

Veto Players and Dispute Settlement

by

Aziz Rahman Popal, B.A

Thesis

In

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Dr. Toby J. Rider
Chair of Committee

Dr. David Lektzian

Dr. Dennis Patterson

Peggy Gordon Miller
Dean of the Graduate School

August, 2012

Copyright 2012, Aziz Popal

Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
List of Tables	iv
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Argument	2
Findings of the paper	4
The Existing Literature on Negotiated Settlements.....	8
Chapter Two: Theory	11
Veto Players	15
Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems	15
Unitary vs. Federal Systems.....	15
Veto Players in Negotiated Settlements.....	15
Negative Effects Theory	16
Positive Effects Theory.....	18
Chapter Three: Quantitative Analysis	22
Dataset.....	22
Statistical Model	27
Veto Players Effect.....	28
Chapter Four: Conclusion	35
Findings.....	36
Implications for International Relations	38
References	40
Bibliography	42

Abstract

This thesis explains why some dyads are more successful in resolving their disputes through negotiated settlements than other disputing dyads. The answer provided by this thesis is that the number of veto players directly affects the likelihood of the dyads reaching a negotiated settlement. Initially the paper proceeds by presenting two contradicting arguments (positive and negative effects theories) of the effects of domestic veto players on the negotiated settlements; and then later on the two hypotheses derived from both of these comparative arguments are tested in the statistical model. After the statistical tests of both the arguments, I find support for the positive effects theory indicating that dyads with higher number of veto players are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement than otherwise. Support for the positive effect theory of veto players is a valuable finding which contradicts the traditional view held by the existing literature about their negative effects on negotiations. The theory is tested in a logit model with the data from the MID dataset ranging from 1816 till 2001. There are 2670 dyadic disputes in the dataset compiled for this study.

List of Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Dataset	23
Table 2: Logit Model of Negotiated Settlement's Success	29
Table 3: Predicted Probability of Negotiated Settlements	33

Chapter One

Introduction

Disputes and conflicts between states have been an integral part of the international systems for as long as the system itself. But one cannot deny the fact that, sooner or later, most of these disputes have ended. The method employed in ending those disputes have varied a great deal depending on the nature of dispute or the disputing parties, for example some have ended through negotiations while other disputes were taken to the battleground and resolved through war. Of all the disputes occurred between dyads within the past two centuries, only 416 (16%) have ended with a negotiated settlements; whereas the rest have either accelerated to war or remained in a stalemate. So what really explains the success/failure of states' ability to resolve disputes through negotiated settlements? This is a question which is important to the better handling and resolution of disputes. That is this is the basic theme of my thesis and will try to present an answer to this question in the coming sections of this paper.

Why Negotiated Settlements?

Understanding the determinants of successful negotiations – which result in a negotiated settlement - is important for two reasons: Negotiation is not only the first step in handling international disputes but it is also the most used method than all the other

methods i.e. mediation and arbitration combined (Merrills, 2011). States prefer negotiation over other methods of conflict resolution due to its greater advantages and fewer risks (Jackson, 2000). That is why, if disputes are to be settled and their escalation into wars is to be prevented then the first step in their resolution, namely negotiation, needs to be thoroughly understood in order to resolve the conflict at its inception.

Even when war breaks out between states, negotiation is not displaced but, as the ripeness literature points out, it waits for the ripe time to replay its role in helping the dyads reach a settlement. Frazier and Goeretz find in their work that almost 35 percent of the war disputes end with negotiated settlements (Merrills, 2011; Frazier & Goeretz, 2002). Therefore, a detailed account of the determinants of the success and failure of negotiations does not only help in preventing conflict escalation into wars; but it also serves as an effective conflict resolution tool once war breaks out between dyads.

The Argument:

Putnam's description of international negotiations as a two level game serves as a blueprint for this thesis. His argument that anything agreed upon between state leaders on international level has to be acceptable to the domestic groups - which seek to maximize its interests – in order for the agreement to be successfully implemented is at the heart of my work (Putnam, 1988). When viewed in this context, it is evident that the success of negotiations shows equal dependency on agreement between states on international level as well as the agreement between these domestic groups on

national level. To put it in other terms, the domestic entities are provided with some sort of veto power over the diplomatic outcomes of interstate negotiations. Tsebelis in his book has rightly termed all these domestic individuals and collective actors - whose approval for changing the status quo is required - as “veto players” (Tsebelis, 2002). Now in the coming paragraphs of this section we try to draw a link between these two arguments – Tsebelis’s “veto player” and Putnam’s “two level negotiations”. We do so by theorizing the effects of Tsebelis’s veto players on Putnam’s two level negotiation framework.

One point is clear through Putnam’s theory that veto players do have a substantial role in the negotiation process, but whether this role is positive or negative is something that this paper attempts to test. According to both Putnam and Tsebelis, generally the role of the domestic players is a negative one in the process of dispute settlement; that is why we term this school of thought as “negative effects”. According to them the domestic pressure, generated and escalated by veto players, is positively related to the number of veto players in the domestic arena. Which means that the higher the number of veto players, the tougher to find the equilibrium between their divergent preferences for a leader – on which all of them can unanimously agree; or in other words the addition of a veto player shrinks the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002). So when the leader agrees on a deal in the international level and brings the deal home for ratification, he is going to have a tougher time in getting his desired deal ratified than a leader coming from a fewer restriction. It is further argued that the effects of these veto players do not stop at this level, but rather extends to the level 1 of the negotiation

processes when leaders meet for resolving the dispute (Putnam, 1988). Since a leader coming from a multi-veto player country has a domestic pressure only agreeing to a limited set of outcomes – that is why the degree of concession that this leader agrees to offer during negotiations is going to be limited than otherwise. This brings a situation of stalemate in negotiations and in extreme cases fails the process completely. So overall a conclusion can be made that countries with more veto players are less likely to reach a negotiated settlement to their dispute than otherwise.

While the “negative effects” argument has remained the dominant one, some signs of possible positive effects of the veto players can also be found in the literature – but those are very rare compare to the negative ones. The positive effects theory presented in this paper in detail is developed by taking under scrutiny the two main pillar-arguments of the negative effects theory. First, the negative effects theory argues that the existence of more veto players shrinks the winset of the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002). The status quo in case of this paper is the dispute. In negative effects theory, high number of veto players are automatically translated into more trouble and hindrances in ways of reaching a deal on the domestic level. Whereas in most cases high number of veto players can mean more options and opportunities for the leader to form a coalition in order to get the deal through (Tsebelis, 2002). For example, suppose in country A there is a multiple party system where there are four political parties and all four of them have differences with the ruling party in the recent deal that has been negotiated with the other country. It means there are four veto players which can block the deal in the legislature and fail the negotiation process. As all of them have different preferences and suggestion to be

included in the final draft of the deal, so the government can actually choose any two of them in order to secure a clear majority in the legislature and get the deal through. All of a sudden the four parties translate into four choices in the hands of the government which can choose from the one which are closer to their ideological and political spectrum. Now, if country A was a two party system country and one of the party was in the government while the other a majority in the legislature, then the government had only one option at its desk which was to give in to the demands of the opposition party in order to get the deal through- something most of ruling parties are reluctant to do as it would provide the opposition with a momentum in the elections.

Second main argument of the negative effects theory is that leaders with more veto players domestically have a limited range of concession on the negotiation table at level 1 which sometimes can cause the parties to halt the negotiation process entirely. A closer look to this point demonstrates that this is trying to explain the cause and effect relation between the two stages of negotiations in dispute settlement; where the agreement of domestic players on level-I determines the failure/success of reaching a negotiated settlement. That is why in the positive effects theory this cause and effect relation is reversed by arguing that successful deals reached on Level-II by the state leaders causes success or failure in the ratification of the deal on domestic level. What this reversion of cause and effect relation of the negative effects theory has done is that it has shifted the key to reaching a successful negotiated settlement to disputes from domestic players (Level-1) to International ones (Level-II) in the two level negotiation process in the following manner: States vary in terms of their levels and scores of

domestic pressures (veto players) which affects their bargaining and concession window accordingly. When leaders from two different disputing countries meet on the Level-1 negotiation and try to negotiate a settlement to their dispute with one of them having a comparably higher veto score than the other one; the country with higher veto score is going to compel the other country, by threats of stalemate, to concede more as it has a lower domestic pressure and a bigger concession window. This is important because if both of these countries had lower veto player scores, none of them would have been ready to give in and each would have asked the other to concede more which would more likely cause a stalemate and failure of reaching a settlement to the dispute. The domestic cost of conceding to a higher veto player nation are lower than otherwise because the tight domestic pressure on the opposing party can be used as a valid explanation to explain the concession to its own cabinet, legislature, and other domestic entities without which the settlements could end up in a stalemate.

In this section both the existing arguments about the role of veto players “negative effects” and “positive effects” have been presented. The positive effect provides a fresh angle for understanding the role of domestic institutions (veto players) in the dispute settlement and negotiation process.

I develop the logic of both these approaches in the theory section of this paper and later on put them both to statistical test at the data section and report the results.

Existing Literature on Negotiated Settlements

As members of a unique international system without an effective international government, states often disagree on issues of their interest. These disagreements occur because both of the parties place a certain claim over an issue which sometimes is tangible and other times not (Hensel & Sara, 2006). Once the dispute arises it can have various outcomes depending on which one of the following three methods is employed by the disputing parties: 1) unilateral 2) bilateral 3) seek third party's help (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996). Unilateral method (war or abundance) and the third party's help (mediation) is out of the scope of this paper; thus we focus on the bilateral method of dispute handling which is negotiation.

In case of disputes, the first step taken by states is getting into negotiations because of its proven results in conflict management and most notably no cost attached to it. Probably that is why negotiation is the most employed technique of conflict management than all the other methods combined (Merrills, 1991). Successful negotiations results in a compromise or settlement over the issue at dispute and failed negotiations can lead to violent consequences of war, destruction, or in some cases a complete deadlock. Thus, the success and failure of negotiation can actually determine the fate of the dispute and how the dispute is going to end, which is probably why most of the recent literature in the conflict management has been focused on investigating the factors responsible for the success/failure of negotiations.

Existing literature on the determinants of success of conflict management fall into two broad categories: the first category has focused on the nature of dispute and the second category focuses on the nature of states – or the parties in conflict – as a major determinant of the success of conflict management.

The debate about how much the success of dispute settlement depends on the characteristics of the dispute and the characteristic of the disputing parties has a long history in the conflict management literature. Works that have articulated the idea of the importance of the nature of dispute have identified issue salience, severity or fatality level, and number of parties involved as the key determinants for the success of dispute resolution (Frazier & Goertz, 2002; Dixon, 2002; Bercovitch & Langely, 1993; Kleiboer, 1996; Hensel 1996; Vasquez 1993; frei, 1976; Frazier & Goertz, 2002; Maoz, 1982). This pool of conflict management literature argues that whether a dispute is going to end in a settlement or it escalates to war highly depends on the type of the dispute itself. Whereas a large portion of the literature plays down the role of nature of dispute in the success/failure of dispute settlement, but rather focuses on the characteristics of the disputing parties as the major determinant in this process. The heart of the literature in this category has identified regime type and domestic institutions of the disputing parties as the major determinants of successful dispute settlement (Dixon, 2002; Huth & Allee, 1996; De Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Putnam, 1988). Authors like Bueno de Mesquita, Dixon, Huth& Allee, to name a few, have been the proponents of regime-type analysis of conflicts and disputes. They have explained how democratic values, institutions, and the audience cost puts democracy in a favorable position compared to non democracies for

peaceful solutions to disputes, if it arises at all. That being said, some of the proponents and critics of this democratic peace literature have now articulated a new finding by arguing that even countries with similar regime type are not identical in their dispute behavior (Huth & Allee, 2002; Elman, 2000; Auerswald, 1999); which means there are other variables that are playing a role in the success or failure of negotiations.

The fact that there is a visible variation in the dispute behavior of the countries with similar regime type has led to the third pool of literature which takes the regime-type analysis a step further by focusing on the effects of domestic institutions and entities such as political parties, legislatures, etc on the negotiations (Huth & Allee, 2002; Elman, 2000; Auerswald, 1999). Building on the work of Putnam these scholars are trying to see how they can actually capture this variance that authors have claimed to exist within countries of similar regime at dispute. The most notable work in this area which has tried to capture the effects of one of these domestic institutions, namely domestic opposition political parties, on state's behavior on international level is the work of Huth & Allee (Huth & Allee, 2002). Other than that no significant step has been taken to further investigate this crucial area mainly because of the lack of data and measures on each of the domestic institutions. In this paper we have tried to take the literature a step further and fill this gap by taking a collective measure of all of these domestic institutions and developing a collective variable of "veto players". With the help of Tsebelis's work, this study has brought together all these domestic factors that, in one way or the other, affect states' dispute behavior under one variable (veto players). Measuring the effects of these determinants under one variable is important because in accordance with the political

system and political culture of the country these determinants either gain or lose leverage in affecting dispute settlement – a point explained in detail by Tsebelis in his book (Tsebelis, 2002). So a domestic determinant considered to be a key behind the behavior of one country in a dispute might be completely less significant in another country. For example, political parties play a major role in a democratic country's behavior while in a dictatorship they may not have a significant role and that same role might be played by a council of minister or the legislature. That is why weighing their effects collectively helps in predicting the dispute behavior of a country more accurately than otherwise.

Understanding the collective effects of all these domestic institutions will not only add a great deal to understanding the determinants of success of dispute settlement and negotiation but will also reiterate the long standing claim of Putnam's linkage of domestic factors to the international processes.

Chapter Two

Theory

Rational states should agree to any deal falling in their bargaining range and thus avoid escalating dispute to its violent stages of war (Fearon, 1995). The puzzle is that since all states would prefer deals falling in their bargaining range than why aren't we seeing more successful negotiations than wars? Of course the answer points to different factors that limit states' ability to successfully end disputes through negotiations and avoid stalemates. One of the most predominant theories in explaining this puzzle has been the democratic peace literature which has credited democratic values, institutions, and higher audience costs in democracy as the soul explanation of why certain disputes end in settlements and others don't. But we find that of all the disputes happened between democratic dyads only 16% have had a negotiated settlement and the rest have either remained in stalemate or reached its severe stages of conflict. These observations and recent studies have given rise to a need for a mechanism within democratic peace literature which can explain this variance of negotiated settlement success within dyads of similar regime type.

Therefore, it is important to reiterate that I don't disapprove the work that has been done so far in understanding the subject, but rather seek to advance one huge assumption of the democratic peace literature which is that countries with similar regime type have a similar dispute resolution behavior. The veto player approach that I develop in this chapter fits into the larger pool of the negotiation literature. But before proceeding

to the other part of the theory, it is important to note some points about the term veto player and how is it going to be used in this thesis and also its different kinds.

Veto Players:

One point that is most commonly mistaken about veto player is that they are viewed as if they only refer to domestic institutions, but it is not correct and veto players, as Tsebelis puts it, may be institutional or partisan in nature i.e. opposition party, referendum, lower house, upper house ...etc. The second point worth mentioning is that the number of veto players is not fixed in a system; we cannot generalize that all federal parliamentary democracies are going to have equal veto players. It is true that most federal parliamentary democracies are going to have almost similar institutional characteristics, but it is the internal party composition of these institutions and their alignment that increases or decreases the number of veto players accordingly. Countries vary in terms of their partisan veto players in presidential and parliamentary while federal and unitary systems vary in terms of their institutional veto players. In certain states it is easier to identify the number of veto players especially when they are institutional; for example in United Kingdom the house of common is the effective institutional veto player and is most often controlled by the party in power, so the partisan veto players play a lesser role than in systems where bicameral legislature exists and the majorities in the legislature requires a coalition between small parties then the number of veto player will be higher in these systems.

Therefore, in an attempt to illustrate how different political systems have different number and kinds of veto players we are going to have a short look at the number veto players in different political systems:

i. Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems:

Presidential systems are marked by separation of power between all three forces – executive, legislature, and judiciary; with the executive and legislature branch having a fixed electoral mandate of its own (Stepan & Skach, 1993). And recent literature has also argued that presidential systems tend to have fewer political parties as well as limited cohesiveness between these parties than parliamentary systems (Diermeier, 1998; Stepan & Skach, 1993). Fewer political parties and the lack limited cohesiveness among those parties both indicate that there are fewer veto players in presidential systems than otherwise. Mainly because few number of parties can be interpreted as fewer partisan veto players and the fact that they are not highly cohesive means they easily can shift their stand on a certain issue which once again makes the veto players number less in this system. Whereas on the other hand parliamentary systems are marked by the dependency of power between the legislature and executive where the leader's power should be supported by a majority in the legislature and is conditional on a vote of no confidence (Stepan & Skach, 1993). Unlike presidential system, the number of parties is believed to be higher in parliamentary systems and they are believed to be more cohesive in nature (Diermeier, 1998; Stepan & Stach, 1993). Which means it can be inferred that the number of partisan veto players is going to be higher in parliamentary systems compared to presidential systems.

ii. Unitary vs. Federal Systems:

One of the institutional characteristics associated with federal governments by Tsebelis in his veto player analysis, even though not a sufficient condition is the existence of a bicameral legislature. The existence of a bicameral legislature is justified partly by arguing that the composition of one house should be such that it has equal representation from all the constituent units of the federation which enjoys more autonomy than the constituent units in unitary systems. Bicameral legislature means the existence of two chambers of legislature in a system where one of the chambers has effective veto power over the legislation of the other, and for any legislation to be passed; it has to be acceptable to the majorities of both houses. Since federalism adds one more legislative chamber which, as an institution, adds an extra veto player in the system irrespective of its party composition; that is why, *ceteris paribus*, there are going to be more veto players in a federal system than unitary systems. Another institutional veto player that is peculiar to federal system is a strongly independent judiciary but that does not have any significant effect in the ratification process of negotiated deals since it mostly prevails in constitutional matters and disputes between federal and state governments. But never the less it increases the number of veto players than otherwise. On the other hand unitary systems have lower institutional barriers because there is one legislative chamber. So, Securing majority in the one and only chamber will guarantee the leader a clear success in the ratification process.

Veto players in Negotiated Settlements:

Disputes begin when two states have a disagreement over a certain, tangible or intangible, issue and over which both the parties have some claim. Once the dispute begins both countries try to achieve their ideal policy with less costs and concessions. The first tool that they imply in achieving their desired policy – and according to literature the most used tool – is negotiation. As stated earlier both states have an ideal policy and strive to get closer to that policy as much as possible. They meet several times and bargain for securing the maximum benefits of the deal; sometimes they succeed in agreeing on a deal but other times they don't and dispute gets into a stalemate position.

As Putnam has argued that negotiation is a two level game, which is why the success of the negotiation depends on the domestic structure of each country as much as it does on the bargaining skills of the leader at the negotiation table. These domestic structures and actors – whose agreement is necessary for any negotiated settlement to take effect-, are hereafter referred to as “veto players”. Since it is clear that these veto players play a crucial role in the negotiation process, so now whether this role is negative or positive is also important to know. Some scholars (including Putnam and Tsebelis) argue that these veto players harm the process of negotiation at both levels and has a negative effect on the odds of reaching a negotiated settlement. While a few other scholars (This thesis being the major one) have argued that veto players can also have positive effects which are largely ignored by the literature. The arguments of both of these approaches are presented in details under separate headings in the following sections.

Negative Effects Theory:

As stated earlier the proponents of this theory believe that domestic veto players harms the process of reaching negotiated settlement – in case of a dispute between two countries. According to them higher number of veto players affects the negotiation process at both levels- namely international and domestic. On international level they do so by limiting the leaders' window of concession. When the leader that comes from a higher veto player country appears at the negotiation table with the other country he feels more reluctant to offer any concessions to the other country because his domestic veto players will only agree to certain deals and oppose will not ratify deals offering benefits to the other country. In other words as the number of veto players increases the pressure on leader also increases which makes him more conservative in terms of conceding to the other country on a certain issue. In case the country also has similar or even higher number of veto players that country will also feel hesitant in offering any concessions for the success of negotiation. This may stretch the negotiations longer, as none of the leaders are willing to change their stand, and may sometimes lead to stalemates/deadlocks.

On the domestic level the negative effects of higher veto players are explained in way that as the number of veto players increases it becomes tougher for the leader to find a deal which can please all of them or meet all of their preferences. In other terms, More veto players means more divergent preferences which would be tougher to incorporate them all into the deal (Cunningham, 2006). For example, a unicameral government which has a multiparty system in place and the seats of the legislature are proportionally divided

between all the parties in such a way that no party hold a majority then in this situation the number of partisan veto players increases and makes it tougher for government to draft a deal which can please all these parties. Every party will be striving to agree to a deal which will be closer to their ideal point.

This way from the above discussion of the negative effects of the veto players we draw our first hypothesis about the effects of veto players on negotiated settlements:

H₁: The higher the number of veto players, the less likely it is that dyads will reach a negotiated settlement in a dispute.

We will put the hypothesis to statistical test in the next section, but prior that we will discuss the alternate argument about the effects of veto players – the positive effects theory.

The Positive Effects Theory:

The positive effects theory of veto players argues that contrary to the negative theory higher number of veto players actually increases the odds of reaching a negotiated settlement in case of a dispute. This theory argues that higher number of veto players actually serve as catalyst in the process of negotiation success between states. It is important to note that this positive theory of veto players is a novel angle provided in details by this thesis which has hardly been formally theorized in the existing literature. To illustrate the positive effects theory further we know that the negative veto player analysis states that the Level-II players (domestic veto players) cause the negotiation on the Level-I to succeed or fail because the leader finally comes to the domestic level to get his deal ratified. But if we reverse the table and argue that the successful deals reached on Level-II by the state leaders itself can cause success or failure in the ratification of the deal on domestic level. Relaxing this assumption shifts the key to reaching a successful negotiated settlement to disputes from domestic players (Level-I) to International ones (Level-II) in the two level negotiation process in the following manner: States vary in terms of their levels and scores of domestic pressures (veto players) which affects their bargaining and concession window accordingly. When leaders from two different disputing countries meet on the Level-I negotiation and try to negotiate a settlement to their dispute with one of them having a comparably higher veto score than the other one; the country with higher veto score is going to compel the other country, by threats of stalemate, to concede more as it has a lower domestic pressure and a bigger concession window. This is important because if both of these countries had lower veto player

scores, none of them neither been ready to give in because countries always strive get the higher share of pie, nor would any of them be able to compel the other by saying that it has higher veto players domestically which if not considered may fail the negotiations completely. The domestic cost of conceding to a higher veto player nation are lower than otherwise because the tight domestic pressure on the opposing party can be used as a valid explanation to explain the concession to its own cabinet, legislature, and other domestic entities without which the settlements could end up in a stalemate. One of the possible explanations for this contradictory results might be that not all veto players are similar in their effects on the negotiated settlement i.e. institutional veto players may have a different weight in their impact than partisan veto players. Institutional veto players are quite often constant in their nature while partisan veto players are more dynamic which makes them prone to having both positive and negative effects. I will continue to lay down some basic logic of why the positive impacts of veto players may actually make sense and how they might help the negotiation process in both domestic and international level in the remaining section of this chapter.

Another argument about why veto players may actually have a positive impact on negotiated settlement is that these domestic veto players make war and other extreme steps politically more costly for a leader. The existence of a strong domestic pressure compels the leader to think twice before opting for any violent step since the political costs and pressure generated by the strong veto players will be very high. Thus they will avoid the high political cost attached to the severe steps of war (Huth & Allee, 2002: 762). A leader's willingness to avoid war will serve as a great advantage for the

negotiation process because the commitment to reaching a peaceful solution to the dispute increases when both parties fear a stalemate or severe steps of war. Therefore, one of the explanations why our model has presented a positive relation between veto players and negotiated settlements is that veto players do limit leaders' choice in considering war as the first means of solution to the dispute and thereby increasing the likelihood of dispute being solved through negotiations.

Another reason behind how these veto players may have a positive impact on a negotiated outcome of a dispute is the one briefly presented by Tsebelis too in his book. In a higher veto player country the higher number of veto players must not always be translated into more trouble for the leader because sometimes it can mean more options lying ahead of him which he can use to form his coalition in getting his deal through. In a situation when all the parties are opposed to the deal, but the leader needs a few of them to line on his side in order to get his deal ratified then the leader can make the deal look attractive enough to a few of these veto players and receive their support which is required for securing a majority; this automatically makes the other veto players inactive and they actually lose their veto power. Whereas in case of fewer veto players he has a limited choice to which he either has to submit or risk his deal being rejected by them. Tsebelis talks about this point in more details when he talks about minority governments; he argues that the party forming a minority government is located centrally among the many other parties, for this reason it can select among many different partners to approve its program (Tsebelis, 2002: 97). For example if there are five parties in the legislature whose agreement is required for ratifying the negotiated deal then if the leader can

secure support of any three of these parties it will be a victory for him as the other two will not be able to veto his deal. The existence of many parties actually enabled the leader to skip the more rigid parties and reach a deal easily with the small parties which have less opposition and can be easily pleased. But if there was a two party system and the opposition was one single party which has a strong opposition to the government then the leader did not have any other choice other than submitting to the will of that party and drafting the deal according to their pleasure. Most of the leaders will be reluctant to do this, as it would provide the opposition with a political leverage. The only way he can provide the opposition with their huge demands is that if he renegotiates the deal with the other country in order to have more concession. So even though there was only one veto player, it actually served as a major veto player in way of the leader than those two or more small parties (veto players).

The detailed account of the positive effects theory of veto players which serves as an alternate explanation to the negative theory leads us to the second hypothesis of our paper which is:

H₂: The higher the number of domestic veto players, the more likely it is that disputes between states will end in a negotiated settlement.

The second hypothesis in itself is a novel proposition which has never been theoretically structured and formally tested in the current literature. That is why we proceed to the next section in order to test both of the hypotheses presented in this segment of the paper and present the results.

Chapter Three

Quantitative Analysis

The discussion in the previous chapter led to two main yet contradicting hypotheses: which have argued for both positive and negative effects of veto players on negotiated settlements of disputes. In this chapter of the thesis I will be testing both of the above hypotheses. I will be first describing my dataset and the variables; next I will be presenting the results and discussing them in details.

Dataset:

I test the effects of veto players on negotiated settlements of all the disputes from 1816 to 2001 included in the MID dataset. The MID dataset defines dispute as “Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones et al. 1996: 163). I use the COW MID dyadic dataset because it is a more comprehensive dataset that covers all the disputes between states from the past two centuries with the outcome of the dispute stated as well. The following table presents the summary statistics of the entire dataset, let’s have a look at it first and then I will describe each of the variables in details:

Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Settlement	2670	0.155	0.362	0	1
Veto Player	2220	0.040	0.109	0	0.57
Duration	2670	45.020	40.630	0	184
Democracy	2097	0.076	0.265	0	1
Alliance	2633	0.180	0.384	0	1
Fatality	2363	0.188	0.391	0	1
Multiparty	2670	0.262	0.440	0	1
War	2670	0.047	0.212	0	1
Territory	22670	0.200	0.400	0	1

Dependent variable:

The outcome of the dispute, dependent variable in this thesis, is coded as 1 if there has been a negotiated settlement and it has been coded as zero in case the outcome has been something else other than negotiated settlement. Other outcomes other than negotiated settlement include cases when the dispute was escalated to war and as a result the outcome that ended the dispute was an imposed one. Another non negotiated outcome that has been included in the zero category is when both the parties have failed to reach

any agreement through negotiations and the dispute has ended in a stalemate. This variable has been developed from the COW MID dataset which has coded the outcome of each dispute in the similar fashion

Independent variable:

For my independent variable, veto players, I have used the Henisz's dataset which is the most comprehensive dataset available. It uses Tsebelis's definition and defines veto player as "individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo" (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). He has assigned the countries a score from zero to one with one being the highest number of veto players and zero indicating no veto players at all. Since the unit of analysis is dyadic dispute in my dataset that is why I have added the veto score of the dyad per dispute in that particular year and have created this veto player variable. In this variable zero indicates that both countries did not have any veto players at the time of dispute and as the score increases it directly shows that the collective veto players in both the countries have been increasing. Translating the score into numbers of veto players is a bit complicated as the Henisz's dataset has weighed all the institutions of a country through their parameters which cannot be translate into individual institution unit. Therefore, this score is taken from the dataset as has been provided. I will be estimating the model using the weak link specification because I want to see that as the lower veto player state's veto score increases how it affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. That is the best possible way to see the effect of

increase in the veto player score on the negotiated settlement because if methods like aggregation, average, and multiplication will actually make it harder to see which country witnessed the change as they provide aggregate score and aggregate scores can be misleading (Coyne, 2011).

Control variables:

Regime type:

This variable has been coded as a dichotomous variable with one indicating that both the dyads have a score of 6 or higher on the POLITY IV; and zero indicates that either one or both the dyads had a score lower than 6. This has been included because effects of regime type have been explained for long in the literature and it also has a relation to our key independent variable by affecting veto player numbers in a country where democracies are believed to have a higher veto score than autocracies

Duration:

This variable has been taken from the MID dataset which indicates the length of the dispute in days - from the start day till the end. It is used to control for the ripeness literature effect on the dependent variable which argues disputes are ripe for resolution at one time than at other times.

Territory:

The issue variable has been included to control for the difference in the effects of territorial disputes and non territorial disputes on the outcome of the dispute as suggested by the literature. It is coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating that the issue at stake was a territory and zero indicating non territorial disputes. The variable has been vastly coded like this in much of recent literature.

Fatality:

This control variable has also been coded as zero and one; where zero indicates that there was no fatality at the dispute and 1 indicates that the dispute involved fatality. This is important to control for as it indicates whether arms were used in the dispute or not. The dispute severity literature has linked the outcome of the disputes with the severity of the dispute which is measure through fatality. But there we only dichotomize the variable for the simplicity of analysis and control of any unknown effects it may have on our dependent variable.

War:

The war variable shows whether the dispute was a war dispute or a non-war dispute; it is also a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the dispute was a war dispute and zero otherwise. It is important because war disputes are different in their understanding and outcome than non-war disputes (Frazier & Goertz, 2002). They show

that negotiated settlements happen in only 15% of the disputes while the number is 35% for the war disputes.

Alliance:

The alliance variable is entered to control for the fact that countries with alliance may be able to reach negotiated settlements more often than non allied countries because they may have more established channels of communication. This variable is coded as 1 if the countries have any sort of alliance and zero if there is not alliance between them.

Multiparty Dispute:

The multiparty dichotomous variable is included to control for the fact that the nature of multi party disputes is different than two party dispute because in multiparty disputes building a consensus might be tougher in negotiation than otherwise. This variable is coded as 1 if the conflict is multiparty and zero if it is a two party conflict.

Statistical model:

I am using a logit model to estimate the probability of disputes being resolved through negotiated settlement in presence of veto players. The unit of analysis is a dyadic dispute identified by the COW dataset. I chose this model for my analysis because I have a binary dependent variable. I have used the probit model too but the overall results were

similar and it didn't make a contrasting difference so I decided to stick with the logit module. I also estimated a relogit model which also produced similar results.

Veto players Effect:

I have presented above the description of the dataset, model, variables and their measurement which I will use to test the two main hypotheses of this paper. I am testing for the effects of the veto players on negotiated settlements while controlling for all other variables that have been specified by the existing literature having an effect on negotiated settlements. Table 2 below in the next page presents the results of logistic regression between negotiated settlement and veto players while controlling for other variables. I have run their effects in three different models. The first model (model I) is run with a dataset including all the variables and cases; the second model (model II) represents the data results for only the cases where the dispute has been a non-war dispute; and the third model (model III) has been run only on cases consisting of war-disputes. The reason for running these three different models is to capture the difference that literature has claimed to exist in the outcome of war and non-war disputes (Frazier & Goertz, 2002).

The results presented in model 1 of the table 1 in the following page shows that there is a positive relation between veto players and the negotiated settlement of the dispute, and the relation is significant as well. This positive relation between the veto players and negotiated settlements supports the positive effects hypothesis (H_2) of this paper while rejects the negative effects hypothesis (H_1) that we presented in the theory

section. We have not found evidence in support of the prevalent view of the literature which claims that as the number of domestic veto players decreases the odds of having a negotiated settlement should also increase, but in table 2 the opposite of it is supported.

Table 2.
**Logistic Regression analysis of effects of Veto
Players on Dispute Outcome**

Variable	Model I	Model II	Model III
Veto Player	11.155** (9.109)	8.608* (7.322)	842.7 (3450)
Duration	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.989 (0.01)
Democracy	0.646 (0.223)	0.628 (0.223)	1.4 (2.676)
Alliance	1.124 (0.216)	1.196 (0.232)	-
Fatality	1.553 (0.270)	1.658 (0.297)	0.335 (0.269)
Multiparty	1.042 (0.184)	0.989 (0.183)	2.746 (2.017)
War	1.140 (0.367)	-	-
Territory	1.170 (0.215)	1.157 (0.221)	1.901 (1.555)
N	1591	1517	65
Chi2	18.37	*<.05, ***<.001	
Prob > chi2	0.01		
Pseudo R2	0.01		

The results in Table 1 above show the relationship between veto players and negotiated settlements. As can be seen that in accordance with the positive effects theory, the sign on veto player is positive (the odds ratio is greater than 1) and it is significant at .05 level too. It is interpreted as that for every one unit increase in the veto score of the least veto player constrained state, the odds of a negotiated settlement versus non negotiated settlement increases by a factor of 11.155. This is an interesting finding and is completely opposite of what one would expect in line with Putnam's argument; where more institutional barriers should limit a leaders ability to get the deal ratified and should limit his concession window on international level and thus make negotiations less successful. We will turn to discussing model I in details after looking at other two models presented in the same table.

Model II which includes only cases of non-war disputes has also produced a positive relation between veto players and negotiated settlements - our key dependent and independent variables. The result can be interpreted as that for every one unit increase in the veto score of the least veto constrained state, the odds of a negotiated settlement versus non negotiated settlements in non-war disputes increases by a factor of 8.608. The result is significant too, which is again a finding against the argument put forward in this thesis's theory section and also against the prevailing view of veto players in the literature.

The third model which includes only cases with war-disputes also produces similar results like that of model I and model II supporting the positive effects theory and contradicting the prevailing negative effects theory. As we can see that the number of

observation is very low in this model (only 65) that is why the results are not as crucial as the results of the other two models which included higher number of cases; but nevertheless, the basic argument about the negative relation between the veto players and negotiated settlement is denied by this model too as the odds ratio is greater than one indicating a that negotiated settlement is more likely in case of the presence of more veto players than otherwise.

The odds ratio for most of our control variables is also greater than one which indicates that a unit increase in their value increases the odds of a negotiated settlement to the disputes between states. This is true for all of the variables except the variable duration and democracy; which has a odds ratio lower than one indicating that a one unit increase in the duration or democratic score decrease the odds of a negotiated settlement versus non negotiated settlement. But none of them are actually statistically significant. Even though these findings are completely in line with the existing theories about the duration and regime type analysis presented in the previous sections of this paper. For example the variable fatality level is also positive in all three models which is completely in line with the argument of the existing literature which claims that more severe conflicts receive high international attention and high pressure develops on the leader for resolving the disputes through negotiations (frei, 1976; Frazier & Goertz, 2002; Dixon, 2002). The results suggest that with a one unit increase in the fatality level of the dispute increases the odds of negotiated settlement versus non negotiated outcome by a factor of 1.553, 1.658, and 0.335 in all three models respectively. These finding are not very surprising,

as said earlier, a major part of the existing literature has predicted a positive relations between these two variables.

Coming to the main finding of this paper, we saw in table one that the statistical model produced results which are in clear support of the positive effects theory of veto players on negotiated settlements presented in this paper. These finding are novel and new because they provide a new angle to how the veto players have been negatively viewed so far. Viewing the veto players only through the eyes of the major prevailing literatures who have argued that increasing domestic groups and pressure are going to affect the negotiation process negatively pose a limitation on our view of the role of domestic players in negotiations process. The literature had long tested and reported the findings that domestic institutions play a major role in relations among states but the direction of those effects have hardly been formally tested because of the lack of availability of a comprehensive dataset. The reason why negative effects theory had received more attention than the positive theory is because imminent authors like Putnam and tsebelis had theorized them years ago.

In the next table I will be trying to demonstrate how significant this effect is on the negotiated outcome of dispute. Consider table 3 below which shows the change in predicted probabilities and is very important for the substantial understanding of the results:

Table 3. Change in predicted probabilities of negotiated settlement

Variable	Min-Max	0-1	(+1/2)	(+sd/2)
Veto Player	0.24	0.50	0.30	0.03
Duration	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Democracy	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01
Alliance	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Fatality	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.02
Multiparty	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
War	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Territory	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01

Table 3 above shows the predicted probabilities of negotiated settlement with the independent variables set at their mean. The results of the above table are easy to interpret as they represent the change in predicted probabilities rather than odds ratio or log of the odds. These results are important because as we can see that the change in the predicted probability of negotiated settlement caused by veto players is by far higher than any of the other variables; which shows that the effect of veto players is highly

substantial and important in order to understand the determinants of successful negotiations. For example, it shows that with other variables set at their mean the predicted probability of negotiated settlement to the dispute is 24% when the score of the least scored veto player is increased from minimum (which is zero) to maximum (which is 0.5). The second column shows the change in predicted probabilities of the negotiated settlement of the dispute when the value of one independent variable is increases from zero to one, while others are held constant at their mean. The third column represents the change in the probabilities of negotiated settlement when the specific independent variable is changed from $\frac{1}{2}$ below its mean value to $\frac{1}{2}$ above its mean value, while the other variables are held constant at their mean. The last column represents the change in predicted probability of a negotiated settlement with changing one of the independent variables from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below its mean value to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above its mean value.

From our analysis and statistical results presented above we found that veto players, contrary to the prevalent logic, actually facilitate and encourage countries to opt for a negotiated solution. They are crucial to the understanding of dispute settlement and conflict management literature as the recent works have been turning to find the answer about why disputes have been escalating destructive wars which bring costs to both sides and why very few of these disputes are stopped and resolved short of conflict.

Chapter Four

Conclusion

I started my thesis investigating the question of: what are the effects of domestic veto players on the negotiated settlements of disputes between states. In accordance with the prevailing theories of negotiations and veto players; I presented my argument explaining how veto players can have positive and negative impact on the dispute settlements between states. I drew two alternate hypotheses from the argument which states that the higher the number of veto players the more/less likely it is that dispute between states is going to end in a negotiated settlement. I explained both these positive and negative effects theories in the theory section of this paper in details.

The above stated logic about the veto players has been present in the existing literature, but the highlight of this thesis is that no one has ever taken both the negative and positive effects theories of veto players and tested it in a formal model on the results of disputes between states. The main reason behind applying veto player analysis, both institutional and partisan, into dispute outcome is to capture the variation of behavior within different political systems. For example, the variation in the behavior of democracies that recent comparative politics literature has claimed to exist can only be captured by analyzing democracies in terms of the veto players present in the system; mainly because some democracies vary in the number of institutional veto players and other vary in terms of partisan veto players. Therefore in order to capture their variation in its entirety a joint variable for both these veto player has been applied in this thesis.

Findings:

The statistical analysis in the chapter three of this paper did not produce the results which widely presented in currently prevailing literature, but instead showed a positive relation between the number of veto players and the odds of getting a negotiated settlement. These findings were novel and new in their nature because the literature has always presented evidence in support of the argument that more veto players causes hindrances in the process of negotiation at both levels (Putnam, 1988; Huth & Allee, 2002). It is important to note that all the veto players are not going to have similar effects, the existing works have either focused on institutional veto players or partisan veto players; but has not tested the relations with both of them combined. They have not done so because of the lack of the data on the veto score of dyads in the past century, whereas this thesis has used such measure and tested for its effects in all disputes that have occurred within past couple of centuries. For example, Huth and Allee only tests for political opposition in his work which is a partisan veto player, but has not included all the other institutional veto players that might have been active at the time of the leader's decision whether to proceed with war or end the dispute through negotiated settlements (Huth & Allee, 2002). These findings turn the attention to a very important point about the veto players which is that veto players don't always have negative impact on negotiations, but can have positive impact too which needs to be accurately estimated through a detailed study and precise measure/model.

Other findings of this thesis have been consistent with the existing conflict management literature. As argued by the literature we found positive and significant

relations between the severity of the conflict and its odds of being resolved through negotiated settlement. It has been argued that disputes with high severity are going to attract more international attention, and the leader is going to be under high domestic pressure too in order to find a settlement to the dispute (Dixon, 2002; frei, 1976). The other finding that has been consistent with the conflict management existing literature in this thesis is the negative relation between the duration of the conflict and the negotiated settlement of the dispute. The democratic peace theory has also found support with the dyads consisting of one democracy and one autocracy decreasing the log odds of negotiated settlement compared to both democratic dyads.

So overall all the findings have been consistent with the existing literature, except we were able to find supporting results for one of the main propositions of our thesis namely the positive effects theory, while the negative effects theory was rejected by our findings. These findings have will eventually open new discussion regarding the effects of the domestic institutions in international relations and will hopefully lead to more solid test of the currently held view which would lead us closer to better understanding of disputes between states.

Implication for International Relations:

The main theoretical contribution of this thesis has been that of highlighting the positive effects of veto players on negotiated settlement of disputes by accounting for both institutional and partisan veto players. Traditionally scholars of international relations have focused on the negative impacts that domestic veto players may have on relations among states but this thesis indicated that veto players don't always serve as hindrances to negotiated settlements but they also hinder the bellicose policies of states which eventually leads to negotiations and cooperation among states. It also emphasized the need to pay attention to the variance that exists within regimes instead of focusing too much attention on across regime studies. Even though the recent literature has been paying attention to this variation but still more work is needed in order to explain all the mechanisms at work.

In this thesis I have tested the traditional view of the veto players' effect on negotiated settlement of dispute, but did not find supporting results for them; instead the finding have opened a new way for research in this area by showing a positive relation between veto players and negotiated settlements. Further, works are needed to investigate the positive effects of veto players as obstacles to avoiding the dispute from getting severe as well not only as hindrances in way of reaching settlements and negotiations. A more thorough study of this positive relation is needed to answer the puzzle of how certain democracies with relatively higher veto players score than their autocratic counterparts reach negotiated settlements at dispute times. If carried out, these studies

will open a new way for understanding the success behind democratic success in negotiations other than the fact that they have similar institutions and shared values.

References

- Bercovitch, J. and Langley, J. (1993). The nature of the dispute and the effectiveness of international mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37:670-91
- Bercovitch, Jacob & Allison Houston, 1993. 'Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behavior on the Success of Mediation in International Relations', *International Journal of Conflict Management* (4):297-321.
- Bercovitch, Jacob & Allison Houston, 1996. 'The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence', in Jacob Bercovitch, ed., *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner (11-35).
- Christopher J. Coyne and L. Mathers, 2011. *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- David E. Cunningham (2006). "Veto Players and Civil War Duration." *American Journal of Political Science*. 50(4): 875-92.
- Derrick Frazier & Gary Goertz. 2002. Patterns of Negotiation in Non-War Disputes. *International Negotiation* 7: 339-61
- Dixon, W. J. and Senese, P. (2002). Democracies, disputes, and negotiated settlement. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(4):547-571
- De Mesquita & Siverson. 1995. War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. *The American Political Science Review* 89: 841-55
- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure. *American Political Science Review* 92: 611-21.
- George Tsebelis. 2002. *Veto Players*. Princeton University Press.
- James D. Fearon. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49: 379-414.
- J.G. Merrills. 2011. *International Dispute Settlement*. Cambridge University Press.
- Marieke Kleiboer. 1996. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40: 360-89.

- Merrills, John G., 1991. *International Disputes settlement*, second edition. Cambridge:Grotius.
- Paul K. Huth & Todd L. Allee. 2002. Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 754-90.
- Paul R. Hensel. 1996. Charting A Course To Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15: 43-73.
- Richard Jackson. 2000. Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 37: 323-43.
- Robert D. Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two Level Games. *International Organization* 42: 427-60.
- Stepan & Skach. 1993. Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism. *World Politics* 46: 1-22

Bibliography

- Bercovitch, J. and Langley, J. (1993). The nature of the dispute and the effectiveness of international mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37:670-91
- Cott, D. L. V. (2005). A graduate student's guide to publishing scholarly journal articles. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 38(4):741-743
- Clarke, K. A. (2005). The phantom menace: Omitted variable bias in econometric research. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 22:341-352
- Chiozza, G. and Choi, A. (2003). Guess who did what? political leaders and the management of territorial disputes, 1950-1990. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47: 251-277
- Dixon, W. J. (1994). Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 88: 14-32
- Dixon, W. J. and Senese, P. (2002). Democracies, disputes, and negotiated settlement. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(4):547-571
- Knopf, J. W. (2006). Doing a literature review. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 39(1):127-132
- Dixon, W. J. (1993). Democracy and the management of international conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(March):42-68
- De Mesquita & Siverson. 1995. War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. *The American Political Science Review* 89: 841-55
- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure. *American Political Science Review* 92: 611-21.
- Derrick Frazier & Gary Goertz. 2002. Patterns of Negotiation in Non-War Disputes. *International Negotiation* 7: 339-61
- Earnest, D. C. (2008). Coordination in large numbers: An agent-based model of international negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52:363-382
- Fortna, V. P. (2003b). Scraps of paper? agreements and the durability of peace. *International Organization* 57: 337-372

- Fearon, J. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3)
- Filson, D. and Werner, S. (2004). Bargaining and fighting: The impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2):296-313
- Fischer, D. D. (1982). Decisions to use the international court of justice: Four recent cases. *International Studies Quarterly*, 26(2):251-77
- George Tsebelis. 2002. *Veto Players*. Princeton University Press.
- Goertz, G. and Diehl, P. F. (2002). Treaties and conflict management in enduring rivalries. *International Negotiation*, 7(3):379-393
- Gent, S. E. and Shannon, M. (2010). The effects of international arbitration and adjudication. *Journal of Politics*, 72(2):366-80
- Gochal, J. R. and Levy, J. S. (2004). Crisis management or conflict of interests? a case study of the Crimean war. In Maoz, Z., Mintz, A., Morgan, T. C., Palmer, G., and Stoll, R. J., editors, Multiple.
- George Tsebelis. 1990. *Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. University of California Press.
- James, P., Park, J., and Choi, S.-W. (2006). Democracy and conflict management: Territorial claims in the western hemisphere revisited. *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 803-818
- J.G. Merrills. 2011. *International Dispute Settlement*. Cambridge University Press.
- James D. Fearon. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49: 379-414.
- Kurizaki, S. (2007). Efficient secrecy: Public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3)
- King, G. (1995). Replication. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 28(3):444-452
- Leventoglu, B. (2008). Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52:533-553
- Leventoglu, B. and Slantchev, B. (2008). The armed peace: A punctuated equilibrium theory of war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):755-771

- Marieke Kleiboer. 1996. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40: 360-89.
- Oneal, J. R. and Russett, B. (2005). Rule of three, let it be? when more really is better. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 33
- Paul K. Huth & Todd L. Allee. 2002. Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 754-90.
- Paul R. Hensel. 1996. Charting A Course To Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15: 43-73.
- Powell, R. (2004). Bargaining and learning while fighting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (2):344-361
- Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution. Lexington Books, Lanham
- Richard Jackson. 2000. Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 37: 323-43.
- Robert D. Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two Level Games. *International Organization* 42: 427-60.
- Ray, J. L. (2003). Explaining interstate conflict and war: What should be controlled for? *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 20(1)
- Slantchev, B. L. (2005). Military coercion in interstate crises. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):533-547
- Stepan & Skach. 1993. Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism. *World Politics* 46: 1-22
- Werner, S. (1998). Negotiating the terms of settlement: War aims and bargaining leverage. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 321-343
- Wittman, D. (1979). How a war ends: A rational model approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23(4):743-763