "intellectual."

Mannheim's Conception of the "Intellectual"

The "intellectual" for Mannheim, is a member of a class, derived through the historical process and related to the total society both as an active participant and as an unattached observer, free of social and economic influence. It is this dual nature that allows objectivity and enables the intellectual to clearly evaluate the needs of society. As such he undertakes " . . . scrutiny of his own social moorings and the quest for the fulfillment of his mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole."¹³

Since the characteristics of the intellectual were described by Mannheim as a process of development, this description must follow the same course.

The intellectual has arisen from the conflict of interest groups during the historical process and from the broadest ranges of social life, and takes natural root in society in order to bring its transforming power into play.¹⁴ From this need there comes a group whose dominant interests are education and knowledge rather than economics.

¹³Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 158.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 154.

This is the value which brings the "intellectual" into being.¹⁵ Since his interests are purely intellectual and not economic in nature, the intellectual's thought is not economically determined. This does not negate the dependence upon socio-economic class but rather involves him in other bonds of group affiliation. Nor does this exempt the intellectual from social determinism, it tends to broaden his perspective:

This acquired educational heritage subjects him (the intellectual) to the influence of opposing tendencies in social reality, while the person who is not oriented toward the whole through his education, but rather participates directly in the social process of production, merely tends to absorb the Weltanschauung of that particular group and to act exclusively under the influence of the conditions imposed by the immediate social situation.¹⁶

The intellectual, then, is not the product of a particular social group or class nor is intellectual activity carried on by only one class " . . . but rather by a social stratum which is to a large degree unattached to any social class and which is recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life.¹⁷

From this shared value of intellectual pursuit comes the group of intellectuals who although still related to the economic sub-structure of society are related in a different way. The common intellectual basis of their association gives the intellectuals a total perspective

¹⁵Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁷Ibid.

"from which all conflicting views within the society may be evaluated for their validity."¹⁸

Since the intellectual became unattached to specific group interests other than interest in education, he remained aloof from social and political interests. This unattachment was branded "characterlessness,"¹⁹ and demands were made by society for the intellectual to commit himself to group interests. There were two ways out of this dilemma for the intellectual:

- (1) Voluntary affiliation with one or another of the various antagonistic classes; or
- (2) Examination of the social factors influencing the intellectual's thought and his role in furthering the intellectual interests of the whole.²⁰

In the first instance the intellectual may choose his class affiliation and his ideas will still be free of existential determination. Yet a sort of dual position is thus created, for it would make the intellectual both a part and not a part of his social class. "This voluntary decision to join in the political struggles of a certain class did indeed unite them (the intellectuals) with the particular class during the struggle, but it did not free them from the distrust of the original members of the class."²¹

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 158.

²⁰Ibid., p. 156.

²¹Ibid., p. 157.

In the latter instance the intellectual received numerous rejections and failures in his attempt to unite with specific class interests but through these experiences, he gained more insight into his position in the total social structure.²² When the intellectual became aware of his position in the social system his social and political affiliation or opposition were decided " . . . on the basis of a conscious orientation in society and in accordance with the demands of the intellectual life."²³

So, through a process of gaining awareness of his position as both accepted and rejected by society, the intellectual gained the capacity of objectively viewing the situation. This position of nearness and distance did not render the intellectual's perspective biased; it was instrumental in his gaining objectivity.²⁴

It was by his distance from the socially determining factors that the intellectual was allowed to escape the social determination of his ideas. Since he was apart from the social situation, he was able to choose the group with which he was to become affiliated. This freedom of choice also rendered his viewpoint objective.²⁵

As seen by Mannheim, then, the intellectual may be

²²Ibid., p. 159.

²³Ibid., p. 160

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 161.

described as a societal member who is both attached and unattached to any particular group or class within the society. He is both welcomed and rejected by group members. He occupies a definite position within the social order which is not economically based in the same way as all other groups and classes. He is able to participate in group activities, yet remain aloof from bias affecting its group members. He is both committed and detached, participant and observer, both and neither. He participates in the social process to gain a total perspective of the situation yet his participation does not denigrate his objectivity. Rather it is through participation that objectivity is gained.

Truth and the Intellectual

Mannheim's conception of "truth" as adequacy to the historical situation gained by participation in the social process has already been discussed. It was by adequacy of adjustment that the intellectual gained true knowledge. What differentiates the intellectual is his participation in all areas of social life. From the "socially unattached intelligentsia" of Alfred Weber, he concluded the obverse; the totally involved intellectual who gains truth by participation.

While those who participate directly in the process of production--the worker and the entrepreneur--being bound to a particular class and mode of life, have their outlooks and activities directly and exclusively determined by their specific social situations, the intellectuals, besides undoubtedly bearing the imprint of their specific class affinity, are also determined in their

outlook by this intellectual medium which contains all those contradictory points of view.²⁶

Mannheim did not believe that the intellectuals must remain aloof from social class participation even though they were not necessarily rooted in a given class. Rather, they might zealously attach themselves to a class interest without distorting their objectivity of "total participation."²⁷ It was a total perspective then, a synthesis of all thought forms that enabled the intellectual to maintain objectivity and access to true knowledge when all else is knowledge or "ideology" relative to the socio-historical situation.

Mannheim's critics have argued that if knowledge is true only for a perspective or particular point of view, then the fact that intellectuals came from all social classes makes no difference. Martindale furthers the criticism:

Moreover, a perspective which synthesizes other perspectives merely multiplies the alternatives. The truth is no synthesis of lies. Mannheim's perspectivism, if consistent, applies also to his own views, making them true only for a perspective as well. His relationism degenerates into a relativism after all.²⁸

Yet Kecsmeti defends Mannheim's exemption of the intellectual by agreeing that it is possible to gain

²⁶Ibid., p. 157.

²⁷Ibid., p. 162.

²⁸Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, p. 415.

objectivity through social participation. Moreover, the insight gained by such participation is of "deep human import."²⁹

Such a conception of the "intellectual" is nebulous in many ways and because of such ambiguity there is a need for clarification. Mannheim employed many terms and made many assumptions that are not clearly defined in his writings. For example, the group is the determining factor of all ideas yet its properties and limitations are only vaguely defined by Mannheim. The same is true of such concepts as the social structure of the group, the "historical period," and a number of other concepts. For this reason, it will be useful to examine the related concept of Simmel's "stranger" which is concretely defined and clarified in many ways which were unclear in Mannheim's conception.

²⁹Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 1.

CHAPTER V

SIMMEL'S CONCEPT OF THE "STRANGER"

The "stranger," for Simmel, is a concept closely related to the sociological constructs. Basic to all of these are a number of conceptions:

- (1) The first is the social structure and social relations of the group to which the stranger is related.
- (2) Another conception is the type of relationship uniting the stranger to the group.
- (3) The change in group relations and social structure with the advent of the "stranger" represents the final conception.¹

General Characteristics of the Stranger

Simmel's conception of the "stranger" was neither original nor unique. In other conceptions the stranger has been viewed in a multitude of ways ranging from influence upon social integration and disintegration to studies of alienation and anomie.² In general, the stranger may be said to have a number of distinctive attributes which define him as a "stranger."

The first of these characteristics is the necessity to share group sentiment. Since the group itself is believed to be centered about some measure of sentiment and

¹Margaret M. Wood, The Stranger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934).

²Chad Gordon and Kenneth Gergen (eds.), The Self In Social Interaction (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967).

emotion, the stranger or "outsider" must share some amount of the group sentiment in order to be accepted.³ Anthropological literature is rife with examples of initiation rites, rites de passage, and puberty rituals in which outsiders are initiated into common sentiments of the group.

The group is almost always responsible for acceptance and integration of the stranger.⁴ Regardless of the size or complexity of the overall society, it is the group (often within a complex society) which is responsible for integration of outsiders.

Each contact between a group and the "stranger" is a unique situation and the nature of the social relationships formed as a result of encounter will be influenced by the combination of social factors which are present. Every group aligns itself in a unique relationship with the stranger.

The stranger, in every encounter with a group, is assigned a position in relation to the group. The nature of this position is relative to the "character" of the group and the manner in which it is organized. But for each of these characteristics the crucial variable is the nature of the values about which the group is organized.⁵

³Colin Wilson, The Outsider (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1956).

⁴Wood, The Stranger, p. 283.

⁵Ibid.

The "group" has been defined by Robert M. MacIver as "any circle of people who live together, who belong together, so that they share, not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and complete enough to include their lives."⁶ Thus, a group is spatially defined and centered about a central set of values. It also contains a social structure into which the stranger is incorporated. The values and structure are consequently the principal factors involved in the concept of the group as it is related to the stranger.⁷

The Stranger and the Alienated Person

A sharp distinction has been made between the concepts of alienation and the stranger.⁸ Alienation was first defined by Marx and has since been employed by such as Max Weber, C. Wright Mills, and Erik Erikson to mean ". . . an individual feeling or state of disassociation from self, from others, and from the world at large."⁹ The stranger, in Simmel's conception, is one who stands in a positive relation of both nearness and distance to the group and whose presence imputes distinctive qualities into the group.

⁶Robert M. MacIver, Society: Its Structure and Changes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1931), pp. 9-10.

⁷Wood, The Stranger, p. 55.

⁸Eric Josephson, Man Alone (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 23.

⁹Ibid., p. 13.

The Outsider

A similar concept is the "outsider," which has achieved notoreity in contemporary literature and philosophy. Yet this conception involves estrangement, aloofness, and removal for the social situation, much the same as Alfred Weber's "socially unattached intelligentsia." The outsider is a person who "sees deeper," who " . . . must tell the truth at all costs."¹⁰ He is one who does not accept life, who sees only chaos in the world. The concept is a literary construct employed to express a particular world-view and can hardly be viewed as a meaningful sociological construct.

Wood's Conception of the "Stranger"

Margaret Wood is a sociologist whose conception of the stranger closely resembles that of Simmel. She defines the stranger as " . . . one who has come into contact with the group for the first time."¹¹ By this definition the stranger need not be defined in terms of his future location (as Simmel stated) but merely by this characteristic. He is a person who is isolated from the group although he may be in daily contact with its members. His position is comparable to that of the individual who has come into contact with the group for the first time. He does not share the values and sentiments of the group members.

The stranger according to Wood, may come to accept

¹⁰Wilson, The Outsider, p. 15.

¹¹Wood, The Stranger, p. 43.

the group's values and sentiments in which case he loses his identity as a stranger. If this does not occur, he remains without the group and maintains his separateness. Wood distinguishes between the stranger who comes into intimate contact for the first time and the stranger who remains aloof after prolonged exposure to the group.¹² But this is a distinction not made by Simmel nor did he explicitly define what was meant by the "group" or its social structure, as will soon be shown.

Simmel's Conception of the Stranger

The "stranger" is a conception of a peculiar type of social relationship sharing many of the qualities of Mannheim's "intellectual." The stranger possesses unique qualities in relation to the group.¹³ He is both close to the group and apart from it. He may reside within the spatial confines of the group and still be socially distant from it. He is not characterized by the fact of his wandering but rather his position as a "potential wanderer."¹⁴

In social relationships the stranger unites the qualities of nearness and closeness which produces a system of relations with group members best characterized by

¹²Ibid., p. 46.

¹³E. A. Park and E. W. Burgess, eds., Introduction to The Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 322.

¹⁴Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 404.

Simmel's words: "The distance within the relation signifies that the Near is far; the very fact of being alien, however, that the Far is near."¹⁵ The stranger is an element of the group yet distant from the group in being " . . . an element whose interior position and membership involve both an exterior and an opposite."¹⁶ Thus, in the relationship between the stranger and the group, these mutually repelling and opposing elements form a " . . . joint and interacting unity"¹⁷ in which the relationship between the two is both direct and inverse.

The stranger is both related to and free from the economic base of production. He appears everywhere as the entrepreneur, the trader who appears within a stable economic system only when inter-group trading of products occurs. By his unattached position, he " . . . thrusts himself, so to speak, as a supernumerary into a group in which all the economic positions are already possessed."¹⁸ The stranger is no landowner in the physical or metaphorical sense; he has no fixed place in the social structure. As Simmel said:

The stranger is by his very nature no landowner in saying which, land is taken not merely in a physical sense but also in a metaphorical one of

¹⁵Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 322.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 323.

a permanent and a substantial existence, which is fixed, if not in space, then at least in an ideal position within the social order.¹⁹

Sociological Characteristics of the "Stranger"

The stranger is characterized by certain sociological attributes such as mobility, objectivity, confidant, freedom from convention, and abstract relations. The first of these is inherent in the previous discussion, especially in the failure to own land. The stranger's relations to group members may be much the same as among the members themselves, but his lack of land ownership keeps him socially distant at the same time. His role as a trader or entrepreneur renders the stranger free of economic ownership and hence, more mobile in the same way that his social relations are both near to group members by his position within the group and distant by virtue of lack of ownership. This mobility accounts for the ". . . synthesis of nearness and remoteness which constitutes the formal position of the stranger."²⁰

The stranger achieves objectivity by his unique position of social nearness and distance.²¹ His position within the group gives him insight into the intimacies of intra-group relations while his distance from the group

¹⁹Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 405.

²⁰Ibid., p. 404.

²¹Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 324.

prevents distortion of perception by prejudices and biases of the group members. As Simmel stated:

Because he is not rooted in the peculiar attitudes and biased tendencies of the group, he stands apart from all these with the peculiar attitude of the "objective," which does not indicate simply a separation and disinterestedness but is a peculiar composition of nearness and remoteness, concern and indifference.²²

The Objectivity of the stranger often leads to a corresponding role as confidant among group members. Objectivity does not render the stranger unsympathetic and his position of social nearness and distance often creates the role of confidant for him. He may receive intimate information which would be revealed to no other group member, so that " . . . often the most surprizing disclosures and confessions, even to the character of the confessional disclosure, are brought to him, secrets such as one carefully conceals from every intimate."²³

The stranger is objective since he is bound in no way to the economic base. He is unprejudiced, free of group-bias, and free to see events in truth rather than distortion.

. . . he is the freer man, practically and theoretically; he examines the relations with less prejudice; he submits them to more general, more objective, standards, and is not confined in his actions by custom, piety, or precedents.²⁴

²²Ibid.

²³Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 406.

²⁴Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 325.

The stranger is characterized by the abstractness of his relations with others. This results from the general nature of the similarities between him and group members as opposed to the specific similarities among group members. Here again the synthesis of closeness and distance renders the stranger unique; "To the extent to which the similarities become general, the warmth of the connection which they affect will have an element of coolness, a feeling in it of the adventitiousness of this very connection."²⁵

This combination of uniqueness and universality is typical of all human relations, says Simmel, and it is typified in the Stranger.²⁶ As one experiences the particularness of his social relations with another, he feels that it is this difference from all other relations which account for its distinctiveness. With the stranger, it is the general similarities of the relation that makes him seem close, yet the fact that they are general make him seem far at the same time.²⁷

For Simmel, there is a trace of strangeness in every relationship. Even in the most intimate, unique relations there is always the feeling that it has "happened before." "There is a feeling, indeed, that these are actually not

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 407.

²⁷Ibid.

the peculiar property of just that relation but of a more general one that potentially refers to us and to an uncertain number of others, and therefore, the relation experienced has no inner and final necessity."²⁸

If there exists no connection between persons of a commonly shared quality, the word "stranger" assumes a negative meaning. He is not a group member, he is related to the group only in his sharing of some vague, general, characteristic common to all of mankind. But in this sense there can be no affinity because differences rather than similarities are emphasized. As Simmel said, "Between these two elements there occurs, however, a peculiar tension, since the consciousness of having only the absolutely general in common has exactly the effect of bringing into particular emphasis that which is not common."²⁹

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 327.

CHAPTER VI

THE "INTELLECTUAL" AND THE "STRANGER"

Mannheim's "intellectual" has been described as he developed through the historical process. Since Mannheim was mainly concerned with the political structure of society, the social characteristics of the intellectual can be gleaned only from his political nature. This was done in the preceding chapters. In many ways the "intellectual" was similar to Simmel's "stranger" which was a more clearly defined and static concept. In this chapter a comparison of the two concepts will be undertaken.

Similarities

It will be seen that the "intellectual" and the "stranger" shared many common characteristics:

- (1) Both the "intellectual" and the "stranger" were creators of ideas.
- (2) True knowledge was gained by participation in the total social process.
- (3) The social group was the point of reference for all knowledge and truth.
- (4) Both the "intellectual" and the "stranger" stood in both nearness and distance from the group.
- (5) Thought originated in social conflict.
- (6) Ideas are produced by exclusive groups within the social system.
- (7) The "intellectual" and "stranger" both gained objectivity through a "synthesis" of conflicting social forces or ideas.
- (8) Change was the inevitable force from which both the "intellectual" and the "stranger" originated.

- (9) Both concepts were based upon exemption from economic influence and land ownership.
- (10) Both distinguished between Mannheim's "particular" and "total" conceptions of ideology.
- (11) Social mobility and communication were necessary for the dispersion of knowledge.

The "intellectual" was related to the social group only by the shared value of educational pursuit. He was concerned with mental rather than economic creations. In the same way the "stranger" was concerned with mental creations by the nature of his role as a trader. Although he was involved in the economic forces of the group, it was upon the basis of his wit and intellect that he gained his livelihood.¹

It has been stated that true knowledge could be gained (in Mannheim's conception) only by participation in the total social process:

While those who participate directly in the process of production--the worker and the entrepreneur--being bound to a particular class and mode of life, have their outlooks and activities directly and exclusively determined by their social situations, the intellectuals, besides undoubtedly bearing the imprint of their special class affinity, are also determined in their outlook by this intellectual medium which contains all those contradictory points of view.²

¹E. A. Park and E. W. Burgess, eds., Introduction to The Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 323.

²Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1936), p. 157.

It is through his total involvement that the intellectual gained objectivity. But it was also by virtue of his being both near and far from the group that his viewpoint was unbiased. By his freedom to choose his class affiliation the intellectual's thought remained unbiased.³ But this freedom of choice was also the basis of the group's distrust; thus, he remained both within and without the group.⁴

The "stranger" of Simmel's conception also gained objectivity by participation in the total social process. Yet objectivity was not gained by remaining aloof from the social situation; it depended upon the stranger's dual relationship of proximity and distance from the group.⁵

Both the intellectual and the stranger had the group as their reference point. Mannheim conceives of a sentiment or educational value system which unites the intellectuals into a group. This is not necessarily spatially located or rigidly defined class, but " . . . rather a social stratum which is to a large degree unattached to any social class and which is recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life."⁶ The stranger is also related to the group as a reference point but this group is more rigidly located than Mannheim's conception. Speaking of the

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1934), p. 404.

⁶Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 156.

stranger, Simmel said: "He is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries."⁷ But like the intellectual, he shares a feeling about the group. In Bogardus' words: "The conclusion is that the newcomer to any group is a stranger to the degree that he does not share the basic sentiments and values of that group."⁸

It has been stated that Mannheim believed opposing groups were the causal factors in the formation of thought and ideology.⁹ The stranger performs somewhat the same function by his location both within the without the group. He is " . . . an element of the group itself. His position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it."¹⁰ By such confrontation the group is affected in its thought and behavior: " . . . his (the stranger's) position in the group is determined by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and can not stem from the group itself."¹¹

Just as Marx had believed that only a small segment of the ruling class were responsible for the creation of

⁷Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 404.

⁸Emory S. Bogardus, The Development of Social Thought (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1966), p. 468.

⁹See Chapter II, discussion of Ideology.

¹⁰Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 403.

¹¹Ibid., p. 402.

ideas,¹² so Mannheim's elite was responsible for the creation of ideas.¹³ But true knowledge (for Mannheim) could be gained only by the intellectual whose "total perspective" rendered his viewpoint unbiased.¹⁴ This was also true of the stranger who gained objectivity through relations with all segments of the group: "For, the fundamentally mobile person comes into contact, at one time or another, with every individual, but is not organically connected, through established ties of kinship, locality, and occupation, with any single one."¹⁵

Both Mannheim and Simmel shared the term "synthesis" in a somewhat related manner. For Mannheim it was the objectivity gained by the intellectual through involvement in and unbiased consideration of the conflicting forces of society.¹⁶ For Simmel, synthesis was the combination of social nearness and distance which rendered the stranger's position unique. By the nature of his proximity and distance to the group, the duality of his relationship, the stranger obtained objectivity. Moreover, it was the dual nature of his relationship to the group that allowed a synthesis

¹²Karl Marx, Selected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Limited, 1943), p. 78.

¹³Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 417.

¹⁴Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 64.

¹⁵Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 404.

¹⁶Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 157.

of conflicting ideas.¹⁷

It has been stated that Mannheim perceived the inevitability of change and concluded that the historical period itself was the only absolute reality.¹⁸ Change was both inevitable and the result of conflict. in Mannheim's theory. Indeed, the expectation of change was the basis of his "utopian mentality."¹⁹ From the conflict of interests both within and among groups, the intellectual gained insight into all points of view and transformed interests into ideas. "It was primarily the conflict of intellectuals which transformed the conflict of interests into a conflict of ideas,"²⁰ Mannheim said. But from this conflict and change the intellectual achieves an awareness of his social position and the opportunities it affords for objectivity and true knowledge.²¹ Thus, the intellectual owes his very existence to the dynamic aspects of social change. The stranger is also related to change but in a less genetic manner. Rather change and stability are inherent qualities. He was described by Simmel: "If wandering (change) is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus, the

¹⁷Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 324.

¹⁸Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge (New York: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 29.

¹⁹Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 192.

²⁰Ibid., p. 159.

²¹Ibid., p. 160.

conceptual opposite to fixation (stability) at such a point, the sociological form of the 'stranger' presents the unity, as it were, of these two characteristics."²² So the stranger and the intellectual differed in their relation to change. Mannheim apparently did not conceive of change as inherent within the intellectual but only as conflict among intellectuals. But in both cases change was necessary for objectivity to be attained.

Both Simmel and Mannheim shared a belief in the economic influence of ideas. The Marxian influence on Mannheim's thought was evident in the latter's belief that social class was based largely upon an economic base. As Mannheim stated, ". . . those who participate directly in the process of production--the workers and the entrepreneur--being bound to a particular class . . ." ²³ But the intellectuals, as a distinct group, formed a separate class drawn from all socio-economic strata yet based upon education rather than economics. As Mannheim said, "The modern bourgeoisie had from the very beginning a twofold social root--on the one hand the owners of capital, on the other those individuals whose only capital consisted in their education."²⁴ From this basis the intellectuals as a group

²²Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 402.

²³Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 157.

²⁴Ibid., p. 156.

evolved. For Simmel, the stranger was no more economically determined than Mannheim's intellectual. Simmel stated: "The stranger is by nature no 'owner of the soil'--soil not only in the physical, but also in the figurative sense of a life substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least in an ideal point of the social environment."²⁵ It is significant that neither Simmel nor Mannheim attempted to negate economic influence, instead they saw it as efficacious to attainment of objectivity.

Knowledge, for Mannheim, was communicable knowledge.²⁶ Only through social mobility are ideas and beliefs communicated between groups and thought stimulated.²⁷ Simmel agreed that communication within groups accounted for the attributes of the stranger; "If mobility takes place within a closed group, it embodies that synthesis of nearness and distance which constitutes the formal position of the stranger."²⁸ So both the intellectual and the stranger possessed social mobility as a requisite for knowledge.

In Mannheim's conception of ideology, the intellectual distinguishes between particular and total conceptions, the former assuming the unintentional distortion of certain

²⁵Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 403.

²⁶Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 9.

²⁷Ibid., p. 7.

²⁸Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 407.

aspects of thought and the latter considering the entirety of thought as ideology.²⁹ The former assumes the sharing of the same reality conception by both parties while the latter assumes a different ontological base of reality. The stranger by definition shares the same reality conception with his adversary or the concept "stranger" taken on another meaning. In this case (the total conception) ". . . there is a kind of 'strangeness' that rejects the very commonness based on something more general which embraces the parties."³⁰

Only when there is something common to both the stranger and the group member (particular conception) does the positive conception of the stranger exist. "As a group member, rather, he is near and far at the same time, as is characteristic of relations founded only on general human commonness."³¹ Thus, Simmel saw only one conception of ideology, the particular, whereas, Mannheim distinguished among four: particular versus total, special and general, evaluative versus non-evaluative, and relationism versus relativism.

Both the intellectual and the stranger stood in a positive relationship to the group. The intellectual's role is to guide societal, especially political, development.

²⁹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1968), p.547.

³⁰Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 407.

³¹Ibid., p. 408.

Such a discipline will be especially valuable in illuminating the nature of socially bound interests. It will, according to Mannheim, expose the existential factors determining the creation of ideas and uncover the social relativity of knowledge.³² Simmel's "stranger" was also related positively: "For, to be a stranger is naturally a very positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction."³³

It is most important to note that both the "intellectual" and the "stranger" exist because they are needed, the former to guide political activity and the latter to promote trade and further solidarity. Neither could exist in isolation yet they both serve a vital, even crucial function within the group. Both are dependent upon intellectual rather than economic forces for their existence.³⁴

Differences Between the Intellectual and the Stranger

By contrasting the differences between the "intellectual" and the "stranger," Mannheim's conception will be clarified. Fewer differences than similarities are to be noted:

- (1) The intellectual united with a group and confronted another; the stranger both belonged to and confronted the same group.
- (2) The intellectual is predominately a political concept, the stranger, economic.
- (3) The intellectual depends upon social mobility for his existence; the stranger gains mobility from his economic position.

³²Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 163.

³³Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 402.

³⁴Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 161.

- (4) The intellectual could unite with group interests and remain objective; the stranger was objective in both detachment and involvement.
- (5) Group location was not spatially fixed for the intellectual; the stranger's group affiliation was somewhat territorial.
- (6) Mannheim's "entrepreneur" was bound to the forces of production; Simmel's "trader" was free of such influence.

The intellectual, it has been stated, could maintain objectivity even though he united with a specific group.³⁵ Once united with a particular group or class, however, he confronted other social groups, but not his chosen group. By repeatedly attempting to unite with differing groups, the intellectual gained objectivity by such exposure to different group perspectives.³⁶ The stranger, on the other hand, both belongs to and confronts the group with which he is affiliated. He is an element of the group itself, yet by his dual relationship of being both within and without the group, he remains within the group and also confronts the group.³⁷

It was seen that Mannheim's primary concern was with political rather than economic activity. From the socio-political structure the intellectual emerged as a member of the social strata but politically oriented in thought. The stranger was basically economic, being " . . . everywhere

³⁵Ibid., p. 161.

³⁶Ibid., p. 159.

³⁷Ibid.

a trader"³⁸ and only incidentally related to the political structure.

The intellectual's very existence was dependent upon social mobility. Were it not for the ability to move among the social strata and choose his group affiliation, the intellectual would have been firmly rooted in class-determination of thought and unable to gain objectivity. Even the purpose of the intellectual would have been denied. "Their (the intellectuals') function is to penetrate into the ranks of the conflicting parties in order to compel them to accept their demands."³⁹ The stranger gained social mobility as a result of his economic position. "Restriction to intermediate trade, and often (as though sublimated from it) to pure finance, gives him the specific character of mobility."⁴⁰

In the discussion of objectivity it was stated that the intellectual became objective only by experiencing as many conflicting views as possible and arriving at an objective synthesis.⁴¹ He was able to unite himself with a particular group and remain objective since he was able to choose his class affiliation. This ability to choose, in addition to social mobility, made the intellectual's

³⁸Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 402.

³⁹Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 160.

⁴⁰Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 402.

⁴¹Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 161.

viewpoint objective. Were his nobility restricted by his affiliation with a particular economic interest, his perspective could not be objective.⁴² The stranger's objectivity was based upon his position of nearness and distance to the group, but no more one than the other. He was no more attached than detached from the group and this gave him objectivity.⁴³

The intellectuals evolved as a social group from all socio-economic strata and were consequently not located territorially within society.⁴⁴ The stranger, although not himself a landowner, was related to a group with definite territorial boundaries. "once an economy is somehow closed, the land divided up, . . . the trader (stranger), too can find his existence."⁴⁵

Simmel equated the stranger with the trader while Mannheim drew a clear distinction between the "entrepreneur" or trader and the intellectual. The entrepreneur was bound to the forces of production while the intellectual was free of such determinism.⁴⁶ Simmel's stranger and the trader were synonymous; "Throughout history of economics the stranger everywhere appears as the trader, or the

⁴²Ibid., p. 158.

⁴³Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 404.

⁴⁴Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 158.

⁴⁵Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 403.

⁴⁶Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 157.

trader as stranger."⁴⁷

Both the intellectual and the stranger were accepted or rejected not on the basis of their specific qualities but by the conditions peculiar to the receiving group. The intellectual was distrusted by the group which he chose to join while being at the same time accepted. This distrust was based upon the unique characteristics of the group.

This distrust is only a symptom of the sociological fact that the assimilability of intellectuals into an outside class is limited by the psychic and social characteristics of their own.⁴⁸

The stranger was similarly distrusted and accepted but in a more specific manner. It was the proportion of attributed characteristics by which the group defined him as a stranger.

In spite of being inorganically appended to it, the stranger is yet an organic member of the group. Its uniform life includes the specific conditions of this element. Only we do not know how to designate the peculiar unity of this position other than by saying that it is composed of certain measures of nearness and distance. Although some quantities of them characterize all relationships, a special proportion and reciprocal tension produce the particular, formal relation to the "stranger."⁴⁹

Beyond Mannheim's "Intellectual"

It has been stated that Mannheim's concern was primarily with the political structure. The intellectual is related to the total social structure of which the political framework is only a portion. As Mannheim viewed the

⁴⁷Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 413.

⁴⁸Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 158.

⁴⁹Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 408.

objectivity of the intellectual as gained through social participation, there needs to be a clarification of what is meant by "social" in this sense. By comparison with Simmel's "stranger" it was seen how a concrete relationship may be viewed. Had Mannheim shared Simmel's conception of social structure, there would no doubt have been much less ambiguity and consequently, less criticism of his conception.

Mannheim failed to define the relationships of the members of the group. Moreover, he did not clarify the basis upon which the group was constituted although this may possibly be gleaned from some of his later writings. Until these ambiguities are clarified, there can be little definiteness in his conceptions.

From Simmel's essay certain questions arise which, if considered by Mannheim, would greatly clarify his ambiguous concepts:

- (1) Upon what basis is the group constituted?
(Political, social, economic, etc.)
- (2) How are the group members related?
- (3) What is the definite social structure of the group?
- (4) What is the specific relationship between the intellectual and the group?
- (5) What are the dynamic changes in social relations and social structure of the group when confronted by the intellectual?
- (6) In what specified, definite manner does the intellectual gain objectivity through social participation?

The answers to these questions would have served Mannheim in clarifying and rendering more precise his conceptions.

It would also have made Mannheim's sociology of knowledge a more valid contribution to that field.

Conclusions

Mannheim's "intellectual" was conceived as an attempt to escape the relativity of the theorist's own ideas to the socio-historical situation. In his attempt Mannheim illustrated the process by which the intellectual had emerged and how he had escaped the economic determinism of Mannheim's own ideas. Although he implied such things as the social structure and relationship of the group and how it was related to the intellectual, he did not clarify either the structure of the group or its relationship to the intellectual. Further, Mannheim was primarily concerned with political rather than social or economic structures of the group. Because of this, he viewed the intellectual's relationship to the political structure to the exclusion of other relationships.

Simmel's "stranger," on the other hand, was a concrete conception which was related to a specifically defined social-economic structure in a definite, well-defined manner. The stranger was both spatially and economically related to the group and the effect of his presence within the social structure was measured by the variation in these factors. Simmel's "stranger" represents a definite, observable, measureable conception whose properties may be subjected to empirical or other means of validation.

In quite different ways valid and universal truths

are possible for the concepts of both Mannheim and Simmel by individuals with unique relationships to the economic system whose ideas, however, are not economically determined. The actual or potential mobility of the individual provides an independence from class determinative factors. The freedom to choose one's group affiliation renders the perspective unbiased.

Mannheim's conception of the intellectual is still accepted today but with perhaps the realization that it exists more as an ideal rather than a real type. There appears to be a continuing belief that only the person who remains aloof from social and economic forces is able to maintain objectivity. To be affiliated with an interest group is apparently believed to invalidate or bias any perspective. Witness the amount of concern by mass communication media to convince the public of their neutral interests. Another blatant example would be the recent controversy over Supreme Court appointments. Economic affiliation with any interest group is apparently popularly believed to destroy any semblance of objectivity. If this were not the case there would be no need for the strong sanction against bribery or related influence.

The intellectual today appears to be capable of objectivity only when his economic needs are satisfied and his values centered about scholarly pursuits. If this were not true, there would not be the congregation of "intellectuals" within academic and research oriented settings

in which no external interest group is ostensibly involved.

Although Mannheim's conception of the "intellectual" served to assuage some of the criticism of his theory of the sociology of knowledge, it is the conclusion of this writer that it served only this function. By comparison with Simmel's "stranger" a more feasible conception of the intellectual may be derived which more nearly satisfies the criticism directed toward Mannheim. Heuristic and not completely adequate as a solution to the dilemma of Mannheim's "intellectual," this paper is offered as an attempt to rectify some of the shortcomings of his conception. Certainly such an attempt is only a part of the badly needed research in this area of Mannheim's contribution.

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