# EXPRESSIVE CONTROL AND SENSITIVITY TO OTHERS' EXPRESSION: VALIDATION OF THE LENNOX-WOLFE SELF-MONITORING SCALE

by

RICHARD DONALD LENNOX, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION

IN

PSYCHOLOGY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

August 1985

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. John Harvey for his guidance throughout the project and to the rest of the committee for their advice and encouragement. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Donneva Crowell for her invaluable assistance in collecting data. Finally, I wish to dedicate this research to my friend and mentor Dr. Raymond Wolfe without whose enthusiasm, encouragement, and advice there would be no self-monitoring scale to validate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....ii

LIST OF TABLES.....vi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....1

The Self-monitoring Scale.....3

Psychometric Properties of the SMS.....5

Tests of Predictions Derived from the Theory of Self-monitoring.....10

Factor Analytic Studies of the SMS.....12

The Problem of the Extraversion Factor.....18

The Problem of Stage Acting.....20

Contradiction within the SMS.....22

A Revised Self-monitoring Scale.....23

Correlations with Other Constructs.....26

Redefinition of the Self-monitoring Construct.....29

Factor Structure of the Revised SMS.....31

Relationships with Other Constructs.....32

Replication of the Factor Structure.....34

CHAPTER TWO: PROBLEM.....42

Problem: Validation of the Lennox-Wolfe SMS.....42

CHAPTER THREE: STUDY 1.....45

Method.....45

Subjects.....45

Procedures.....46

Scoring Procedures.....47
Analysis.....48
Results and Discussion.....48
CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY 2.....53
Method.....53
Subjects.....53
Procedures.....53
Results and Discussion.....54
CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY 3.....58
Method.....61
Instruments.....61
Results and Discussion.....63
Subscale Intercorrelations.....65
Social Self-esteem.....65
Interpersonal Competency.....65
"P": Avoidance of Social Acting Situations.....66
"R": Active Acting Style.....66
"C": Passive Acting Style.....67
Self-efficacy.....67
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS.....69
Implications.....69
Some Closing Comments on the Dramaturgucal Metaphor.....75
REFERENCES.....80

APPENDIX A: SELF-EFFICACY SCALE.....85

APPENDIX B: INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCY SCALE.....87

APPENDIX C: SOCIAL SELF-ESTEEM SCALE.....89

APPENDIX D: PERFORMANCE STYLE TEST.....91

APPENDIX E: SNYDER'S SELF-MONITORING SCALE.....94

APPENDIX F: LENNOX-WOLFE SELF-MONITORING SCALE.....96

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Factor Structure of Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale.....15

2. Intercorrelation Matrix.....27

3. Correlates of the Final Revised Self-monitoring Scale.....33

4. Replication of Original Factor Structure.....35

5. Procrustes Rotation of the Self-monitoring Scale..38

6. Item Analysis of the Self-monitoring Scale.....40

7. Analysis of Variance of Expressive Control by Ablity and Gender.....49

8. Analysis of Variance of Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior by Sensitivity and Gender.....55

9. Correlates of the Lennox-Wolfe Self-monitoring Scale.....64

# CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

Social scientists often use the "life as theater" metaphor for trying to understand face-to-face interactions (Sarbin & Allen, 1968, p. 488-489). In this view, when we attempt to control the way we present ourselves to others, we are in a position similar to that of a stage actor playing to an audience. Exploitation of the metaphor is perhaps best illustrated in the works of Goffman (1959, 1967) and Snyder (1979).

It is common knowledge that individuals often strive to influence the impressions that others form of them during the course of social interaction. This activity is what social psychologists have called impression management (Tedeschi, 1981). One task for social psychology is to identify and classify the ways these activities affect social behavior. Snyder (1974, 1979) has identified a construct, self-monitoring of expressive behavior, which promises to enhance our understanding of impression management.

Self-monitoring refers to deliberate efforts at impression management and addresses presumed individual differences in the ability and motivation to engage in

it. Some people are probably better able to manipulate their self-presentation than are others. It is obvious that not all of us are as skilled as stage actors or politicians in varying our self-presentation or our behavior to fit the demands of each specific situation we encounter (Snyder, 1974). Similarly, some people are more likely to respond to cues concerning the appropriateness of their social behavior than are others. The theory of self-monitoring assumes a normal distribution of the ability to exercise control over the impression one makes on others in the process of maintaining socially appropriate behavior.

Snyder (1974) has characterized individuals as having either high or low self-monitoring ability. The prototypic high self-monitor is one whose behavior is highly susceptible to feedback concerning its social appropriateness and effectiveness vis-à-vis one's own ends. The high self-monitor's behavior tends to be variable across situations. For example, in dealing with a particular individual, a high self-monitor may discern that he or she is being viewed by that individual as too much of a "wise guy." Upon realizing that this is not the most suitable "face" for this situation, he or she would quickly attempt to alter the apparently inappropriate "wise guy" image to that of a more subdued

person. Putting on different faces as the situation demands is the social forte of the high self-monitor.

Conversely, the prototypic low self-monitor is a person who does not possess the requisite repertoire of faces (or, perhaps, lacks facility in switching from one to another) and is not particularly sensitive to cues indicating how appropriate his or her behaviors are. Therefore, in a given situation, if the low self-monitor were to be viewed as acting too much the intellectual, for example, upon being subjected to cues suggesting that this was not the most appropriate behavior for the particular setting, he or she would be expected to continue to act in this same inappropriate manner.

## The Self-monitoring Scale

The Self-monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) consists of 25 self-descriptive statements with a true-false response format. It was designed to assess five theoretical aspects or dimensions of the self-monitoring construct. These five dimensions constitute characteristics thought by Snyder to be necessarily possessed by an individual in order to be considered a self-monitor. The first dimension is "concern for the appropriateness of social behavior." A sample item used to measure this dimension

is "At parties or social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things others will like" (scored negatively for self-monitoring, receiving a negative weight in calculating the total score). The second dimension is "attention to social comparison information" or "attention to environmental appropriateness cues." This dimension is illustrated by the item "When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues" (scored positively). The third dimension is the "ability to control or modify one's self-presentation and expressive behavior" (e.g., "I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face, if for the right end," scored positively). The fourth dimension concerns the use of this ability in a social situation (e.g., "I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them," scored positively). The fifth dimension of the self-monitoring construct deals with the extent to which one's expressive behavior and self-presentation are tailored to fit the social situation (e.g., "In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons," scored positively).

Snyder (1974, 1979) repeatedly makes reference to these aspects of self-monitoring, but gives little rationale for his theoretical structure. It is plausible

to regard each dimension as a necessary disposition or characteristic of the self-monitoring individual. Therefore, in order to be considered a self-monitor, one must possess to a large degree, all five of the attributes. This conclusion is implied in Snyder's description of the self-monitor:

> The prototypic high self-monitoring individual is one who out of a concern for the situational and interpersonal appropriateness of his or her social behavior, is particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of relevant others in social situations and uses these cues as guidelines for monitoring (that is, regulating or controlling) his or her own verbal and nonverbal self-presentation (Snyder, 1979, p. 89).

Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale (SMS), yields a possible score of 0-25: high scores identify self-monitoring individuals.

## Psychometric Properties of the SMS

The reliability of the Self-monitoring scale, estimated by Kuder-Richardson Formula 20, was .70 in a sample of 192 college students (Snyder, 1974). Test-retest reliability was .83 in this sample after a one-month interval. To cross-validate the internal consistency estimate, data were collected in a separate sample of 146 students; here the Kuder-Richardson

coefficient was .63.

Most of the reported attempts at construct validation of the Self-monitoring scale in Snyder's 1974 and 1979 articles have yielded favorable results. In one investigation (Snyder, 1974), 16 fraternity members who were all acquainted with one another rated each of the 15 others on the following attributes:

1. Concerned about acting appropriately in social situations.
2. Openly expresses his true feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.
3. Has good self-control of his behavior; can play many roles.
4. Is good at learning what is socially appropriate in new situations.
5. Has good self-control of his emotional expression and can use it to create the impression he wants (Snyder, 1974, p. 530).

Using a median split on the Self-monitoring Scale to define high and low self-monitors, the self-monitoring characteristics were seen as truer of high self-monitors ($M$ = 50.5) than for low self-monitors ($M$ = 40.2; ($t$ (14) = 2.69, $p < .02$).

In an effort to show that high self-monitors were better actors as well as better judges of emotional expression, Snyder (1974) selected high and low self-monitors to serve as both judges and actors. In the

acting task, subjects were instructed to express certain emotions. Each subject's performance was filmed and evaluated by naive judges who guessed each emotion portrayed. The dependent variable was accuracy of the guess. High self-monitors significantly exceeded low self-monitors in expressing correctly identifiable emotions ($F$ (1,51) = 11.72, $p < .01$). In the task requiring high and low self-monitors to act as judges of emotional expression, the observed difference was not significant ($F$ (1,153) = 1.69, $p < .25$). The claim that the Self-monitoring Scale is capable of identifying persons sensitive to expression and self-presentation was not supported.

Another way to validate an instrument is to identify criterion groups, individuals who are expected to exhibit particularly high or low scores--and then demonstrate that they do. Snyder (1974) found that professional actors score higher on the Self-monitoring Scale than a reference group of undergraduate students. On the other hand, it has been suggested that hospitalized psychiatric patients exhibit less situational-dependent behavior than "normal" persons (Moos, 1968). Snyder (1974) showed that such patients score lower on the Self-monitoring Scale compared to a group of college students. The data from psychiatric patients probably cannot be taken as

unequivocal support for the Self-monitoring Scale since psychiatric patients may be in a situation where social stimulation is low, or where institutional rules tend to restrict the range of expressive behavior or where both of these circumstances operate.

Theoretically, the high self-monitor should be particularly alert and attuned to the behavior of others. Snyder (1974) recorded the instances in which persons looked to records of others' behavior for cues in an ambiguous situation. Subjects responded to a series of true-false self-descriptive personality items in preparation for a discussion of how test takers decide how to respond to ambiguous items. During the task each subject was given the opportunity to consult a "majority response sheet" and the instances of consulting this sheet were recorded. High self-monitors consulted the sheet more often that did lows ($\underline{F}$ (1,24) = 4.70, $\underline{p}<.05$; means for this test were not reported). This result indicates that the self-monitor relies more heavily on at least one type of social comparison information for cues to appropriate behavior. In a related study, Berscheid, Graziano, Monson and Dermer (1976) suspected that high self-monitors remember more accurately information about people with whom they anticipate interacting than do their low self-monitoring counterparts. This hypothesis

was supported by their data.

Incremental validity is defined by the ability of an instrument to measure theoretically distinguishable constructs. In order for a measure to possess incremental validity, it must be shown that the individual differences assessed by the instrument are not identifiable by a measure of the related construct. The Self-monitoring Scale has demonstrated incremental validity against measures of need for approval (Snyder, 1974), extraversion (Lippa, 1976, 1978; Snyder & Monson, 1975) and machiavellianism (Jones and Baumeister, 1976), since correlations with these variables do not exceed .2. Of course such tests assume that all measures involved are both reliable and valid. Nevertheless, the results suggest that Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale is empirically distinguishable from measures of three personality constructs that bear some resemblance to it.

These validation studies generally indicate that the Self-monitoring Scale possesses some degree of construct validity: it appears to measure some of the defining characteristics of the self-monitor (Snyder, 1974). There are, however, some implied theoretical relationships that have to be assessed before it can be used with confidence.

Tests of Predictions Derived from the Theory of Self-monitoring

According to the theory of self-monitoring, individuals in a social context actively attempt to construct patterns of behavior that are socially appropriate (Snyder, 1974). There are two general sources of information one can use in deciding how to act. First, one knows one's own inner states, attitudes and personal dispositions. Second, there are always situational cues influencing what one does. The essence of the self-monitoring construct is that there are individual differences in the degree to which a person relies on each source of information, and the studies cited above indicate that the Self-monitoring Scale appears to measure them. Other experimental results (Snyder & Monson, 1975) show that subjects who score high on the Self-monitoring scale display greater cross-situational variability of social behavior, as the theory implies they should.

More recent studies, however, raise serious questions about the self-monitoring construct and measure. In a study by Stewart and Carley (1984), college students subjects who scored at the extremes on the Self-monitoring Scale (scores of 5 or less, and 20 or more) were asked to describe their personality

characteristics on Gough's Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1980) and the 16PF Profile Sheet (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970). Each subject also designated four acquaintances, including peers and parents, who later rated them independently on the same instruments. It was hypothesized that if the Self-monitoring Scale did in fact identify individuals whose behavior was variable across situations, personality ratings for the high self-monitors should differ across raters more than should those for low self-monitors. That is, it was assumed that the raters of the subjects are likely to have contact with them in different situations (e.g., the parents at home, and the roommate at college), and therefore the ratings should be indicative of cross-situational variability/consistency. The cross-situational variability hypothesis was not supported; the extreme groups did not differ significantly in terms of self-ratings, others' ratings, or extent of self-other or other-other agreement, even though samples were sufficiently large to produce reliable results.

In another study, Wolfe, Lennox and Hudiburg (1983) hypothesized that self-monitoring acts as a moderator variable in the statistical explanation of self-reported drug use. Dispositional variables were expected to be

more potent for the low self-monitors, and proximal perceived drug-specific environmental predictors were expected to be more potent for the high self-monitors. Data from a sex-stratified sample of 807 students failed to support the moderator variable hypothesis for either marijuana or alcohol use, although the predictors functioned almost exactly as they had in previous studies (Jessor & Jessor, 1977).

While the evidence cited earlier attests to its validity, the Self-monitoring Scale devised by Snyder (1974) appears to fall short of fulfilling all of its theoretical promises. Its failure to produce some of the expected effects may result from difficulties in measuring the construct adequately or from an incorrect conceptualization of the construct.

## Factor Analytic Studies of the SMS

Because the self-monitoring construct holds great theoretical promise, the question of whether Snyder's scale is an adequate measure of it is an important one. Snyder suggests that the scale measures five basic components of behavior that make up the self-monitoring process. Thus, we can conclude from his description of the scale that it is not conceived of as unidimensional

in nature. Functional verification of the multidimensionality of the Self-monitoring scale can be assessed using exploratory factor analysis (Gorsuch, 1974). The major goal of exploratory factor analysis of a scale is to establish the initial psychometric dimensions measured by the instrument. By identifying factors within the Self-monitoring Scale and assessing their correspondence to the characteristics proposed by Snyder (1974), we can determine the adequacy with which the measure assesses each of the five theoretical attributes. Failure to identify factors capable of measuring all of these relevant attributes would challenge the construct validity of the scale.

There have been several factor analytic studies of the Self-monitoring Scale (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) but procedural variations render a satisfying comparison of the factor analytic results from these studies difficult to achieve. In comparing the reported factor analytic results, it is necessary to allow for three types of between-study differences: 1) the subject population, 2) the method of analysis and 3) the method of rotation. Other differences may pertain to the investigator's decision concerning the number of factors to be retained from the correlation matrix and the size of the correlation required between an item and

a factor before it is interpreted. Because of these various differences between factor analytic studies, two separate sets of results are usually not strictly comparable. Some of the sets of results to be examined (particularly those obtained via personal communication) appear to demand attention even though details that would be useful in estimating their degree of comparability with other sets are lacking.

The studies to be reviewed have two important features in common: all used the Snyder's 25-item Self-monitoring Scale, and all used samples of U.S. college students of both sexes. Their results are presented in tabular form for ease of comparison in Table 1. This table illustrates the empirically defined structure of the Self-monitoring Scale as observed in eight samples from six studies. Factors identified by these analyses constitute clusters of items which possess substantial commonality. Factor names are those assigned by the authors. Factor items are defined by a loading of .3 or more on a factor, except in the data from Snyder, Bailey and Arabie (1980) who used the method of cluster analysis, and in the data from Gabrenya and Arkin (1980), who used a loading of .4 or more to define saliency.

Of the studies cited, the two published accounts (Briggs et al., 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) are the

Table 1

Factor Structure of Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale

| Source | Factor name | Factor items |
|---|---|---|
| Snyder (1980) | Sociability | 1,12,14,21,22,23 |
| | Impression managment | 4,5,6,8,18,20,24 |
| | Congruence between inner state and self-presentation | 2,13,16 |
| | Other-directedness | 3,7,11,15,17,19,25 |
| Lippa (1979) | Acting ability | 1,5,8,12,18,20 |
| | Other-directedness | 3,6,7,9,17,19 |
| | Variability in behavior | 2,13,16 |
| | Extraversion | 12,22,23 |
| Briggs et al. (1980) | Extraversion | 12,14,20,21,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 2,3,6,7,13,15,16, 17,19,23,25 |
| | Acting ability | 5,8,18,20,24 |
| Gabrenya & Arkin (1980): Male | Acting ability | 8,18,20 |
| | Extraversion | 12,14,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 3,7,17,19 |
| | Communication skills | 1,4,5 |
| Gabrenya & Arkin (1980): Female | Acting ability | 8,18,20 |
| | Extraversion | 12,14,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 9,17,19 |
| | Communication skills | 4,5,7 |
| Gabrenya & Arkin (1980): Male | Acting ability | 5,6,8,18 |
| | Extraversion | 12,14,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 3,7 |
| | Communication skills | 4,5 |
| Gabrenya & Arkin (1980): Female | Acting ability | 6,8,18,20 |
| | Extraversion | 12,14,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 9,17 |
| | Communication skills | 4,5 |
| Lennox (1979) | Acting ability | 5,6,8,18,20 |
| | Congruence between inner and outer states | 2,13,16 |
| | Extraversion | 12,14,22,23 |
| | Other-directedness | 10,15,17,19,25 |

most thoroughly reported. Briggs et al. depart from the usual true-false response format of the original Self-monitoring Scale and adopt a five-point Likert format in an effort to avoid the problems resulting from departures from symmetry of distribution characteristic of true-false formats. They present data from two samples and define factors by listing only those items which load above .3 in both. In Gabrenya and Arkin's data, subjects are segregated by gender. Thus there is an attempt at confirmation of the factor structure within both studies as well as across the studies. Results of these studies generally agree with one another in terms of the factor structure. Two factors, Acting ability and Extraversion, are found in all studies. Another factor, Other-directedness, also appears in all sets of data, although the particular items that load on the factor differ from study to study more than do items of the Acting ability or Extraversion factors.

Evidence summarized in Table 1, indicates that the items of the Self-monitoring Scale, whether answered in a true-false or Likert format, yield a consistent pattern of factors and an important element in them is the Extraversion factor. Referring back to Snyder's original description of the five dimensions subsumed by the

self-monitoring construct, the self-monitor is said to be:

1. Concerned with the social appropriateness of his or her behavior.
2. Attentive to social comparison information.
3. Able to manipulate or control his or her self-presentation.
4. Oriented toward using this ability in particular situations.
5. Cross-situationally variable in his or her social behavior (Snyder, 1979, p. 89).

Results of the factor analytic studies suggest that the scale measures only one of these dimensions--attention to social comparison information (the Other-directedness factor)--in a relatively unequivocal fashion. There appears to be some correspondence between the Acting ability factor and the ability to control or modify self-presentation, but its direct connection is questionable. The Extraversion factor fails to correspond to any of the five dimensions.

The presence of the Extraversion factor in all of the analyses, combined with the lack of a theoretical rationale for it, is cause for concern. Briggs et al. (1980) conclude that the factor is irrelevant to the construct of self-monitoring. Lippa (1978) has encountered difficulties in working with the

Self-monitoring Scale and has traced some of the scale's limitations to the Extraversion factor. The fact the the scale systematically measures extraversion may be responsible for its comparatively low internal consistency and its inability to withstand some tests of validity (Snyder, 1974; Stewart & Carley, 1984; Wolfe et al., 1983).

## The Problem of the Extraversion Factor

One of the primary concerns of incremental validity is to assure that an instrument does not assess the same individual differences as another instrument measuring a similar construct. As previously noted, this relationship has been assessed for the Self-monitoring Scale and a measure of extraversion (Lippa, 1976, 1978). The presence of a cluster of items within the Self-monitoring Scale that appears to measure extraversion, however, suggests that although the scale as a whole may be empirically distinguishable from a measure of extraversion, the Extraversion factor itself may not.

In an effort to assess more adequately the role of the Extraversion factor, a more rigorous test of distinctiveness between the Self-monitoring Scale and a

measure of extraversion was undertaken (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984, study 1). The Self-monitoring scale and the Extraversion subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (1975), were administered to 179 undergraduates at SUNY Geneseo and the results subjected to principal components analysis. If there exists a true discriminant relationship exists between the two scales, the retention of two factors should result in the loading of items comprising each scale on separate factors. The results of this study failed to demonstrate the needed discriminant relationship for several items of the Self-monitoring scale. Those items comprising the Extraversion factor of the Self-monitoring scale (12, 14, 22, and 23) loaded on the factor composed predominantly of items from the Eysenck Extraversion subscale and failed to load on the same factor as the rest of the self-monitoring items. These results suggest that the Extraversion factor of the Self-monitoring Scale has more in common with Eysenck's measure of extraversion than it does with the rest of the Self-monitoring Scale. The extraversion items are empirically unrelated to the other self-monitoring items, and are conceptually unrelated to the construct and its components as defined by Snyder.

The Problem of Stage Acting

Another potential problem with Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale is its apparent reliance on theatrical acting ability to measure one's ability to modify or control self-presentation in a social context. Snyder does assume a high degree of similarity between stage acting acting ability and social acting. Briggs et al. object to the use of theatrical-entertainment items, noting that the process of self-presentation in everyday social interactions differs in fundamental ways from the portrayal of a character in a dramatic performance, and fault Snyder for relying too heavily on the life-as-theater metaphor in his explanation of social behavior.

To investigate Briggs et al.'s criticism, Lennox and Wolfe (1984, study 3) compared Snyder's "stage acting" items with a measure of "social acting," which consisted of items having a direct and obvious relationship to acting in the social context. Two scales were created from the two categories of items. The stage acting scale consisted of items having a direct and obvious connection to theatrical acting (e.g., "I have considered being an entertainer"), while the social acting items contained items referring to acting in the social context (e.g., "I have the ability to control the way I come across to

people depending on the impression I wish to give them"). In this study, the assumed convergence between "stage acting" and "social acting" was tested by pooling responses to both types of items and subjecting them to a principal components factor analysis. The rationale here was the same as that used in isolating the Extraversion factor. To support the convergence hypothesis, both sets of items would have to load on the same factor when two factors were retained. Results showed that the two sets of items were distinct; they loaded on separate factors and hence failed to converge. This finding supports Briggs et al. and is contrary to Snyder's assumption that stage acting ability is similar to social acting. Inasmuch as the self-monitoring process is a social one, it would seem that to use theatrical acting to measure the construct would be inappropriate and that a measure of social acting ability would be more plausible.

The observed distinctiveness of the two sets of items implies that they may correlate with other personality dimensions in quite different ways. Obviously, those who possess the ability to perform on stage and those who possess the ability to act in the social context call upon somewhat different skills. Also stage actors and social actors engage in their respective behaviors for different reasons.

Contradiction within the SMS

As mentioned earlier, it seems that Snyder considered the self-monitoring process to be unitary. An individual must possess all attributes in order to be considered a self-monitor. Therefore, the factors that make up the Self-monitoring Scale must all correlate in a consistent manner with relevant external variables. That is, those individuals who possess the trait measured by one factor should be the same individuals who possess the traits measured by the other factors within the scale. Briggs et al. report a significant positive correlation ($r$ = .35) between sociability and the Extraversion factor, while the Other-directedness factor correlates nonsignificantly ($r$ = .05) with sociability. They also report a negative correlation ($r$ = -.56) between shyness and the Extraversion factor, while the correlation between the Other-directedness factor and shyness is positive ($r$ = .37). Cheek and Briggs (1982) show a similar result: In their data the Extraversion factor correlated -.28 with trait anxiety, and the Other-directedness factor correlated .26 with trait anxiety. Finally, the Extraversion factor correlated positively ($r$ = .65) with a measure of self-confidence, while the Other-directedness factor correlated negatively ($r$ = -.32) with self-confidence (Cheek & Briggs, 1982).

These findings suggest that the person who possesses the trait measured by the Extraversion factor tends to be outgoing and confident, while the person possessing the trait measured by the Other-directedness factor tends to be anxious, shy and lacking in self-confidence. It is unlikely that the same person possesses both traits. This paradox illustrates one way that a part of Snyder's Self-monitoring Scale competes with another part (Seigman & Reynolds, 1982, give a comparable example dealing with the Acting ability factor). The inconsistent fashion in which factors correlate with other variables makes it unlikely that the scale is an effective measure of a single unitary construct.

## A Revised Self-monitoring Scale

In view of the evidence presented thus far, it seems that the shortcomings of the Self-monitoring Scale can be at least partially attributed to its inability to measure all dimensions of the Construct (Snyder, 1974) and its contamination by what appears to be an irrelevant construct within the scale. Lennox and Wolfe (1984) judged that the most viable solution to this problem would include the removal of the irrelevant factor from the scale and the development of new subscales to assess

the relevant characteristics theoretically possessed by the self-monitor (Snyder, 1974). Such a revision was carried out. The initial version of the Revised Self-monitoring Scale involved the definition of subscales designed to measure Snyder's five components of self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974):

A. concern for the appropriateness of social behavior

B. attention to social comparison information

C. ability to modify or control self-presentation

D. use of this ability in particular situations

E. cross-situational variability of behavior

These subscales contained items possessing some logically apparent connection to one of the above dimensions; that is, each item was face valid for one and only one dimension. Once these subscales were designed, the entire pool of items was again subjected to common factor analysis to see whether or not these items were capable of producing factors corresponding to the theoretical components. The results of this analysis indicated that those characteristics ascribed to the self-monitor reduced to only three empirically distinct dimensions. That is, two of the five "aspects" loaded consistently with two others. The "concern for social

appropriateness" items and the "attention to social comparison information" items loaded on the same factor, and the "use of the ability to control or modify self-presentation in particular situations" items and the "cross-situational variability" items loaded on another factor. The inseparability of these pairs of sets suggests that the relevant dimensions of self-monitoring can be assessed with three subscales: 1) the use of social comparison information to maintain socially appropriate behavior, 2) the ability to control or modify self-presentation, 3) cross-situational variability of behavior.

After determining that only three subscales were needed to assess all five aspects attributed to the self-monitor by Snyder, a three subscale measure was designed by retaining items from the three relevant factors which contributed to the internal consistency of the scale and removing those which did not. The internal consistency of the scale was estimated by Cronbach's coefficient alpha. For the items assessing the ability to control or modify self-presentation, this coefficient had the value of .71; for the items assessing cross-situational variability of behavior it was .82; and for the items assessing reliance on social comparison information, it was .83. Cronbach's coefficient alpha

for the total scale was .88.

Although the initial version of the Revised Self-monitoring Scale appeared to be capable of measuring the components described by Snyder in a face-valid and reliable fashion, its capacity to demonstrate construct validity remained untested. Furthermore, it should be remembered that this version was the result of an attempt to measure the construct as Sndyer defined it. Whether or not that definition is scientifically useful also remained to be tested. The research step called for next was a test of that definition, investigating the plausibility of a single superordinate construct containing these three dimensions.

The question that needed to be answered was, can the factors comprising the initial version of the Revised Self-monitoring Scale be reasonably expected in a single individual? This leads us back to Briggs et al.'s contention that the factors must be correlated in a consistent fashion with external variables.

Correlations with Other Constructs. The intercorrelations displayed in Table 2 call attention to another possible flaw in Sndyer's conceptualization. The 27 self-monitoring items correlate .52 with fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1968), which suggests that the high scorer on this instrument is

Table 2

Intercorrelation Matrix

| Variables | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Cross-situational variability | 42* | 45* | 77* | 24* | -06 | 35* |
| 2. Attention to social comparison | | 40* | 85* | 27* | -09 | 64* |
| 3. Ability to modify self-presentation | | | 71* | 01 | 33* | 08 |
| 4. Total SM items | | | | 25* | 03 | 52* |
| 5. Neuroticism | | | | | -32* | 55* |
| 6. Extraversion | | | | | | -32* |
| 7. Fear of Negative evaluation | | | | | | |

Note: * = p .01.

likely to be apprehensive in many social situations. This finding clashes with Snyder's (1979) description of the high self-monitor as a confident, perspicacious, socially facile impression manager. There is reason to believe that the data are closer to the truth than Snyder's description is; to assume, as Snyder does, that variability of behavior is associated with effective social participation, one must ignore a fair amount of evidence indicating that they are negatively related (Block, 1961; Brownfain, 1952; Campus, 1974; Lennox, 1984).

However, the rs in Table 2 also reflect poorly on this version of the Revised Self-monitoring Scale. Cheek and Briggs (1982) discredit Snyder's scale by showing that its factors correlate dissimilarly with relevant third variables, and this version's factors exhibit the same defect. In the coefficients of Table 2, Cross-situational Variability and Attention to Social Comparison Information show similar correlations with Extraversion, Neuroticism (Eysenck, 1975), and Fear of Negative Evaluation, suggesting that the self-monitoring characteristics measured by these two subscales could easily belong to the same individual. But Ability to Modify Self-presentation yields a pattern different from that of the other two subscales: it is significantly

related to Extraversion, while the other two are not, and it is not significantly related to Neuroticism or to Fear of Negative Evaluation, while the other two are. The question of what the scale as a whole measures, arises again, and again there is no satisfactory answer.

Redefinition of the Self-monitoring Construct. The first attempt to revise Snyder's scale assumed that his hypothetical five component structure of self-monitoring is complete and correct. Results show that a 27-item version of the scale can assess all the components, but the evidence summarized in Table 2 indicates that these 27 items should not be combined in a single unidimensionally scored instrument. The subscales' patterns of relationships with other measures imply that Ability to Modify Self-presentation differs enough from the other two subscales to make it unlikely that a single superordinate construct can encompass all three.

Although the measures of cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information appear to be psychometrically adequate, their correlations with measures that are associated with social anxiety (Neuroticism and Fear of Negative Evaluation) are too high to support the conclusion that they can contribute to an empirical definition of self-monitoring. Effective social interaction is the

hallmark of the high self-monitor, and social anxiety is not compatible with this. The evidence thus suggests that four of Snyder's original hypothetical components cannot be subsumed by the construct: concern for appropriateness, attention to social comparison information, use of the ability to modify self-presentation, and cross-situational variability of behavior.

All that remains of the construct is summarized in Snyder's description of the high self-monitor as one who "is particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of relevant others" (1979, p. 89) and who uses these cues as a guide to regulating his or her own self-presentation. Adopting this narrower definition, it was assumed that two characteristics could fully represent self-monitoring: Ability to modify Self-presentation, and a trait or ability that had not been directly measured previously, sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others.

Seven items having face validity for "sensitivity to expressive behavior" were devised. Together with the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale, these items constitute an attempt to operationalize the reconceptualized self-monitoring construct. To assess the basic psychometric attributes to the measure, it was

administered along with two other inventories designed to measure variables which may have relevance for the narrower definition of self-monitoring: the Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and the Individuation Scale (Maslach, Stapp, & Santee, 1981). The Self-consciousness Scale yields scores for public self-consciousness, private self-con- sciousness, and social anxiety, and the Individuation Scale is a measure of willingness to call attention to oneself. It was expected that the two subscales of the Revised Self-monitoring Scale would not correlate positively with social anxiety, would not correlate negatively with individuation, and would not correlate dissimilarly with any of the four external variables.

Factor Structure of the Revised SMS. Common factor analysis of the pool of items from both subscales yields a two-factor simple structure. The observed structure is interpretable, with 14 of the 28 loadings being less than .14 and 10 being less than .10. The structure corresponds closely to the expected structure. The seven items retained from the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale all loaded above .3 on the first factor, which accounted for 24.5 percent of the variance in the correlation matrix. Additionally, all but one of the

new items ("I tend to be attentive to the reactions of others to my behavior") load above .3 on the second factor, which explained 15.1 percent of the variance. Because the one item failed to load above .3 on either factor, it was eliminated from consideration for this version of the scale. The remaining 13 items constitute the Lennox-Wolfe Self-monitoring scale (Lennox-Wolfe SMS).

Relationships with Other Constructs. Intercorrelations are displayed in Table 3. None of the three self-monitoring variables showed a significant positive correlation with social anxiety, and none showed a significant negative correlation with either public self-consciousness or individuation. The Lennox-Wolfe SMS appears to be free of some of the shortcomings of the previous 27-item version. It identifies high self-monitors as people who are neither socially anxious nor reluctant to behave in a manner that will call attention to themselves.

The two self-monitoring subscales do, however, correlate dissimilarly with two of the four external variables: public self-consciousness, $t(198) = 2.32$, $p < .05$, and social anxiety, $t(198) = 4.00$, $p < .01$. Although these disparities are small in comparison with those discussed by Cheek and Briggs (1982), the fact that

Table 3

Correlates of the Final Revised Self-monitoring Scale

| Variables | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ability to modify self-presentation | 22* | 84* | 07 | 05 | -29* | 30* |
| 2. Sensitivity to expressive behavior | | 72* | 15 | 25* | 05 | 16 |
| 3. Revised SM scale | | | 14 | 17 | -18* | 30* |
| 4. Public self-consciousness | | | | 48* | 31* | -17 |
| 5. Private self-consciousness | | | | | 27* | 02 |
| 6. Social Anxiety | | | | | | -58* |
| 7. Individuation | | | | | | |

Note: * = p .01

they are statistically significant indicates that the meaning of a total composite score across the two subscales is somewhat equivocal. The internal consistency of the Lennox-Wolfe SMS is slightly lower than that of the 27 items described previously; the values of coefficient alpha are .77 for the seven items measuring ability to modify self-presentation, .70 for the six items measuring sensitivity to expressive behavior of others, and .75 for the total scale.

This version of the self-monitoring scale is a face-valid measure of the reconceptualized construct and has enough internal consistency to merit further examination (Nunnally, 1978). Before proceeding with an extensive program of construct validation, however, the basic structure of the scale needs to be cross-validated on an independent sample.

Replication of the Factor Structure. The stability of the factor structure was tested on an independent sample of 116 introductory psychology students (Lennox, 1985). To insure a rigorous test, the data were subjected to a direct comparison of factor solutions as well as a quasi-confirmatory Procrustes rotation.

In the first analysis, common factor solutions of the 13-item scale were directly compared. The results of this test are presented in Table 4. They show that both

Table 4

Replication of Original Factor Structure

| Subscale | Item Number | Factor 1 Sm1 | Factor 1 Sm2 | Factor 2 Sm1 | Factor 2 Sm2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ability to modify self-presentation | 1 | 54 | 20 | -12 | -10 |
| | 3 | 50 | 50 | 11 | 30 |
| | 7 | 49 | 42 | 09 | 11 |
| | 9 | 65 | 58 | -01 | -06 |
| | 10 | 74 | 61 | -05 | 25 |
| | 12 | 32 | 28 | 07 | 01 |
| | 13 | 77 | 72 | -04 | 09 |
| Sensitivity to expressive behavior | 2 | 12 | -06 | 51 | 78 |
| | 4 | -06 | 08 | 46 | 51 |
| | 5 | -05 | 18 | 59 | 68 |
| | 6 | 06 | 15 | 41 | 50 |
| | 8 | 05 | -09 | 66 | 65 |
| | 11 | -04 | -06 | 53 | 64 |

Note: Sm1=original data set (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984), Sm2=present data set. Item number correspond to those used in Appendix F. Correlation between factors = .26 in both samples. Coefficients of congruence= .945 for Factor 1 and .960 for Factor 2.

samples yield interpretable solutions in that the proportions of salient/nonsalient loadings (salience is defined by a .3 loading or greater) is roughly 1/1. Furthermore, of the nonsalient loadings, approximately 70 percent are less than .1. The most parsimonious description of the scale does in fact appear to be a two-factor solution.

Direct comparison of the factor loadings also yields favorable results. With the exception of item 1, all salient loadings in the original sample correspond to salient loadings in the replication sample. With the exception of item 3, all nonsalient loadings in the original sample correspond to a nonsalient loading in the replication sample. The results of this high degree of similarity are extremely high coefficients of congruence (Harman, 1976) for Factor 1 (.945) and for Factor 2 (.960). Taken together, these two sets of results suggest that the factors comprising the Lennox-Wolfe SMS are stable and replicable.

The results of the first analysis support the contention that this version of the self-monitoring scale contains two distinct clusters of items, one corresponding to the Ability to Modify Self-presentation (Ability) Subscale and the other to the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior (Sensitivity) Subscale. The

relationship between the two clusters, however, can only be inferred from the factor loadings. Just how distinct are the two clusters remains to be determined.

The Procrustes confirmatory rotation used in the second analysis tests the hypothesis that the two clusters of items are maximally distinct. This was done by setting up a target matrix consisting of extremely high loadings (1's) and extremely low loadings (0's). It was hypothesized that on a factor where the items in the Ability Subscale (1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13) have loadings close to 1, the loadings for the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior Subscale (2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11) should have loadings close to 0. The reverse was expected on a factor where the items of the Sensitivity Subscale have loadings close to 1. The results of the Procrustes rotation are presented in Table 5. They show that when the factor matrix is rotated to the best approximation of the target matrix, all but two items appear to support the hypothesis. Items number 1 and 3 (the same troublesome items seen in the previous analysis) depart substantially from the target loading on Factor 1. Nevertheless, the majority of the items correspond quite closely to those hypothesized in the target matrix. To test the significance of the correspondence between the rotated factor matrix and the

Table 5

Procrustes Rotation of the Self-monitoring Scale

| Subscale | Item Number | Factor 1 ref | Factor 1 tar | Factor 2 ref | Factor 2 tar |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ability to modify self-presentation | 1 | -52 | 0 | 97 | 1 |
| | 3 | 40 | 0 | 75 | 1 |
| | 7 | 17 | 0 | 88 | 1 |
| | 9 | -17 | 0 | 99 | 1 |
| | 10 | 28 | 0 | 83 | 1 |
| | 12 | -01 | 0 | 96 | 1 |
| | 13 | 06 | 0 | 93 | 1 |
| Sensitivity to expressive behavior | 2 | 97 | 1 | -07 | 0 |
| | 4 | 90 | 1 | 14 | 0 |
| | 5 | 85 | 1 | 24 | 0 |
| | 6 | 83 | 1 | 27 | 0 |
| | 8 | 98 | 1 | -12 | 0 |
| | 11 | 98 | 1 | -09 | 0 |

Note: Ref=reference vector matrix, Tar=hypothesized target matrix. Item numbers correspond to those used in Appendix F. The correlation between factors is .31.

target matrix, 100 completely randomized matrices were also rotated to the best approximation of target matrix. The logic behind this procedure is that if the number of random matrices which can be rotated to a better approximation of the target matrix than that seen in the actual data exceed 5, the probability level of the present solution is greater than .05 and the null hypothesis could not be rejected. If, on the other hand, the number of superior random matrices is less than 5, the rotated solution would be statistically significant beyond the .05 level.

This procedure was undertaken for the reference vector matrix presented in Table 5. The results showed that none of the 100 random matrices produced a fit superior to that observed in these data. Rotation of the factor structure produces an approximation of the target matrix that is significant beyond the .01 level (Lennox, 1985).

Although the previous analyses clearly support the stability of the original factor structure, they also point to a potential problem which may indicate a need for further refinement of the scale. To look more closely at this possible problem, an item analysis was conducted. The results are presented in Table 6. The correlations between items and subscales and total scale

Table 6

Item Analysis of the Self-monitoring Scale

| Subscale | Item Number | M | SD | rSS | rTS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ability to modify self-presentation | 1 | 3.5 | .8 | .14 | .07 |
| | 3 | 3.3 | 1.1 | .51* | .55* |
| | 7 | 2.7 | 1.0 | .34* | .33* |
| | 9 | 4.1 | 1.0 | .47* | .34* |
| | 10 | 3.2 | .9 | .54* | .57* |
| | 12 | 3.9 | 1.2 | .22* | .19 |
| | 13 | 3.3 | .8 | .61* | .35* |
| Sensitivity to Expressive behavior | 2 | 3.1 | 1.0 | .63* | .50* |
| | 4 | 3.4 | 1.0 | .47* | .42* |
| | 5 | 3.5 | .9 | .64* | .61* |
| | 6 | 3.3 | .9 | .49* | .48* |
| | 8 | 3.4 | .7 | .56* | .42* |
| | 11 | 2.9 | .9 | .55* | .39* |

Note: rSS=correlation of item with subscale score. rTS=correlation of item with total score. * indicates p .05. Item numbers correspond to those in Appendix oefficients alpha for Ability to modify self-presentation, sensitivity to expressive behavior, and the total score are .69, .80, and .79 respectively.

scores are presented along with descriptive statistics. All but three of these correlations are significant beyond .05. That item 12 fails to correlate significantly with the total scale may speak to the distinctiveness of the two subscales and not to a problem with the particular item. This is especially likely given that the item does correlate significantly with its subscale score. Item 1's failure to correlate significantly with either scale score is cause for slightly more concern. It implies that to include it in the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale is as questionable as it is to include it in the total scale score. Perhaps this item ought to be removed from consideration. The fact that the item shows a higher loading on Factor 1 in the results presented in Table 4 for the original sample, however, suggests that the correlation observed in the replication sample is spuriously low. Nevertheless, users of this version of the scale should view this item with some caution.

Coefficients alpha in this replication sample were .69 for the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale, .80 for the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior Subscale, and .79 for the Total SMS. All coefficients are thought to represent respectable levels of internal consistency for instruments in early development (Nunnally, 1978).

# CHAPTER TWO

# PROBLEM

## Problem: Validation of the Lennox-Wolfe SMS

Evidence presented thus far suggests that the present 13-item version of the self-monitoring scale possesses enough face validity and internal consistency to be considered a reasonable measure of the reconceptualized construct. This research, however, has focused on seeking assurances that the scale is psychometrically sound in a rather narrow view--in the manner in which its items intercorrelate and the way the scale correlates with other operational definitions. Whether or not the subscales are capable of identifying individual differences in their respective subconstructs has yet to be tested. That is, the individual differences in self-report must be linked to individual differences in behavioral patterns. Convergence has to be demonstrated between two methods of measuring self-monitoring: self-report and behavioral observation. Accordingly, the purpose of the present research is to seek these convergences: in Study 1, between the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale and behavioral displays of social acting ability, and in Study 2,

between the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior Subscale and behavioral evidence of such sensitivity. Study 2 is particularly important because Snyder's scale was unable to predict differences in the ability to decode expressive behavior. Therefore, if this version of the self-monitoring scale is to be considered superior to Snyder's, it should pass this test of validity. Only after assurances have been made that these self-reported characteristics are reflected in actual behavior can the Lennox-Wolfe SMS be considered an adequate measure of the self-monitoring construct.

A secondary purpose of Studies 1 and 2 is to investigate the possible gender differences in both expressive control and sensitivity to others' expression. It has been suggested that women are better able to send or encode nonverbal information than are men (Hall, 1984) and as such perhaps possess greater expressive control. In addition, Hall's (1984) results show that women are more susceptible to environmental information, which is consistent with the interpretation that they also possess greater sensitivity to interpersonal cues such as others' expression.

Taking another approach to validity, Study 3 examines the extent to which the Lennox-Wolfe SMS is capable of identifying individuals who also possess traits that are

presumably part of the self-monitor's personality profile. SMS scores should correlate predictably with measures that are theoretically relevant to the construct: High scorers on the SMS should be high in social self-esteem, high in interpersonal competency, low in avoidance of social acting situations, high in social acting skill, and high in perceived control over social environments. To the extent that these relationships fail to emerge, the validity of the SMS will become open to question, regardless of the results of Studies 1 and 2.

# CHAPTER THREE

## STUDY 1

According to Lennox and Wolfe's reconceptualization of the self-monitoring construct, it is necessary that the high SMS scorer be able to tailor his or her behavior to fit the immediate social situation. A valid measure of self-monitoring must therefore be able to differentiate persons having good control of their expressive behavior from those who do not have such control.

### Method

The first phase of the project involved linking scores on the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale to the ability to communicate arbitrary emotional states. The logic and methodology are similar to that used by Snyder (1974).

Subjects. Experimental subjects were 16 high and 16 low scorers on the Ability subscale selected from a pretest pool of 200 introductory psychology students who completed the SMS along with several other personality measures. The response format used with the SMS items was:

5) Certainly, always true

4) Generally true

3) Somewhat true, but with exception

2) Somewhat false, but with exception

1) Generally false

0) Certainly, always false

Experimental subjects were selected so that gender would be equally represented at both extremes of Ability. Low scorers were defined as subjects who scored 18 or below and high scorers were defined as subjects who scored 27 or above.

Procedures. Subjects attempted to portray three of six emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, fear, and surprise) while reading an emotionally neutral statement: "I have to go out for a while. I'll be gone all day. If anyone calls, just tell them I'm not in." Their portrayals were video taped.

The exact scenario was as follows:

The female experimenter greeted the subjects, showed them where to stand and instructed the them as to the nature of the experiment. They were reminded that the study was concerned with emotional expression and were told that their performance would be video taped. Video equipment was in clear view of the subjects. Subjects were instructed to consider the experimenter the recipient of the

subject's expression attempts. The experimenter was unaware of subjects' level of ability to modify self-presentation, and was trained to not respond to the subjects' interaction attempts. The same experimenter was used for all subjects. Subjects were informed that we were interested in people's abilities to realistically express emotions they do not feel. They were told that they would be presented with a series of three emotional descriptors on 3 X 5 cards. The three emotions were chosen at random from the six previously mentioned (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust). Subjects were instructed to express each of the emotions as realistically as possible while reading the previously mentioned passage. The passage was taped to the wall directly beneath the video camera. Subjects were also instructed to portray each emotion as though speaking to someone with whom they may conceivably interact.

Scoring Procedure. Once all expressive control sessions were completed, two male graduate students who were unaware of subjects' level of ability to modify self-presentation rated the acting attempts on a 10 point continuum ranging from extremely poor performance to extremely good performance. Each judge rated the video

tapes in the absence of the other and was aware of the specific emotion being portrayed. The interjudge correlation was .86 ($p < .000$). A composite score for each subject was calculated by averaging across acting attempts and across judges.

Analysis. In the first analysis the data were analyzed using an ANOVA procedure. A 2 X 2 factorial between groups design was used. It was expected that the results of the ANOVA would yield a significant main effect for ability to modify self-presentation with high scorers on the Ability Subscale receiving higher scores on the expressive control task. There was also expected to be a main effect for gender with women receiving higher scores than men. No interaction was hypothesized.

## Results and Discussion

The results of the Analysis of variance for the acting task are presented in Table 7. The total sample size for this study was 31. One male subject was not included in the analysis because his data were incomplete. When we spoke to him on the phone he said he had participated in the pretest session, but after the video taping we discovered that he had confused this study with another one and therefore we had no pretest scores with which to classify him. Attempts to contact him to take the pretest questionnaire at a later time

Table 7

Analysis of Variance of Expressive Control by Ability and Gender

| Source of Variations | SS | df | MS | F | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main effects | | | | | |
| Ablity | 16.8 | 1 | 16.8 | 5.4 | .027 |
| Gender | 17.3 | 1 | 17.3 | 5. | .025 |
| Interaction | | | | | |
| Ability X Gender | 2.8 | 1 | 2.8 | .9 | .352 |
| Residual | 83.3 | 27 | 3.1 | | |

failed. Therefore, cell sizes were slightly uneven for both Ability and gender. There were fifteen low scorers and sixteen high scorers on the Ability subscale and fifteen males and sixteen females.

The mean and standard deviation of quality of performance for the total group were 3.96 and 2.0, respectively. The hypothesized main effect of Ability is significant with the high scorers' performance ($M$ = 4.65, $SD$ = 1.8) judged as better than the low scorers' ($M$ = 3.22, $SD$ = 1.9). The hypothesized gender main effect is also significant with females' average performance ($M$ = 4.66, $SD$ = 2.0) exceeding males' ($M$ = 3.21, $SD$ = 1.8). The interaction effect is not significant.

The results show that the Ability Subscale is capable of predicting an important element of the self-monitoring process--control of expressive behavior. This finding constitutes clear evidence of construct validity. The results also indicate that women are better able to control their expressive behavior than are men. This is of course consistent with the previous findings of Hall (1984) and others.

These two significant effects combined with the nonsignificant interaction effect suggest that the Ability Subscale is a valid measure of control of expressive behavior for both male and female subjects.

It should be noted that ability to modify self-presentation produces approximately the same predictive accuracy as gender.

To determine whether the other self-monitoring subscale, Sensitivity to Others' Expressive Behavior could account for variance above that explained by the Ability scale, a multiple regression analysis with hierarchical inclusion was conducted. The Ability subscale alone produced a simple correlation with quality of performance of .37 and a squared multiple correlation of .13. When Sensitivity was added to the equation it produced a simple correlation of .61 and increased the squared multiple correlation to .37. These results indicate that the Sensitivity Subscale is a better predictor of expressive control than is the Ability Subscale. It is difficult to explain this surprising outcome; apparently both subscales tap important aspects of expressive control. Perhaps expressive control includes being sensitive to others' self-presentation. The ability to control one's expression may come from modeling others' expressive behavior. Thus one's repertoire of emotional expression may be governed in part by the ability to identify and imitate others' displays of particular emotions. Whatever the causal relationship, this result suggests a relatively strong

covariance between the two subscales and therefore supports the notion of a total scale score.

Taken together, these results suggest that the Lennox-Wolfe SMS is a valid measure of at least one facet of self-monitoring. Whether the Sensitivity scale is a valid measure of the ability to read and interpret social cues has yet to be tested. This test is the purpose of Study 2.

# CHAPTER 4

## STUDY 2

In the second phase of the project an attempt was made to demonstrate that the Sensitivity to Others' Expressive Behavior Subscale could be linked to actual differences in that ability. Here a convergence was sought between the self-report of sensitivity to expressive behavior and a behavioral demonstration of accuracy in decoding others' recorded attempts to express emotions.

### Method

Subjects. Subjects were 95 male and female undergraduates. There were 51 males and 44 females.

Procedures. After completing the Self-monitoring Scale, subjects were shown the 31 video tapes made in Study 1. Their task was to guess which of the six emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, fear, and surprise) the actors were attempting to portray. Each actor portrayed three emotions for a total of 93 stimulus presentations. Subjects were told that actors may have portrayed the same emotion more than once. The dependent measure was the number of correct guesses.

Results and Discussion

Table 8 presents the results of the Analysis of Variance performed on these data. The mean performance score for the 95 subjects was 50.58 with a standard deviation of 5.7. High and low scorers on the Sensitivity Subscale were defined by a median split of the distribution, with persons scoring above 19 designated as high scorers and those scoring 19 or lower as low scorers. As Table 8 shows, the results fail to support the hypothesis that high scorers show greater facility at decoding expressive behavior. The mean number of correct guesses among high scorers (M = 50.91, SD = 5.2) was not significantly greater than for low scorers (M = 50.15, SD = 5.3)

The procedure of defining subgroups by means of a median split is a common one, but it does have its shortcomings. For example, assuming some degree of error in measurement, classification of subjects who score near the median value is likely to be rather hazardous. The result is that subjects who are classified as high scorers in terms of the analysis, may in fact be low scorers. Of course the converse is also possible. The two groups defined this way are likely to be rather heterogeneous and thus the probability of a Type II error is increased. One way of reducing this heterogeneity is

Table 8

Analysis of Variance in Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior by Sensitivity and Gender

| Source of Variations | SS | df | MS | F | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main effects | | | | | |
| Sensitivity | 13.6 | 1 | 13.6 | .5 | .496 |
| Gender | 402.7 | 1 | 402.7 | 13.9 | .000 |
| Interaction | | | | | |
| Sensitivity X Gender | 4.1 | 1 | 4.1 | .1 | .708 |
| Residual | 2644.8 | 91 | 29.1 | | |

to exclude the middle group from the analysis and look only at "pure" groups at the ends of the distribution.

Such a procedure was undertaken using the top 14 subjects and the bottom 13 subjects (the approximate sample size used in Study 1). This procedure produces a greater difference between the two groups, with high scorers performing better ($M$ = 52.7, $SD$ = 5.0) than low scorers ($M$ = 48.0, $SD$ = 6.9). Using this definition of high and low scorers, the difference between the means does reach statistical significance ($F$ (1,25) = 4.22, $p < .05$). The male-female ratio for the low scoring group (7/6) did not differ significantly from that for the high scoring group (5/9). Although significant, the difference between the two groups is still approximately one half of a standard deviation which does not translate into a very large effect size.

As in Study 1, the predictive contribution of the other Self-monitoring Subscale, in this case Ability to Modify Self-presentation, to the dependent measure needs to be assessed. Entering Sensitivity first into the regression equation predicting decoding ability produces a simple correlation of .17 and a squared multiple correlation of .03. In the second step, Ability to Modify Self-presentation is added to the equation, producing a simple correlation of -.05 and a squared

multiple correlation of .045. The results here show that the Sensitivity Subscale produces only a marginally significant correlation ($p<.05$, one tailed test). Adding the Sensitivity Subscale fails to enhance prediction.

Table 8 also shows that the expected gender effect does appear. Results show that women are better able to decode emotional expression ($M$ = 52.8, $SD$ = 5.2) than men ($M$ = 48.7, $SD$ = 5.4). The difference in this case is approximately .77 standard deviations. This should be considered a moderate effect size.

In general, Study 2 produced much less convincing evidence of validity than Study 1. One has to seriously consider questioning the ability of the Self-monitoring Scale to predict accuracy of decoding of the emotions studied here. It is possible that the decoding task is too contrived to be a useful test of the scale's validity; artificiality is always a concern when analogue studies are used to investigate social phenomena. Whatever the case, the results of Study 2 provide only weak support for the validity of the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior Subscale. Clearly, further validation is needed.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## STUDY 3

Self-monitoring theory (Snyder, 1974, 1979) asserts that individuals oftentimes actively manipulate their self-presentations to fit the specific social setting. Other times, they rely on dispositional information such as moods, attitudes and personality characteristics to determine their behavior. The theory of self-monitoring also assumes that there are individual differences in the extent to which a person relies on each type of information. The high self-monitor is presumably responsive to cues from the proximal perceived social environment concerning the appropriateness of his or her behavior, while the low self-monitor's behavior is more closely linked to his or her dispositions and is not so much influenced by immediate social feedback.

The self-monitoring theory also depicts the high self-monitor as skillful at controlling his or her social behavior. For these individuals, situational cues are important sources of information indicating what actions are required in order make the most of the particular social encounter. While the self-monitor presumably regulates his own actions in accordance with other's

communications, his behavior does not necessarily reflect the values and expectations that prevail. In some instances, his choice of self-presentation may contradict the immediate social norm. That is, the motive to "fit in" is only one of many goals pursued by the self-monitor. According to Snyder, "high self-monitors regard themselves as flexible and adaptive individuals who shrewdly and pragmatically tailor their social behavior to fit situational and interpersonal specifications of appropriateness" (Snyder, 1979, p. 101). Appropriateness, though defined by the social setting, is not necessarily defined as consonant with social norms.

Low self-monitors are less likely to control thier self-presentation in this manner. The behavior of these individuals is presumed to be regulated more by internal factors such as dispositions, attitudes or beliefs, and less by characteristics of the immediate social situation. These people are more likely to regard their actions as true reflections of who they are and what they believe, and to act in ways that are congruent with their attitudes and beliefs. Their behavior is therefore not easily predicted from characteristics of the situation, and they may, as a result, run a greater risk of behaving inappropriately.

In this study, assurances are sought that the Lennox-Wolfe SMS identifies high scorers who are socially adept. Accordingly, high scorers on the scale ought to be high in social self-esteem, high in interpersonal competency, low in avoidance of situations requiring social acting, high in general and social self-efficacy, and high in active performance style.

While measures of self-monitoring should converge with measures of active acting styles, they ought to be empirically distinguishable from more passive styles of self-presentation. Arkin (1981) dichotomizes self-presentation into two general styles; acquisitive (characterized by attempts to achieve particular ends by manipulating others' attitudes or actions) and protective (seeking to avoid social disapproval). Because the high self-monitor actively seeks to present a particular image and does so with specific goals in mind, self-monitoring can be thought of as a type of acquisitive self-presentation. Moreover, given the shrewd and pragmatic orientation which is characteristic of the self-monitor, it would seem unlikely that such an individual would frequently resort to passive (or protective) styles. Thus, the Self-monitoring Scale should not correlate with measures of passive acting styles.

Method

Instruments. The Self-efficacy Scale (Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Pretice-Dunn, Jacobs & Rogers, 1982) was used to assess self-efficacy expectancy, the belief that one can successfully perform a given behavior. The scale's two subscales, General and Social, are directed at the perceived ability to perform behaviors 1) across a variety of situations, and 2) across various social situations, respectively. Experimental and correlational studies show the instruments to be valid and reliable.

Holland and Baird (1968) take a slightly different approach to assessing social effectiveness than do Sherer et al. Defining interpersonal competency as consisting of 1) health, 2) intelligence, 3) empathy, 4) autonomy, and 5) creativity, these authors created items for the five qualities and developed the Interpersonal Competency Scale. Although the internal consistency is somewhat less than optimal (K-R 20 = .69 for males, and .67 for females), Holland and Baird (1968) provide impressive evidence of concurrent and predictive construct validity. For this reason, the rather modest levels of internal consistency can be regarded as acceptable.

To measure self-worth in the social situation, Lawson, Marshall, and McGrath's (1979) Social Self-esteem Inventory was employed. While there are many other more

widely used measures of self-esteem, none are directed specifically at the social domain within which the self-monitor theoretically excels. The instrument is face valid and is apparently reliable (test-retest = .88). However, extensive behavioral validation on the Social Self-esteem Inventory is lacking.

Ring and Walston (1968) propose that actor-based sources of variance in interpersonal behavior are fundamentally linked to individuals' styles of performance. The authors further propose three distinct performance styles of interaction with others. Style P involves the avoidance of social situations requiring acting. The person high in style P presumably lacks social agility and when the situation calls for something other than simply "being himself," he feels incompetent and ill-at-ease. Performance style R represents the opposite of the P style. The person high in style R is skilled in interpersonal relations and is said to oftentimes exhibits certain Machiavellian styles. Thus the R style involves an active pursuit of social goals through impression management. This construct might also be referred to as active acting style. Performance style C differs from R in that the goals of self-presentation seem to be limited to fitting in with the immediate social setting. This passive orientation means that the

C person's behavior is predictable from the social norm (that is, it is likely to be consonant with social expectations), whereas the R person's behavior may run counter to social norms. This construct might also be called passive acting style.

The Performance Style Test is a widely used instrument for the measurement of these styles and is considered generally reliable and valid. For further information on the scale, the reader is directed to Ring and Walston's article (1968).

A sample of 219 male and female undergraduate students took part in the study. Subjects responded to a 141-item questionnaire containing the Lennox-Wolfe SMS and measures of general and social self-efficacy (Sherer et al., 1982; Appendix A), social self-esteem (Lawson et al., 1979; Appendix C), interpersonal competency (Holland & Baird, 1968; Appendix B), and three performance styles; P, avoidance of social acting situations; R, active acting style; and C, passive acting style (Ring & Walston, 1968; Appendix D).

## Results and Discussion

The results of the correlational analysis are presented in Table 9. Because of the potential for inflated correlations among these measures as a function of common method variance, an extremely conservative

Table 9

Correlates of the Lennox-Wolfe Self-monitoring Scale

| Variable | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Ability | 46* | 87* | 53* | 56* | -47* | 52* | -18 | 45* | 49* |
| 2 Sensitivity | | 84* | 35* | 49* | -27* | 35* | -19 | 22* | 38* |
| 3 SMS (1+2) | | | 52* | 61* | -44* | 51* | -21* | 40* | 52* |
| 4 Est | | | | 55* | -72* | 71* | -08 | 59* | 74* |
| 5 IC | | | | | -65* | 65* | -22* | 57* | 53* |
| 6 "P" | | | | | | -85* | 08 | -49* | -62* |
| 7 "R" | | | | | | | -49* | 52* | 69* |
| 8 "C" | | | | | | | | -14 | -21* |
| 9 GSE | | | | | | | | | 58* |
| 10 SSE | | | | | | | | | |

Note: * = $p < .001$; Ability=Ability to Modify Self-presentation; Sensitivity = Sensitivity to Other's Expressive Behavior; Est = Social Self-esteem; IC = Interpersonal Competency; "P" = Avoidance of Acting Situations; "R" = Active Acting Style; "C" = Passive Acting Style; GSE = General Self-efficacy; SSE = Social Self-efficacy

alpha level is used ($p < .001$). Despite this strict criterion, however, virtually all the hypothesized relationships appear. The only exceptions are the rs between the Self-monitoring subscales and Ring and Walston's passive acting style.

Subscale Intercorrelations. The distinctiveness of the factors as illustrated by the data summarized in Table 4 raises the question of whether the SMS can yield a meaningful total score (that is, one summed across all 13 items). Even though the items define separate factors, the subscale scores produce a significant and substantial intercorrelation (.46, $p < .001$). The two subscales yield extremely high rs with the total scale score. Of course most of this correlation is due to item repetition. Nevertheless, the r of .46 appears to constitute sufficient evidence to support a total scale score.

Social Self-esteem. How does the high scorer on the Lennox-Wolfe SMS feel about himself or herself as a participant in interpersonal relationships? Correlations of the SMS subscales and total score with the Social Self-esteem Inventory are all positive and substantial, suggesting that these individuals have a positive feeling of social self worth.

Interpersonal Competency. Do high scorers on the

SMS show the attributes of interpersonal competency? The pattern of rs between the SMS scale and subscales and Holland and Baird's scale indicate that these individuals possess to some extent the attributes (health, intelligence, empathy, autonomy, and creativity) thought by Holland and Baird to comprise interpersonal competency. If this definition is correct, the high scorer on the SMS appears to be an effective, well-rounded social participant.

"P": Avoidance of Social Acting Situations. If the self-monitoring scale measures a construct associated with social acting skill, it would seem reasonable to expect high scorers to score low on the tendency to avoid social acting situations. Ring and Walston's (1968) performance style *P* measures such a tendency. The negative *r*s between the self-monitoring scores and the *P* scale indicate that high SMS scorers do not avoid these types of situations.

"R": Active Acting Style. Ring and Walston's *R* performance style assesses one's tendency to rely on assertive patterns of self-presentation. These types of actors possess precisely the kinds of interpersonal skills expected of the self-monitor. The Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale should correlate quite highly with this scale, and does: $r = .52$.

"C": Passive Acting Style. Ring and Walston's C scale measures the type of self-presentation used by those who tend to rely heavily on unassertive strategies such as compliance and conformity. To the extent that self-monitoring represents acquisitive self-presentation and performance style C represents protective self-presentation, self-monitoring scores ought to be unrelated to scores on the C scale. While the rs between the self-monitoring scores and the C scale are among the lowest in the correlation matrix, they are marginally significant and consistently negative. The correlations are not inconsistent with the requirements of self-monitoring theory.

Self-efficacy. The last two columns of the correlation matrix concern an individual's perceptions of his or her ability to engage effectively in a number of behaviors. The self-monitor is likely to consider himself or herself capable of coping effectively in a wide range of situations. This ought to be especially true in the domain of social interaction. Sherer et al.'s Self-efficacy scale (general and social domains) correlate positively with all self-monitoring scores.

Taken together, the correlations presented in Table 9 offer clear support for the claim that high scorers on the Self-monitoring scale tend to describe themselves as

likely to use assertive patterns of self-presentation and to regard themselves as socially effective individuals. Consistent with the theory's requirement of social facility, high scorers on the scale also report that they are quite comfortable and skillful in a variety of social situations.

It should be noted, however, that the criterion variables in Table 9 are themselves highly intercorrelated; the reader should therefore be cautioned against making too much of this display of rs. Further research must focus on behavioral indices of social effectiveness. Nevertheless, the evidence reported here does suggest that the Lennox-Wolfe SMS is worthy of serious consideration as a measure of the self-monitoring construct.

# CHAPTER SIX

# CONCLUSIONS

## Implications

The three studies described here attempt to validate the Lennox-Wolfe SMS. In order for the scale to be a useful measure of the self-monitoring construct, it must adequately tap the components of self-monitoring and must not be measuring anything else.

Factor analysis of the scale produces two factors that appear to represent the two dimensions thought by Lennox and Wolfe to comprise the construct. There seem to be no additional irrelevant factors which may confound the measurement of self-monitoring. In addition, item analysis of the scale suggests that each subscale and total scale possess adequate internal consistency.

The search for convergence between the Lennox-Wolfe self-report measure and behavioral indices of relevant self-monitoring variables produces somewhat equivocal results. While there is little doubt that the Ability to Modify Self-presentation Subscale converges with judged social acting skill, the Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior Subscale produces little evidence of convergence with its behavioral criterion. The Sensitivity Subscale

therefore should be used with some caution.

A major shortcoming of Snyder's self-monitoring scale is the tendency for its factors to correlate with measures of social ineptitude. For example, Briggs, Cheek, and Buss (1980) reported a positive correlation between the Other-directedness factor and and shyness and trait anxiety, and Cheek and Briggs (1982) reported a negative correlation between the same factor and self-confidence. According to Snyder, self-monitoring is the process by which a shrewd and pragmatic actor achieves social fluency or adroitness. It seems unlikely that high scorers on the Other-directedness factor are particularly skilled in social situations.

Study 3 produces some evidence that high scorers on both SMS subscales are interpersonally competent, high in social self-esteem, and consider themselves capable of a wide variety of behaviors required to be a successful social interactant. However, the correlations presented in Table 9 presume construct validity of all measures in the matrix and also are likely to be inflated by common method variance and item similarity. It seems unlikely, though, that correlations of the magnitude seen in Table 9 are accounted for only by these factors. Furthermore, the use of multiple measures allows for triangulation of definition that should offset any particularly poor

measures in the matrix.

Given these results, we can be reasonably confident that the Lennox-Wolfe SMS can be used to assess individual differences in self-monitoring tendencies. It is likely that use of this measure will facilitate research in the area by providing a more precise index than Snyder's scale. The substantial accumulation of evidence questioning the validity of Snyder's scale raises some rather serious questions regarding the existing research on the construct. If the total score on Snyder's scale is basically uninterpretable, as the factor analytic studies suggest it is, then one has to wonder what construct or set of constructs actually explain existing results. One possibility is that the original scale was at least partially capable of measuring self-monitoring. If this is the case, then we can expect to see some replicability of results with the Lennox-Wolfe SMS. If, on the other hand, Snyder's scale was hopelessly confounded, then perhaps research in self-monitoring must start over again.

Arkin's recent work on self-presentation strategies (1981) indirectly pointed to possible hazards in the assessment of self-presentation by explicating two distinct categories of impression management. The acquisitive style of self-presentation involves the use

of assertive strategies in the service of achieving some unspecified goal. The protective style involves the use of unassertive behavioral patterns in the service of protecting the self from negative feedback. While it's likely that most people use both styles to some extent, it is unlikely that a single person relies heavily on both. Each of the factors emerging from Snyder's scale seems to tap one or the other of Arkin's styles. For example, a case can be made that the Acting Ability factor (see Table 2) measures acquisitive self-presentation and the Other-directedness Factor measures protective self-presentation. The result of a summed score across these factors does in fact seems to be meaningless.

To what type of impression management does self-monitoring belong? Some key descriptors associated with the self-monitoring individual in Snyder's writings (1974, 1979) identify the self-monitor as a shrewd and pragmatic operator, one who systematically exploits social situations for his own purposes. The self-monitor presumably uses self-presentation to enhance favored treatment in social circumstances and not merely to protect himself or herself from interpersonal rejection. Viewing self-monitoring this way uncovers a marked similarity between self-monitoring and the

machiavellianism construct (Christie & Geis, 1970). Both self-monitors and machavellians appear to rely on self-presentation strategies to acquire unspecified interpersonal advantages. However, Christie and Geis (1970) ascribe to the machiavellian certain power-seeking related characteristics that are not altogether consistent with the notion of self-monitoring. These characteristics are:

1. A relative lack of affect in interpersonal relationships.
2. A lack of concern with conventional morality.
3. Low ideological commitment.

These characteristics speak to a type of social pragmatism which seems more extreme than that exhibited by the self-monitor. Nevertheless, there are some obvious similarities.

. Even though similar to machiavellianism, self-monitoring is likely to enhance our understanding of impression management by allowing us a more fine-grained typology. Self-monitoring is not only a process by which one achieves specific goals, but refers also to general interpersonal effectiveness. Perhaps the self-monitor uses his or her skills of social acting and sensitivity to others' expressive behavior in the immediate service of interpersonal competency which may ultimately

## Some Closing Comments on the Dramaturgical Metaphor

Use of the life-as-theater metaphor for the study of social behavior has a long history in the social sciences, from James (1890) through Mead (1934) to Goffman (1959). Over the years writers have used the metaphor with varying degrees of fidelity to the dramaturgical analogue. Burke (1962) for example, takes the metaphor quite literally, defining the five key terms of dramatism. He uses these terms--act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose to support his argument that ordinary human motives and interactions can be understood from the perspective of a theatrical performance. Snyder (1979) also invokes dramaturgy in describing the self-monitoring process and even attempts to operationalize the construct with stage acting items. Buss and Briggs summarize this view by stating that "presumably people are always onstage, playing to either an immediate, real audience or a generalized imaginary audience" (1984, p. 1311).

Buss and Briggs (1984) point out that the current use of the dramaturgical metaphor is limited to an impression management model of social behavior. These authors suggest that social psychologists employ an extreme situational view which proposes that virtually all behavior can be explained by knowledge of the demand characteristics of the particular social setting. The

social psychological and sociological view of man, then, shows a lack of any defined self apart from the social setting. Man has no single self as such; he has many social selves (James, 1890). Buss and Briggs take issue with this extreme stance because it ignores obvious personality characteristics that are likely to be manifested in instances when impression management is not called for. Although they see the metaphor as useful, they note that much of real life takes place "offstage" and that the metaphor applies best to circumstances in which one is "onstage" (consciously or unconsciously attempting to present oneself in a particular way).

Schlenker and Leary (1982) also refer to the life-as-theater metaphor, but emphasize the distinction between contingent and noncontingent interaction (which characterize social acting and stage acting, respectively). Social acting requires sensitivity and attention to many interpersonal cues that are not part of the theatrical performance. Stage acting proceeds according to a predetermined script; paying too much attention to the audience may cause the actor to miss his lines. Not paying attention to the audience in the social context will, however, undermine the interaction and may wreck it completely (Goffman, 1967, pp. 119-129). Schlenker and Leary thus identify another major

limitation of the dramaturgical metaphor.

There is also an intuitive limitation to the drama analogue stemming from its use of a unidirectional link between actor and audience. Actor and audience do not actually interact per se; there is no explicit dialogue between actor and audience. This dialectical or give-and-take relationship between interactants is the essence of social intercourse and it is not represented in the dramaturgical metaphor at all. This deficiency makes the metaphor a poor model of social behavior.

Considering the apparent shortcomings of the life-as-theater metaphor, why is it that such notable writers as Goffman and others continue to use it without qualification? The answer to this question may lie in the varying levels of analysis used to study human behavior. At the distal level the dramaturgical metaphor with its emphasis on scripts, roles and audiences may be appropriate. For example, an average adult entering a drug store has a script of appropriate behaviors for that setting. He is unlikely to violate the script by, say, ordering a beer. Instead, he must walk through the store looking at merchandise and ultimately buying something.

At the proximal level, however, this individual's potential behaviors are less resticted, and they depend heavily on the inputs from various other interactants.

The dramaturgical metaphor does not allow for this type of specificity. In fact, the stage metaphor is a one-way affair; its actors and audiences each have relatively prescribed functions that limit the nature of their actions. The limits are a great deal broader in everyday social intercourse, where each interactant is both actor and audience, more or less continuously and simultaneously. For example, while a person is listening to another's argument, some amount of attention is probably given to framing her own argument. She is simultaneously an actor and an audience, although she alternates between these functions in her overt behavior. The dramaturgical metaphor imposes a sort of stability of function on human interaction that is simply untenable.

Though limited by its unidirectional nature, the dramaturgical metaphor's appeal is not surprising. Virtually all of our statistical techniques are also unidirectional (they involve the partitioning of variance into sources) which is of course required by any analytic science. Nevertheless, that man and his environment are reciprocally related (i.e., man affects the environment and the environment affects man) means that individual contributions are not fully specifiable, and analytic science is of limited utility. Because all of the relevant, ever-changing cues operating at a given moment

cannot be identified, the package of predictors is necessarily incomplete. And, analytic science is at somewhat of a loss when it comes to dealing the kind of active, proximal reciprocity that characterizes face-to-face social exchange. For these reasons, our methods of conceptualization and measurement drastically distort the social phenonema we investigate and this fact the investigator must always keep in mind.

## REFERENCES


Arkin, R. M. (1981). Self-presentation styles. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), Impression management: Theory and Social Psychological research. New York: Academic Press.

Berscheid, E., Monson, T., & Dermer, M. (1976). Outcome dependency: Attention, attribution and attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 987-989.

Block, J. (1961). Ego identity, role variability, and adjustment. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 25, 392-397.

Briggs, S. R., Cheek, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1980). Analysis of the self-monitoring scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 679-686.

Brownfain, J. J. (1952). Stability of the self-concept as a dimension of personality. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47, 597-606.

Burke, K. (1962). On human behavior considered dramaturgically. In D. Brissett and C. Edgley (Eds.), Life as theater. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

Buss, A. H., & Briggs, S. R. (1984). Drama and the self in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1310-1324.

Campus, N. (1974). Transituational consistency as a dimension of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 593-600.

Cattell, R. B. (1978). The scientific use of factor analysis. New York: Plenum Press.

Cattell, R. R., Eber, H. W., & Tatsuoka, M. M. (1970). Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. Champaign, IL.: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing.

Cheek, J. M. & Briggs, S. R. (1981). Self-consciousness, Self-monitoring, and aspects of identity. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles.

Christie, R., & Geiss, F. L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press.

Eysenck, S. B. G., & Eysenck, H. J. (1975). Manual for the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. San Diego: Educational and Industrial Testing Service.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43, 522-527.

Gabrenya, W. K., Jr., & Arkin, R. M. (1980). Self-monitoring: Factor structure and correlates. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6, 13-22.

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor.

Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor.

Gorsuch, R. L. (1974). Factor Analysis. Philadelphia: Saunders.

Gough, H. G., & Heilbrun, A. B. (1980). The Adjective Check List Manual. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Hall, J. A. (1984). Nonverbal sex differences . Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Harman, H. H. (1976). Modern factor analysis (3rd. ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Holland, J. L., & Baird, L. L. (1968). An interpersonal competency scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 28, 503-510.

James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology(Vol. 1). New York: Holt.

Jessor, R., & Jessor, S. (1977). Problem behavior and psychosocial development. N.Y.: Academic Press.

Jones E. E., & Baumeister, R. (1976). The self-monitor looks as the ingratiator. Journal of Personality, 44, 654-674.

Lawson, J. S., Marshall W. L., & McGrath P. (1979). The social self-esteem inventory. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 39, 803-811.

Lennox, R. D. (1983). Self-monitoring, social acting, and stage acting. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia

Lennox, R. D. (1984). Public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and variability of social behavior. Psychological Reports, 54, 911-914.

Lennox, R. D. (1985). Factor structure of the Lennox-Wolfe Self-monitoring scale. Unpublished manuscript.

Lennox R. D., & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). A revision of the self-monitoring scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1348-1364.

Lippa, R. (1976). Expressive control and the leakage of dispositional introversion-extraversion during role-played teaching. Journal of Personality, 44, 541-559.

Lippa, R. (1978). The effects of expressive control on expressive consistency and on regulation between expressive behavior and personality. Journal of Personality, 46, 438-461.

Maslach, C., Stapp, J., & Santee, R. T. (1981). The individuation scale. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicigo Press.

Moos, R. H. (1968). Situational analysis of a therapeutic community milieu. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 73, 49-61.

Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill.

Ring, K., & Walston, K. (1968). A test to measure peformance styles in interpersonal relations. Psychological Reports, 18, 203-220.

Sarbin, T, R., & Allen, V. L. (1968). Role theory. In G. Lindsey and E. Aronson (Ed.), The handbook of social psychology. MA. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.

Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: a conceptualization and model. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 641-669.

Seigman, A. W., & Reynolds, M. (1982). The validity of Snyder's self-monitoring scale as a measure of expressive self-control. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association.

Sherer, M., Maddux, J. E., Mercandante, B., Prentice-Dunn, S., Jacobs, B., & Rogers, R. W. (1982). The self-efficacy scale: construction and validation. Psychological Reports, 51, 663-671.

Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 526-537.

Snyder, M. (1979). Self-monitoring process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12). N.Y.: Academic Press.

Snyder, M., & Monson, T. C. (1975). Persona, situations and the control of social behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 637-644.

Stewart, A., & Carley, L. (1984). Personality characteristics of extreme scorers on the self-monitoring scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58, 199-205

Tedeschi, J. T., & Reiss, M. (1981). Identities, the phenomenal self, and laboratory research. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), Impression management theory and social psychological research. N.Y.: Academic Press.

Watson, D., & Friend, R. (1968). Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33, 448-451.

Wolfe, R. N., Lennox, R. D., & Hudiburg, R. A. (1983). Self-monitoring and sex as moderator variables in the statistical explanation of self-reported marijuana and alcohol use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1069-1074.

APPENDIX A

THE SELF-EFFICACY SCALE

General Self-efficacy

1. When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work

2. One of my problems is that I cannot get down to work when I should.

3. If I can't do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can.

4. When I set important goals for myself, I rarely achieve them.

5. I give up on things before completing them.

6. I avoid facing difficulties.

7. If something looks too complicated, I will not even bother to try it.

8. When I have something unpleasant to do, I stick to it until I finish it.

9. When I decide to do something, I go right to work on it.

10. When trying to learn something new, I soon give up if I am not initially successful.

11. When unexpected problems occur, I don't handle them well.

12. I avoid trying to learn new things when they look too difficult for me.

13. Failure just makes me try harder.

14. I feel insecure about my ability to do things.

15. I am a self-reliant person.

16. I give up easily.

17. I do not seem capable of dealing with most problems that come up in life.

Social Self-efficacy

1. It is difficult for me to make new friends.

2. If I see someone I would like to meet, I go to that person instead of waiting for him or her to come to me.

3. If I see someone interesting who is hard to make friends with, I'll soon stop trying to make friends with that person.

4. When I am trying to become friends with someone who seems uninterested at first, I don't give up easily.

5. I do not handle myself well in social gatherings.

6. I have acquired my friends through my personal abilities at making friends

# APPENDIX B

## INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCY SCALE

1. I have a reputation for being able to cope with difficult people.

2. I find it easy to talk with all kinds of people.

3. I find it easy to play many roles -- student, leader, church goer, athelete, travelor etc.

4. I am good at playing charades.

5. People seek me out to tell me their troubles.

6. My physical endurance is greater than that of the average person my age.

7. I think I have unusual skill for assessing the motivation of other students.

8. My physical energy is greater than that of the average person my age.

9. I have unusual skills for making groups, clubs, or organizations function effectively.

10. If I want to, I can be a very persuasive person.

11. I have a clear picture of what I am like as a person.

12. I know what I want to do with my life.

13. My physical health is excellent.

14. My friends think that I am shrewd and insightful about other people.

15. I have good coordination.

16. I would enjoy being an actor (actress).

17. Most of the time, I have an optimistic outlook.

18. My friends regard me as a person with good practical judgement.

19. I am seldom ill.

20. I believe I have good practical judgement.

# APPENDIX C

## SOCIAL SELF-ESTEEM

1. I find it hard to talk to strangers.
2. I lack confidence with people.
3. I am socially effective.
4. I feel confident in social situations.
5. I am easy to like.
6. I get along well with other people.
7. I make friends easily.
8. I am lively and witty in social situations.
9. When I am with other people I lose self-confidence.
10. I find it difficult to make friends.
11. I am no good at all from a social standpoint.
12. I am a reasonably good conversationalist.
13. I am popular with people my own age.
14. I am afraid of large parties.
15. I truly enjoy myself at social functions.
16. I usually say the wrong things when I talk to people.
17. I am confident at parties.
18. I am usually unable to think of anything interesting to say to people.
19. I am a bore with most people.
20. People do not find me interesting.
21. I am nervous with people who are not close friends.
22. I am quite good at making people feel at ease with me.

23. I am more shy than most people.
24. I am a friendly person.
25. I can hold people's interest easily.
26. I don't have much "personality."
27. I am a lot of fun to be with.
28. I am quite content with myself as a person.
29. I am quite awkward in social situations.
30. I do not feel at ease with other people.

# APPENDIX D

## THE PERFORMANCE STYLE TEST

1. I would be uncomfortable in anything other than fairly conventional dress.

2. If given the chance I would make a good leader of people.

3. I have skill in influencing people.

4. I must admit that I enjoy trying to manipulate others for my own purposes.

5. I like to do things that other people regard as unconventional.

6. I often find it's difficult to get people to do me favors, even when I have the right to expect them.

7. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about.

8. I find it easy to get along with people.

9. I dislike having to behave according to the rules of etiquette.

10. In most social situations, I feel tense and constrained.

11. I can fit in pretty easily with any group of people.

12. It's usually easy for me to persuade others to my own point of view.

13. I like to conform to custom and avoid doing things that people I respect might consider unconventional.

14. I think I could be a sucessful businessman if I wanted to.

15. I like to avoid situations where I am expected to do things in a conventional way.

16. I usually find it difficult to change someone else's opinions.

17. When serving on a committee I like to be appointed or elected chairman.

18. I must admit I try to see what others think before I take a stand.

19. I can easily make other people afraid of me, and sometimes do for the fun of it.

20. A person should adapt his ideas and his behavior to the group that happens to be with him as the time.

21.I do not mind meeting strangers.

22. I think I'd enjoy being an actor (actress).

23. At parties I am more likely to sit by myself or with one other person than to join in with the crowd.

24. I can usually get people to do what I want.

25. I usually have trouble making myself heard in an argument.

26. I like to be the center of attention in a group.

27. People can pretty easily change me even though I thought my mind was already made up on a subject.

28. Even the idea of giving a talk in public makes me afraid.

29. I think I would enjoy being a salesman.

30. I like to meet new people.

31. I don't like participating in formal ceremonies.

32. If I'm with someone I don't like, I usually don't express my real feelings to him.

33. I like to follow instructions and do what is expected of me.

34. I find it hard to talk when I meet new people.

35. I frequently feel intense sympathy for others.

36. I enjoy being with other people who are suave and sophisticated.

37. I think it's important to learn how to obey.

38. I think most people would like to get ahead.

39. When in a new situation, it's best to watch what others do.

40. I enjoy being the host (or hostess) of a party.

41. I feel I can handle myself pretty well in most social situations.

42. I sometimes enjoy misleading people just for the fun of it.

43. I can deceive people if I have to without feeling guilty about it.

44. I don't mind pretending to like someone when I really don't if there's a good reason to do so.

45. I like people to notice and to comment upon my appearance when I am out in public.

46. I often feel like telling people what I really think of them.

47. I feel ill at ease with people I don't know.

48. I have no dread of going into a room by myself where other people have already gathered and are talking.

49. I am a good mixer.

50. I like to go to parties.

51. In general, I find that I dislike nonconformists.

52. I don't like to be too conspicuous in social gatherings.

53. I should like to belong to several clubs or lodges.

54. I often find that my wishes conflict with those of others.

55. I feel guilty whenever I have done something I know is wrong.

# APPENDIX E

## SNYDER'S SELF-MONITORING SCALE

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of others.

2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.

3. At parties and social gatherings, I don't attempt to do or say things that others will like.

4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.

5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.

6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.

7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues.

8. I would probably make a good actor.

9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.

10. I sometimes appear to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am.

11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.

12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.

13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different people.

14. I am not particularly good at making people like me.

15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.

16. I am not always the person that I appear to be.

17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor.

18. I have considered being an entertainer.

19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else.

20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.

21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

23. I feel a bit awkward in company and don't show up quite as well as I should.

24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end).

25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

# APPENDIX F

## THE LENNOX-WOLFE SELF-MONITORING SCALE

### Ability to Modify Self-presentation

1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel something else is called for.

3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.

7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.

9. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.

12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.

13. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.

### Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others

2. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.

4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.

5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.

6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.

8. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate to someone by reading it in the listener's eyes.

11. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.