

SOVIET ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES:  
THE BREZHNEV REGIME

by

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## INTRODUCTION

### Purpose and Scope of the Thesis

General studies dealing with political leadership, policy formulation and decision-making are not new to the field of political science. Interest groups in Western societies have been examined in depth for many years as researchers seek to discern the true lines of communication and authority among elected officials, the bureaucracy, the lobbyists and the special elite groups. However, due to a long established belief that totalitarianism precludes the growth and development of influential factions, Communist societies have been seriously neglected when elite studies are undertaken. It is true that the precise identification of elite groups in Communist states is difficult and often baffling, but for an accurate understanding of the policy-making process it is essential to learn as much as possible about the basic influences which affect the thinking of the ruling party. The study of elite tendencies and activities in the Soviet Union has only begun to attract researchers' attention since the passing of Stalin's "cult of personality."

During the mid-1960s, Milton C. Lodge conducted a comparative analysis of five Soviet elite groups--the Party apparatchiki, and four specialist elites: the economic

managers, the career military commanders, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing the representative periodicals for each elite, Lodge collected data on the elite attitudes toward the Soviet political system in the post-Stalin era. The ultimate aim or goal of the study was to gain a measure of the development of gruppovshchina, or elite groupism, since Stalin<sup>1</sup> and, more specifically, "(1) to measure the extent to which the elites perceive themselves as participants in the policy-making process, (2) to determine whether the elites perceive their participatory role as expanding over time, and (3) to demark changing patterns of Party-specialist elite relations from 1952-65."<sup>2</sup>

The following study is an attempt to replicate the thorough research done by Lodge in order to fill the gap created by the passing of the Soviet reins of power from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. At the time of publication Lodge's study received high praise from fellow Soviet specialists and political scientists; nearly a decade later, the work is still extensively cited.<sup>3</sup> Lacking, however, is an updated version, again using content analysis, which should reveal elite attitudinal changes during the time of Brezhnev's consolidation of control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)--a time which has had moves toward detente interspersed with threats and acts of

hostility. Thus, Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes: The Brezhnev Regime will follow the same research methods (explained in Part II) and employ the same analytical categories and hypotheses formulated by Lodge in order to build upon prior research, yet fill a distinct void in current literature dealing with interest groups<sup>4</sup> or elites in Soviet society.

#### Review of Prior Research

Normally a researcher setting out to review applicable, previously published literature relevant to his topic is left facing the ominous task of reducing voluminous writings to a more workable, selective level. However, in studying Soviet elites one quickly recognizes that very few definitive works have been published dealing specifically with the concept "elite" or "interest group," and only in the past eight to ten years have Soviet specialists brought empirical research into their studies. Therefore, the purpose of this section is not to review and consolidate the scholarly works of past years, but, rather, to recognize the efforts of social scientists who are trying to develop new concepts and approaches for examining elite attitudes and actions within the Soviet political system.

In an imaginative 1964 publication Brzezinski and Huntington go to great lengths to show that the old

Stalinist oligarchy is slowly withering and the powerful Party appartchiki, while still dominant under Khrushchev's command, has been forced to accept a certain degree of specialist elite participation in policy-making.<sup>5</sup> The authors, unfortunately, tend to neglect this topic and replace it with a detailed study of the dynamics of power in the Soviet Union and the United States. The book does not explore satisfactorily the role or position of elites, but gives the reader an indication of what may surface during the Brezhnev era.

Appearing simultaneously with Political Power: USA/ USSR was the December, 1964 volume of the Journal of Conflict Resolution which contained a trio of articles examining Soviet elite values and articulations.<sup>6</sup> Two of the studies, by Angell and Singer, used content analysis of newspapers and journals, assumed to represent six Soviet elites,<sup>7</sup> to discover the extent of the influence the elites exerted upon the decision-makers. Because specific hypotheses were not formulated nor the representative journals selected with utmost care, the results of the massive statistical analysis were dubious, and, according to the authors, revealed no significant information about the elite influences. Yet, Angell still concludes his study supports the theory held by many Western political scientists that Soviet elite values are in fact being

circulated in the pages of specialist journals.

To Soviet specialists, the name H. Gordon Skilling has become synonymous with studies of interest groups and Communist politics. Writing in 1966, Skilling had this to offer concerning groupism in the Soviet Union:

The idea that interest groups may play a significant role in Communist politics has, until recently, not been seriously entertained either by western political scientists or by Soviet legal specialists. The concept of "totalitarianism" that has dominated the analysis of communism in the West has seemed to preclude the possibility that interest group could challenge or affect the single ruling party as the font of all power. The uniqueness of a totalitarian system has been deemed to lie in the very totality of its political power, excluding, as it were by definition, any area of autonomous behavior by groups other than the state or party, and still more, preventing serious influence by them on the process of decision-making.<sup>8</sup>

To Skilling it has become increasingly evident that a totalitarian concept which excludes group interests or elite demands is no longer an appropriate means of analyzing Soviet politics, and that a more systematic study of the reality of group politics is long overdue.<sup>9</sup> He notes that the Party is no longer to be viewed as a monolith, but as a conglomeration of interests, or, to borrow from Robert Dahl, a "polyarchical system."<sup>10</sup>

In concluding his exemplary article, Skilling argues it is difficult to deny that there are, in the USSR and other Communist states, political interest groups which

seek not so much to become the government as to realize aspirations through governmental decision-making.<sup>11</sup> The final plea from Skilling is that "much remains to be done to apply the interest-group approach to Communist systems."<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, save for the works of Lodge, little has surfaced in response to the appeal for empirical studies of the Soviet elite.

A wealth of publications was released in the West from 1967 through 1970 to reflect upon the first fifty years of Communism in the Soviet Union. Extensive empirical and analytical research was applied to comparative Communist studies but the great majority were overly historical, failing to examine current developments in the Soviet Union. In the postscript to Power in the Kremlin, Michael Tatu concludes that the Soviet system is definitely moving away from totalitarianism. Two elites, the army and the secret police, are gaining enormous stature as a result of international tensions and the need for increased internal surveillance, while the power of the Party apparatchiki is diminishing.<sup>13</sup> Tatu does not stand alone in envisioning the rise of elites in the Soviet Union. Late in the 1960's four notable, supportive works were published by Kurt London, Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, Thomas W. Wolfe, and Mark W. Hopkins.<sup>14</sup>

Schwartz and Keech, recognizing the need for increased empirical study of the elite groups in Communist societies, propose to illustrate how Soviet public policy in general, or even a given Soviet policy, can be importantly affected by group activity.<sup>15</sup> Referring to the Brzezinski and Huntington analysis of Soviet policy-making, Schwartz and Keech agree that groups such as the military, industrial managers, agricultural experts and state bureaucrats suggest to the political leadership certain courses of action. They have their own specialized publications, which can become important vehicles for expressing specific points of view.<sup>16</sup> At the conclusion of their study, which examined group influence in the debate over Khrushchev's proposed Educational Reform Act of 1958, both authors stated the belief that the influence and pressure of specialist elite groups in Soviet society has increased significantly in the past fifty years. The very few specialist groups existing after the October Revolution "tended to be stigmatized by their identification with the old regime. . . .The a priori belief of the Party that such individuals were disloyal deprived them of any political currency which could be used in the process of trading support for recognition of their demands."<sup>17</sup> Schwartz and Keech recognize that today the "modernization of Russia has fundamentally altered this situation. Not only has it

generated a complex economic and social pluralism, but it has provided new cadres to staff these skilled groups. Those who possess scarce technical capabilities are far more likely to exert influence today than in the past."<sup>18</sup>

"How" the specialist groups exert influence in the policy and decision-making arena is noted by London, Hopkins and Wolfe. London presumes there may be efforts similar to what we know as lobbying in the West, where influence is privately exerted by professional or specialist groups on the appropriate Party apparatchiki. He foresees an emergence of public discussion of issues in newspapers, journals and professional digests. Additionally, the writers will strive to reach the Party by expounding their views in plays, stories and books.<sup>19</sup> In discussing mass media in the Soviet Union, Hopkins notes that many specialized journals are growing in circulation and importance, while increasingly reflecting the opinions of their editorial staffs.<sup>20</sup> Hopkins also recognizes two types of controversy surfacing in the Soviet press. The first involves a relatively open give and take with one interest group at odds with another. The second, which Hopkins concedes is quite difficult to detect, develops at the upper echelons of power where "basic foreign and domestic policies are challenged and formulated through speeches, reports, and editorial statements appearing in

newspapers and periodicals."<sup>21</sup> Speaking before a Congressional subcommittee, Wolfe declared that the historical tendency of the Soviet system has been to try to suppress the emergence of autonomous interest groups of any kind that might develop a life of their own and rise to challenge the leadership monopoly of the Party. After Stalin's demise the interest groups have been finding more maneuvering room and important Soviet policy decisions under the Brezhnev regime probably represent a kind of "committee compromise" among contending factions within the ruling hierarchy.<sup>22</sup>

Perhaps the most welcome event of the past decade for students of Communist systems has been the emergence of the behaviorist approach to social science. The prodigious amount of knowledge accumulated on the Soviet political system was all too infrequently systematized or evaluated until behaviorists began to stress concept formulation, causality, explanation, methodology or research techniques. Two of the early advocates of applying objective empirical research to Communist studies, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. and Roger E. Kanet, recognize the great need for studies that codify the assumptions made by students representing various schools of thought and assess the impact that these assumptions have had on the analysis and interpretation of Communist systems.<sup>23</sup> Both writers

led the way by calling for increased attention to replication, methodology and research designs in their pioneering editions which linked behavioralist-oriented techniques to Communist studies.<sup>24</sup>

The initial impetus that empirical elite studies received only a few years ago seems to have been insufficient to stir continued interest in Soviet elites, for a great void is still to be found when one searches for source material on interest groups in Soviet society. Since the publication in 1969 of Lodge's Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (the data was collected in 1965-66), the only full-fledged attempt at analyzing interest groups in the Soviet Union has been Skilling and Griffiths' Interest Groups in Soviet Politics which, like Lodge's work, republishes data previously reported in professional journals. These two works constitute one of those remarkable early steps which is only rarely followed by the intensive refinement of other scholars.<sup>25</sup>

In order to allow the reader to appreciate the ambivalence surrounding Soviet elite studies, it is necessary to recognize those social scientists who argue against the possibility that interest groups can exert sufficient pressure upon the Party apparatchiki to alter substantially the policy-making processes. In a work dealing with the transition of power from Khrushchev to

Brezhnev, Henry W. Morton stresses,

The important decisions and discussions are still initiated at the top, by the party leadership, rather than from below, by the organized pressure of interest groups and experts. The growing tendency toward bargaining and autonomy might even suffer a reverse in the unlikely, but not wholly implausible, event that an absolute ruler in the Stalinist tradition should seize power. Once again, societal efficiency would be sacrificed to political control.<sup>26</sup>

Shortly after the publication of Morton's theme, Philip D. Stewart systematically studied the role of interest groups in the Soviet policy process and deduced that "writers appear to divide roughly into two camps when assessing the informal rules governing group activity."<sup>27</sup> Stewart notes that Brzezinski, (Jeremy R.) Azrael, and (Frederick C.) Barghoorn stress the Party's formal monopoly over decision-making and the weakness of the interest groups, while (Alfred G.) Meyer concludes that the interests of the groups do not count very heavily.<sup>28</sup> "Griffiths, Skilling, and (Boris) Meissner, by contrast, argue that certain kinds of strategic groupings may indeed count heavily in Soviet decision-making."<sup>29</sup> Stewart's unresolved questions leave the reader with the following carefully phrased observation:

. . . even when interest-group representatives participate in authoritative decision-making they do so only as expert consultants, not as spokesmen for a grouping or as advocates of a special point of view. Under these conditions, it is contended, interest groupings cannot really be said to share political power.<sup>30</sup>

Appearing in 1972, two books, one by Abraham Rothberg, the other by John Dornberg,<sup>31</sup> support those writers who contend that in a highly totalitarian and monolithic society such as the Soviet Union, any challenge to the omnipotent Party apparatchiki is doomed to failure. Rothberg's analysis of the Party's policy toward interest groups and the growing dissident movement<sup>32</sup> is best summed up in his last chapter, appropriately entitled "The Iron Heel." He equates the present Soviet system with Stalinism; a view that strongly implies that the possibility of reforms within Soviet society is all but hopeless and the efforts of dissidents and specialist elites are for naught. The scathing, hostile account of Soviet life during the period 1968-1971 is Dornberg's impressionistic view of life in Moscow as Brezhnev began his consolidation of power. Rather than a scholarly study, The New Tsars is more in the style of the Marquis de Custine's Journey for Our Time;<sup>33</sup> an observation of the drudgery and hopelessness of daily living in a troubled society. Dornberg uses The New Tsars to convey how the Russian

people must exist under a regime threatening a return to repressive traditions and neo-Stalinism.

The final work which points out the ambivalence pervading any examination of elites in Communist societies is Richard C. Gripp's The Political System of Communism, a book that "hopes to reach a better understanding of the unique structures and features which distinguish communist-party states from noncommunist political systems."<sup>34</sup>

Gripp writes,

The interest group is neither organized nor encouraged by the communist party, but arises out of its own efforts. Interest groups in communist states are very poorly developed, for they cannot appear to assume the role of an opposition political force. Unable either to challenge party leaders or party doctrine, such groups, unlike their counterparts in the West, must articulate their demands softly, respectfully, even subtly, before high party officials.<sup>35</sup>

All in all, interest groups in communist states are more embryonic than developed. They are poorly organized and function always within a framework imposed by the communist party. They certainly do not challenge the party for power--not openly nor obviously at least. . . And yet, some of the interest groups are growing in importance, increasingly learning how to articulate popular demands, and from time to time even influencing policy.<sup>36</sup>

Having examined the debate over the importance of interest groups in influencing policy-making in the Soviet Union and other Communist states, the research study that

follows hopefully will determine the extent to which the apparatchiki dominate the political process. More specifically, it is designed to measure the degree to which the specialist elites manifest the attitudinal orientations of active participants in the Brezhnev regime.

## RESEARCH METHODS

In order to measure quantitatively the degree to which the elites manifest the attitudinal orientations of active participants in Soviet policy/decision making, specific categories for data classification must be established. These categories, the classes into which material is grouped for the purpose of analysis,<sup>1</sup> are crucial to the success or failure of any content analysis<sup>2</sup> research. Bernard Berelson writes,

Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and to the content. Content analysis studies done on a hit-or-miss basis, without clearly formulated problems for investigation and with vaguely drawn or poorly articulated categories, are almost certain to be of indifferent or low quality, as research productions. Although competent performance in other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the formulation and the definition of appropriate categories take on central importance. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories.<sup>3</sup>

The participatory categories employed by Lodge stem from research done by Brzezinski and Huntington<sup>4</sup> in their efforts to establish a scheme for classifying political systems along a continuum. At one end of the continuum are the ideological political entities such as the

Soviet Union, at the opposite end are the instrumental systems, represented by the United States. Lodge asserts that:

In instrumental systems the relationship between the political and social system is characterized by the "access and interaction" of societal groups in the political system; in ideological systems by the "control and manipulation" of groups by the top leaders of the ruling party. As an ideological system the Soviet political system is distinguished by the dominance of the Party apparat in the political process. Societal groups are infiltrated, controlled, and manipulated by the apparatchiki and thereby denied a participatory role in policy-making and implementation.<sup>5</sup>

Lodge continues to explain that western scholars, like Brzezinski and Carl Linden,

. . .note some degree of Soviet systematic change in the post-Stalin period, arguing that the Party apparat, while still dominant in the political arena, is being forced to tolerate greater specialist elite participation in the political process. To gain a measure of the extent of change along the continuum toward a more instrumental (i.e. elite participatory) political system, attitudinal data are collected on two operational indicators of Party-elite relations: one, the level of specialist elite participation, the other, the degree of group consciousness.<sup>6</sup>

To Lodge, an indication of any move toward a more instrumental system would be indicated by the specialist elites articulating over a period of time a set of participatory beliefs and values which make them attitudinal

co-participants with the Party apparatchiki.<sup>7</sup> The continuum, which is graphically portrayed in Figure 1, represents a field of attitudes ranging from ideological (Party participation solely) to instrumental (Specialist elite participation solely). The previously mentioned categories for coding the data are used by Lodge,<sup>8</sup> and repeated in this study, to gain a measure of the extent to which the elites develop and articulate participatory attitudes. The hypotheses formulated by Lodge, which will be replicated and tested in Part III, seek to find answers to the following questions:

Who is responsible for policy-making?

Who is responsible for local decision-making?

Who should be responsible for policy/decision-making?

Ultimately, it is hoped, an answer will be found to the most important question, "Are the specialist elites developing a set of participatory attitudes which tend to undermine the dominance of the Party apparatchiki in policy making and implementation?"<sup>9</sup>

Lodge plots a hypothetical relationship between the development of group consciousness and participatory attitudes along the ideological-instrumental continuum over a period of time ( $T_1$  to  $T_8$ ) which predicts the Soviet political system is becoming increasingly instrumental.




Fig. 1. The Ideological-Instrumental Continuum

With 3.0 reflecting relatively equal Party-specialist elite participation, at  $T_1$  (1952) the political system is Party dominant (specialist elite participation and group consciousness are low, the apparatchiki are dominant); at  $T_8$  (1965) the system is in the instrumental range (the specialist elite participatory scores reach the co-participation range and the level of elite group consciousness is high). . . the Party's optimal position would be in the 2.5 to 2.9 range where the apparatchiki could best capitalize on specialist elite participation without surrendering control.<sup>10</sup>

### The Elites<sup>11</sup>

In order to undertake empirical content analysis of Soviet elite participatory attitudes, one must assume "that the Soviet specialist elites--due to their strategic role in society--enjoy sufficient leeway in the system to articulate a distinctive range of beliefs and values in

their specialist journals."<sup>12</sup> To replicate properly Lodge's research, and to bring in new data for the 1968-1973 time span, the periodicals he used to represent each specialist elite will also be used for the present study. The following periodicals were used for content analysis of attitudes of the respective elites:

<u>Kommunist</u> <u>Current Digest of the</u> <u>Soviet Press</u>	The Party <u>Apparatchiki</u>
<u>Soviet Military Review</u> <u>(extracts from Krasnaya</u> <u>zvezda)</u>	The Professional Military
<u>Soviet Government and Law</u>	The Legal Profession
<u>Oktyabr</u>	The Literary Elite

#### The Sampling

Bernard Berelson declares, "by definition, content analysis calls for the quantification of content elements . . . and must be objective,"<sup>13</sup> while Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz add,

The objective of content analysis is to convert recorded "raw" phenomena into data which can be treated in essentially a scientific manner so that a body of knowledge may be built up. More specifically, content analysis must be conducted so as (1) to create reproducible or "objective" data, which (2) are susceptible to measurement and quantitative treatment, (3) have significance for some systematic theory, and (4) may be generalized beyond the specific set of material analyzed.<sup>14</sup>

To meet the objectivity requirement, rotated sampling of each elite periodical was employed. During the even years (1968, 1970, 1972), the even-numbered issues were selected and only articles beginning on even-numbered pages were selected as the unit of analysis. For the odd years (1969, 1971, 1973), an odd numbered rotated sampling was chosen. Berelson identifies rotated sampling as one of three which may be successfully applied to content analysis research.<sup>15</sup>

The recording unit, or that segment of the content which is labeled when the analyst codes the content,<sup>16</sup> is the major theme of a paragraph which, when articulating one position in one category, can be coded only once. The sample size, somewhat smaller than Lodge's, remains equal for each elite every year. Four hundred paragraphs per elite were coded for each of the six sampled years (1968-1973), or a yearly sample of 1600 paragraphs (400 paragraphs X 4 elites) and a total study sample of 9,600 paragraphs (1,600 paragraphs per year X 6 years).

#### Reliability

Adhering to the cautions of Festinger and Katz, Berelson, and Budd and Thorp, that reliability<sup>17</sup> must be carefully checked, test articles were chosen and given to two additional coders working independently. The formula,

used by Lodge, for testing reliability is:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of agreements}}{\text{Total number of paragraphs coded}} = \text{percent of reliability}$$

Applying this formula, the total study reliability is 92 per cent. How large a percentage of agreement is necessary to establish reliability? No researcher using content analysis can specifically answer the question, but Budd and Thorp emphasize that coders should attain about 90 per cent agreement, even using somewhat vague classifications, and that a correlation of 75 per cent is too low for satisfactory reliability.<sup>18</sup>

## ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES

### Policy-Making

If one conceives of the Soviet political system as being dominated by the Party apparatchiki, then operationally this Party primacy will be reflected in scores of 1.0-2.9, while higher, more participatory scores of 3.0-5.0 will indicate that the specialist elites perceive the policy-making process as becoming more instrumental over time.<sup>1</sup> The first of Lodge's hypotheses to be tested states:

H<sub>1</sub>: Over time the specialist elites increasingly describe themselves as participants in the policy-making process.

Table 1a. Elite Perceptions of the Policy-Making Process, 1968-1973

Elites	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	All Years
Policy-making is the responsibility of 1.0 the Party leadership solely 2.0 the Party leadership primarily 3.0 joint Party-specialist elite participation 4.0 the specialists primarily 5.0 the specialists solely							
Party	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.2	1.7
Legal	3.3	3.6	3.0	2.8	3.2	2.2	3.0
Military	3.6	4.2	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.6
Literary	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.2	2.0	2.2	2.6
All Elites	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.5	2.7
Specialists Only	3.2	3.5	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.6	3.1

Unlike Lodge's data,<sup>2</sup> which uncovers a general trend toward increased specialist elite participation in the policy-making process, Table 1a. depicts a peak in 1969-1970 and then a noticeably sharp decrease in scores for each elite in all of the following years. By dividing the six sampled years into two three-year periods (1968-1970 and 1971-1973), changes in participatory scores can be studied.

Table 1b. Elite Perceptions of the Policy-Making

Elites	1968-1970	1971-1973	% Change
Party	1.9	1.5	-21%
Legal	3.3	2.7	-19%
Military	3.9	3.3	-15%
Literary	2.8	2.5	-11%
All Elites	3.0	2.6	-13%
Specialist Only	3.3	2.8	-15%

The 13 per cent and 15 per cent All Elites and Specialists Only decrease, respectively, indicates a reversal of participatory attitudes in the current decade. The hypothesis cannot be supported, for the data indicates a strengthening of Party control and an apparent simultaneous withdrawal of specialist elites from the policy-making arena.

The counterpart to the previous hypothesis, which Lodge calls "a value category on who 'should' make policy,"<sup>3</sup> declares,

H<sub>2</sub>: The Specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater influence in the policy-making arena.

In order to support this hypothesis, not only must specialist scores on the value category increase over time, but the value scores must be appreciably higher, i.e., more participatory, than perceptions of actual participation in policy-making.

Table 2a. Elite Values Toward Participation in the Policy-Making Process, 1968-1973

Policy-making should be the responsibility of							
	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0		
	the Party leadership solely	the Party leadership primarily	joint Party-specialist elite participation	the specialists primarily	the specialists solely		
Elites	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	All Years
Party	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.2	1.9
Legal	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.6	3.4	3.3
Military	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8	4.3	4.0
Literary	2.4	2.8	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.6	3.0
All Elites	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.1
Specialists Only	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.8	3.5

One will recognize that the data in Table 2a shows a slight trend toward increasingly higher specialist elite scores on the value category. Although the years 1971 and 1972 produce a dip in scores for All Elites and Specialists Only, a strong recovery is made in 1973, when the specialist elites are well into the participatory range.<sup>4</sup> Table 2b more graphically portrays elite value changes over time.

Table 2b. Elite Values Toward Participation in the Policy-Making Process, 1968-1970 vs. 1971-1973

Elites	1968-1970	1971-1973	% Change
Party	1.9	2.0	+ 5%
Legal	3.3	3.3	-
Military	4.0	4.0	-
Literary	2.8	3.2	+14%
All Elites	3.0	3.2	+ 7%
Specialists Only	3.4	3.5	+ 3%

Both prerequisites necessary to accept fully the second hypothesis have not been met conclusively. While no specialist elite scores had a negative percentage change over time, the 7 per cent and 3 per cent increase cannot be taken as significant. Dramatically, however, from 1970 on, the scores for All Elites and Specialists Only (Table 2a) are appreciably higher than perceptions of actual participation in policy making (Table 1a).

Reflecting momentarily, one finds the specialist elites not increasingly describing themselves as participants in the policy-making process, yet, simultaneously, perhaps as a reaction to strong Party controls, they are pressing for more responsibility than they depict themselves as having.

#### Decision-Making

In an ideological political system the Party apparatchiki is seen as dominant in local (decision level) as well as policy level decisions, reserving for itself the role of final arbiter in disputes over implementation.<sup>5</sup> To examine elite participatory attitudes toward the decision-making arena, Lodge developed two hypotheses closely akin to the policy-related hypotheses,  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ .

$H_3$ : Over time, the specialist elites increasingly describe themselves as participants in the local decision-making process.

Table 3a. Elite Perceptions of the Decision-Making Process, 1968-1973

Decision-making is the responsibility of							
	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0		
	the Party leadership solely	the Party leadership primarily	joint Party-specialist elite participation	the specialists primarily	the specialists solely		
Elites	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	All Years
Party	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.4	3.0	2.7
Legal	3.0	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.4	3.4
Military	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.1
Literary	2.1	2.4	3.6	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.5
All Elites	2.4	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0
Specialists Only	2.4	3.0	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.1

Except for Party score of 2.4 in 1972, a trend toward increased specialist elite participation at the local level is seen. The uncommonly high Literary elite score for 1970 (3.6) skews the per cent change over time (Table 3b) to give this elite the only negative change for the two three-year groups. Lodge concluded that an 8 per cent participatory increase tenuously supported the hypothesis.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the 10 per cent participatory increase for Specialists Only found in this study leads one also to accept  $H_3$ .

Table 3b. Elite Perceptions of the Decision-Making Process, 1968-1970 vs. 1971-1973

Elites	1968-1970	1971-1973	% Change
Party	2.7	2.8	+ 4%
Legal	3.3	3.5	+ 6%
Military	2.7	3.6	+33%
Literary	2.7	2.3	-15%
All Elites	2.9	3.1	+ 7%
Specialists Only	2.9	3.2	+10%

Although Lodge found elite participatory attitudes in both of his periods (1952-1957 and 1959-1965) higher for decision-making than for policy-making,<sup>7</sup> a comparison between Tables 1b and 3b reveals that greater Party tolerance of specialist elite participation at the local level occurs only in the later period (1971-1973). The score of 3.2 indicates that the Specialists now perceive themselves as relative equals to the Party apparatchiki in local level planning.

To investigate the question, "Who should make decision?" another hypothesis was formulated by Lodge, which reads

H<sub>4</sub>: The Specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater influence on the decision-making level.

Table 4a. Elite Values Toward Participation in the  
Decision-Making Process, 1968-1973

Decision-making should be the responsibility of							
	1.0	the Party leadership solely					
	2.0	the Party leadership primarily					
	3.0	joint Party-specialist elite participation					
	4.0	the specialists primarily					
	5.0	the specialists solely					
Elites	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	All Years
Party	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2
Legal	3.8	3.8	3.6	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.9
Military	3.4	3.0	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.6
Literary	3.5	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.9
All Elites	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.4
Specialists Only	3.6	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.8

The hypothesis ( $H_4$ ) is strongly supported by the data, with pressure upon the Party peaking in 1971 and leveling off well into the instrumental range in the two following years. Only the Party scores remain in the ideological half of the continuum while all other elites, in each year, yield scores reflecting continuing pressure is being placed upon the Party to allow the specialists more responsibility in local decision-making.

Table 4b. Elite Values Toward Participation in the  
Decision-Making Process, 1968-1970 vs.  
1971-1973

Elites	1968-1970	1971-1973	% Change
Party	2.2	2.2	-
Legal	3.7	4.0	+ 8%
Military	3.3	3.9	+18%
Literary	3.7	4.1	+11%
All Elites	3.2	3.6	+13%
Specialists Only	3.6	4.0	+11%

When specialist elite perceptions of the decision-making process (who is making decisions?) are compared with specialist elite values (who should make decisions?), the same two patterns that Lodge found again emerge:<sup>8</sup>

(1) The Specialist elites currently opt for much greater responsibility in local decision-making than they perceive themselves as possessing (Legal 4.0 desired vs. 3.5 perceived; Military 3.9 vs. 3.6; Literary 4.1 vs. 2.3).

(2) The Party apparatchiki, conversely, claim that elite participation for the years 1971-1973 (2.8) is well ahead of the desirable (2.2).

#### Combined Participatory Attitudes

At this point in Lodge's research, he executed an operationally lax but, nevertheless, highly profitable and enlightening "collapse of the categories into one dimension."

Each elite's score on the four categories is averaged and a Grand Mean Score is derived which, Lodge says, "may serve as a general indicator of overall participatory trends."<sup>9</sup>

Table 5a. Elite Participatory Attitudes: Grand Mean Scores, 1968-1973

Elites	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	All Years
Party	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.2
Legal	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.7	3.2	3.4
Military	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.6
Literary	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.0
All Elites	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Specialists Only	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4

Lodge's data discloses a year by year instrumental increase for specialist elites with participatory trends being manifested by all the elites.<sup>10</sup> The thesis data, however, shows evidence of a continued participatory trend in 1968 and 1969, with a very level plateau (3.1 for All Elites and 3.4 for Specialists Only) being maintained throughout the seventies. Table 5b readily portrays this instrumental plateau, which is indicative not of steadily increasing elite participatory attitudes but of the specialist elites firmly establishing themselves as coparticipants with the Party apparatchiki, in spite of Party insistence that the apparatchiki are (and should be) dominant.

Table 5b. Elite Participatory Attitudes, 1968-1970  
vs. 1971-1973

Elites	1968-1970	1971-1973	% Change
Party	2.2	2.2	-
Legal	3.4	3.4	-
Military	3.5	3.7	+ 6%
Literary	3.0	3.0	-
All Elites	3.0	3.1	+ 3%
Specialists Only	3.3	3.4	+ 3%

## FINDINGS

Having coded numerous paragraphs and tabulated a great quantity of an interpretation and an explanation are required to correlate the findings. A cursory examination of the tables shows the military elite to consistently register well into the instrumental range on both policy and decision-making questions. Perhaps some events of the late 1960s foreshadowed the sharp rise above the Lodge data in military scores. Following crises in 1957 (the forced retirement of Marshal Zhukov) and 1962 (the Cuban missile confrontation), Lodge found a discernible ascent in military elite values and participation, which he attributed to the elite reaction to excessive Party domination.<sup>1</sup> Similar ascents can be observed in Tables 1a and 2a, where the military, in 1969, scores 4.2. Perhaps this sudden rise accurately reflects the growing conflict between the Party and the military which began in 1968 and reached its zenith in mid-1969.

In August, 1968, the Czechoslovakian uprising was devastatingly crushed by Soviet forces as the army conducted a brilliant occupation coinciding with the fumbling political actions of the Party. Bitter world reaction and internal Soviet dissent were directed at both the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership and the top military commanders. The

Party, naturally, as was done following the withdrawal of weapons from Cuba, allowed the military to accept most of the blame for abuses and mistakes and thus to serve as a scapegoat for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Defense budget allocations were another source of contention between the Party and the military elite in 1968-69. Although the 1968 budget authorized 16.7 billion rubles for Soviet national defense, and was increased to 17.7 billion rubles in 1969, the percentage set aside for defense decreased from 13.6 per cent to 11.8 per cent. Military leaders were appalled that money was diverted from heavy industry and technological areas to agricultural and consumer goods production at the same time that hostilities in Southeast Asia continued and the United States and the Soviet Union were vying for control of nuclear strategic forces.

The Party's crushing blow to the military was delivered on May 1, 1969, during the May Day festivities. Traditionally, May Day in the Soviet Union is a gay, military-oriented holiday with impressive marching units, weapons displays and climaxed by a keynote speech by the Minister of Defense or a Marshal of the Soviet Union. But 1969 brought change: military parades became an occurrence of the past, Minister of Defense Grechko was in attendance as an observer while Brezhnev was called upon to deliver

the day's major address. It was clear, says Robert G. Wesson, that the Soviet leadership now wished to use the military, not to share power with them.<sup>2</sup> The military elite was indeed shaken and the data in all the tables (as noted in Table 5a) reflects continued demands for a greater role in policy and decision-making by the military specialists.

The literary elite data indicates this group recognizes the primacy of the Party in policy-making processes and, until the 1970s, in the decision-making arena as well. Table 3a shows a marked change in literary perceptions at the decision-making level that is best accounted for by noting important happenings at the turn of this decade. Harassment of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, undoubtedly the most renowned and outspoken of the Soviet literary dissenters, began in earnest with his ouster in November 1969 from the Russian Republic Writers' Union for continued negative portrayal of Soviet life coupled with failure to aid budding young writers. The following month a purge of 15 per cent of the dissidents from the same union brought a surge of letters from Soviet and foreign literary circles asking reconsideration for those expelled. Liberal writer Anatolii V. Kuznetsov, coeditor of Yunost, the youth-oriented magazine of the Soviet Writers' Union, could no longer stand the increased literary oppression and defected

to Great Britain in 1969 rather than return to face threats, prison terms or incarceration in an insane asylum. Rumor of A. T. Tvardovsky's impending removal as editor of Novy Mir became fact in February, 1970. To the end Tvardovsky stood for quality publications even if they were critical of Soviet life or CPSU leadership. His successor, the conservative V. A. Kosolapov, was appointed after close scrutiny by Party apparatchiki to insure less literary opposition from the journal.

Conceivably, the great drop in perceptions of decision-making by the literary from 1970 to 1971 (3.6 to 2.2) stems from the awarding of the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to Solzhenitsyn. After first graciously accepting the award and stating his intention to travel abroad for the ceremonies, Solzhenitsyn finally yielded to Party demands and in December 1970 he refused the honor. The reaction was so great and prolonged throughout the Soviet Union that KGB officials were instructed to destroy all underground publications (samizdat) and deal harshly with any dissenters. The Chronicle of Current Events, a major samizdat weekly, was put out of operation and literary circles were closely monitored in early 1971.

Before leaving the literary elite, one should note that its decision-making perceptions remain quite ideological (Table 3a shows 2.5 for All Years; lower than the

Party's 2.7) yet their value scores (who should make decisions) are the highest among all elites during the 1970's (Table 4b). The indication is that Party oppression continues to be extremely strong but the intellectuals are still pressing, in fact demanding, greater freedom to write and to publish.

Of all the specialist elites examined, the legal profession shows the least fluctuation of scores. Legal elite values toward participation in the policy-making process remain constant from 1968 to 1973 (Table 2b) and their values toward decision-making yield only an 8 per cent rise (Table 4b). The relative calm found in legal circles is not unexpected since "one of the basic characteristics of the Soviet view of law is to regard it as an instrument of the state and as an executor of state policies. . . Law is to further state interests."<sup>3</sup> The CPSU administers justice in the Soviet Union by maintaining close control of the judges, courts, and procuracy. Limited tenure rights insures that the judiciary will remain dependent upon the Party and will function as directed by the Party, the Ministry of Justice or the Supreme Soviet. This is not to say that the legal elite has been docile and undemanding, for its combined participatory score of 3.4 for All Years (Table 5a) places it well within the instrumental range, (trailing only the

military) where demands for greater participation are voiced.

After grouping the elites together to find All Elite Grand Mean Scores, Lodge found that elite participatory attitudes show a marked increase over time, reaching the instrumental level in 1959 and holding there until 1965.<sup>4</sup> Since this grouping was also done in the present thesis (Table 5a) a plot of the All Elite data from both studies can be placed on the ideological-instrumental continuum to portray trends. Figure 2 graphically shows the conformity of the two sets of data.




Figure 2. Grand Mean Scores on the Ideological-Instrumental Continuum.

Lodge's data shows increasing scores from 1952 to 1959 followed by a slight drop (3.1 back to 3.0) in 1961 and 1963 and a recovery (to 3.1 again) in the final year of his study, 1965. The data from the thesis interlock with Lodge's data and then fixate at 3.1 for the last five years.

While conducting the research and coding thousands of paragraphs for this thesis, three data outcomes appeared as probable. First, recognizing the long tradition of Party domination in Soviet society, it was felt that a continuing upward rise of All Elite scores into the high instrumental range could not be expected. A people who have been living under Communist rule for over fifty years cannot suddenly rebel against the Party and assume control of policy and decision-making. Second, the scores could have been incomprehensibly strewn about the continuum giving hint of neither trend nor tendency. Such results would have created misgivings and dismay with data interpretation being virtually denied. Fortunately, this result failed to materialize. Third, a reversal of the trend found by Lodge was thought to be a distinct possibility. With Party-military conflict making headlines, and with the daily commentary on literary dissenters and the government's oppression of the Jews, one could foresee a strengthening of Party dominance coupled with much stricter controls of the elites and elite articulations.

Comparing the thesis data to Lodge's resulted in a totally unexpected, yet most welcome result--near perfect correspondence of the two studies. Apparently, the Party appartchiki have yielded maximum ground to the specialist elites, with the elites recognizing that achieving joint Party-specialist elite participation (3.0 on the continuum) is, in fact, goal attainment.

## CONCLUSIONS

It appears that interest groups in the Soviet Union, especially those representing technical experts and specialists, are playing an increasing role in developing modern Soviet society. Relaxation of tensions with the West and the need for a strong defense posture, coupled with firm internal security measures, brought about a dramatic change in Politburo membership on April 27, 1973. Admitted to the ultimate directing body in the Soviet Union were Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko, KGB leader Y. V. Andropov, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. The Politburo thus has brought within its ranks representatives of elite groups which have been clamoring to affect and implement policy. One should decide whether or not this coopting into the Politburo removes the members from specialist elite status and transforms them into Party loyalists, or if they remain elite spokesmen, protecting the welfare of their former associates?<sup>1</sup>

Unquestionably, states Wesson, the most valuable outsiders today are the skilled specialists and technical experts. He goes on to show by analogy how the Party-specialist relationship exists. The affiliation is much like that between a home-builder and his architect. The builder selects the professional, sets the specifications

and heeds, or disregards the recommendations. Because he wants a proper home, the builder must necessarily let sufficient decision-making rest with the expert. Also, the builder knows that the architect will work better if treated with respect even though all the advice is not fully accepted.<sup>2</sup> Supporting and amplifying Wesson's statements, Wolfe feels that the top Party leadership, due to the limited time involved in reaching certain important decisions, cannot master all the complexities and necessarily turns to the specialists for information and judgment. The specialists, having their own vested interests, aims and ambitions, use the opportunity to structure the issue so that policy decisions are more favorably weighted in their direction.<sup>3</sup>

What this study reveals is a balancing between Party apparatchiki and specialist elite. The data indicates that the Party does not plan to give up its strong hold in the policy-making arena and the elites have not increasingly fought for additional participation in this sphere. However, at the local or implementation level the specialist elites and the Party apparatchiki agrees that more specialist participation is in order (Table 3b). Brezhnev, in his drive to consolidate power, has increasingly sought decision-making assistance from the specialists by admitting them to the Party hierarchy or soliciting specific advice.

This is not to say that the ambivalence surrounding study of elite groups in the Soviet Union has been cleared but, unlike Gripp, who sees Soviet interest groups as embryonic, this writer places them in the developing or articulative stage where pressure is brought to bear on leading policy-makers. The ideological model of Soviet society is no longer applicable. The Party and specialist elites have reached the point of interdependence. New models of Soviet politics, incorporating specialist elite participation, are obviously needed for the myth that the Soviet system is a monolith has been shattered.<sup>4</sup> The future holds great hope for increasing importance of interest groups in Soviet politics.

## NOTES

### INTRODUCTION

1. Milton Lodge, "'Groupism' in the Post-Stalin Period," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (August, 1968), p. 330.
2. Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968).
3. The data for the study was collected at the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, during 1965-66 and published in "Groupism," "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes," and Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969). Additionally, the material has been reprinted in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.'s Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1971) and presented at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, April 27-29, 1967 and at the 1968 Midwest Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Wayne State University, Detroit, March 28-30, 1968. See Fleron's Communist Studies, Roman Kolkowicz's The Soviet Military and Communist Party (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Thomas W. Wolfe's Soviet Policy-Making (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., February 1970) for commentary on Lodge's studies.
4. The idea of an elite or interest group in the Soviet Union has both supporters and challengers. The single most comprehensive study of this concept, edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971) has not answered all the questions raised nor eliminated conceptual ambiguities in the term "interest group."
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1964).

6. Robert Angell, "Social Values of Soviet and American Elites," Vera S. Dunham, "Insights from Soviet Literature," and J. David Singer, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII (December, 1964) pp. 330-491.
7. The six Soviet elites in question are the military, scientific, cultural, labor management, Party apparatchiki, and economic.
8. H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII (April, 1966), p. 436 and H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 3.
9. Skilling, "Interest Groups," pp. 441-2.
10. Ibid., pp. 448-9.
11. Ibid., p. 450.
12. Ibid., p. 451.
13. Michael Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, translated by Helen Katel (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p. 538.
14. Kurt London, ed., The Soviet Union: A Half-Century of Communism (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), Thomas A. Wolfe, Policymaking in the Soviet Union: A Statement with Supplementary Comments (Washington, D.C.: Rand Corp., June, 1969), and Mark W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Pegasus, 1970).
15. Schwartz and Keech, "Group Influence," p. 840.
16. Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, p. 196.
17. Schwartz and Keech, "Group Influence," p. 850.
18. Ibid.
19. London, A Half-Century of Communism, p. 138.

20. Hopkins, Mass Media, p. 30.
21. Ibid., p. 45.
22. Wolfe, Policymaking in the Soviet Union, p. 12.
23. Fleron, Communist Studies, p. 28.
24. Fleron, Communist Studies and Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
25. Derek J. Waller's "Elite Analysis and Communist Systems: An Overview," and Robert E. Blackwell, Jr.'s "The Relationship Between Social Background Characteristics, Career Specialization, Political Attitudes, and Political Behavior Among Soviet Elites: A Research Design" are the most recent attempts at analyzing Soviet elite attitudes and actions. Unfortunately, neither study has progressed beyond the stage of papers presented at professional meetings, nor is there any indication that data has been gathered to test the research hypotheses formulated in the papers.
26. Henry W. Morton, "The Structure of Decision-Making in the USSR: A Comparative Introduction," in Soviet Policy-Making--Studies of Communism in Transition, ed. by Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1967), p. 12.
27. Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education," World Politics, XXIII (October, 1969), p. 30.
28. Ibid., p. 31.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
31. Abraham Rothberg, The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953-1970 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972) and John Dornberg, The New Tsars: Russia Under Stalin's Heirs (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972).
32. The groups of dissidents and elites delineated in The Heirs of Stalin include: the literary (Brodsky, Daniel, Solzhenitsyn); the political (Grigorenko, Amalrik); and the economic or scientific (Sakharov, Medvedev).

33. Custine, Astolphe L. L., Marquis De, Journey for Our Time: Selections from the Journals of Marquis de Custine, edited and translated from the French by Phyllis Penn Kohler, Introduction by Walter Biddell Smith. (New York: Pellegrine and Cudahy, 1951).
34. Richard C. Gripp, The Political System of Communism (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company), p. 1.
35. Ibid., p. 134.
36. Ibid., p. 138.

#### RESEARCH METHODS

1. Richard W. Budd and Robert K. North, An Introduction to Content Analysis (Iowa City, Iowa: School of Journalism Publications, 1963), p. 10.
2. Perhaps the best, concise definition of content analysis is found in Bernard Berelson's Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 18, "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."
3. Ibid., p. 147.
4. Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, Part I.
5. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 2.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. As Lodge cautioned his readers at this point, all data in the study is meant to reflect elite articulated attitudes, not political behavior. We are dealing solely with attitudinal changes, changes in Soviet elite perspectives and values. Assumed, of course, is a positive correlation between articulated attitudes and political behavior.

8. Throughout Lodge's study and this thesis, each of the participatory categories will be scaled as follows:
  - 1.0 Party participation solely
  - 2.0 Party participation primarily
  - 3.0 Joint party-specialist elite participation
  - 4.0 Specialist participation primarily
  - 5.0 Specialist participation solely
9. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
11. Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., in "Note on the Explication of the Concept 'Elite' in the Study of Soviet Politics," Canadian Slavic Studies, II (Spring, 1968), pp. 111-15, states that "elite" is an elusive and ill-defined concept in behavior-function terms, (e.g., to wield power, to exert influence), and there are advantages to making the definition in positional terms (as is being done in this thesis and Lodge's work). By defining "elites" in positional terms, power, influence, and decision-making then become linked with elite status by means of empirical relations, rather than by definition.
12. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 5.
13. Berelson, Content Analysis, p. 135, p. 171.
14. Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, eds., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Dryden Press, 1953), p. 435.
15. Berelson, Content Analysis, pp. 182-3. The three suggested sampling methods in content analysis are (1) random, (2) rotated, and (3) stratified.
16. Festinger and Katz, Research Methods, p. 440.
17. Reliability, say Berelson, Content Analysis, pp. 171-2 and Budd and Thorp, Content Analysis, p. 26, means that every investigator, applying the same techniques to the same material, will obtain substantially the same results. Additionally, there should be consistency through time--results should be the same, independent of the coding time-span.
18. Budd and Thorp, Content Analysis, p. 26.

ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES

1. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 12, Table 2.1.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. The highest scores on the "who should participate" table (Table 2a) for Party, Military, and Literary elite are found in 1973. Several periodicals of January, 1974, were analyzed out of professional curiosity and the scores, although not fully tabulated, indicate that 1974 may find even more specialist elite pressure for a greater voice in policy-making.
5. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 15. As Lodge notes, policy-making refers to resolutions which affect either a constituent republic or the totality of the USSR, while decision-making refers to decisions affecting a region, city, kolkhoz or factory.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 18.
9. Ibid., p. 22.
10. Ibid.

FINDINGS

1. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, Table 2.3, p. 14 and Table 2.8, p. 17.
2. Robert G. Wesson, The Soviet Russian State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), p. 303.
3. John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), p. 241.
4. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 27 and Table 2.14 Elite Attitudes Toward Participation: All Categories Combined 1952-1965.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. Wesson, in The Soviet Russian State, p. 185, contends the Party strives to keep decision-making for itself by bringing into its higher ranks experts totally dedicated to Party purposes. On the other hand, Wolfe, in Soviet Policy-Making, p. 9, argues that the Politburo, recognizing the need for skilled and technical advice, today seeks specialists among its members to present expert testimony to the full body, even if the testimony interest oriented.
2. Wesson, The Soviet Russian State, p. 185.
3. Wolfe, Policymaking in the Soviet Union, p. 3.
4. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes, p. 115.

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