

Turkism: An Ottoman Era Ideology in Search of a Modern State

by

Wesley Lummus, B.A.

A Thesis

In

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
of Texas Tech University in  
Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for  
the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Dr. Saad Abi-Hamad  
Chair of Committee

Dr. Laura Calkins

Dr. Aliza Wong

Peggy Gordon Miller  
Dean of the Graduate School

May, 2011

Copyright 2011, Wesley Lummus

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the product of four years of intensive study under the direction Prof. Saad Abi-Hamad. As both an undergraduate and graduate student, I have benefited immensely from Prof. Abi-Hamad's expertise on the history of the Modern Middle East. Prof. Abi-Hamad's instruction has been fundamental to my conception of Turkey during the Kemalist period. For his four years of continued support for the research, Turkish language acquisition, reading and writing it took to produce this thesis, I am truly grateful.

In addition, Profs. Alan Barenberg, Paul Bjerk, Laura Calkins, Stefano D'Amico, Lynne Fallwell, and Aliza Wong were instrumental in my academic development during this period. Profs. Barenberg, Bjerk and Fallwell were influential in forming my conception of the inner workings of seemingly monolithic nationalizing states (Soviet, Post-Colonial, and National Socialist respectively). Profs. Calkins, D'Amico and Wong guided me through various theoretical perspectives (Marxist, Nationalist, Post-Modern) so indelible to the field of history.

I also extend my deepest appreciation to the History Department's Idris Traylor European Research Travel Fellowship for providing support for my archival research in Paris. This fund allowed me to collect the materials necessary for analysis of the Kemalist state. My thanks are also extended to the American Research Institute in Turkey for providing me with a fellowship to study Turkish in Istanbul for the summer of 2010.

I would also like to thank Profs. Meltem Kelepir, Günizi Kartal, Mine Nakipoğlu Demiralp as well as Mr. Onur Uludağ, for their invaluable instruction in Turkish language and grammar.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE KEMALIST STATE’S REVOLUTION	8
EARLY HISTORIOGRAPHY: SINGLE PARTY PERIOD	9
HISTORIOGRAPHY DURING THE RULE OF THE DEMOCRAT PARTY (1950-1960)	13
THE 1960S: THE COUP, POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY	15
1980-1985: VIOLENCE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY	22
IS TURKEY PART OF EUROPE OR THE MIDDLE EAST: COMPARATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY	27
CONCLUSION	30
II. IMPLEMENTING TURKISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ANATOLIA	32
THE FRENCH CONNECTION	34
THE NEW TURKISH STATE	39
MOBILIZATION OF THE YOUTH OF THE IZMIR HALKEVI	42
TURKISM, MODERNIZATION AND SINGLE PARTY GOVERNANCE	49
CONCLUSION	53
III. GÖKALP’S “PROPRE” TURK: MUSTAFA KEMALS AS A COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF TURKISM	55
DURKHEIM, GÖKALP AND COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION	58
MUSTAFA KEMAL: GÖKALP’S “GREAT TURK”	63

MUSTAFA KEMAL’S ANATOLIA TOURS	70
“ATATÜRK”	78
CONCLUSION	82
IV. KEMALIST LAIKLIK: AN IDEOLOGY OF IMPROVISATION AND PRAGMATISM	83
GÖKALP AND SECULARISM	84
GÖKALP AND RIDA: TURKIST AND ISLAMISTS’ VIEWS OF THE “NEW” CALIPHATE	86
ABOLISHING THE CALIPHATE: THE FIRST PHASE OF KEMALIST LAIKLIK	90
AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND TURKISH SECULARISTS	95
KEMALIST “PATRONS” OF ISLAM: TURKISH LAIKLIK 1930-1938	99
CONCLUSION	106
V. CONCLUSION	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY	112

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

“Nationalism” writes Elie Kedourie, “...is a comprehensive doctrine which leads to a distinctive style of politics.”<sup>1</sup> Kedourie uses the qualifiers *comprehensive* and *distinctive* to differentiate political nationalism from mere patriotism or xenophobia, because it is nationalism alone that “...asserts a particular doctrine of the state [and] of the individual’s relation to it.”<sup>2</sup> This characterization of nationalism defines the Kemalist state from 1919 until the death of Mustafa Kemal in November of 1938. During this period, the state employed both a comprehensive doctrine and a distinctive style of politics in order to foment a full-scale social revolution aimed at the complete Turkification of its populace. The state’s comprehensive doctrine was known as *Turkism*, and its distinctive style of politics was the single party state. The term *Turkism*, rather than *Kemalism*, will be used for two specific reasons. The first is that *Turkism* provides continuity with the ideology of the Turkist intellectuals whose theoretical writings were the foundation for the Kemalist state’s nationalist doctrine. These intellectuals, writing in the Tanzimat and Late Ottoman periods, were distinct from previous generations of intellectuals due to their new *function*<sup>3</sup> in society; namely “[their] active participation in practical life, as constructor[s], organizer[s], ‘permanent persuader[s]’ and not [acting as]

---

<sup>1</sup> Elie Kedourie, “Nationalism and Self Determination,” in *Oxford Readers: Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 50.

<sup>2</sup> Kedourie, “Nationalism and Self Determination,” 50.

<sup>3</sup> For more on the differentiation of “new” intellectuals from “old” by social function, see *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

just simple orator[s].”<sup>4</sup> In other words, the Turkist intellectuals of the Late Ottoman period sought to capitalize on their elite status, distinguished by their employment in the state’s bureaucracy and their extensive western education, to fundamentally alter state and society in Anatolia along Turkist lines. Their writings were received, modified and implemented by the Kemalist state in the effort to spread Turkism and its tenets in post-Ottoman Anatolia. In particular, the works of one particular Ottoman-era Turkist, Ziya Gökalp, exerted considerable influence on the Kemalists with regard to the formation of a comprehensive doctrine and its application. Gökalp stood out from other Ottoman-era Turkists not only because he was the most prolific contributor to the ideology of Turkism, but also because he drew up a workable *blueprint*, the 1923 treatise *The Principles of Turkism*, from which the future Kemalist state would implement this ideology.

The second reason to use the term *Turkism*, rather than *Kemalism*, is that, though Mustafa Kemal played an instrumental role in implementing this ideology, it is necessary to keep with the latest historiographic trends by focusing on how the state as a whole defined and enacted Turkism. *Kemalism* refers specifically to the six principles (republicanism, secularism, nationalism, etatism, populism, and reformism) enshrined as late as 1937 in the Turkish constitution. During the period from 1924 to 1938, these six principles were yet to be fully solidified as the state’s comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, to be as exact as possible, this thesis will avoid speaking about *Kemalism* in order to

---

<sup>4</sup> Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 10.

illustrate that *Turkism*, the ideology of the Ottoman-era Turkists, served as the state's doctrine from 1924-1938.

The use of *Turkism* over *Kemalism* may prompt several historiographic concerns; namely, how can a *Kemalist* state not enact *Kemalism*? The response to this concern lies in the specific way this work will use the term "Kemalist." This thesis will use the term "Kemalist" as Erik J. Zürcher, the leading scholar on Late Ottoman and Early Republican Turkish history, used it: to denote a specific faction that emerged from bloc of Turkish nationalists during the War of Independence.<sup>5</sup> The partisans of this faction were more radical and uncompromising with regard to nationalist ideology than other, more moderate nationalists. Operating under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, these ideologues, soldiers and bureaucrats labeled themselves as *Kemalists*. Upon the "election" of Mustafa Kemal as *başkumandan* [generalissimo] of the nationalist forces in 1921, the Kemalist faction wrestled total political control from the moderate nationalists. Then, after securing autonomy for Anatolia in 1923, the Kemalists declared the *Turkish Republic* that same year. Capitalizing on their monopoly on power, the Kemalist governing elites set their sights on the implementation of Turkist ideology within the borders of the newly declared republic. The Kemalist state, then, denotes *their* state, governed by *their* dictates, and pursuing *their* revolution. It was only after the culmination of fifteen years in power that the six specific principles of *Kemalism* were realized. However, during the time frame analyzed by this work, the specifics of *Kemalism* were yet to be fully determined. Therefore, it was *Turkist* ideology, set down

---

<sup>5</sup> See Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

by the Ottoman Turkist intellectuals, that acted as the Kemalists' comprehensive doctrine during the time frame analyzed by this work.

The Kemalist state was fundamentally an *ideological* one. The Turkist intellectuals of the Late Ottoman Empire provided the framework by which their ideology could empower the historically "oppressed" Turks and elevate them to the dignity of residing within their own Turkish state. One may indeed find fault with this ideology considering that Turks governed the Ottoman state and the Ottoman sultan claimed legitimacy through lineage from the House of Osman, the Turkish bey, *warlord*, who founded the Ottoman dynasty. However, in order to understand the grievances of Turkist intellectuals in the late Ottoman period and their ideological descendants in the Kemalist period, one must look at Turkism as the product of nationalist *ethos*, not a historical inquiry. Affirmation of the state's ideological character, however, does not suggest that the state implemented its comprehensive doctrine of Turkism purely as Gökalp and other Turkists had outlined. On the contrary, the Kemalists modified, omitted, even expanded upon Turkist ideology in order to facilitate its application. Concerned primarily with illustrating how the Kemalists modified Turkist ideology, this thesis will analyze three specific instances where the state-enacted ideology was taken from its original source and modified, often times heavily, for implementation. In the historiography of the Kemalist state, no attempt has been made to juxtapose the theoretical writings of the Ottoman-era Turkists with the Kemalist-enacted policies they inspired. The original contribution of this thesis, therefore, will be to employ this methodology (juxtaposition of Turkist theory and Kemalist application) to show that the

Kemalist program of Turkification underwent constant negotiation and adjustment as opposed to direct implementation.

Chapter One explains the state's modification of ideology as seen in *halka dođru*, Gökalp's proposed program for the urban elites to go "towards the people" of the countryside in order to blend urban "civilization" with rural "culture." Gökalp envisioned this to be a reciprocal exchange between urban elites and rural peasants that would result in the full Turkification of both parties. However, in its implementation, *halka dođru* became a way for the urban elites to impose their vision of Turkish identity upon the peasants. Chapter Two deals with the state's attempts to mold Mustafa Kemal into the sole *collective representative* of the Turkish nation. Gökalp theorized that, if Mustafa Kemal would use his prominence to cast himself as the undisputed symbol of the nation, the state would be able to spread Turkist ideology effortlessly and quickly among the populace of Anatolia. The Kemalists did successfully achieve this, as Mustafa Kemal became, and remains, the enduring symbol of Turkey. However, it was not without arm-twisting and the use of intimidation tactics to garner support from skeptical governing elites that collective representation was achieved. The reality was anything but effortless, as, once again, the state had to significantly modify and expand upon Gökalp's original theory in order to attain its implementation.

Chapter Three, focused on *laiklik*, provides the most problematic example of how the Kemalists modified Turkist theory for application. This is due to the fact that neither Gökalp nor any other Ottoman-era Turkist advocated or outlined a coherent program for the secularization of Turkish society. Nevertheless, the Kemalist state pushed secularism hard. In discussing Kemalist *laiklik*, Chapter Three's contribution to the historiography of

the Kemalist period and of *laiklik* is to divide the span of *laiklik* into two distinct periods. The first, from 1924-1930, was characterized by the state's attempt to completely relegate religion to the private sphere. During this period, both the Islamic caliphate as well as Christian schools were the target of the state *laiklik*. However, in the wake of two major ethno-religious rebellions, the 1925 Şeyh Sait rebellion and the 1930 Menemen rebellion, the Kemalist state modified its program of *laiklik* to encompass a semi-official program of Turkifying of Islam for inclusion in the public sphere. This chapter will argue that, while Gökalp did not provide a coherent program of secularism, his insistence on a unique Turkish Islam provided the state with some ideological precedent to modify *laiklik* during this second phase. In addition, Chapter Three argues that because the Turkist movement was derived from inherently western, "secular" notions of ethnic nationalism, the Kemalist state sought to pattern its own program of *laiklik* along western lines, namely French *laïcité*, during the first phase. Gökalp did not advocate the radical secularism that the Kemalists were to enact; he did, however, advocate for the moderate separation of Islam from the state as well as for Islam's complete Turkification. These undeveloped generalities of separation of religion and state and Turkification of Islam provided only minimal groundwork for the Kemalist state. *Laiklik*, therefore, is the Kemalist state's unique contribution to Turkism.

In any historical work, primary and secondary sources are the cornerstone of inquiry and analysis. The sources used by this work may be divided into two major categories. The first category comprises a truly impressive and diverse collection of French diplomatic correspondence on Turkey. This particular collection, housed at France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive in Paris, spans a ten-year period, 1924 to

1934. These documents on Turkey, written by French ambassadors, consuls and administrators, have provided this thesis with a diverse array of source material: cables on Izmir's halkevi, newspaper editorials on Turkism, Muslim reaction to the abolition of the caliphate, Atatürk's travels around Anatolia, the celebration of Republic's 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, etc. As it was French nationalism in particular the Turkist ideologues and Kemalist governing elites sought to emulate, the use of French diplomatic correspondence commenting on these efforts offers sobering insights into the Kemalist state's efforts to simultaneously Turkify and westernize. To date, no major historiographic work has used French diplomatic correspondence to juxtapose the Kemalist negotiation between Turkist theory and its real life application.<sup>6</sup> French diplomatic correspondence, in addition to being astonishingly candid and comprehensive, is particularly meticulous with regard to details on the workings of the state.

In addition to French diplomatic correspondence, this thesis will use Turkish literary works from the Late Ottoman Period. Because Ottoman-era Turkists advanced their ideas primarily through the *written word*, it is pertinent to incorporate these works in the analysis of Turkism's progression from ideology to implementation. Turkish works, penned by such notable ideologues as Ahmet Vefik and Süleyman Paşa, continually shaped conceptions of Turkish identity, particularly in its differentiation from other ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire. Analyzing these authors in their own idiom, and reading the very words they used such as *millet*, *memleket*, *vatan*, to conceive of and

---

<sup>6</sup> This thesis' use of French diplomatic correspondence is inspired partially by the methodology employed in Gavin D. Brockett's article "Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-1938," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998).

explain Turkism, greatly enhances the conceptualization of Turkism as it was originally conceived in the Late Ottoman period and then modified during the Kemalist period.

### The Historiography of the Kemalist State's Revolution

The historiography of the social and political revolution enacted by the Kemalist state deals with the events that took place in the emerging Turkish nation-state from 1919 to 1938. During this period, the broken and defeated Ottoman Empire was overthrown in 1922 as the Turkish nationalist movement secured its own state during the final years of the Turkish War of Independence. From within the Turkish national movement, a radical faction had gained a monopoly on power when the title of *başkumandan* [generalissimo] was bestowed upon its leader, Mustafa Kemal, in 1921. This faction was the Kemalist faction, named after its leader. Not satisfied with merely winning independence from the post-WWI European forces who had set out to carve up Anatolia for their own imperial purposes, the Kemalists then turned to a set of internal reforms that were to radically overhaul all facets of the former Ottoman society: language, politics, economy, education, religion and most of all national identification. These reforms, enacted from 1923 to 1938, were designed by the new governing elites to modernize and westernize the new Turkish Republic. The historiography generally designates this period as having been concluded in 1938 with the death of the nation-state's authoritarian leader Mustafa Kemal.

The object of this section is to examine the historiography of the Kemalist state's revolution, from 1939 to the present. Turkey's historical development subsequent to the revolution has made as profound an impact on the historiography as the revolution itself.

In fact, Turkey's varied and dynamic internal politics have exerted more of an impact on the historiography than even Western theoretical trends, such as Marxism and Post-Modernism. Historians writing on the Kemalist Revolution are at once engaged in both historiographical and political debates. For this reason, analysis of the literature on this subject will run chronologically, noting the political and historical developments that shaped each author's argument. A chronological assessment of the historiography will also expose gaps in the literature that this thesis will seek to fill in.

### Early Historiography: Single Party Period

Upon the death of Mustafa Kemal in November of 1938, the formal Kemalist Period reached its conclusion. Despite this end, the single party state, led by the Republican People's Party, remained completely intact. In fact, İsmet İnönü, who had been Mustafa Kemal's most loyal supporter during the Revolution, successively assumed leadership of the country in 1939. This new period in Turkey, beginning with İnönü's rise to power in 1939 and ending with the introduction and eventual triumph of the oppositional Democrat Party in 1950, will be referred to as the "Post-Atatürk Single Party Period."

İnönü's peaceful ascension to power was due to the success of the governing elites in institutionalizing Kemalist ideology within the state apparatus. The authoritarian rule of Mustafa Kemal had facilitated the state's acceptance, institutionalization and eventual dissemination of this ideology. For Kemal and his followers, the single party system, under which "The Republican People's Party established a governing monopoly

[over the country] in every aspect,”<sup>7</sup> became the surest way to ensure a prompt and steady application of state-sponsored ideology. The RPP’s hold on power became solidified “at the 1931 party congress in which it was officially announced that Turkey’s political system would be a single party system.”<sup>8</sup> Under this system, “voting [was to become] a mere formality,”<sup>9</sup> used only to affirm support of the state’s methods of implementing Kemalist reforms. In other words, the ratification of reformist legislation in the Grand National Assembly was always a foregone conclusion; however, voting for the legislation became a way to signal support for the state’s programs.

During the “Post-Atatürk Single Party Era,” the state continued its program of reform for an uninterrupted six-year period, 1939-1945. Cracks in the ideological solidarity of the governing elites, however, would begin to surface in the post-World War II period when the state decided to allow a multiparty political system. For this 1939-1950 period, two publications by Donald E. Webster emerge as the foremost academic commentary on the Kemalist state’s revolution. In his book, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, and article, *State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey*, both published in 1939, Webster focuses on explaining how the Kemalists’ “revolution from above” during the rule of Mustafa Kemal solidified the state’s reformist agenda.

*State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey* emphasizes the central role of the Republican People’s Party in enacting this series of reforms so integral to the revolution. To identify the primary goal of the reforms, Webster quotes a 1936 speech

---

<sup>7</sup> Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 261.

<sup>8</sup> Zürcher, 261.

<sup>9</sup> Zürcher, 262.

given by Recep Peker, the secretary of the party, which stated that “avoiding the wastes of laissez-faire individualism, the [sic] class struggle, and the ‘agony of liberalism’” were major concerns of the Kemalist Revolution.<sup>10</sup> For Turkish historians today, Webster’s primary emphasis on the socio-economic nature of the Kemalist Reforms stands as an anomaly to other works on the subject as the economic nature of the revolution is largely viewed by modern-day historians as tangential to the principles of Turkish nationalism and secularism. However, historians must take the period in which Webster wrote into account in order to understand the reasons for which he gives priority to economic issues. In the late 1930s, the effects of the Great Depression could still be felt in the developing world. In response to the apparent failure of capitalism, governing elites in Kemalist Turkey looked upon the command economy featured in Stalin’s Soviet Union as the ideal economic model under which they would be able to industrialize the Turkish economy within a decade. Though the party elites in Turkey sought to emulate the Soviet command economy, they also sought to avoid wholesale adoption of a Marxist economic system just as much as laissez-faire Capitalism. The party viewed both systems as contradictory to the ultimate goals of Turkism.

Webster, in his explanation of the Kemalist state’s aversion to both laissez-faire and Marxist economic models, is keenly aware of the theoretical writings of so-called ‘grandfather’ of the Kemalist Revolution, the bureaucrat, participant in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and poet of the Late Ottoman Empire, Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp’s writings certainly inspired the Kemalist elites as many sought to apply his theories which, in the

---

<sup>10</sup> Donald E. Webster, “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey,” *American Sociological Review* (1939), 247.

area of economics, were concerned with establishing neither a capitalist nor a Marxist economic system for Turkey. In his 1923 treatise, *The Principles of Turkism*, Gökalp identified Turkey's ideal economic system as "*solidarism*" for which "The economic ideal of the Turks [would be] to prevent the appropriation of social wealth by individuals without abolishing private ownership and to try to preserve and increase this wealth for use in the interest of the whole."<sup>11</sup> Webster, familiar with Gökalp's theory, makes a connection between the Kemalist state's etatism and Gökalp's "solidarism."

In his article, Webster also begins the historiographic trend of contrasting the reforms of the Late Ottoman Period, collectively called the *Tanzimat*, with the Kemalist reforms. Webster writes, "The chief differences between the Ottoman constitutional period and the era of the Republic are that the latter benefits from remarkable leadership, has learned from the mistakes of its predecessors and enjoys a national integrity as contrasted with the Ottoman disintegration."<sup>12</sup> Beginning with Webster's article, the historiography of the Kemalist period has always included a discussion of the Ottoman-era reforms before it. Whether to affirm the success of the Kemalist reforms over the failure of the *Tanzimat* reforms or to characterize the Ottoman-era *Meşrutiyet*<sup>13</sup> as a precursor to the Republican period, historians, taking Webster's lead, have often linked the Late Ottoman Period to the Kemalist Period. This is quite ironic, given that the

---

<sup>11</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, ed. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 123.

<sup>12</sup> Webster, 248.

<sup>13</sup> The two periods of *Meşrutiyet*, or Constitutionalism, in the Ottoman period span from 1876-1879 until Sultan Abdülhamit II abolished the Ottoman Constitution, and from the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, which overthrew Abdülhamit II, to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.

Kemalist elites aimed for the wholesale rejection of the Ottoman past, a rejection that included willing “forgetfulness” of its existence.

Webster offers further explanation of the reasons for which the Kemalist’s revolution succeeded where the Ottoman-era reforms failed by stating that

Leaders and led [in Kemalist Turkey] were accustomed to state responsibility for all action, so there was legislation for all large-scale changes. The single-party system [was] a logical consequence of the failure of the first [Ottoman] parliaments to get beyond debate to concerted action, and the lethargy of the masses could be overcome only by preaching a doctrine and practicing devices in contrast to do-nothing fatalism.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, for Webster, the success of the Kemalist reform programs was based primarily on a-priori notions the Turks held for an all-encompassing state that took the initiative to dictate political and social norms. According to Webster, the single party governance of the Republican People’s Party was a “logical consequence” of the stagnation of former Ottoman parliamentary procedures, not an independent entity arising of its own accord. As the historiography of the Kemalist Revolution progresses, Webster’s analysis of the revolution would be challenged by historians seeking to give credit to the Ottoman Constitutional periods that they saw as having provided a positive and workable precedent for the Kemalist state’s Turkist reforms.

#### Historiography during The Rule of the Democrat Party (1950-1960)

The immediate post-WWII era in Turkey marked the first instance of cracks beginning to surface in the single-party structure of government. As Bernard Lewis, the noted historian of Turkey, explained in his 1951 article *Recent Development in Turkey*,

---

<sup>14</sup> Webster, 249.

the most significant instances of opposition to the program of the Republican People's Party came when the government announced its plans to join the United Nations. Three particular members of parliament, among whom the deputy Adnan Menderes would become the most significant, tabled the motion because they felt Turkey had not carried out the proper democratic reforms that the UN Charter had called for its potential members to enact. Though the three deputies were expelled from the party, they seized the chance to form their own opposition party, the Democrat Party, in 1946 after President İnönü announced the abandonment of the single party system in Turkey. In the 1950 elections, the Democrat Party inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Republican People's Party and Menderes became the new prime minister of Turkey. The rule of the Kemalists had been abruptly terminated by the election and under the rule of the Democrat Party, the Kemalists transitioned from official enactors of state policy to the state's most formidable opposition.

Though Bernard Lewis' article *Recent Development in Turkey* serves primarily as a commentary on the political events in surrounding the victory of the DP in Turkey, it offers new insight into the Kemalist's Turkist reform era. For Lewis, and other historians writing in the 1950s, the Kemalist state was simply a "dictatorship."<sup>15</sup> However, historians writing during the Menderes period were careful to qualify their application of the term "dictatorship" to the Kemalist state. Lewis stated in his 1951 article that "force and repression were no doubt used to establish" the state, but that after this establishment,

---

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Lewis, "Recent Development in Turkey," *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 1944-, (1951), 320.

“violence was rare, and was usually in answer to violent opposition.”<sup>16</sup> Unlike Webster’s characterization of Atatürk as a mere leader of the revolution, Lewis’ characterized Atatürk as an explicitly “authoritarian and paternalist” mastermind behind the “dictatorship” of the Kemalist state.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, Lewis linked the Kemalist state to the Ottoman past in a novel way: he explained the authoritarianism of the Kemalists as stemming from “roots [found] deep in the Islamic past” of the Turks.<sup>18</sup> For Lewis and other historians of this period, Atatürk’s secular rule was a mere variation of the authoritarian paternalism exercised by the Ottoman Sultans under the guise of Islamic governance. In other words, Lewis viewed the Kemalist state as one that had inherited deep-rooted authoritarian notions of governance from its immediate Islamic past. Lewis’ article intimately linked the secular Turkish state to its past Muslim predecessor. Webster had attempted to affirm the success of the Kemalist Revolution *in spite of* failed attempts by the Ottomans to reform. Lewis, on the other hand, attributed the success of the Revolution to the authoritarianism *resulting from* Turkey’s Ottoman, and by definition Islamic, past.

#### The 1960s: The Coup, Political Instability and Historiography

In May of 1960, fearing the Democrat Party had deviated too far from the Kemalist principles upon which the Republic was “founded,” the Turkish military staged a coup d’état against the government of Menderes. After the trial and execution of Menderes and other officials from his cabinet, the military junta appointed General

---

<sup>16</sup> Lewis, 320.

<sup>17</sup> Lewis, 320.

<sup>18</sup> Lewis, 320.

Cemal Gürsel as the new prime minister of Turkey. The military junta proclaimed a new constitution in 1961 that strongly reaffirmed the six Kemalist principles as the foundation for the Turkish state. After the new constitution was proclaimed, the junta transferred power back to the civilian government.

The 1960 coup effectively created a new political environment in Turkey that was characterized by a radicalization of ideologies. Though the Democrat Party was now banned from being elected to the assembly by law, the RPP and its Kemalist sympathizers had to contend with other parties that had formerly resided on the radical fringe of the political scene. After the 1960 coup, these parties had become more vocal as the mainstream began to embrace them. One of the parties was the leftist *Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, or the *Workers' Party of Turkey*, which espoused a radical Marxist agenda that included severing ties with NATO and joining the Warsaw Pact. The other was the staunchly Islamist *Milli Selamet Partisi*, or *National Salvation Party*, that advocated a return to shari'ah law. In addition to the rise of radical politics, numerous student and faculty demonstrations, workers' strikes and street clashes between leftist and rightist groups created a climate where Kemalism and the RPP were forced on the sidelines as their ideology became drowned out as merely "left of center" in the midst of more polarizing political ideologies. For the historiography of the revolution enacted by the Kemalists, the 1960s offered a chance for academics to experiment with different historical concepts and alternate explanations of the Kemalist period.

The first major historian to emerge from the 1960s was the prolific Şerif Mardin. Obtaining his PhD from Stanford University, Mardin went on to become a professor at Turkey's prestigious Boğaziçi Üniversitesi before eventually settling at Sabancı

Üniversitesi, both in Istanbul. Mardin's 1962 book, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, revised from his doctoral dissertation entitled "*The Young Ottoman Movement: A Study in the Evolution of Turkish Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*," revolutionized the field of Turkish Studies and has become a staple of the discipline. One should hardly classify Mardin's book as part of the historiography of the Kemalist's revolution, as Atatürk and the Kemalists are barely visible. Instead, Mardin focuses exclusively on Ottoman intellectual thought as the genesis for modern Turkish political thought.

For Mardin, who shares Lewis' idea that paternalistic authoritarianism was linked to Turkey's Islamic past, the notion of constitutional rule for the Ottomans was rooted not in western conceptions of constitutionalism but in the Islamic principle of *biat*, or "the ruler's supposed obligation to consult with his community."<sup>19</sup> Thus, Mardin affirms that Ottoman notions of constitutionalism, and hence the successive ideas of republicanism for the Kemalist period, owes its origins to the very Islamic thought the Kemalist state attempted to discard. Mardin extends his thesis further to mention that *biat* means a "government *for* the people" not *by* the people.<sup>20</sup> This definition of *biat* indirectly references the Turkist, and later Kemalist, principle of populism, where the elites were to enact reformist legislation with the best interests of the greater population in mind.

One may ask how Mardin links these *thoughts* of the Islamic-oriented Young Ottomans, who came about in the 1860s, to the secular-oriented Kemalist state in the 1920s and 30s. Mardin explains that "the link between the Young Ottomans, the

---

<sup>19</sup> Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 399.

<sup>20</sup> Mardin, 399.

[successive] Young Turks and [finally] Atatürk, [came with] the weakening of Islamic content” with regard to notions of governance.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the gradual weakening of Islamic identity and principles in the governance of the state is what in fact binds the Kemalist state to its Ottoman past. The Kemalists, according to Mardin, did not escape their Ottoman heritage by excluding its Islamic precepts; instead, the Kemalist state was, in effect, bound further to its past via this exclusion.

Mardin draws another astonishing conclusion in his book: he attributes the success of Kemalist reforms to the *conservative* nature of Ottoman-Islamic society. In his discussion of a particular Islamic conservative activist, Ali Suavi, Mardin explains how like-minded Young Ottomans were “disappointed by Abdülhamit’s failure to lead ‘the nation in arms’ in an inch-by-inch defense of the Ottoman soil against the Russian invaders.”<sup>22</sup> Under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II, the Ottoman Empire fought the Turko-Russian War which resulted in territorial defeat for the Ottomans. According to the empire’s Islamic ideology, the yielding of Ottoman territory, conceived as belonging to the domain of Islam, to the Christian Russians went against the religious norms of the Muslim society. The defeat of the Ottomans in WWI and the partition of their land by other “Christian” Europeans served as a rallying cry for the Turks to support Mustafa Kemal’s national resistance. In fact, Mardin states in his book that for the religious conservatives, Mustafa Kemal embodied the “apocalyptic figure” yearned for by the Islamists who would resist “Christian” European territorial advances. Thus, for Mardin, Mustafa Kemal, in the early years of the Turkish War for Independence, “was

---

<sup>21</sup> Mardin, 404.

<sup>22</sup> Mardin, 364.

[eventually] able to ride over popular conservatism and carry modernization much farther than anybody had dared” due to his success in persuading Islamists that he fulfilled the role of this particular “apocalyptic figure” who would protect the domain of Islam. The figure of Mustafa Kemal, in Mardin’s analysis, is a figure that skillfully engages the expectations of his conservative contemporaries. Mardin’s Atatürk is not merely an idealist bent on secularization of society, but a skillful manipulator who uses Islam to his political advantage. This historiographic view Mardin has of Atatürk is similar to Gökalp’s theory of collective representation to be discussed in Chapter Two. Both Mardin and Gökalp emphasize Mustafa Kemal’s manipulation of his “savior” status among the Turks as ensuring the success of his regime and its revolution.

In much the same way Mardin examined the Islamic and Ottoman precedents to Kemalist revolutionary thought, so too does Niyazi Berkes research possible Ottoman influences on Kemalism. In his 1964 book, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Berkes comes as close to Braudel’s concept of *histoire totale* as any Turkish historian has ever come. As the title indicates, Berkes’ book is concerned with tracing the roots of secularism in Turkey and showing its long development over the centuries. Like Mardin, Berkes finds the roots of secularism to be in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Kemalist state’s application of secularism only receives a brief chapter at the end of the book.

Berkes traces the origins of Turkish secularism to a “New Worldliness” exhibited in the Ottoman Empire from 1718 to 1768. In this time, the Ottoman high society exhibited what Berkes explains as “cynicism, moral turpitude, selfishness, and

materialism.”<sup>23</sup> Along with this gradual societal shift from Islamic piety to “New Worldliness,” “the coffee house, the tavern, and the brothel [appeared] to have become established places of pleasure.”<sup>24</sup> Along with the Ottoman “New Worldliness,” a keen interest in western science, especially astronomy, as well as the discovery of the New World spurred Ottoman orientation from strict religious observance to a gradual secular worldview.

Unlike Mardin, who linked the Kemalist’s overall program of Turkism to the Islamic society of the Ottomans, Berkes sees the particular principle of secularism as originating from the Ottomans’ *deviation* from this traditional Islamic society. In Berkes’ narrative, Sultan Mahmud II, who reigned from 1808 to 1839, served as the vanguard for the realization of secularism in Turkey. During his reign, Mahmud II took unprecedented steps to Europeanize education in the Ottoman Empire. For Berkes, however, Mahmud’s real contribution to the development of secularism came with his “farsighted sense of national consciousness to predict that the scientific language of the future would not be Arabic—as it was [in Turkey] during the pre-modern period—but Turkish...”<sup>25</sup> Attributing Turkish “national consciousness” to an Ottoman Sultan was a bold move on Berkes’ part, as the traditional historiography characterized the Sultan as concerned foremost with preserving Islamic orthodoxy. Berkes explains that although scholars of the Turkish national movement have traditionally failed to credit Mahmud II, he was indeed a “prophet” of nationalism “insofar as the importance of language in national

---

<sup>23</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 27.

<sup>24</sup> Berkes, 27.

<sup>25</sup> Berkes, 113-114.

revivals is concerned.”<sup>26</sup> For Berkes, the principle of nationalism for the Kemalists, particularly as implemented in the Language Revolution of 1928, owed its origins to the reign of the “radical” Mahmud II.

In his discussion of the secular reforms of the Kemalist state, Berkes emphasizes the role of secular education, which developed over the previous hundred years, as cementing the authority of the secular state. Berkes states that the Kemalist *contribution* to secularism was its “elimination of the dichotomy between the religious and secular educational institutions...[and its] focalization upon universal secular primary education as the basic education policy.”<sup>27</sup> Unlike Mardin, who fully credits the Ottomans for Turkist ideology to the exclusion of the Kemalists themselves, Berkes acknowledges that the Kemalist’s state did play a major role in the process of finalizing the development of secularism in Turkey. The Kemalists retain their traditional revolutionary status in Berkes’ narrative. They still play a profound role in secularizing the country; however, the Kemalists achieve this only after the culmination of a long process that had taken several hundred years to develop. In contrast to Webster’s article, the Kemalists in Berkes’ book are not “independent variables” in the development of secularism in Turkey.

Bernard Lewis’ 1968 book, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, marks the third important historiographical work on the Kemalist period to emerge from the 1960s. The book’s main contribution comes with Lewis’ dating of the revolution. Lewis does not use the traditional term “Kemalist” to describe the Revolution, but instead classifies the

---

<sup>26</sup> Berkes, 114.

<sup>27</sup> Berkes, 476.

Revolution as “Turkish.” The use of “Turkish Revolution” instead of “Kemalist Revolution” allowed Lewis to push the date of the movement’s beginning back to 1908. In the conclusion of his book, Lewis states that “The Turkish Revolution began, in the formal sense, with the forcible overthrow of an old political order and an establishment of a new one in 1908.”<sup>28</sup> For Lewis, the overthrow of the autocratic rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II by the Young Turk revolutionaries in 1908, not the Turkish War of Independence in 1919, marked the “formalized” beginning of the revolution. Like Berkes, Lewis both affirms that the “Turkish Revolution” did not originate with the Kemalist state under Atatürk but that it did play a fundamental role in consolidating the reforms for the country. From 1908 to 1938, Lewis sees Turkey as transforming “from an Islamic Empire to a national Turkish state, from a medieval theocracy to a constitutional republic, [and] from bureaucratic feudalism to a modern capitalist economy...”<sup>29</sup> Lewis’ assessment of Turkey’s transformation does not extend as far back in the past as Berkes’, however, Lewis’ analysis of the Revolution is closer to Berkes’, especially when compared to Mardin’s assessment in his *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

#### 1980-1985: Violence and Historiography

After further political instability that continued to plague Turkey throughout the 1960s, the military once again staged a coup d’état in 1971 by sending a memorandum to the civil government instructing it to resign. When the civilian government was restored two years later, it had become clear that the radicalism of the extreme right and left had

---

<sup>28</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 480.

<sup>29</sup> Lewis, 481.

only worsened in the intervening years. The period between 1971 and 1980 saw an increase in student and worker demonstrations, supported by the left, which continually crippled the economy. To add fuel to the fire, this period saw the rise of two parties that were to exacerbate the already fragile political situation. In 1976, the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (abbreviated as PKK in Turkish) marked the beginning of violent Kurdish insurrections staged across Anatolia that were aimed at complete Kurdish secession from Turkey. Following suit in 1977, the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, or *Nationalist Movement Party*, rose to represent the extreme right of the country's political scene. Throughout this period, the extreme left and right carried out numerous assassinations, bloody street riots, kidnappings (the left had even managed to kidnap an Israeli diplomat and hold him hostage), and even organized paramilitary activity.

The late 1970s saw Turkey's heterodox Shi'ite minority, the Alevi, increase their demands for further political participation. In 1978, several thousand Alevi were massacred in the town of Maraş by a Sunni mob, a massacre that greatly alarmed the secularists who were afraid old religious tensions were resurfacing. To add to this, 1979 saw Turkey's neighbor, Iran, overthrow the pro-western shah and replace him with the Islamist cleric Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini, in an effort to export his Islamic Revolution, declared that Turkey would be the scene for the second wave of Islamic revolutionary activity. Faced with political chaos from the left and the right, the increased violence of the PKK's insurrection and the threat of a continuance of Sunni-Alevi tensions, the military, for the third time in Turkey's history, staged a coup in 1980. This coup became the most infamous as its leader, Kenan Evren, ruthlessly suppressed all

political, ethnic and religious factions. Thousands disappeared under Evren's junta, but the coup did succeed in restoring stability to the country.

The historiography from 1980 to 1985 marked a return to the focus on the ideology of the Kemalists and the personality of Atatürk as central players in the revolution. The 1980s historiography rejected most of the observations made by Turkish historians of the 1960s, especially the links between the Ottoman past and the Kemalist state. The abandonment of 1960s contributions to the historiography can be interpreted as a product of the conservative nature of the political scene following the restoration of civilian government in 1982. While in power, the junta stressed Atatürk's "conservatism" as the model for the post-1982 government.

The 1981 anthology, *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, embodies this historiographical trend of emphasizing the central role of Atatürk in the revolution. In the introduction to the anthology, the editors Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancıoğlu present their view of Atatürk:

Like all great men in history, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk can be viewed from a number of different perspectives: as the founder of a state, as a nation builder, as a creator of political institutions, as a modernizer of his society, as an extraordinarily capable political leader, as a successful military commander, as an educator of his nation, as one of the first successful anti-imperialist leaders of the Third World, as a statesman who deeply believed in and contributed to world peace.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, one can see from the introduction that the editors of this anthology intended to return to a more "conservative" interpretation of the "Kemalist" Revolution than their predecessors of the 1960s. Mustafa Kemal is presented as an "everyman," who has the

---

<sup>30</sup> Ali Kazancıoğlu and Ergun Özbudun, "Introduction," in *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ali Kazancıoğlu and Ergun Özbudun (Hamden: Archon Books, 1981), 1.

ability to achieve impressive goals both internally and externally. Atatürk, for the historians in this anthology, is truly the “great man” of Turkish history.

In his chapter entitled “*The Ottoman-Turkish state and Kemalism*,” Ali Kazancııl addresses the previous historiography concerning links between the Ottoman past and the “Kemalist” Revolution when he writes that “the Kemalists were successful in one strategic aspect of state-building, which the Ottoman reformers failed to even perceive: the capacity to narrow the gap between the political centre and the periphery and to mobilize societal resources in building the modern state.”<sup>31</sup> For Kazancııl, this ability of the Kemalists to narrow the gap between the political elites and the populace was due to the Kemalist economic model of etatism. Thus, for the first time since Webster, historians returned to an inclusion of etatism in their analysis of the “Kemalist” Revolution. However, the discussion of etatism by historians in the 1980s did not share Webster’s assessment that the model rejected capitalism. In fact, Kazancııl claims that it was etatism’s inclusion of aspects of free enterprise and capitalism that closed the gap between the political elites and the populace in Kemalist Turkey.

In the following chapter of the anthology, Dankwart A. Rostow builds upon Kazancııl’s assessment of the Kemalist state’s break from the Ottoman past. Rostow states that Atatürk was singlehandedly responsible for “the transformation of a decadent empire into a vigorous nation-state...” as well as victory in war and the building of modern institutions in Turkey. Rostow’s assessment of Atatürk harkens back to the Ottoman political theorist, Ziya Gökalp, who decried the “decadence” and “corruption”

---

<sup>31</sup> Ali Kazancııl, “The Ottoman-Turkish state and Kemalism,” in *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ali Kazancııl and Ergun Özbudun (Hamden: Archon Books, 1981), 49.

of the Ottoman Empire and yearned to form a Turkish nation based on justice and rule of law. Rostow and Kazancıoğlu affirm that such a nation was created by the genius of its leader, Atatürk.

The personality of Atatürk was further analyzed in the 1984 anthology, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. In the introduction, the book's editor, Jacob M. Landau states the central question of the scholarly contributions to the anthology: "what was the secret of Atatürk's success?"<sup>32</sup> By stating this question, the reader can be certain of the goals of the book: to paint Atatürk as a successful genius in establishing the modern Turkish state. Landau describes the "adoration" the Turks unanimously feel for Atatürk by writing that "it is the Turks who most cherish him and his service to Turkey. Like George Washington, Atatürk has remained 'great in war, great in peace, great in the hearts of his fellow countrymen.'"<sup>33</sup>

In the anthology's central chapter, "*Atatürk's Quest for Modernism*," historian Osman Okyar makes an innovative observation of Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman past: he places Kemal at the center of events in the political development of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. Okyar writes that "Mustafa Kemal was one of the very few military leaders [of the Empire] who perceived that the only solution [to the Empire's stagnation] was retrenchment into the basic Turkish homeland."<sup>34</sup> This marks a definite break with the historiography of the 1960s as Okyar attempts to bridge the gap between the Ottoman period and Kemalist period by presenting Atatürk as this bridge.

---

<sup>32</sup> Jacob M. Landau, "Introduction," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), xiii.

<sup>33</sup> Landau, xiii.

<sup>34</sup> Osman Okuyar, "Atatürk's Quest for Modernism," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 47.

According to Okyar, it was Atatürk who conceived of Turkish nationalism, it was Atatürk who played a defining role in the Young Turks constitutionalist program and it was Atatürk who eventually liberated the Turkish homeland from the yoke of European imperialism. Okyar's assessment seems farfetched, but one must remember that he is deliberately exaggerating Atatürk's presence in the Ottoman period to perpetuate the "great man" myth of the conservative 1980s establishment. Like Kazancıoğlu and Rostow, Okyar summarizes Atatürk's legacy as "liberating Turks from the various social, cultural, economic and psychological constraints of the Ottoman Islamic system..."<sup>35</sup>

The return to the central figure of the "Kemalist" Revolution, Atatürk, in the historiography of the 1980s reflects the conservative nature of the post-coup political establishment. The 1980s marks the rejection of the intimate link between the Ottoman and Kemalist periods made by Mardin, Berkes and to a lesser extent Lewis. The Kemalist state, while influenced by the Ottomans to a minor degree on matters of nationalism and economics, *broke* completely from the "decadent" Ottoman past.

#### Is Turkey part of Europe or the Middle East: Comparative Historiography

In modern Turkish politics, the rise of the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party has caused historians of Turkey to question whether Turkey's future will ultimately rest in Europe or in the Middle East. Though the JDP has vowed to forge ahead with Turkey's accession to the European Union, widespread skepticism both in Turkey and in Europe have cast serious doubts on the reality of Turkey's acceptance. At

---

<sup>35</sup> Osman Okuyar, "Atatürk's Quest for Modernism," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 53.

the same time, Turkey's increasingly strong relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors has caused many to say that Turkey's ultimate future lies in this region. The JDP has taken bold steps to strengthen Turkey's relations with Iran and Syria, including sponsoring Persian and Syrian cultural centers. Though relations are strained due to the recent incident with the Turkish flotilla, Turkey continues to do business with Israel, a partnership that has been mutually beneficial to both states.

In this climate of uncertainty over Turkey's destiny, historians have either portrayed the Kemalist's revolution as a European one or they have tried to situate the revolution within a greater series of revolutions in the Middle East. Two books exemplify this reality. Sina Akşin's *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic* orients Turkey towards Europe whereas Touraj Atabaki and Eric Jan Zürcher's anthology, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, places the revolution alongside the modernizing and secularizing efforts of Atatürk's contemporary in Iran Reza Shah, who reigned from 1921 to 1941. In the historiography of the Kemalist period, these two books stand as the most important scholarly contributions to the field in the last ten years.

Akşin, tying Turkey to Europe, carefully points out that "after Germany, Austria and Hungary, Turkey too became a republic [post-WWI]" upon the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923.<sup>36</sup> In his chapters on the Kemalist reforms, Akşin states Atatürk's main objective was "to westernize Turkey."<sup>37</sup> This marks a departure from the

---

<sup>36</sup> Sina Akşin, *Turkey From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to Present* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 190.

<sup>37</sup> Akşin, 202.

historians of the 1980s for whom “Turkification” or “nationalization” of Turkey, not “westernization” was the key objective of the Kemalist reforms. Likewise, Akşin breaks from the historiography of the 80s by returning to an assessment of Ottoman influence on the Kemalist state. In an assessment close to Lewis’, Akşin states that the Ottoman “Second Meshrutiyet [Constitutional Period]... was the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution, a period that catapulted the Turks into the modern age...”<sup>38</sup> Thus, in Akşin’s analysis, The Young Turk Revolution and the “Kemalist” Revolution, while not encompassing a single and comprehensive movement that Lewis’ had once characterized, both attempted to enact a process of “westernization” that was aimed at orienting Turkey towards Europe.

Conversely, Touraj Atabaki and Eric Jan Zürcher’s anthology *Men of Order* orients the Kemalist’s revolution towards the Middle East by placing it in a regional context and comparing it to the contemporaneous Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. In his chapter, “*The Caliphate, the Clerics and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks*,” Atabaki states that “the success of Kemal Atatürk in terminating the Sultanate/Caliphate and establishing a republic in Turkey” runs concurrent “to the failure of Reza Shah in his earlier attempts to abolish the Qajar’s rule by establishing a republic in Iran.”<sup>39</sup> Atabaki is placing the success of Atatürk’s revolution in dialog with the failures of Reza Shah’s movement. This is not to glorify Atatürk in any way, but to attempt to explain the broader implications of secularizing regimes in the Middle East in

---

<sup>38</sup> Akşin, 53.

<sup>39</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, “The Caliphate, the Clerics and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks,” in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik Jan Zürcher. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 45.

the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Why did Iran's secular monarchy fail where Turkey's secular republic succeeded? Questions such as this one are an example of where future scholarship of Kemalist Turkey is headed, even more so than Akşin's European-oriented scholarship.

Zürcher's chapter, "*Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: The Role of the People's Party*," is also a sign of where scholarship on Kemalist Turkey is headed. In this chapter, Zürcher analyzes the unique role the RPP played in modernization during the single party era. Zürcher claims that Kemalist Turkey did indeed inherit the institutions of the Ottoman bureaucracy, but that it was an innovative regime because it used mass mobilization, organized by the RPP, in its revolutionary goals. Zürcher's analysis of the party and its relationship to the Kemalist state is indicative of recent scholarly focus on various Kemalist institutions.

## Conclusion

*Turkism: An Ottoman Ideology in Search of a Modern State* will build on the recent scholarship of Atabaki and Zürcher, presented in such works as *Men of Order*. This work seeks to analyze, as both scholars have, the *application* of ideology by the Kemalist state. Zürcher's scholarship on the role of the RPP during the single party era has greatly informed my own research on the period. The role of the RPP, especially in the spread of Turkism to the rural peasants by establishing "People's Houses," is the subject of Chapter One. Zürcher's scholarship has served to inform and steer the argument of Chapter One towards affirming that the Revolution did indeed enjoy broad support from intellectuals and university youth.

As for orienting Turkey towards Europe or the Middle East, both Akşin and Zürcher's arguments are equally convincing. The Kemalists, while holding their Turkish identity to be the most sacred, did see their movement as an effort to "westernize." In that sense, Akşin is correct. However, in reality, the Kemalists mirrored a trend occurring in the contemporaneous Middle East, i.e. Iran, Egypt and to a lesser extent, Iraq. This trend was the "revolution from above" enacted to modernize and westernize the societies, economies and political structures of these countries. These movements were always enacted by the political elites. In that regard, Zürcher is correct in placing Kemalist Turkey alongside Pahlavi Iran in this effort to modernize.

The historiography of the Kemalist period has been directly influenced by the subsequent historical events that have shaped Turkey since the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938. The 1960s represented the first major trend in the field of tying the Kemalist state to its Ottoman past. The 1980s represented the second trend of reaffirming Turkey's unique leader, Atatürk, and his success in creating a modern state. Modern historiography represents a third trend of attempting to answer the question of Turkey's ultimate orientation by explaining its past. All of these trends have shaped understanding of the Revolution by providing the lens through which Turkish historians view it.

## CHAPTER II

### IMPLEMENTING TURKISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ANATOLIA

The Turkish newspaper, *Milliyet*, printed an article in April of 2009 documenting an archeological excavation centered near Istanbul's Yenikapı Marmaray station. This dig was reported to have unearthed a Neolithic gravesite dating back 8,500 years.<sup>40</sup> The advanced technology employed as well as the expertise of the Turkish archeologists was clearly defined in the article leaving the reader with little doubt that this discovery was an impressive achievement. What was curious about the article, however, was a conclusion drawn by the head archeologist, Dr. Yaşar Anılır, concerning what he deduced to be the *en önemli keşif*<sup>41</sup> of this particular archeological venture. Dr. Anılır concluded, "that great clans [from Hungary and the Balkans] during the course of their migration were able to come and settle [Istanbul]" some 8,500 years ago.<sup>42</sup> Dr. Anılır's "...most important conclusion made clear [that] the Greeks' theory that [they, the Greeks] founded Istanbul was completely defunct."<sup>43</sup>

One must ask if Dr. Anılır's conclusion was based exclusively on archeological concerns, or whether other considerations, such as nationalist sentiment, played a contributing role in formulating this conclusion. By seeking to debunk the 'theory' that the Greeks founded Istanbul, he discredited the historical claims that Hellenic

---

<sup>40</sup> "En Eski İstanbullu," April 11, 2009, in *Okuma Kitabı TK S30*, ed. Dr. Özlem Ögüt, Dr. A. Sumru Özsoy, Dr. Sabahat Sansa, Dr. Eser E. Taylan. Boğaziçi University's Türk Dili ve Kültürü Programı, 2010.

<sup>41</sup> 'most important discovery'

<sup>42</sup> "En Eski İstanbullu," *Okuma Kitabı TK S30* .

<sup>43</sup> The Turkish reads: "...netleşen en önemli sonuç; Yunanlıların, 'İstanbul'u Yunanlılar kurdu' tezi tamamen bitti."

Civilization makes to this ancient and contested metropolis. To validate Turanic claims to Istanbul, the article used an intellectual discipline, in this case archeology, to give credit to the proto-Turkic Turan peoples for founding the city. Dr. Anılır used his academic prowess to introduce his “most important discovery” that has empowered Turkish identity to both interact with European Civilization and claim precedent over it. Dr. Anılır’s conclusion sought to construct a proto-Turkic claim to the city at the expense of Hellenic claims. In the history of Turkey, constructions of the Turkish identity have traditionally been perpetuated by a nationalist ethos that historians call *Turkism*. Dr. Anılır’s convenient conclusion did much to reinforce a Turkish claim to Istanbul and a sense of *Turkic* pride integral to Turkism. The origins of Turkism can be traced to the Late Ottoman period when intellectuals, bureaucrats and upper echelons of the military conceived it to differentiate themselves from the Empire’s non-Turkish subjects. This ideology was used in the Kemalist Era, 1923-1938, to validate and empower the fragile Turkish nation. Dr. Anılır’s *en önemli keşif* represents a modern-day example of the perpetuation of Turkish national identity.

This chapter analyzes the process of construction and promulgation of Turkish national identity during the Kemalist period as carried out by important social groups in the society. One such group was the Kemalist ruling elite who enacted legislation to promote Turkish identity. Another was made up of intellectuals who employed the language and methods of “science”- or more accurately the pseudo sciences in vogue across contemporaneous Europe- to legitimize Turkism. These Turkist principles became a tool for the governing elites to mobilize the newly educated youth who were charged with spreading this elite-constructed identity among the Anatolian peasants. The

Kemalist elites, the intelligentsia and the youth worked in tandem to spread Turkist ideology in Anatolia. Many works, focusing on the governing elites, have been written on the high politics of this movement during the Kemalist period. However, only in the course of the last two decades have historians begun to analyze the nationalizing mission of the Kemalists by assessing its effect on the other classes of Anatolian society.<sup>44</sup>

Though an understanding of the political elites is necessary for any meaningful examination of the Kemalist period, this chapter will focus primarily upon the intelligentsia and mobilized youth acting on the directive of the governing elites.

### The French Connection

From its inception, the Turkish national movement emulated French nationalism. This was due in part to the rise of the Ottoman bureaucratic class who were the product of the Tanzimat Reforms from 1839 to 1876. For the Ottoman elites of this period, command of the French language became necessary for their positions within the state's new bureaucracy. The emphasis on knowing French led Ottoman bureaucrats to absorb French nationalist ideals as they encountered French literature, political thought and history; for example, the Tanzimat era introduced western theatre to Istanbul featuring plays "patterned on patriotic French plays of the period...[which were] indeed, quite effective on a Turkish audience."<sup>45</sup> Therefore, the French nationalist model profoundly influenced the nascent Turkist movement conceived by the members of this bureaucratic

---

<sup>44</sup> Particularly Gavin D. Brockett's article *Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution* and Asım Karaömerlioğlu's article *The Village Institute's Experience*.

<sup>45</sup> Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 67. Mardin's book provides a great reference of French influence on Young Ottoman intellectuals.

elite in the Ottoman Empire. France's national army was also a source of emulation for the Ottomans as many French military manuals were translated into Turkish during Sultan Mahmud II's modernization of the military in the 1820s. The result of French influence on the Turkist movement was that its proponents idealized the West and sought to orient their national movements towards finding a place within the West. The most influential of the Ottoman Turkists was the poet, sociologist and bureaucrat Ziya Gökalp. Born in Diyarbakır in 1876, Gökalp moved to Istanbul in 1896 to study veterinary science. Soon after arriving in the capitol, Gökalp became absorbed in the intellectual currents sweeping the empire, namely Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism. Abandoning his studies, Gökalp joined the Young Turks society and used his writing talent to advocate Turkist ideology.<sup>46</sup> In 1919, in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I, Gökalp was exiled to British-controlled Malta, and resided there until 1922. Upon returning to Turkey in the wake of the victory of the Turkish nationalist forces, Gökalp wrote his 1923 manifesto, *The Principles of Turkism*, which would become particularly important for the Kemalist governing elites of the recently founded Turkish Republic.

Much like his Ottoman contemporaries of the bureaucratic class, Gökalp was profoundly influenced by the intellectual, artistic and literary currents flowing from France. For example, he cited the French artistic movement *La Turquerie* as the genesis of Turkish national thought:

“...forming part of this *Turquerie* were paintings of Turkish life by European artists and books describing Turkish moral values written by

---

<sup>46</sup> For more on Gökalp's life see Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

poets and philosophers. The sympathetic writings of Lamartine, Comte, Laffitte, Mismér..., Loti and Farrère are examples.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, Gökalp credits the French depictions of ‘the Turk’ in art, literature and philosophy as awakening the nationalist spirit among many of the Ottoman intellectuals. What Gökalp and other Turkist intellectuals took for granted, however, was that French national consciousness had been slowly acquired through an evolutionary process, rather than being accepted as a primordial constant. In fact, even as the Ottoman Turkists borrowed from the French model, France itself was still in the process of exporting its nationalism from Paris to the surrounding countryside. This type of nationalism, whose origins were found in the French Revolution of 1789, was an urban, *Parisian* nationalism that had not completely taken root across France even as the Ottoman Turkists began to emulate it.<sup>48</sup> In France, the metropole (Paris) believed that the periphery (rural areas, especially the Loire Valley) was not sufficiently “civilized” and therefore not capable of understanding its own national identity.<sup>49</sup> In fact, the urban elites in Paris believed that “Civilization [was] what the [rural] peasants lacked” altogether.<sup>50</sup> Thus, urban elites, government officials, priests, and schoolteachers alike launched a campaign to civilize the French peasantry. This campaign took shape in numerous ways, an example of which was to make “the ill-treatment of domestic animals a misdemeanor...to ‘civilize people’

---

<sup>47</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, ed. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 1.

<sup>48</sup> See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

<sup>49</sup> For a general discussion of urban metropole and rural periphery relations, see Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization,” in *Oxford Readers Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 55-63.

<sup>50</sup> Weber, 5.

and children.”<sup>51</sup> To further illustrate this undertaking, Eugen Weber reports that “Between the 1860’s and the 1880’s [there were] repeated references in the reports of primary school inspectors to the progress of civilization and the role of the schools in civilizing the populations in whose midst they operated.”<sup>52</sup> Thus contemporaneously, as Ottoman elites, such as Ahmet Vefik or Namık Kemal, traveled to France, they resided exclusively in Paris and therefore had exposure to the rhetoric of urban intellectuals, priests and government officials who advocated for a program of reform, civilization and *nationalization* to be launched in the “savage” French countryside.<sup>53</sup>

The influence of this urban nationalist rhetoric on the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elites reached its zenith during the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. An article appearing in the *New York Times* in July of 1908 reported on the celebrations held after the Sultan reinstated the Constitution by noting that “The people of Salonika paraded in the streets shouting ‘Long Live Liberty!’ Soldiers to the number of 2000 joined with the populace in singing ‘The Marseillaise.’”<sup>54</sup> In French intellectual circles, the Young Turk Revolution was considered a success because “the Young Turks, with their hands on the army, were able to strike at the heart of absolutism.”<sup>55</sup> Thus, both the Young Turks and their co-nationalizing French counterparts employed terminology of the French Revolution and French nationalism, including words such as ‘absolutism,’ ‘constitutionalism,’ and ‘old regime’ to describe the 1908 uprising staged by the Young

---

<sup>51</sup> Weber, 5.

<sup>52</sup> Weber, 5.

<sup>53</sup> See Weber *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Chapter I.

<sup>54</sup> “Sultan, in Panic, Gives Constitution.” *New York Times (1857-1922)*; Jul 25, 1908; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg. 1

<sup>55</sup> “Article 6 -- No Title.” *New York Times (1857-1922)*; Jul 26, 1908; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg. C3.

Turk officers. Gökalp, who was affiliated with the Young Turk's political regime, the *Committee of Union and Progress*, used the term "24 July Revolution" when describing the events of 1908. This was a deliberate attempt on Gökalp's part to link the events in the Ottoman Empire to the French 'July Days' of 1830, where the absolutist monarch Charles X was overthrown in favor of the liberal monarch Louis-Philippe. The Young Turks, using rhetoric and terminology, attempted to place the 1908 Revolution within the greater trajectory of European nationalist revolutions.

As monumental as the 1908 Young Turk Revolution was, however, it remained incomplete from the standpoint of the Turkists because it did not advance their ideology. In fact, Gökalp states that it was "the idea of Ottomanism [that] gained the ascendancy in Turkey" in the aftermath of 1908, not Turkism.<sup>56</sup> The Young Turks "were...intent on retaining...a multi-ethnic Empire. Many of [in the Committee of Union and Progress] wished to strengthen their 'Turkishness' but were afraid of alienating non-Turks."<sup>57</sup> It would not be until the victory of the Turkish forces in the War of Independence that the writhing Ottomanist ideology would be dealt a *coup de grâce* and that Turkism would gain ascendancy as the ideology of the emergent Turkist movement.

The French influence on Ottoman Turkists illustrates the extent to which national identity was constructed among the urban elites. What had been essentially a military coup staged by a selected group of Ottoman officers was translated as a populist 'July Revolution' that overthrew tyranny and ensured liberty. Though Ottomanism triumphed over Turkism in the years after the 1908 uprising, the proponents of Turkism learned the

---

<sup>56</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 8.

<sup>57</sup> Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), 209.

power of French nationalist rhetoric to civilize and export urban nationalist thought to the surrounding countryside during their sojourns in Paris. The Turkists also learned that identity could be molded and more importantly *exported* from the urban centers to rural ones. To undertake such a feat, however, required something the Ottomans did not have: a modernist and nationalist state.

### The New Turkish State

A prominent trend in the historiography of Turkey is to classify the Turkish State, founded in 1923, as a continuation of, and not a break from, the Ottoman past. Authors such as Şerif Mardin and Niyazi Berkes stress that Kemalist secularism, language reform and construction of national identity owed its origins to the intellectual, political and economic developments of the Late Ottoman Empire. In an interview with *Asharaq Alawsat* in 2007, Mardin discussed the origins of secularism in Turkey identifying ‘exceptionalism’ in the national character of the Turks that led to the development of this policy. This exceptionalism, according to Mardin, steered “the Ottoman Empire [to be] cautious to distance the religion from the state.”<sup>58</sup> Though Mardin focused on secularism in the interview, his book *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* includes nationalism, the attempt for linguistic purity and secularism as the *genesis* of future Kemalist policy.

What Mardin failed to acknowledge, however, was that the Turkish state represented a *break* from the Ottoman past. While the new state’s ideology owed its origins to Ottoman bureaucrats, military leaders and intellectuals who became

---

<sup>58</sup> Manal Lotfi, “Turkish Exceptionalism: Interview with Serif Mardin.” *Asharaq Alawsat*. December 12, 2007.

increasingly conscious of their ‘Turkishness,’ the Turkish state did not attempt to salvage Ottoman identity or political institutions. Instead, the new state sought to create an entirely novel system based on its construction of Turkish identity. In affirming the point that “...modern Turkey during Ataturk’s era...neglected the particularities of the Ottoman experience,” Mardin contradicts his notion that somehow ‘Turkish Exceptionalism’ transferred smoothly from empire to republic.<sup>59</sup> On the contrary, the Republic turned its back on the Ottoman past in its pursuit of Turkism.

The political and social organization of the newly formed republic represented a novelty in Turkish history. Unlike the Committee of Union and Progress under the Young Turks where the sultan still wielded considerable political power, the ultimate political authority of the Turkish nation was theoretically vested in a legislative assembly called the Grand National Assembly established in 1923. Though Mustafa Kemal’s charisma and personality made him the unquestioned ruler of the new state, he was adamant about using the organ of the Assembly to legitimize the implementation of his social reforms that constructed Turkish identity. Rather than the monarchical office of the sultan, it was the political assembly, in theory, that enacted legislation for the new Republic.

Furthermore, unlike the Ottoman state, the Kemalist Republic employed a political party, the Republican People’s Party, to oversee the implementation of this new Turkish identity. As historian Erik Jan Zürcher explains, the Republican People’s Party, though it started out relatively distant from political participation, eventually became

---

<sup>59</sup> Manal Lotfi, “Turkish Exceptionalism: Interview with Serif Mardin.” *Asharaq Alawsat*. December 12, 2007.

“active in education and propaganda” in the 1930s.<sup>60</sup> The use of a political party to help implement the state’s social programs marked certainly a novelty that broke with the tradition of the Ottoman state.

The Grand National Assembly and the Republican People’s Party became the instruments used by the Kemalist governing elite to mold Turkish society along the ideological lines of Turkism. The governing elites, in turn, relied on the writings of prominent Turkists, such as Ziya Gökalp, to legitimize their reforms. The observation that “Gökalp’s ideals influenced the governance of the Republic,” made by historian Turhan Feyzioğlu cannot be understated.<sup>61</sup> In fact, the governing elites of the new Republic relied on specific ideas of Turkists such as Gökalp to steer their social revolution. One such idea was Gökalp’s *halka doğru*, or proposed program of going ‘towards the people.’ Gökalp wrote that Turkish identity could only be discovered through the program of *halka doğru*, meaning a reciprocal exchange between the urban elite and the rural peasantry. Gökalp explained the need for this exchange by writing, “...there can only be two reasons for the elite to go to the people: (1) to receive a cultural education from them, and (2) to carry civilization to them.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, Gökalp envisioned a situation in which the elites, whose consciousness had been polluted by ‘Ottoman’ culture, would live among the peasants to soak up ‘Turkish’ culture. In return, the elites would educate the peasantry in the ways of civilization. *Halka doğru* thus mirrors the

---

<sup>60</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Chapter IV: Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic, the Role of the People’s Party,” in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik-Jan Zürcher (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 108.

<sup>61</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu, “Türk İnkılabının Temel Taşı: Lâiklik,” in *Atatürk Düşüncesinde Din ve Lâiklik*, ed. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi. (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık Ltd. Şti., 1999), 169.

<sup>62</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 34.

civilizing campaigns of the Parisian urban elites in during the French Third Republic as it too sought to bring civilization to the “savage” and “ignorant” peasants of the French countryside.

As *halka doğru* played out in real life, however, it was not the urban elites who were ultimately mobilized, but instead the generation of youth recently graduated from universities, to participate in campaigns sponsored by the state. Nor would “cultural exchange” be the prime reason for the mobilization of this youth; instead, the Kemalist state’s language policies would serve as the prime motivation for youth mobilization. As outlined in the succeeding section, the actualization of *halka doğru* by the Kemalist state would leave a gap between the way in which Gökalp envisioned the program would play out and the reality of how it actually progressed. Nevertheless, the Turkish Republic and its Republic People’s Party sponsored a mobilization of youth that was unprecedented in Turkey’s history.

### Mobilization of the Youth of the Izmir Halkevi<sup>63</sup>

One of the motivations for the “state sponsored campaign” of mobilizing the youth was to compel the inhabitants of Anatolia to use what the state deemed as *Öztürkçe* or ‘pure Turkish.’<sup>64</sup> Although Gökalp advocated the need to *create Öztürkçe* as early as 1923, the Turkish language would not undergo reform until the Language Revolution of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Gökalp’s writings had certainly inspired the Language Revolution, specifically in passages where he states that “In order to create a national

---

<sup>63</sup> *halkevi*, people’s house. The plural is *halkevleri*.

<sup>64</sup> Aslı Göksel and Celia Kerslake, *Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar*. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), vii.

language, [Turks] must discard Ottoman as if it had never existed and accept the Turkish language which serves as the medium of the people's literature."<sup>65</sup> *Creating* a national language is indeed what the Kemalist state did, and using Gökalp's suggestion to "write this language as people, especially the women, of Istanbul speak it," the Istanbul dialect eventually did become the standard upon which a national language was constructed.<sup>66</sup> Gökalp had considered the language spoken by the women of the bazaars in Istanbul to have been *corrupted* the least by Ottoman.

The promotion of this newly constructed *Öztürkçe* became a political act, not only because it reinforced Turkish identity, but also because the state spread its own construction of the Turkish language. Ottoman Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp had advocated for modest grammatical reforms of Turkish, but deemed purism with regard to vocabulary as impractical. Gökalp's conception of language reform mostly entailed the abandonment of Arabic and Persian *grammatical* elements in Turkish syntax. The Kemalist Language Reform of the late 1920s, in contrast, amounted to a complete overhaul of the language, including both grammar and vocabulary. The standard Arabic script was abolished in November of 1928 in favor of the Latin script. A year later, the Kemalist state made Arabic and Persian language instruction illegal. Building on the Alphabet Reform of 1928, the Kemalist state established the *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*, or *Turkish Linguistic Society*, in 1932 to oversee the purification of Turkish vocabulary. This purification process consisted of removing Arabic and Persian words from dictionaries and publications and replacing them with words "from the popular language

---

<sup>65</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 93.

<sup>66</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 93.

and from old Turkish texts.”<sup>67</sup> This linguistic revolution reached its height in 1934 as the mobilized youth of the *halkevleri* went out among the population and pressed them to adopt this state-constructed Turkish as their sole language.

In 1934, however, it was not only the desire to spread *Öztürkçe*, but also to reclaim *Turkish pride* that pushed the governing elites to mobilize Kemalist youth. The utterance of a foreign language on sacred Turkish soil was an insult to this fragile and newly created Turkish pride. An editorial in the *İzmir Postası* dated July of 1934 speaks of the threat of foreign languages used in Turkey:

There are foreigners, in this country for many generations, who do not know five words of Turkish. They learn every other language except Turkish. On the train, on the bus they speak foreign languages in a loud voice and feel no shame. If by chance someone reminds them they have to speak in Turkish or remain silent, they frown [and] respond ‘I’m English, I’m Italian,’ etc. These *messieurs* should know that if they are English or Italian, we are also Turkish.<sup>68</sup>

The editorialist went on to state, “those who live here must respect without exception the Turkish language and Turkism.”<sup>69</sup> Thus, the editorialist justified his resentment against those in Izmir speaking a foreign language by stating that the ideology of Turkism was not respected. The construction of *Öztürkçe* became linked to the spread of Turkist ideology and to the very formation of the new and proud Turkish nation state. The insecurity of the young Turkish nation in the 1920s and 30s, as it was still undergoing the

---

<sup>67</sup> Charles F. Gallagher, “Language Reform and Social Modernization in Turkey.” In: Bjorn H. Jernudd and Joan Rubin, *Can Language Be Planned? Sociolinguistic Theory and Practice for Developing Nations*. (Honolulu: Bow Historical Books, 1971), 165.

<sup>68</sup> Author Unknown, July 4, 1934. “La lutte pour la propagation du turc et les étrangers (de l’Izmir Postasi 4/7).” Microfilm Collection: P2250. Pp. 236. *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>69</sup> Author Unknown, July 4, 1934. “La lutte pour la propagation du turc et les étrangers (de l’Izmir Postasi 4/7).”

fundamental process of creation and self-definition, could not help but render it extremely sensitive. Scenarios such as the one cited above highlight the extent to which even minor challenges to the idea of an all Turkish Turkey became sources of anxiety and resentment.

Much like Dr. Anılır's *en önemli keşif*, the editorial from the *İzmir Postası* espoused a Turkish national identity that sought to distance itself from the former failed Pan-Ottomanist multicultural identity. Speaking languages other than Turkish was seen as 'shameful' at the height of Kemalist application of Turkism. When reprimanded, the Europeans using public transportation cited their national identities as reason enough to claim special allowance for speaking in a foreign language. The editorialist, however, did not see someone's British or Italian identity as sufficient reason for failing to speak Turkish while residing in Turkey. Instead, he displayed an assertive national sentiment that sought to champion Turkish identity at the expense of other nationalisms. This was in keeping with the general trends of the period as assertive national pride was on the rise in Europe, the Middle East, and in fact globally in the 1930s.

To ensure that Turkish alone would be the only legal language spoken in Turkey, the Kemalist government passed legislation in 1934, called *Installation*<sup>70</sup> by the French Consul General in Izmir, Jean Beguin Billencocq. This legislation both made it unlawful to speak another language and also directed the youth to mobilize in order to spread knowledge of Turkish. Billencocq's report on *Installation* insightfully included the institutions to which this new law was communicated:

---

<sup>70</sup> The term *Installation* seems to be a French translation of the 1934 Law.

Inspired by the sentiment...to ensure that all Turks speak Turkish, this law, communicated to the *valiyet* [of Izmir] and to the *halkevi* (seat of the Republican People's Party) has received an immediate and somewhat amazing application...<sup>71</sup>

What stands out from this quote is that both the *valiyet* and the *halkevi* in Izmir received notification concerning the new legislation from Ankara. This was significant because the local government in Izmir, the *valiyet*, was charged with implementing this language policy along with the *halkevi*. Set up by the Republican People's Party to sufficiently "embody an educational attempt...to transform the Turkish countryside,"<sup>72</sup> the *halkevleri* in Turkey were usually staffed with "students [who] were financed by the state and paid [this] debt...by compulsory employment in the public sector."<sup>73</sup> Thus, *Installation Öztürkçe*.

The *function* of the students in the *halkevleri* was to instruct the masses with a means to discover their Turkish identity. To achieve this, the youth conducted Turkish language courses, staged patriotic theatrical plays, and held public readings of nationalist literature. All of these events centered on Turkish identity and were designed to provide the masses with a means of conceptualizing and adopting this identity. Instruction in the Turkish language became one of many ways to teach the masses what Turkishness meant including the way a Turk spoke, thought and conducted himself. In the area of language, Billencocq illustrates this point,

---

<sup>71</sup> M. Jean Beguin Billencocq, July 17, 1934. "L'obligation de parler exclusivement le turc à Smyrne." Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 234. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>72</sup> M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey*. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, (1998), 47.

<sup>73</sup> Karaömerlioğlu, 54.

...all the members of the *halkevi* has been entrusted to require that Turkish be the sole language practiced in the streets of Izmir. In all public places signs have been posted to remind [people] that ‘A Turk speaks only Turkish’ or ‘those who do not speak Turkish do not deserve to be a Turk,’ or still ‘In Turkey, everyone must speak Turkish.’<sup>74</sup>

Billencocq continues, “The youth of the [Republican] People’s Party have set out for the countryside inviting [people] everywhere who use a language other than Turkish to speak exclusively in [Turkish]. We [French consulate employees] can confirm that it has been recommended [to the youth] to show courtesy and not address foreigners.”<sup>75</sup> The ‘courtesy’ in not addressing foreigners indicated the exclusive nature of youth mobilization. This was intended as a program for the benefit of Turks and therefore non-Turks were not included in this movement, though as discussed above, they were compelled to speak Turkish in public.

This mobilization of the youth to enforce Kemalist language policy marks an interesting twist on Gökalp’s proposed *halka doğru* program. Originally, *halka doğru* was devised as a reciprocal exchange between the urban elite and the rural peasantry. When implemented by the Kemalist state, however, the policy of going ‘to the people’ took on another form. From Billencocq’s report, there is no evidence of a reciprocal exchange between the youth of the *halkevi* and the peasantry. The mobilized youth seemed to already be infused with Turkish identity, thus negating the need to acquire cultural education from the peasants. In fact, it was the peasantry itself that was deemed by the Kemalist state as not being sufficiently Turkified. The youth of the *halkevi* were far from the ‘sommambulists’ Gökalp had once predicted they would be. The documents

---

<sup>74</sup> Billencocq, July 17, 1934. “L’obligation de parler exclusivement le turc à Smyrne.”

<sup>75</sup> Billencocq, July 17, 1934. “L’obligation de parler exclusivement le turc à Smyrne.”

from the French Consulate in Izmir portrayed them as assertive, organized and demonstrating unquestioning allegiance to Turkist principles. Another innovation of the Kemalist state concerning the idea of ‘going to the people’ was the abandonment of *halka doğru* as a voluntary act. Instead, the mobilized youth actively used propaganda and state-party institutions to force compliance from the local population to their dictates. *Halka doğru*, as enacted by the metropole in Ankara, became the Kemalists’ *mission civilisatrice* as they demanded compliance from the periphery in the implementation of Turkism.

Thus, it is ironic that Kemalist mobilization diverged ideologically from Gökalp’s *halka doğru* program to enforce speaking a language altered in ways Gökalp would not have supported. Though Gökalp did not live to see the Turkish Language Revolution<sup>76</sup>, he did comment on the attempts at purification of vocabulary proposed during the Ottoman era. Gökalp wrote, “The linguistic doctrines of the Turkists are diametrically opposed to those of the *purists*, nor are they compatible with the views of the linguistic reformers known as *purifiers*.”<sup>77</sup> Though Gökalp recognized the need to abolish Arabic and Persian *grammatical* elements in Turkish, such as Arabic passive participles he saw as alien to Turkish grammar, he did not necessarily advocate the purification of Turkish vocabulary proposed by the purists of his era. In fact, Gökalp encouraged borrowing vocabulary from Arabic, Persian and French as he saw that an ‘international vocabulary’ would suit Turkish because with diverse vocabulary, it could engage with both the

---

<sup>76</sup> Gökalp died in 1924.

<sup>77</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 81.

scientific advancements of the West and the tenets of Islam which Gökalp did not consider to be exclusive to Western thought and the tenets of Islam.

### Turkism, Modernization and Single Party Governance

*Halka doğru* certainly provided a theoretical legitimacy for the Kemalist state to mobilize its youth. However, when it came to actual application, the Turkish state relied on methods not dissimilar from those employed by the Soviets for spreading ideology rather than resembling what Gökalp had outlined. In his book *Magnetic Mountain*, Stephen Kotkin discusses a particular innovation in the Soviet city of Magnitogorsk: the ‘red corner.’ According to Kotkin, ‘red corners’ were “intended as places to read, listen to lectures, watch films, and discuss political issues; the red corners were conceived as not simply showcases, but also cultural training grounds for the new civilization of socialism.”<sup>78</sup> In the same vein, the various *halkevleri* in Turkey were set up “to modernize the social relations, to bring an end to poverty and ignorance among the peasants, to create peasant intellectuals, to increase agricultural productivity, and to help spread the Kemalist Revolution in the countryside.”<sup>79</sup> The attempt to create ‘peasant intellectuals’ is not representative of Gökalp’s original *halka doğru* program. Turkish peasants in Gökalp’s mind were *intrinsically* endowed with a cultural intelligence that they preserved in the face of Ottoman ‘subjugation.’

Both the Soviet and Kemalist governments constructed public facilities to serve as the place where the population would be educated in state’s ideology. Kotkin cites the

---

<sup>78</sup> Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 180.

<sup>79</sup> Karaömerlioğlu, 47.

Soviet desire for ‘cultural hegemony’ as the reason for the construction of red corners. With the *halkevleri*, the Kemalists also sought cultural hegemony. The mobilization of the youth in the Izmir *halkevi* to encourage the sole use of Turkish as a means of communication was one way to push for this cultural hegemony. Likewise, in the town of Samsun, the youth of the local *halkevi* “devoted quite a bit of [their] spare time to the spreading of Kemalist values” by maintaining a weekly schedule of events that included reading and writing classes, sporting events, sanctioned history classes, museum exhibits, village group meetings, party meetings, lectures, concerts, conferences, and curiously enough, foreign language classes.<sup>80</sup> The inclusion of foreign language classes in the Samsun *halkevi*, in contrast to the deep suspicion of foreign languages in Izmir, indicates that implementation of Turkism by the Kemalist state was somewhat adaptive in addition to being ideological. The lack of hostility towards foreign languages in Samsun could also be a result of its relative isolation from outside influence, hence the perceived threat and menace of foreign communication was not as acutely felt as it was in Izmir.

The Turkist elites believed that “in order for the Turkish nation to become modern,” in the western sense of the word, “they must elicit an appropriate cultural level to exist in modern civilization.”<sup>81</sup> Not only were the peasants to be educated according to the beliefs of Turkism, but these so-called ‘peasant intellectuals’ were to attain an ‘appropriate’ cultural level to ready themselves for inclusion into Western Civilization.

---

<sup>80</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, “Chapter IV: Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic, the Role of the People’s Party.” In *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 108.

<sup>81</sup> Ahmet Vebi Ecer, “Atatürk’ün Din ve İslam Dini Hakkındaki Görüşleri,” in *Atatürk Düşüncesinde Din ve Laiklik*, ed. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık Ltd. Ştd., 1999), 117.

An ‘appropriate’ cultural level meant that, among other aspects, Europe’s positivism was to replace religious mysticism and scientific rationality was to replace superstition. In short, included in the process of Turkification was the intent for the citizenry to become modernized.

To facilitate this process, the Kemalist government adopted the structure of a single party state to both strengthen its hold on the country and ensure the proper implementation of its nationalist ideology. As a reaction against various Kurdish and Islamic-motivated rebellions that challenged the new nation state, the Grand National Assembly declared the Takrir-i Sükûn Law in March of 1925 that established martial law in Turkey for a period of four years and in turn paved the way for “authoritarian single party governance.”<sup>82</sup> Then, in 1931, building on the precedent set by the Takrir-i Sükûn Law, the annual Party Congress of the Republican People’s Party<sup>83</sup> “established [itself] in every aspect as the single party in power [*iktidar*].”<sup>84</sup> This allowed the Republican People’s Party unprecedented authority to direct the mobilization of the youth. Billencocq explicitly made this connection between the state and party by tying the Izmir halkevi with the ‘*parti du peuple*.’

Along with the assertive nationalism exhibited by the editorialist in the *İzmir Postası*, the single party state in Turkey would not have been an anomaly when placed in

---

<sup>82</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Moderleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. (London: I.B Tauris & Co., 1993, 2004), 261.

<sup>83</sup> The Republican People’s Party has many forms in the historiography. English sources refer to the party as both *Republican People’s Party* or *The People’s Party*. Likewise, French sources usually refer to the party as Billencocq does: *le parti du peuple*. French sources also refer to it as *le parti populaire*. In Turkish sources, Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi.

<sup>84</sup> Zürcher, 261.

context with contemporaneous political developments in Europe and globally. The Soviet Union, too, was a single party state with the Bolshevik Party acting as the driving force for spreading the tenets of its ideology to the masses. Likewise, Italy and Germany in the 1930s were also under single party governance. Though the historiography classifies the Kemalist single party state ‘dictatorial,’<sup>85</sup> it should be noted that, considering this trend of single party governance, the Kemalist state was no more dictatorial than many states of the time. In fact, Turkey stood out from other single party states of the time in its attempt to create so-called *itaatkar muhalefet partileri*, or ‘loyal opposition parties.’ This was the state’s attempt to imitate multiparty parliamentary systems of the French and British. Although such attempts proved to be short-lived and served only to reinforce the authority of single party governance in Kemalist Turkey, these attempts provide insight into the extent to which the Kemalist state saw itself as promoting Western European-style nationalism in Anatolia.

After the temporary experiment of introducing a multiparty system, the return to a single party state represented the pragmatic side of the Kemalist state. Enacting reforms to Turkify and modernize Anatolia required a political system that would best ensure their realization. The young state could not afford interruptions as its durability was tied to the success of its programs. Thus, the Republic’s single party system, under which “party discipline was tightened,” provided a smooth process of legislating then implementing the tenets of Turkism.<sup>86</sup> Tightening of party discipline also ensured that party members and deputies in the Assembly would not stand in the way of the state’s

---

<sup>85</sup> H.B. Sharabi and Erik J. Zürcher are major authors using this term.

<sup>86</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Moderleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. (London: I.B Tauris & Co., 1993, 2004), 262.

nationalist mission. In fact, for the Assembly during the Kemalist period, “voting became a [mere] formality” because the outcome of voting was always “a foregone conclusion [*sonucu baştan*].”<sup>87</sup>

As the mobilization to spread the state-constructed *Öztürkçe* among the masses, modernization became a feature of Turkish nationalism. Together with *Öztürkçe*, the modernization programs under the Kemalist state represented a break with the Ottoman past. The Empire was shamed as the stagnant ‘sick man of Europe’ since its defeat in 1774 in the Russo-Turkish War. Seeking to avoid this label for the new nation state, the Kemalist state’s program of Turkism included the idea of modernization to advance the cultural level of its populace and also to enter the ranks of other European states. The single party system became the surest method of carrying out the state’s ideals.

## Conclusion

The construction and spread of Turkish identity under the Kemalist state represented the state’s attempt to break from its “stagnant” Ottoman past and join the ranks of “modern” Western Civilization. More importantly, the Kemalist state sought to imbue its populace with a Turkish identity that was to empower and enlighten it. In order to implement the state’s goals, the governing elites used the writings of intellectuals, such as Ziya Gökalp, to legitimize its nationalist vision. In turn, these writings provided a program for the state to mobilize the newly educated youth in its attempt to spread Turkism to the countryside. Language revolution and construction became a major agent for spreading Turkist ideology. The state-constructed *Öztürkçe* came to embody the

---

<sup>87</sup> Zürcher, 262.

state's vision for a society and culture that would sufficiently undergo Turkification. In this process, the youth of the *halkevleri* proved invaluable as they showed great enthusiasm for bringing this nationalist idiom to the peasants of Anatolia.

Likewise, the single party structure of the Kemalist state facilitated the spread of its nationalist vision among the populace as voting on legislation that further implemented the state's goals became a mere formality. In this regard, the People's Party, like the mobilized youth it governed, served as a useful tool for the governing elites in their spread of Turkism. With the single party structure, the Kemalist state saw that pragmatic realities could help implement its ideological and nationalist visions.

Throughout the history of the Turkish state, the governing elites, the intellectuals and the educated youth have employed an assertive nationalist ideology aimed at legitimizing and empowering the nation-state. From the writings of Ziya Gökalp to the *önemli keşif* of Dr. Anılır, the intelligentsia has continually reinforced this state and elite-constructed Turkish identity. Thus, the use of intellectuals by the state to further construct the identity of the Turks has a longstanding tradition.

### CHAPTER III

#### GÖKALP'S "PROPRE" TURK: MUSTAFA KEMALS AS A COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF TURKISM

October 29<sup>th</sup> 1933 saw an explosion of ceremony and celebration across Turkey as The Republic marked the tenth anniversary of its founding. In Ankara, the French Ambassador to Turkey, Albert Kammerer, reported that celebrations took place “in the midst of a gathering of people [of] extraordinary enthusiasm” who witnessed “a review [of the troops] that lasted four hours...”<sup>88</sup> A French newspaper reported that in Istanbul,

At ten o'clock, the loud speakers aired the speech that the Gazi [Mustafa Kemal] was going to give from Ankara. Complete silence hung then over the 150 thousand people gathered in Bayazid Square. The people, touched, prepared to listen religiously to the words of the Great Leader. A little while after, we heard the Gazi's voice. The speech of the President of the Republic lasted a quarter of an hour. The last words were received by enthusiastic ovations: Long live the Gazi!<sup>89</sup>

Commenting on the state's planning of these festivities, L.L. Bellan, the head of the French Consulate in Adana and Mersin, reported as early as July of 1933 that “instructions [were given]...to organizational committees [in Adana and Mersin] on the preparations” for the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Celebrations.<sup>90</sup>

The 1933 celebrations not only featured Turkish officials, but also officials from other countries. Kammerer noted somewhat snidely in his diplomatic cable that “an *unrivaled* spot had been reserved in the festivities for the Soviet delegation [who had]

---

<sup>88</sup> Albert Kammerer, October 29, 1933. “N°305.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 93. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>89</sup> Author Unknown, October 29, 1933. “*La Revue*.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 111. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>90</sup> L.L. Bellan, July 19, 1933. “De la célébration du 10e anniversaire de la fondation de la République Turque.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 55. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

arrived [with] hands full of rich gifts for Turkey...”<sup>91</sup> Despite not receiving special accommodation as the Soviets did, French officials did publically congratulate the Republic on its anniversary. Monsieur Souritch, the most senior member of the French Diplomatic Corps, extended his ministry’s “warm hearted congratulations” to Mustafa Kemal:

We who are present...are witnesses to the dazzling success achieved by your country in the areas of politics, economics, and culture, despite the numerous difficulties and grave economic crises that run across the world. This success is precious, not only for your country but also for people of other countries for whom [these successes] have provided an encouraging example...By congratulating you yet another time, Mister President, on this great journey, I am permitted...to express to you the certainty that work begun under your guidance will continue to be developed, by bringing new progress and success to the welfare of the Turkish people as well as to the good of humanity.<sup>92</sup>

Additionally, Souritch’s superior, the French Foreign Minister Paul Boncours, sent a cable to his Turkish counterpart, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, expressing congratulations:

I am very happy to communicate to Your Excellency the very lively congratulations that the government of the French Republic gives to the government of the Turkish Republic on the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of its foundation and the warm wishes that it makes for the prosperity of a friendly nation [guided by] an illustrious leader by peaceful and progressive means towards its destiny.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Kammerer, October 29, 1933. “N°305.”

<sup>92</sup> Author Unknown, October 29, 1933. “M. Souritch doyen des Ambassadeurs présente au Gazi les felicitations du Corps Diplomatique.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. unknown. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>93</sup> Paul Boncours, October 26, 1933. “Analyse.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 89. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris. Note: This cable is interesting in that its title “*Analyse*” suggests that it was a rough draft to be edited before being sent. The date, October 26<sup>th</sup>, also seems to indicate that. In the text of this particular document, Paul Boncours scratched off “*son existence*” and wrote over it “*sa fondation*.”

By all accounts, the Turkish government responded quite graciously to these external expressions of congratulation, even lavishing praise on countries that had extended such “warm” words. In response to Boncours’ cable, Tevfik Rüştü responded that “His Excellency, the President of the Turkish Republic, thanks you quite deeply” and also that “esteemed sentiments of admiration as well as profound friendship [were expressed] from the Turkish people to the French nation for which...much happiness and perfect prosperity in peace” was wished.<sup>94</sup> Writing directly to the Foreign Minister, Kammerer stated that “the Turkish government is very touched by the spontaneous marks of friendship from the French Republic.”<sup>95</sup> Kammerer went on to write that “Rüştü Bey had just charged him [Kammerer] with making the appreciation and the satisfaction of the Gazi known to [Boncours].”<sup>96</sup>

In the midst of organized celebrations, external congratulations, public ceremony and ‘extraordinary enthusiasm,’ one must ask what the Kemalist state intended to achieve by holding such lavish celebrations of the Republic’s tenth anniversary. The effects of the worldwide depression on the Turkish economy were dire, prompting the state to take a more active role managing industry. The celebrations undoubtedly served to “cheer up” the Turkish people and direct their focus away from their immediate misfortune to the “triumph” of their recent past. But this motivation alone does not quite sum up the goals of the Kemalist state in sponsoring these grandiose ceremonies. The real answer lies in

---

<sup>94</sup> Tevfik Rustu [sic], November 1, 1933. “Télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Turquie à Monsieur Paul-Boncours, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Paris {reçu le 1er novembre 1933}.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 116. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>95</sup> Albert Kammerer, November 2, 1933. “N°308.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 112. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>96</sup> Kammerer, November 2, 1933. “N°308.”

the state's ongoing attempt to disseminate its Turkist ideology within its borders. By staging patriotic parades and allowing foreign diplomats to lavish praise on Mustafa Kemal, the Kemalist state was fostering and nurturing an image of Mustafa Kemal as the "collective representative" of the Turkish nation among its citizenry. The deliberate manufacturing of a "collective representative" was proposed by Gökalp in his *Principles* as an effective means of facilitating the spread of Turkism among the peoples of Anatolia.

### Durkheim, Gökalp and Collective Representation

In his book *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, historian M. Şükrü Hanioglu states that Gökalp was "[a] devout follower of Durkheim" throughout the period when he was began to provide "an ideological framework for action" concerning Turkish nationalism.<sup>97</sup> Hanioglu's assertion is certainly valid as Gökalp went to great length to provide a rational plan for the creation of a Turkish *esprit de corps* utilizing Durkheim's ideas of "the collective" as the prime mover. In this conceptualization of civilization, "the collective" transcends all, hence sets in motion the process of transformation ultimately shaping identity and affirming legitimacy. In Chapter Seven of *Principles*, entitled *Historical Materialism and Social Idealism*, one can see a clear process by which Gökalp deduced that "the collective" would be instrumental to the formation of a Turkish nation state. Gökalp begins this chapter by contrasting the sociological systems of Marx and Durkheim. According to Gökalp, Marxist cosmology is

---

<sup>97</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 159.

characterized by the belief that economic phenomena are solely responsible for fomenting social change. Apart from economic phenomena, according to Marx, all other phenomena are relegated to the category of epiphenomena. As a result other motivators deemed integral to change by Gokalp would become no more than “forceless shadows that trail behind” actual phenomena.<sup>98</sup> For this reason, Gokalp sternly rejects the Marxist claim that things outside of economics are merely epiphenomena. Instead, he supports Durkheim’s claim that, in addition to economics, religion, morality, and aestheticism are viable social phenomena that are capable of driving change in a society.

Gokalp extends Durkheim’s logic further by affirming that these “social phenomena [are] conscious realizations [existing] in the collective consciousness of the group to which they pertain.”<sup>99</sup> In other words, these “collective conscious realizations” of society are the “mental patterns that are common to all individuals of a society...”<sup>100</sup> Durkheim labeled these “mental patterns” *collective representations*. Gokalp saw in these collective representations the power to radically alter existing society. Since collective representations were social phenomena that were believed to be the driving forces of society, the power to create or destroy them was invaluable to Gokalp. For example, according to Gokalp, it was only when the elites of the Ottoman Empire collectively began to consider themselves as *Turks* that the rise of Turkish nationalism was able to happen. Turkish identity, born out of this collective recognition of being Turkish, became a powerful, if an initially limited, force in society. One can see why Gokalp rejected

---

<sup>98</sup> Ziya Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, ed. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 49.

<sup>99</sup> Gokalp, ed. Devereux, 51.

<sup>100</sup> Gokalp, ed. Devereux, 52.

Marx's idea that the economy was the sole phenomenon able to shape collective recognition. Gökalp wrote that extra-economic phenomena (i.e. art, literature, religion) would prove invaluable as tools for the Turkist movement to build, mold and spread such collective representations of Turkish identity.

One way in which collective representation of Turkish identity was perpetuated was through written "histories" penned by Turkist intellectuals of the Tanzimat and Late Ottoman periods. Gökalp credited these early Turkists as a vanguard from which Turkish identity was constructed and communicated to future generations. One such writer, Ahmet Vefik Paşa, used both ethnic and linguistic history to lay the building blocks of Turkish identity. In Vefik's 1864 work *Şecere-i Türki*, or *Turkish Lineage*, he presented a "historical" dialog between the non-Turkic Mahmud Yalvaç, an ambassador for Genghis Khan, and Sultan Mehmed Harzemşah of the Turkic Harzemşah Sultanate. Here, Vefik's characters have been differentiated into categories of Turk and non-Turk. Yalvaç, who is "othered" in Vefik's narrative as a non-Turk, taunts the Turkish sultan by affirming the might of Genghis Khan and his armies in the face of the sultan's apparent "inferior" forces. Yalvaç claims that Genghis Khan possesses the means and the right to expand his empire. To this claim, the Turkish sultan boldly declares,

Oh Mahmud, do you realize [the extent of] my country's borders, how virtuous my country is in its demand [to preserve this borders]? And [do you realize] how glorious a state my state is? By what standard does your Khan consider himself greater than I when he calls me son [a derogatory label] [?] And by what measurement as a soldier does he considers himself greater than I?<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Ahmet Vekif, "Şecere-i Türki," in *Yeni Lise Kitapları: Metinli Türk Edebiyatı III*, ed. Abdurrahman Nisari (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1951), 86.

According to Vefik, the sultan's bold speech convinced the Mongol ambassador to immediately recognize the glory of the sultan's domains and thus the ambassador agreed to share conquest with the Turks. By concocting this *deus ex machina*, Ahmet Vefik did not subject his narrative to historical inquiry, but instead used historical narrative to proclaim the defining qualities he associated with Turkish identity. The Turks were "virtuous," "glorious," and devoted to the preservation of their homeland. Vefik's "history" was intended to instruct the Turks of his era to pursue truly Turkish qualities. Through the phenomenon of "history," as Gökalp would classify it, Vefik's early work *contributed* to a budding collective representation of the "Turkish nation."

In addition to Ahmet Vefik, Gökalp also cites Süleyman Paşa, a member of the Ottoman military elite and writer during the Late-Ottoman period, as instrumental in perpetuating collective representation of the Turkish nation. As Minister of Military Schools from 1874-1877 until the defeat of the Ottomans in the Turko-Russian War, Gökalp revered Süleyman Paşa for making the first attempts "to introduce Turkism into the [Ottoman] military schools."<sup>102</sup> In *Tarih-i Alem, or History of the World*, Süleyman Paşa reconstructed a speech given by Oğuz Han, who represented the Oghuz Turkic peoples, ancestors of the modern-day Turks, to his sons. Süleyman Paşa arranged this speech to come before Oğuz Han's sons planned to embark on a hunt in the desert territories of Iran, Syria and Egypt. "We are in a foreign land," the Khan says to his sons, careful to differentiate his identity from that of the surrounding inhabitants, "and I have no time to hunt for my tasks are many. From the sunrise, I have learned that there is a lot of game in the nearby desert. Go there and take your maidservants and menservants and

---

<sup>102</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 4.

hunt.”<sup>103</sup> Süleyman Paşa later explains the significance of Oghuz Khan sending his three sons out to hunt in these “foreign” lands: his sons were “Gök Han of the [future] Ottomans, Deniz Han of the Seljuks and Dağ Han of the Oghuz.” According to Süleyman Paşa, these three branches of identity, Ottoman, Seljuk and Oghuz, would eventually contribute to “exalted status of [modern] Turks” by claiming the “foreign desert” as their own and producing a Turkic population to inhabit it.<sup>104</sup>

Thus, with the early writings of Ahmet Vefik and Süleyman Paşa, the foundations of Turkism were born. Validated by “academic disciplines” such as history and geography, these foundations would prove invaluable to Turkist intellectuals of subsequent generations. Ahmet Vefik and Süleyman Paşa both emphasized the Turks’ primordial “attachments” that they believed were “dervied from [the Turks’] place of birth, [their] kinship relations, religion, language, and social practices that [were] natural for [them]...”<sup>105</sup> Yet, as important as these writings were to Gökalp, he felt that Turkism remained incomplete as a fully realized “collective representation” as of 1923, when his treatise, *Principles*, was published. The final triumph of Turkism, for Gökalp, depended not merely on the ability to communicate the particulars of Turkish identity, but also on collective internalization of this identity. To this end, Gökalp wrote that Turkism’s ultimate success would be dependent on societal adherence “[to] a [national] savior who enjoy[ed] a great moral influence [and who himself could] soon become part of the

---

<sup>103</sup> Süleyman Paşa, “Tarih-i Alem,” in *Yeni Lise Kitapları: Metinli Türk Edebiyatı III*, ed. Abdurrahman Nisari (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1951), 159.

<sup>104</sup> Süleyman Paşa, ed. Nisari, 159.

<sup>105</sup> Paul R. Brass, “Elite Competition and Nation-Formation,” in *Oxford Readers: Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 83.

common thoughts of the whole people.”<sup>106</sup> In other words, it was not enough to merely *teach* the Turks their history and identity; the Turkist state needed to actively *promote* a modern-day individual, with whom the populace could engage. This mythic figure would, by his example, *embody* the tenets of the Turks’ “national salvation.”

The success of Turkism, both for Gökalg and the Kemalists, depended upon the wholesale adoption of a Turkist-constructed collective identity. Kemal, the heroic leader, was the model Turk whom all the populace was to emulate. It was incumbent upon Gökalg’s proposed leader to impart to the inhabitants of Anatolia the Turkist-created collective identity. The people must be made to realize that “they [were indeed] Turks” and that “[their] religion and race [were] noble.”<sup>107</sup> Hence, Kemal simultaneously became the leader and the chosen tool of the new Turkist state. It was to that end that such great efforts were poured into the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the founding of the Turkish state. Displays of military might, speeches from the beloved Gazi, declarations of friendship and praise from foreign nations all reinforced the idea of the supremacy of the Turkist-created collective identity that was measured in the flattering speeches of foreign diplomats.

### Mustafa Kemal: Gökalg’s “Great Turk”

Among the proponents of Turkism the belief is widely shared that the “truth” of Turkish identity was concentrated initially in the hands of a select elite in the Ottoman bureaucracy, military and intelligentsia. They were the guardians and eventual

---

<sup>106</sup> Gökalg, ed. Devereux, 52.

<sup>107</sup> Gökalg, ed. Devereux, 5. Gökalg quotes from Mehmet Emin Bey, “*Ben bir türk’üm, dinim, jinsim uludur.*”

proselytizers of the immutable “Turkish national character.” Men such as Ahmet Vefik, Mehmet Emin Bey and Süleyman Paşa bore what those proponents have deemed to be the “truth” of the Turks’ righteousness, bravery and morality. This “message” was then inherited by the next generation of elites, including Ziya Gökalp and Halide Edip Adivar, who safeguarded it, nurtured it, interpreted it and sought to implement it. All they lacked, then, was the appearance of their “apocalyptic figure” (to use Mardin’s terminology) to fulfill the promises of this carefully guarded message.

The anointing of Mustafa Kemal as the “Great Turk” who would accomplish this endeavour was achieved via a process of deliberate and ideological construction by the Kemalist state. In other words, it was never preordained that Mustafa Kemal would fulfill the role of Gökalp’s “Great Turk,” able to implement Turkism in Anatolia. This took years of consistent image building, but such determination on the part of the state paid off. By the year of his death in 1938, Mustafa Kemal was hailed by the vast majority of Turks not only as the enduring leader of the country, but also as the unifying symbol of its revolutionary ideals.

Mustafa Kemal’s ascent to the role of Turkey’s “Great Turk” was the result of the efforts of the Kemalist state as well as certain Turkist ideologues from within his inner circle. They recorded and emphasized his intellectualism, knowledge, and his intimate command of the ideals of the enlightenment and positivism. Those were the intellectual traditions which had long informed the Turkist movement. It was only natural then, that only he who had mastery over these ideas would be qualified to preside over the birth of the new nation, and to reign as its “philosopher king.” One historical source that showed how successful the Kemalists were in promoting and perpetuating Mustafa Kemal’s

“Great Turk” image was Halide Edip Adivar’s memoir on the Turkish War of Independence titled *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı*, or *The Turk’s Trial by Fire*. In her memoir, which was written in 1962, Adivar recounts her time spent in Ankara as an interpreter to Mustafa Kemal. When reading Adivar’s account it is striking to discover the extent to which Kemal and the other leaders of the Turkish nationalist movement were portrayed as completely versed in the writings of the French philosophes and as well as Turkist intellectuals such as Gökalp. This is significant because French philosophy, as discussed in Chapter One, was central to the creation of Turkish national identity. Adivar’s writings reinforced this image of the “Turkish nationalists versed in French political thought.” As Mustafa Kemal best “understood” French political ideology, according to Adivar’s account, he was naturally poised to claim the leadership of the Turkist movement which was after all conceived by French-knowing elites of the Ottoman past.

To illustrate this, Adivar recounted a debate that took place between Mustafa Kemal and other nationalists in March of 1920. The debate was centered on the type of representative body the new Turkish state would adopt. Firstly, Adivar’s narrative presents the views for the vision of the future Turkish state as advocated by the faction of the “[distinguished] professor of constitutional law,” Celâlettin Arif. Arif advocated for “a legislative parliament, a cabinet and also an executive council at the head of which [these partisans] wanted to bring a parliamentary chairman.”<sup>108</sup> Vehemently opposed to this vision was Mustafa Kemal. Believing that Arif’s proposed government “would frighten the people,” Mustafa Kemal, as recounted by Adivar, boldly asserted that “all

---

<sup>108</sup> Halide Edib Adivar, *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı: İstiklâl Savaşı Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları, 2007), 133. “*Bir teşrî-i meclis, bir kabine, bir de icra heyeti kurmak ve bunun başına de meclis reisi getirmek istiyorlardı.*”

power [rests with] the people.” Furthermore Kemal stated that “[this] power is not [to be] divided; the executive and legislative [should not be] separated from one another.”<sup>109</sup> In this speech, Adivar states that Kemal “spoke completely like Jean Jacques Rousseau”<sup>110</sup> as he advocated the principle popular sovereignty. By painting Mustafa Kemal in this light, Adivar reinforced the myth that it was the elite “French-knowers,” who would harbor and protect Turkism. Ultimately, Kemal was portrayed as the most accomplished of these new age philosophers, and the one best suited to bring a modern and powerful Turkish nation into being.

Adivar portrayed Mustafa Kemal and his partisans as firm advocates for the implementation of Rousseau’s theories of governance. She paid particular attention to Kemal’s advocacy of Rousseau’s notion of *volonté générale*, or “the general will of the people.” Kemal’s opposition to a representative body with divided executive and legislative chambers was based, according to Adivar’s account, on his “concern” that such a division would bypass popular sovereignty and *volonté générale*. Kemal’s argument used Rousseau’s idea that sovereignty should not be divided by the political structure of government. Hence, Mustafa Kemal advocated a single chamber *meclis*, or *assembly*, that would act as the legislative and executive body of the new Turkish state.

Adivar quotes Mustafa Kemal further,

All legislative and executive power will be in the hand of the assembly and [both] will elect representatives to the cabinet. They [the deputies] will only be accountable to the assembly. By this, their accountability will not be to the cabinet.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>109</sup> Adivar, 133. “*Bütün kudret halkındır. Kudret bölünmez, icrai ve teşriî diye birbirinden ayrılmaz.*”

<sup>110</sup> Adivar, 133.

<sup>111</sup> Adivar, 133.

Mustafa Kemal, according to Adivar's account, envisioned a *meclis* where one chamber exhibited both legislative and executive authority and from that chamber a ruling cabinet [*kabine*] would be selected. In this system, the political notion of *volonté générale* would be affirmed. It was believed that, in order to best implement a Turkist government, it would be quite appropriate and necessary to borrow from Rousseau's idea of *volonté générale*. The use of French nationalist concepts, such as *volonté générale*, had a long precedent in the trajectory of Turkism and, when taken up by authors like Adivar, further affirmed Mustafa Kemal's identity as the "Great Turk" who, by his superior intellect, would stand ready to guide the masses.

Along with acknowledging the principles of French political thought as fundamental to Turkist legitimacy, Mustafa Kemal's insistence on a single-chamber assembly was also intended to return to the supposed governmental structure of the pre-Ottoman Turkic tribes. In other words, Kemal and his followers, in addition to patterning their ideas off Rousseau, harkened back to the imagined past of their tribal confederations for inspiration on forming an assembly. Thus, the Kemalists secured their legitimacy twofold: by using French political rhetoric so integral to their ideological forerunners and by seeming to return to their Turkic past by patterning the nationalist *meclis* off of pre-Ottoman Turkic "tribal assemblies." In *Principles*, Gökalp, too, melded French political thought, *volonté générale*, with the idea that the pre-Ottoman Turkic tribes preserved national sovereignty through their assemblies. In his chapter on "*Ethical Turkism*" Gökalp writes that "Among the ancient Turks, sovereignty belonged to the tribe. Small tribes ruled by a national assembly that administered the fate of the people, while in large

tribes tribal affairs were in the hands of an assembly...”<sup>112</sup> Thus, Gökalp affirmed that tribal sovereignty indeed existed among the pre-Ottoman Turks. The all-power tribal “assembly” embodied this sovereignty.

Mustafa Kemal’s insistence on the pivotal role the cabinet would play in selecting a leader for the *meclis* was also upheld in Gökalp’s *Principles*. Gökalp wrote that the tribal *kurultay*, or *council*, “[was] elected, and could depose, the [tribe’s] ruler.”<sup>113</sup> The function of the *kurultay* became synonymous with that of the *kabine* proposed by Mustafa Kemal. According to the Turkist vision, the *kabine* would be a modern-day *kurultay* that would select the leader of the assembly or parliament. It should be noted that *kurultay* remains a term used extensively in modern Turkish politics and it exists under various spellings in other Turkic languages.

The question must be asked then, “in their pursuit of collective representation, did Turkists like Gökalp simply reconstruct the governing structure of the pre-Ottoman Turkic tribes in order to match neatly with Rousseau’s idea of *volonté générale*?” Significant research, conducted by historians focusing on Imperial Russia’s interaction with the Turkic tribal confederations, offers a provocative answer. In his monograph on the expansion of Imperial Russia into the frontier, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier*, Michael Khodarkovsky explains the political structure of individual Turkic tribes Russia encountered. Khodarkovsky writes that “In both the Crimea and Kazan, major decisions were made at the Khan’s council (divan), or, if necessary, at a larger gathering (kurultay),

---

<sup>112</sup> Gökalp, 103.

<sup>113</sup> Gökalp, 104.

which included nobles, clergy, and the ‘best’ people.”<sup>114</sup> Here, the *kurultay* emerges as one type of council responsible for major tribal decisions. Khodarkovsky characterizes the “authority of the [Kazakh] khan [as being] severely circumscribed by members of the nobility, who preserved their influence and independent power base” as well as Buddhist Kalmyk Turks’ leader, or chief *tayishi*, as being elected “by consensus among the [other] *tayishis* and influential *zayisang* [lesser nobility].”<sup>115</sup> Thus, Khodarkovsky’s research on the Turkic tribes of the Russian Empire reveals some truth to Gökalp’s assessment of tribal sovereignty. For the Crimean, Kazan, Kazakh and Kalmyk tribes, there existed a council, comprised mainly of nobles, which elected the khan or an equivalent to power.

Along with the ideological side of Kemal, reciting Rousseau and defending the national sovereignty of the Turkish nation, Adivar included the pragmatic side of Kemal as well. Further in her memoir, Adivar reports that “On August 5, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Paşa was elected by the Grand National Assembly as *başkumandan* [head general], meaning a type of military dictator possessing all power.”<sup>116</sup> The assembly, formed according to the vision of the partisans of Kemal, manipulated *volonté générale* and “Turkic” national sovereignty in order to bestow limitless authority upon Mustafa Kemal. It is ironic that, in the end, the Turkists’ wish to emulate French nationalism would indeed be granted as the “Napoleonic” Mustafa Kemal would seize control of the assembly and invest himself with limitless authority. The initial investiture of Mustafa Kemal with limitless power was seen as crucial to ensure the success of the war effort.

---

<sup>114</sup> Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 11.

<sup>115</sup> Khodarkovsky, 14.

<sup>116</sup> Adivar, 215.

By the authority of the assembly representing national sovereignty and *volonté générale*, Mustafa Kemal had consolidated his supreme position among the nationalists in Ankara. He was, for all practical purposes, elected the “khan” of the newly empowered Turkish “tribe”. From his initial position as *başkumandan* of the nationalist forces to his undisputed authority as the Republic’s first president, Mustafa Kemal, and his partisans, sought to elevate his status to that of the “Great Turk” through collective representation; effectively Kemal was to become the “apocalyptic figure” Gökalp sought: the long-awaited messiah who would establish perfect justice and peace among the Turks through the implementation of Turkist ideology.

### Mustafa Kemal’s Anatolian Tours

As the Kemalist state entered the 1930s, one of the ways it guarded the image of its reforming savior was to keep Mustafa Kemal highly visible to the populace. The Gazi’s frequent tours through Anatolian villages and cities, all in the name of monitoring the progress of the nation, became one way for the state to continually reinforce adherence to his image and hence to Turkism. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal’s tours of Anatolia mirror those of his contemporary, Reza Pahlavi, the recently crowned Shah of Iran. Both men made frequent and extended tours of their countries in an effort to promote the metropole’s programs of nationalizing identity to its periphery. In Reza Pahlavi’s case, the metropole was Tehran and the periphery were the provinces of north and south. In Mustafa Kemal’s case, the metropole was Ankara and the periphery were major towns in eastern and western Anatolia.

From various reports on Mustafa Kemal's tours across Anatolia by French diplomats, one can see that there were varying degrees of success in soliciting admiration for the Kemalist state's great leader. In a diplomatic cable dated January of 1933 from J.S. Barbier, the French *chargé d'affaires* to Turkey, it was reported that Mustafa Kemal and his cadre decided to "leave Ankara on the 15<sup>th</sup> [of January] to embark on a trip [through] Anatolia lasting multiple weeks."<sup>117</sup> On a voyage that included sojourns in Eskişehir, İsmiit, Bursa, Konya, Adana, Mersin and İzmir, Mustafa Kemal and his "*familiars habituels*," or *close circle*, were reported to have inspected the progress of industrial development in each locale. For example, Barbier reported that Mustafa Kemal "had his special train stop at principle stations on the new iron track that [was] directed towards [the] Kütahya [province]. After having been stationed for a day in this city [Kütahya], where he visited, among others, the [centers] of pottery manufacturing, the Gazi departed again for Konya, Adana and the southern provinces..."<sup>118</sup> Like other industrializing countries of the 1930s, Turkey had been hit hard by the worldwide economic crisis, prompting the state to enact *etatism*, or state-directed investment in industrial development. Barbier provided a general assessment of the Gazi's voyage by stating that "the zigzag voyage [of Mustafa Kemal]...seems only to be oriented towards enterprise without a certain political goal other than to bring enthusiasm to a population traumatized by the crisis and [also] to keep up, by passing through, the zeal of the local

---

<sup>117</sup> J.S. Barbier, January 27, 1933. "A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie." Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 3. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>118</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. "A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie."

chapters of the People's Party."<sup>119</sup> Barbier certainly failed to understand the *raison d'être* of Kemal's tour by ruling out the political intentions of state's attempt to maintain morale in the local chapters of the People's Party. This was precisely the goal of the state in sending Mustafa Kemal on tour of Anatolia.

Barbier's report on the Gazi's tour, despite failing to see the tour as a political move, does, however inadvertently, provide insight into the motives of the state. Barbier explained that from among Kemal's cadre, "the Minister of the National Economy...came into contact with producers, to inquire into their situation and, if need be, to raise their morale and promise government assistance looking towards the largest possible development of national industry and agriculture."<sup>120</sup> Therefore, the state ministers certainly paid lip service to the economic concerns of local industrialists. Mustafa Kemal, however, had much more pressing concerns than the ailing economy. Barbier wrote,

As for the Gazi, his principle personal concern seems to be, if the local press is to be believed, to inquire from the delegations he has received the state of linguistic research in the surrounding regions, [as well as] to investigate the etymologies of area names in order to make their origins seem purely Turkish...[He] seeks, in all circumstances, to establish that the Turks, far from being...considered recent invaders of Anatolia, are directly tied to the ancient populations of this region, in particular to the Hittites.<sup>121</sup>

Therefore, one can see in Barbier's report that the state's goals in affirming its Turkist ideology through proto-Turkic claims to Anatolia remained a top priority, even in the face of economic hardships. Here, Mustafa Kemal took an active role in making inquiries

---

<sup>119</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. "A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie."

<sup>120</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. "A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie."

<sup>121</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. "A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie."

on the progress of local etymologists and historians commissioned with “discovering” proto-Turkic settlement. In this, Kemal employed his exalted status to advance one of Turkism’s core tenets: the ancient presence, and therefore legitimacy, of the Turks in Anatolia. If the “visionary” ideas of Ahmet Vefik and Süleyman Paşa pronounced the historical greatness of the Turks, then Mustafa Kemal, Turkey’s “philosopher king,” would seek verify such ideas through historical and etymological inquiry. This inquiry of Mustafa Kemal shows not only the extent to which the Kemalist state was committed to Turkism, but also the personal role the leader played in upholding this ideology through academic and scientific inquiry.

From Barbier’s report, the Kemalist state did not only send Mustafa Kemal on tours of Anatolia in the effort to perpetuate his mythic status, but, in his absence, also sent other influential members of the government to surrounding *valiyetler* to promote Turkism’s collective representative. Barbier reported that government ministers, “imitating at once [the Gazi’s] example [,]...embarked on tours of diverse regions; [for example] the President of the Council...[went] on route to Adalia, and the President of the Assembly, Kiazim Paşa<sup>122</sup>, [set out for] Cilicia.”<sup>123</sup> According to Barbier, “it [was] evident that these influential personalities did not choose to undertake such long trips at the same time that winter show[ed] its severity on the high plateaus of Anatolia, but [instead] preferred to spend the up-coming holiday in Istanbul.”<sup>124</sup> Nevertheless, their co-opted participation in spreading the cult of the leader was indicative of the efforts of the

---

<sup>122</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. “A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie.” Note: Most likely Kazım Karabekir. “Kiazim” could be misspelled or a French rendition of the name.

<sup>123</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. “A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie.”

<sup>124</sup> Barbier, January 27, 1933. “A.S. Voyage du Gazi en Anatolie.”

*state* as a whole. In other words, the promotion Mustafa Kemal's image was not resigned to him alone or to his inner circle; instead, the state as a whole took part in his promotion. By stating that these officials "did not choose to undertake such long trips," Barbier hinted at the fact that their tours of Anatolia were not voluntary but rather coerced. The political climate was indeed such that the Kemalist elites could coerce its ministers to embark on such tours of promotion.

The touring of various government ministers raises an important question: how were the Kemalists able to *compel* these ministers to perpetuate Mustafa Kemal as Turkism's "messiah?" After all, could these ministers, many of whom acquired impressive nationalist credentials during the War of Independence, not have taken the opportunity to promote themselves instead of Kemal? A diplomatic cable from Charles Pineton de Chambrun, the French ambassador to Turkey, dated May of 1933, provides a possible answer to this question. In reporting on an interview given by Kazım Karabekir, the President of the National Assembly, to the newspaper *Milliyet*, de Chambrun writes that the reporter who interviewed Karabekir "envok[ed] the origins of the Kemalist movement, [and] personally placed blame on Karabekir [for] having favored a regionalist, if not separatist, movement in the neighboring provinces of the Caucasus" during the Turkish War of Independence.<sup>125</sup> In other words, the journalist was reported to have accused Karabekir outright of being a traitor to the Turkish Republic. De Chambrun's report would not have been farfetched, as historians do know that Karabekir

---

<sup>125</sup> <sup>125</sup> Monsieur de Chambrun, May 16, 1933. "Incident survenu entre la presse officieuse et le Générale Kaizim Karabekir." Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 38. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

was accused numerous times of treason by the Kemalist state, which even went so far as to threaten him with execution and to publically burn his memoirs. In the brief span of time the Kemalists allowed multiple political parties, October of 1924 to June of 1925, Karabekir founded the *Progressive Republican Party* with other influential nationalists such as Rauf Orbay, Adnan Adıvar (husband of Halide Edip Adıvar) and Ali Fuat. This party was opposed to Kemalist's Republican People's Party not so much in terms of ideology (for example, all members of the PRP supported the act of abolishing the Caliphate), but instead they were opposed to the timing and specific implementation of state programs. Under the pretext of "foiling" a PRP assassination plot, the Kemalists disbanded this party during its efforts to set up single party governance.

In this 1933 interview, Karabekir could not escape his past association with the PRP. What was worse, the Kemalists had deemed such an association to be "separatist" thereby opening the door to intimidation and coercion. However, Karabekir responded to the journalist's allegations by stating first that "[the journalist] [should] abstain... from mentioning [in a negative way] those who worked body and soul for national independence, but if [he did] speak of them, to have the scruples not to present them as *insolvent*."<sup>126</sup> Later on in the interview, Karabekir seemed to affirm his loyalty to Kemalist state and "verified" Kemal alone as the "savior" of Turkey. Karabekir quoted Mustafa Kemal, stating, "Those who attribute the exclusive glory of our liberation to me commit an error of judgment. There exists two Mustafa Kemals. I am the mortal and fallible [Mustafa Kemal]. The other [Mustafa Kemal] is all of you, it is all of those [on]

---

<sup>126</sup> de Chambrun, May 16, 1933. "Incident survenu entre la presse officieuse et le Générale Kaizim Karabekir."

whom I have defined and based the hopes [of the nation], all of those with whom I have worked to realize them [these hopes]. This [Mustafa Kemal] is immortal.”<sup>127</sup>

Thus, as the example of Kazım Karabekir shows, the state went to great lengths to “compel” its ministers and officials to actively promote the image of Mustafa Kemal as Turkey’s sole “savior,” even to the detriment of the acknowledgement of their own contributions. As one sees from Karabekir’s interview, not only had these prominent figures been silenced as well as constantly put on the defense for the slightest ideological deviation from the Kemalist state’s conception of Turkism, but also that they had no choice but to resort to perpetuating their “Great Turk” as an outlet to voice their loyalty to the state. Again, one sees the gap between theory and practice in this. Gökalp advocated for Mustafa Kemal to embody the identity of the Turkish nation. The Kemalist state took Gökalp up on that; however, in order to ensure that no other individual would claim glory for himself, the state aggressively sought to intimidate and silence these potential “pretenders.” Gökalp envisioned that collective representation would be enough to win the people to the Turkist cause. He believed that the populace would naturally accept the exalted image of Mustafa Kemal if the Gazi stepped out as their “Great Turk.” Gökalp, however, *did not* envision the state’s need to silence other prominent figures in its effort to promote Mustafa Kemal as the sole inheritor of Turkist ideology and application.

One must ask then *why* the Kemalist state had to resort to such measures of intimidation against otherwise credible nationalists such as Karabekir. The answer lies in a shortcoming in Gökalp’s logic: that collective representations, once conceived, would

---

<sup>127</sup> de Chambrun, May 16, 1933. “Incident survenu entre la presse officieuse et le Générale Kaizim Karabekir.”

maintain their perpetual potency in Turkey. This was not the case in reality. In fact, a diplomatic cable from Billencocq dated February of 1933 comments on a rather lukewarm reception thrown for Mustafa Kemal by the people of İzmir. Billencocq reported that

Although the local press [in İzmir] consecrates laudatory [*dithyrambiques*] articles of raging enthusiasm among the people of İzmir [*la population smyrniote*] on the subject of the [up-coming] visit of their ‘glorious liberator,’ the truth is that the welcome made for the Gazi had been one of the most cold. Far from reaching the number of ten thousand people of which the newspapers spoke, the crowd that stood at the customs entry [where Mustafa Kemal entered the city] did not exceed seven or eight hundred people, the majority various [local] employees and dockworkers...<sup>128</sup>

From this cable, it is apparent that the newspapers’ efforts to inspire enthusiasm from the people of İzmir for the visit of their “great leader” were in vain as Mustafa Kemal received a meager reception upon his visit to the city in 1933. Billencocq cites a credible reason for the small numbers who greeted the Gazi. He states that “the harsh repression of the attempted Menemen revolt and the numerous executions that followed...are visibly the reasons for the dissatisfaction for the Gazi...”<sup>129</sup> The Menemen revolt, to which Billencocq referred, took place in December of 1930 when a self-proclaimed *mehdi*, or messiah, Derviş Mehmet, led his supporters in a full-scale riot over the Kemalists’ secular programs.<sup>130</sup> After decapitating one soldier who tried to put down the riot, Derviş

---

<sup>128</sup> M. Jean Beguin Billencocq, February 8, 1933. “A/S. Séjour à Smyrne du Gazi Moustapha Kemal Pacha.” Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 9. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>129</sup> M. Jean Beguin Billencocq, February 8, 1933. “A/S. Séjour à Smyrne du Gazi Moustapha Kemal Pacha.”

<sup>130</sup> For more detail, see Gavin G. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Collective Framework” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (Oct., 1998), pp. 44-66.

Mehmet and his supporters seized the local mosque's green flag, placed the soldier's severed head on top of the pole and paraded it around the city. The riots were eventually crushed and the rioters made examples of by the Kemalist state to other would-be "*mehdis*." Derviş Mehmet and thirty-seven of his associates were publically hanged in the city square. The memory of that event, if one is to believe Billencocq's assessment, had since created negative sentiments among the people of İzmir for their "Great Turk" as they saw him as repressive and brutal for resorting to public execution. Given that this negative connotation of Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalists could possibly hinder the progress of Turkism in the city, it is not surprising that İzmir was a hotbed of Turkist intercession during the language and nationalist campaigns in the local halkevi 1934.

#### "Atatürk"

Mustafa Kemal's rise to power began with victory over the European Imperial forces during Turkey's War of Independence. The so-called "radical wing" of the nationalist movement achieved independence for Turkey through shrewd negotiation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. The emergent Turkish state, however, did not stop at independence; instead, it sought to differentiate itself from the Ottoman past by aggressively combating Ottoman institutions, societal structure and identity and, in turn, reconstruct them along Kemalist-constructed "Turkist" lines. One such way the state went about the simultaneous process of Turkification and westernization was to make the adoption of surnames mandatory. Leading by example, Mustafa Kemal "accepted" the surname "Atatürk" after the deputies in the National Assembly voted overwhelmingly to

bestow it upon him. As with the formation of an assembly that reflected the models of Rousseau and the pre-Ottoman tribes, the adoption of surnames marked the Kemalists' plan to elicit its Turkic past in the effort to both spur Turkism and "elevate" the Turks to the status of western, itself a principle of Turkism.

French diplomats in Turkey, privy to the nuanced ambitions of the Kemalists, reported on the law mandating that surnames be adopted in Turkey. The secretary of Interpretation in the French Consulate in Adana, L.L. Bellan, wrote a letter, dated November of 1934 that reported on the significance of Mustafa Kemal's adopted surname to the simultaneous programs of westernization and Turkification. Bellan reported that "...*Atatürk* [signified], not exactly 'the father of Turks' but 'Father Turk' or 'Turk the Father...in this sense [of conveying the]... meaning of "*Great Turk*."'<sup>131</sup> Therefore, according to a deputy of the Grand National Assembly, Ferit Güven, who provided this insight for Bellan, the surname "Atatürk" did not necessarily mean that Mustafa Kemal was set up personally as the "*father of Turks*," but instead, his "*greatness*" was reinforced and institutionalized by the assembly. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became living proof, through name and example, that the "greatness" of Turkey was indeed alive. The surname "Atatürk" became a way to reinforce to Mustafa Kemal's fellow countrymen their status as "... the most eminent representatives of the world of Turkism."<sup>132</sup>

The "world of Turkism" is indeed a curious statement; however, considering that the Soviet Union's policy of indigenization (intended for national territories such as the Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan) ran contemporaneous

---

<sup>131</sup> L.L. Bellan, November 28, 1934. "Des Atatürks." Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 326. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>132</sup> Bellan, November 28, 1934. "Des Atatürks."

with the Kemalists' program of Turkification, "Turkism", the promotion of Turkic language, culture, and history, did assume an international character. Bellan's wording (*the world of Turkism*) signaled the efforts of both the Kemalist and Soviet states to launch Turkification programs. Unlike the Kemalist state, however, the Soviets believed indigenization would facilitate the spread of Socialist Internationalism. Despite being motivated by different ideologies, the Kemalist state's efforts to project its populace as "the most eminent representatives of the world of Turkism" most likely meant that in the face of the Soviet Union's indigenization policy, Turkey aspired to project itself as the eminent example of Turkism's realization.<sup>133</sup>

Bellan's 1934 letter discussed the link between bestowing the surname "Atatürk" and the Kemalists attempt to reconstruct and reintroduce their Turkic past. Bellan wrote that "...the only known Turkish word [that has] similar formation [to Atatürk] is *Atabek*."<sup>134</sup> Bellan explained that *Atabek* was a "noble title placed in circulation for the first time by the Seljuks and that [signified] not Father Bek but Great Bek."<sup>135</sup> Therefore, Bellan made the connection between the Turkish word *ata*, which means *ancestor* or *forefather*, and the idea of greatness or eminence among the Turkists. The greatness of the nation resided in the Turkic past of its people, hence the association of *ata* with *greatness*. For Bellan, the fact that the surname "Atatürk" was first constructed, then

---

<sup>133</sup> For more information on indigenization under the Soviet Union, see Adrienne Lynn Edgar, *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Matthew J. Payne, *Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2001); Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001).

<sup>134</sup> Bellan, November 28, 1934. "Des Atatürks."

<sup>135</sup> Bellan, November 28, 1934. "Des Atatürks."

bestowed on Mustafa Kemal, and meant that the assembly was looking into its Turkic past to recreate symbols of greatness.

With the surname law, the Kemalists both westernized the populace by mandating the adoption of surnames and Turkified them by creating such surnames as “Atatürk” that were intended to “remind” people of the glory of the Turkish past and the state’s commitment to rediscovering that glory. Surnames, such as *vatansever*, *he who loves his country*, or *aslan*, *lion*, which invoked animal symbolism central to Turkic literature, were created and adopted by the new citizenry of the Kemalist state. Bellan pointed out that the title “Great Turk” was similar to other “contemporary ones such as... *Grand Mogol*”<sup>136</sup> which also had connections to the Turks’ origins among Mongolian tribes and among the Mughal Empire of Turkic-Mongol descent.

In taking on the title of Great Turk, Mustafa Kemal solidified his status as the “savior” of the newly formed Turkish nation. Though no doubt such a surname was personally beneficial for Mustafa Kemal’s rule, his acceptance of it does not seem to be merely for personal gain. Bellan does not discuss any personal motives Mustafa Kemal could have had in adopting the name, but instead focuses on the broader implications for the Kemalist nationalizing mission. The Turks had their “khan,” their Great Turk, who symbolized the nation’s return to its past as well as its forward progress. Their past included throwbacks to the glories of the Seljuk and Mughal Empires, whose Turkic roots Bellan stressed, as well as symbolized the solidarity of the “tribe” with their elected “khan”.

---

<sup>136</sup> Bellan, November 28, 1934. “Des Atatürks.”

Halide Edip Adıvar, who had left Turkey in the wake of Kemalist crackdowns on opposition, later employed the image of Atatürk as the symbol of the nation in the closing remarks of her 1962 memoir. Adıvar wrote that “in the trial of the Independence War, it was Mustafa Kemal who became the symbol and was regarded foremost.”<sup>137</sup> By adopting the surname Atatürk, Turkism’s long awaited savior had secured his place as *the* collective representative of the Turkish nation.

## Conclusion

Mustafa Kemal in all his forms, whether the “Great Turk”, the nation’s savior or the military’s khan, perpetuated his image as Turkey’s defining and all-encompassing collective representative. This was in accordance with Gökalp’s theories. In this, the Kemalist sought to legitimize its Turkist programs. If the collective representative of the nation willed a reform, then that reform must be enacted. In addition to Mustafa Kemal, the state employed other government officials (sometimes through coercion) to spread the message of Turkey’s leader while on their own tours of Anatolia.

---

<sup>137</sup> Adıvar, 311. “*İstiklâl Savaşı’nın imtihanında en başta telâkki edilen ve sembol olan Mustafa Kemal vardı.*”

### CHAPTER III

#### KEMALIST LAIKLIK: AN IDEOLOGY OF IMPROVISATION AND PRAGMATISM

Political scientists and historians of Turkey have made much about the “resurgence” of Islamic identity among the Turks today. Many attribute this “resurgence” to Turkey’s frustration with its stagnant candidacy to the European Union. Others claim that Turkey’s increased economic ties, facilitated under the present ruling party, *Adelet ve Kalkma Partisi* of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with its immediate Muslim neighbors have also fostered a surge in Islamic identity at home. In the traditional historiography, Turkey has been presented as a battleground between the proponents of secularism and those of Islam. For both, the Kemalist period is traditionally seen as the era of “radical secularism” in Turkey.<sup>138</sup>

This chapter stands as a rejection of this mutually exclusive dichotomy between “secular” and “Muslim,” especially where Kemalist Turkey is concerned. Instead, this chapter proposes that both *secular* and *Muslim* identities were continually negotiated concepts for the Kemalist elites; these two identities clashed at times, yet other times they played off each other. This fluidity between “secular” and “Muslim” in Kemalist Turkey resulted from the fact that, unlike other tenets of Turkism, there was no clear and concise *ideology*, let alone *program*, outlining the way in which secularism was to be implemented. Differing from other areas of Turkist ideology, the Kemalist elites did not have a comprehensive precedent from the Ottoman-era Turkists regarding secularism. Ziya Gökalp himself provided no consistent opinion on secularism. The Turkish word for

---

<sup>138</sup> Noah Feldman, *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 87-88.

*secularism* is *laiklik*. Taken from French *laïcité*, Kemalist secular model attempted to imitate the French secular model in which “the sanctification of the [French] state [had] enabled it to cast the church outside the political realm.”<sup>139</sup> What emerged in reality however was an improvised and pragmatic program of secularism enacted by the Kemalist state. This improvisation developed in response to violent opposition to the state’s initial program of secularism, thereby causing the Kemalists to rethink the exclusion of Islam from its program of *laiklik*. Kemalist *laiklik* ultimately developed into something different from French *laïcité*, however, both programs remained similar in that a strong state in both countries reinforced them. In fact, as Olivier Roy states, “...there is no true *laïcité* without a strong state: the political domain is at the heart of the process of secularization.”<sup>140</sup> The presence of the “strong state” in Turkey was certainly instrumental in the application and later the renegotiation of *laiklik*.

### Gökalp and Secularism

Unlike other Turkist principles (*halka doğru*, language purification, collective representation, etc.), the writings of Ziya Gökalp gave no concise or comprehensive blueprint for Kemalist *laiklik*. In fact, his feelings on secular and Muslim identity proved at times contradictory. In a 1915 editorial, entitled *Dinin İçtimai Vazifeleri*, or *The Social Functions of Religion*, Gökalp stated that “In primitive societies there is only one kind of authority—that is, religious authority—because no political or cultural authority developed in [these societies] independently... In organic societies, at first political *mores*

---

<sup>139</sup> Olivier Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 41.

<sup>140</sup> Roy, 41.

and later cultural *mores* take shape in addition to religious *mores*.”<sup>141</sup> Gökcalp goes on to state that the Turkists, such as himself, “seek the functions of religion in organic society because only there can [they] see religion in its own sphere.”<sup>142</sup> Therefore, one can see that in this editorial, Gökcalp argued for the separation of religion from politics and culture. He advocated this not to guard against religious influence in the other two areas, but as a way to *purify* religion by separating it from other areas of the “organic society” he sought Turkey to become.

Yet, in the same editorial, Gökcalp argues that Islam should occupy a prevalent place in Turkish society. Gökcalp categorized the Turks as belonging to a multilayered societal system: on one hand, they belonged to the Muslim *ümmet*, or *community*, and on the other, to Turkish *vatan*, or *nation*. Again, Gökcalp seemed to separate Muslim and Turkish identity from one another; however, he advocated strengthening the *ümmet* for the benefit of the *vatan*. Gökcalp rationalized this by stating that

To fulfill [national and societal] duties, one has to develop a will powerful enough to overcome individual ambitions. In short the individual has to ‘negate’ himself in community before he may ‘survive’ in it...[whoever achieves this] elevates himself to the status of a genuine human being by acquiring a will-power to overcome his desires in this “training-school” [i.e. Islam] of self-control.<sup>143</sup>

Gökcalp believed that “if [such] religious policing did not exist, a moral and legal policing of men would not be possible.”<sup>144</sup> If Gökcalp seems inconsistent on the place of religion in society, it was because he remained consistent on a more “important” point: the need for

---

<sup>141</sup> Ziya Gökcalp, “Social Functions of Religion.” Niyazi Berkes. *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökcalp*, ed. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 184.

<sup>142</sup> Gökcalp, ed. Berkes, 185.

<sup>143</sup> Gökcalp, ed. Berkes, 188.

<sup>144</sup> Gökcalp, ed. Berkes, 188.

the individual to give “*himself*” up for the good of the community and by extension, for the nation. For Gökalp, individualism was an evil that threatened to tear the fabric of society apart. He would express this nine years later in his *Principles* when discussing economic solidarism. On this subject, Gökalp’s economic theories, like his religious and societal ones, affirmed his commitment to social well being over individual interest:

...Turks must possess the same economic well-being that they once enjoyed in [their pre-Ottoman] past, and the wealth which is earned must belong to everyone...The large sums that will result from collecting surplus values [taken from private enterprise] in the name of society will serve as capital for the factories and farms to be established for the benefit of society. Earnings of these public enterprises will be used to establish special refuges and schools for paupers, orphans, widows, invalids, cripples, the blind and deaf...to build housing for workers and peasants. In short, everything necessary will be done to end all forms of misery and to assure the well-being of the populace.<sup>145</sup>

It was adherence to and sacrifice for collective good that empowered a nation. Thus, Gökalp saw that Islam as a communal religion that would prove a useful *tool* to police mankind’s otherwise unchecked individual desires and instruct him in the ways of collective self-sacrifice. It can be said that Gökalp advocated, if only lightly, for the separation of Islam from the political and cultural spheres, but not for the *disappearance* or the *subjugation* of Islam to either.

### Gökalp and Rida: Turkist and Islamists’ views of the “new” Caliphate

When the Turkish nationalists separated the sultanate from the caliphate in November of 1922 and abolished the former, the victory of the nationalist movement was solidified. The abolition of the sultanate was met with much support from the upper

---

<sup>145</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 122-123.

echelons of the military, bureaucracy and intelligentsia. Gökalp, who abhorred the institution as it exemplified Ottoman degeneracy, also lent his support to its abolition. Gökalp characterized the last sultan, Mehmet Vadeddin, as one who committed “treason” by virtue of his “alliance with the enemies of the [Turkish] nation.”<sup>146</sup> Under this *Ottomanist* sultanate, treason against the monarch’s people was possible, according to Gökalp and his Turkist contemporaries, “due to the usurpation of the rights of the people for the interests of the court.”<sup>147</sup> As many in the nationalist camp felt the same as Gökalp, the abolition of the sultanate by the National Assembly in Ankara came as no big shock. The debate over the Caliphate’s future, however, would prove an entirely different one.

Decrying the long-standing “deterioration” of the caliphate brought about by centuries of sultanic corruption, beginning “when [Sultan] Selim I...unified [the] two offices,” Gökalp himself believed that the Caliphate had been newly liberated and thus restored to its prominence due to the Assembly’s decree to separate it from the newly defunct *Ottoman* sultanate. He wrote euphorically in 1922 that

The Turkish revolution...[had] assured the complete independence and freedom of these two powers [Caliphal and National]. As the right of sovereignty of the Turks [had] passed entirely to the people, the Caliphacy [sic] too [had] won its independence by being separated from the Sultanate. Now the office of the Caliphate, having won its independence, will be able to establish...religious organization...<sup>148</sup>

For Gökalp, “religious organization” entailed the newly liberated Caliphate’s authority to reinforce communal identity and social values that it had not enjoyed when bound to the office of the sultanate. Wanting to keep members of the House of Osman as the rightful

---

<sup>146</sup> Gökalp, ed. Berkes, 225.

<sup>147</sup> Gökalp, ed. Berkes, 225.

<sup>148</sup> Gökalp, ed. Berkes, 229.

inheritors of the Caliphal title, Gökalp effectively championed the *Turkish* supremacy in determining Caliphal authority. He wrote in 1922 that

As to the question of confining the right of election to the [Caliphate] only to the house of Osman, we [the Turkists] believe this is correct. This respectful family is a blessed dynasty which has served and elevated the Turkish nation for a thousand years and both Islam and the Turkish nation for six centuries.<sup>149</sup>

Caliph or not, Gökalp characterized the “House of Osman” as a historic bedrock of Turkish nationalism. How fitting then that this “blessed” dynasty not only be institutionalized in the new Turkish state but also continue the Turks’ rightful claim as the spiritual leaders of the greater Muslim world. In both instances, Gökalp emphasized the centrality of Turkish identity.

In order to understand the historical context surrounding Gökalp’s writings on the 1922 abolition of the sultanate as well as the full implications of the Kemalist’s ultimate decision to abolish the Caliphate outright in March of 1924, one must briefly consider the writings of other prominent intellectuals of the former Ottoman Empire, mainly Islamist reformers centered in Egypt. One prominent reformer was Muhammad Rashid Rida. Rida was known as a staunch advocate for uniting the entire Muslim World under Pan-Islamism. Rida also advocated for the wholesale adoption of western technology, sciences and education in order to modernize the Muslim community. In this regard, Rida echoed Gökalp, though each argued for the empowerment of his own community, be they the Muslim or Turkish community.

During WWI, many Arab Muslim reformers, including Rida, found themselves on the opposite side of their Ottoman counterparts as they secretly conspired with the British

---

<sup>149</sup> Gökalp, ed. Berkes, 227.

to establish an Arab state with its own Arab caliphate in the event of Ottoman defeat. After the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France, and the subsequent European control of Arab lands under the mandate system, the once pro-British reformers such as Rida now found themselves in a more dire situation than was experienced before the war. These Arab reformers saw in the ultimate victory of the Turkish national forces against European encroachments into Anatolia a chance to follow their Turkish, more in more importantly in their mind, *Muslim*, compatriots in throwing off the yoke of British and French imperialism. Unlike Gökalp who saw the Caliphate as empowered by its separation from the political authority of the sultanate, Rida believed that this separation brought about an “emptiness of the [now solely] spiritual caliphate newly created in Ankara.”<sup>150</sup> Rida believed this new caliphate was “empty” because the Kemalists in Ankara deprived it of its “spiritual [and] temporal power [as well as] the right of *ijtihad* [religious interpretation].”<sup>151</sup> In contrast, Gökalp saw this new Turkish caliphate as “no longer subject to the politics of any nation, [and able to] enjoy free communication with the Muslim muftis of all lands; [the new caliph could] issue decrees to all imams and khatibs...[and] exercise his right of religious authority over all religious institutions.”<sup>152</sup>

Though Rida disagreed on a number of points with Gökalp and the Kemalists, he was willing temporarily to put aside these points of contention in order to unite against a common European occupier. The problem for Rida and reformers like him was that the Kemalists were in no way interested in rekindling relations with the former non-Turkish

---

<sup>150</sup> Mahmoud Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida’s Ideas on the Caliphate.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, (1997), 272.

<sup>151</sup> Haddad, 272-273.

<sup>152</sup> Gökalp, ed. Berkes, 226.

subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In fact addressing the Arab World on any point, let alone the apparent “impotency” of the new Caliphate, was the last thing on the Kemalists’ minds as they moved towards total abolition of the caliphate. In fact, Rida’s major flaw in trying to establish dialog with the Kemalists in the area of the Caliphate was that he falsely “based his treatise [on the Caliphate] on the premise that the Turkish nationalists still had an abiding interest in the Arab and Muslim worlds.”<sup>153</sup> In the end, as the Kemalists moved to abolish the caliphate itself in March of 1924, any hope of international Muslim cooperation between Turks and Arabs was lost as the Kemalists demonstrated that “they were concerned about [Turkey’s] national destiny [rather] than about cooperating with the Arabs to revive the caliphate, or about any notions of primacy in the Islamic world.”<sup>154</sup> The Kemalists turned inward to enact its revolutionary reforms aimed at simultaneously westernizing and Turkifying the populace within the new borders of the Turkish state.

### Abolishing the Caliphate: the First Phase of Kemalist Laiklik

On March 3, 1924, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara proclaimed the abolition of the Caliphate and thus severed all ties with the past institutions of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the elimination of caliphate, the Assembly abolished the office of the *Şeyhülislam*, closed down religious schools, and outlawed Sufi orders. With this bold and shocking move to eliminate all facets of Ottoman Islamic institutions, the Kemalists laid the foundation for their eventual program of *laiklik*, or state secularism.

---

<sup>153</sup> Haddad, 276.

<sup>154</sup> Haddad, 276.

*Laiklik* as enacted by the Kemalist state stood as its original contribution to Turkism, as neither Gökalp, nor any other Turkist forerunner, addressed the concept of secularism in terms of its total application to society that it would come to embody in the Kemalist state. But one must ask whether the Kemalists themselves had a definite plan of secularization of both state and society, or if secularism evolved as a functional process. I argue the latter, that secularism in Kemalist Turkey was a fluid and functional process that was profoundly shaped by the state's continual "testing of the waters" with regard to the attitudes of its population.

As radically revolutionary as other tenets of Turkism were, the implications of *laiklik* promised to be the most polarizing for Anatolian society. One must ask *why* the Kemalist state proceeded with *laiklik* then, considering that it had no clear precedent in the writings of Ottoman-era Turkists and if pushed too far, could threaten the legitimacy of the state. If the elevation of Turkish nationalism was key for the Kemalists, then would not the promotion of Islam, the majority religion of the Turks, be in the state's interest? The answer to this lies in the *type* of nationalism the state sought to construct and impose upon its population. The pursuit of wholesale westernization, concurrent with Turkification prompted the Kemalist state to break from Ottoman-era Turkism by grafting secularism onto traditional constructions of Turkish identity. The period between 1924 and 1930 represents the first phase of the implementation of Kemalist *laiklik*. In this first phase, *laiklik* was characterized by the state's aggressive program to prevent Islam from gaining any authoritative role in the structure of the Kemalist state. This phase mirrored the efforts of the French state to enact *laïcité*, a strict and state-mandated

separation of religion and state. The adoption of the term *laik* in Turkish signifies the Kemalist state's attempts to gear its own secular program towards that of France.

Writing an article on the newly formed Turkish Republic and the recent abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in the *New York Times* in April of 1924, Abraham Mitrie Rihbany, an Arab nationalist and Christian theologian, commented glowingly that “having achieved true freedom by their own might and power, the liberated Turks find themselves in a position to tell the whole world—Arabs and all—that they are Turks first and Moslems [*sic*] afterward. Moslems as individuals, if they wish to be, but Turks as a nation.”<sup>155</sup> In Rihbany's tone, praise is lavished on the Turks for having set a precedent for achieving independence from the imperialist “Christian nations” of the west. Rihbany recognized that the only language the world truly understood was the language of power, and thus, for him, it was “not by their whispered confessions [but by] their loud acts” that Turks achieved independence through a display of power.<sup>156</sup>

In the first phase of its implementation, both “loud acts” and “whispered confessions” were indeed characteristic of Kemalist *laiklik*. After being deposed, the last caliph, Abdülhamit, and his family were expelled from Turkey. A French diplomatic cable from Syria dated March 22, 1924 reported that in being stripped of his office, the ex-caliph had been “dispossessed of his dignity by the Assembly in Ankara.”<sup>157</sup> Indeed,

---

<sup>155</sup> ABRAHAM MITRIE RIHBANY. “What the Turks Demand!” *The Christian Science Monitor* (1908-Current file); Apr 9, 1924; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Christian Science Monitor (1908 - 1997), 22.

<sup>156</sup> Rihbany, Apr 9, 1924. “What the Turks Demand!”

<sup>157</sup> Department de Beyrouth, March 22, 1924. “Lettre Collective a.s. du Califat.” Microfilm Series: PO1428. Pp. 39. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

the expulsion of the caliph had earned the Kemalist state bad press. Writing an editorial in the *Lausanne Gazette* in March of 1924, Maurice Muret noted that

There is nothing more respectable than the religious faith of all people. It is absurd to clash with this head-on. A government has the right to control political manifestations of the clergy. [However] it commits a grave error in scorning...the masses [who] remain religious. The brutal expulsion of the caliph will not bring fortune to the young Turkish republic.

At any rate, the revolutionaries in Ankara are mistaken if they think they have answered once and for all the question of the caliphate in the dismantling of Abdulmecit, an open-minded, artistic, lettered and intriguing man.<sup>158</sup>

Many in France saw the abolition of the caliphate as a British plot to undermine their newly acquired colonial authority in Syria and the Levant. The editorialist Ludovic Pottier declared it was the “Young Turks” who “who lacked religion in general and Islam in particular” were coerced by “the deceitful British...to [render]...the Caliph in Constantinople [destitute] in order to transfer the title and function of the title to King Hussein of the Hedjaz [who was Britain’s] creation and humble servant.”<sup>159</sup>

In the outrage that poured out from these and other western periodicals, as well as from the Muslim world, one detail of the situation was, and continues to be, overlooked, if not forgotten. The Kemalist state did not merely abolish the caliphate without first replacing it with an alternate institution. On the contrary, the caliphate and *şeyhülislam* were succeeded by the state-run *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, or, *Presidency of Religious Affairs*. Under this new *Kemalist* institution, it was the state, not autonomous figures, that

---

<sup>158</sup> Nicole, March 20, 1924. “A Propos de l’arrivée du califat Abdul Medjid à Territet.” Microfilm Series: PO1428. Pp. 27. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>159</sup> Ludovic Pottier, March 8, 1924. “Le Petit Orauais du 8 mars 1924.” Microfilm Series: PO1428. Pp. 15. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

was to assume the “responsibility” of religious affairs in the new republic. The Kemalists had seized authority of religious matters and sought to regulate them through the state organ. Another matter that is overlooked is the 1924 constitution drafted a month after the deposing of the Caliph. Article 2 of the constitution stated, “The Turkish State’s religion is the religion of Islam; the official language is Turkish and the capital is Ankara.”<sup>160</sup> Therefore, the picture that emerged was one of the Kemalist state abolishing the institution of the caliphate, and *transferring* the religious authority of the former office to the *Presidency of Religious Affairs*. In addition, the original 1924 constitution clearly stated that Islam was the state religion of the new republic.

In 1925, the Kemalist state pushed its secular program further. The Ottoman fez, symbol of Ottoman Islamic identity was outlawed and European hats were promoted. This would provoke a violent rebellion in the eastern portion of Anatolia that would rock the foundation of the Kemalist state. In March of 1925 in the eastern provinces of Diyarbakır and Mardin, a full-scale revolt was instigated against the authority of the Kemalist state. Frustrated at not receiving their own autonomous state during the negotiations at Lausanne as well as the aggressive Turkification policies of the young republic, Kurdish inhabitants of these eastern provinces took to the street as the core participants of this revolt. The Kurds, however, were not the only group to join; “Alevi, Kurds and Sunnis” alike, in addition to the Zaza and Kırman tribes soon joined their Kurdish counterparts in violent displays of opposition to the Kemalist state.<sup>161</sup> This

---

<sup>160</sup> Kemal Gözler, *Türk Anayasaları* (Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999), 73-79. Featured on: Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi, “1924 Teşkilat-ı Esâsiyye Kanûnu.” <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr>.

<sup>161</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 253.

diverse demographic of those who took part in the revolt has led historians to conclude that *religious* frustrations, along with ethnic frustrations, were instrumental in mobilizing the participants of this revolt. The “religious impetus” for the rebellion, organized under the charismatic religious leader Şeyh Sait, was the demand that “the *şeriat* and the caliph be restored [*getirmek*].”<sup>162</sup> The rebellion was violently crushed by the Kemalist state and Şeyh Sait and his associates were publically hanged. Emerging victorious in crushing the revolt, the Kemalist state was convinced that the perpetrators were motivated solely by religious fanaticism. Secularism would thus need to be applied even more rigorously in order to ensure the success of the state’s westernization and Turkification programs by further curtailing all religious dissent. In April of 1928, the constitution was updated and Islam was effectively omitted as the official religion of the state. The new article merely read, “Turkey’s official language is Turkish and its capitol is Ankara,” leaving out any mention of Islam.<sup>163</sup>

### American Missionaries and Turkish Secularists

The first phase of Kemalist *laiklik*, 1924-1930, was characterized by an aggressive campaign against “religious propaganda” of any sort. This was especially the case after the Şeyh Sait Rebellion of 1925. However, it was not only Islam that was the target of the state’s secular program, but “foreign” faiths as well, including Christianity. A series of diplomatic cables between the American ambassador to Turkey, Joseph Grew,

---

<sup>162</sup> Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi*, 253.

<sup>163</sup> Kemal Gözler, *Türk Anayasaları* (Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999), 73-79. Featured on: Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi, “1924 Teşkilat-ı Esâsiyye Kanûnu.” <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr>.

and the Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, in January of 1928 show the extent to which the Kemalist state sought to eliminate *all* religious intrusion, whether Islamic or Christian, into the public sphere.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 1928, Ambassador Grew wrote to Secretary of State Kellogg stating that “In view of the Turkish law prohibiting religious propaganda in schools, [the] Turkish government has sent representatives to investigate alleged conversion to Christianity of four girl students in [the] American School in Brusa [sic] whose diaries were stolen and turned over to Turkish authorities.”<sup>164</sup> When the investigation by the Turkish authorities concluded, Grew informed Kellogg of the exact nature of the situation, “The charge against the school by the Turkish educational authorities is that religious propaganda had been carried on which resulted in the conversion of at least three Moslem [sic] girl students to Christianity. Whatever the method employed, there seems to be no doubt that the charge of proselytizing has been sustained.”<sup>165</sup> One of the teachers apprehended, Miss Edith Sanderson, openly admitted to the Turkish authorities that she had “described the spiritual forces of Christianity so effectively” that her students sought to organize into “Bible study groups” in order to learn more about the faith.

This case created a sensation in the local Bursa press. Grew reported that “the Turkish press...has been inflammatory and has called on parents to take their children

---

<sup>164</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 964.

<sup>165</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 966.

away from these mission schools lest they be contaminated by foreign influence.”<sup>166</sup> The anger over this incident even touched “İsmet [İnönü] Pasha and other members of the cabinet [who were] much stirred up over the incident and were determined from the first to close the school if the reports of religious propaganda should be confirmed.”<sup>167</sup> From Grew’s description, the ire of the Bursa press towards the “foreign influence” of Christian proselytizing demonstrates *nationalist*, not *secular* concerns. In a sentiment that would mirror that of the *İzmir Postası* during the height of the youth mobilization in the city, the press of Bursa demonstrates a deep-seated suspicion of “foreign” and “outside” influences. *Laiklik*, then, was invoked by the press and upheld by İnönü during this instance not for its own sake, but for the sake of guarding the Turkish youth against outside influences. This presents a contradiction in the Kemalist state’s reasoning, as on the one hand, the state sought to *westernize* to the fullest extent and, on the other, the nationalist fervor of the state was deeply suspicious of “foreign influence” coming from the west. Therefore, *laiklik* was not equated with keeping religion from the public sphere, but instead was equated with keeping outside and foreign influences away from the Turkish youth who could be susceptible to them. Grew wrote that “The Minister of Public Education [was]...opposed to [the schools’] existence as they were continually under suspicion of conducting the very activities which have occurred at Brusa [sic] and

---

<sup>166</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 967.

<sup>167</sup> <sup>167</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 968.

which even under a secular government are held to be opposed to Turkish nationalism.”<sup>168</sup>

The invocation of *laiklik* during this episode by the Kemalist state also served a pragmatic purpose. Grew states the obvious question in a May 8<sup>th</sup> 1928 cable to Kellogg: “Looking back at the closing of the Brusa school and the prosecution of the teachers, one may well ask why all this fuss by a government which was then on the point of complete laicization.”<sup>169</sup> He cites a conversation held with Tevfik Rüştü as the answer to this question. Crews states that Rüştü’s “frank explanation to [him] was sincere: the Government was obliged in self defense to take drastic steps against alleged Christian propaganda in a locality which was well-known for its opposition to the Government on religious grounds—a fanatically Moslem community.”<sup>170</sup> In other words, though “Christianity itself [was] of little consequence to [this] irreligious government,” the Kemalist state felt it pertinent to go on the offensive in prosecuting the American teachers who had sought to spread it in Bursa. In a climate where religious tensions were high, especially anti-secular sentiment among devout Muslim populations, the state sought to use *laiklik* as a tool to “combat” Christian missionaries so as to seem as if it was protecting its populace from proselytization. *Laiklik*, in this sense, became a tool to subdue Muslim fears of Christian penetration in Bursa. In the end, the Kemalist state publically deemed Christianity “to be contrary to Turkish culture and Turkish

---

<sup>168</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 969.

<sup>169</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 975.

<sup>170</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III*, 975.

nationalism, and therefore in effect essentially anti-Turkish.”<sup>171</sup> Though in private, Crews was assured by the Turkish officials that such an incident would have been of little consequence had it occurred in a more diverse and metropolitan area.

In the first decade of its existence, the Kemalist state had abolished the caliphate and most Islamic institutions, but, as the state was fragile, it had to proceed with caution in perpetuating its secular program. In the aftermath of the 1925 Şeyh Sait Rebellion, which threatened to undermine the state’s legitimacy, the Kemalists preceded with a pragmatic, yet ideological, program of *laiklik*. The pragmatic side came as the state used *laiklik* to “demonstrate” its commitment to countering western *religious* penetration in Turkey. *Laiklik* became “necessary” to preserve Turkish culture and identity. With the state’s newfound control over Islam through its *Diyanet*, it seemed to many Turks as if Islam, while its autonomy was greatly curtailed by state control, would actually be preserved and protected under the banner of *laiklik*. It would be the emphasis of the state acting as the *patron* of Islam in Turkey that would characterize the second phase of Turkish *laiklik* from 1930 to 1938.

#### Kemalist “Patrons” of Islam: Turkish Laiklik 1930-1938

In the wake of the Menemen Incident of 1930 in İzmir, the latest of a series of anti-secularism riots and rebellions, the Kemalist state’s policy of *laiklik* shifted from distancing Islam from the Turkish state to *secularizing* and *Turkifying* Islam to “complement” the Turkish state. Though Islam would never again reclaim its status as the

---

<sup>171</sup> Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. III, 975.*

republic's official religion as it had been from 1924 to 1928, the Kemalist state would mold the faith into a truly *Turkish* one. In fact, in restructuring *traditional* Islam into a completely *Turkified* and *secularized* Islam, the Kemalists seemed to strike a compromise. Yes, Islam, a cornerstone of Turkish identity, would continue to exist in Anatolia; however, the Kemalist state would strip Islam of its "radical" and "anti-modern" elements and retailor it to *fit* into the modernist and Turkifying state. As prominent historian of the Kemalist period, Suna Kili, states,

The Atatürkist principle of laicism did not advocate atheism. It was not an anti-God principle. There was no liquidation of religion in Atatürk's Turkey. Rather, religion and clergy were removed from areas that they had traditionally controlled. The latter were asked to confine themselves to specifically religious affairs. In short, it can be stated that the Atatürkist principle of laicism was not against an enlightened Islam but rather against an Islam that was opposed to modernization.<sup>172</sup>

The situation that emerges with *laiklik* then is not one of the state *removing* Islam from its people, but one of the state *modifying* Islam for them.

The first order of business for the Kemalists was to implement Turkish as the language of Islam. In March of 1930, Mustafa Kemal gave a speech on the need to *translate* the Koran from Arabic into Turkish. Two years prior, the state had prohibited Arabic classes; now, Arabic was further driven from Turkish society with the publication of the Koran translated into Turkish. Mustafa Kemal stated in his 1930 speech, "Recently, I have ordered the Koran to be translated. For the first time, it will be translated into Turkish. I have also ordered a book on the life of Muhommad to be

---

<sup>172</sup> Suna Kili, *The Atatürk Revolution: A Paradigm of Modernization* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 242.

translated [into Turkish].”<sup>173</sup> Mustafa Kemal used the word *tercüme* which gives the meaning of “translating.”<sup>174</sup> The implications of “translating” the Koran directly from Arabic to Turkish were enormous. It was believed that the Koran could never be *translated* from Arabic into another language as it was the literal *word* of God. The meaning of God’s word could be *intrepreted* by scholars into the vernacular language of the respective community, but could never translated directly. The Kemalist state slowly took steps to counter this tradition by comissioning religious scholars, the most prominent of which was Elmalılı Muhammad Hamdi Yazır, to *translate*, not merely intrepret, the Koran from Arabic into Turkish. Here, the Kemalist state acted as a “patron” of Islam by comissioning Islamic scholars to translate and write their commentaries for these new Turkish Korans. This comission resulted in various Turkish language Korans, the most prominent of which was Yazır’s 1935 *Hak Dini Kur’an Dili*, or *Religious Rights of the Koran in Vernacular*, which was soley in Turkish and featured extensive exegesis from Yazır. The title of this Turkish Koran indicates the state’s cautious approach to promoted Turkish translations in place of the Arabic original. Nevertheless, beginning with this effort, the Kemalist state was to use *laiklik* “to nationalize and modernize Islam.”<sup>175</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. “*Mart 1930; S, D, III.*” in *Atatürk Düşüncesinde Din ve Laiklik*, ed. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık Ltd. Şti, 1999), 3.

<sup>174</sup> The primary meaning of *tercüme etmek* is *to translate*. The word’s secondary meaning is *to intrepret*, which would be less problematic for Muslims. However, the verb *yorumlamak*, which Mustafa Kemal did not use, has the primary meaning of “intrepreting, rendering, decipherring, or paraphrasing.” Due to the context of the period and the speech I conclude that Mustafa Kemal intended to use *tercüme etmek* in the sense of “translating.”

<sup>175</sup> Zürcher, 284.

In 1932, the state pushed the “nationalization” of Islam further during the month of Ramadan when “it was announced that the *hafiz* [would] read Turkish Korans” instead of Arabic ones.<sup>176</sup> In addition to the *hafiz* reading the Turkish Koran exclusively, the state announced that “in place of the Arabic *ezan* [Muslim call to prayer], a Turkish *ezan* would be composed by the state conservatory” and be made mandatory for all mosques. As with the language revolution taking place concurrently, the Kemalist state found itself implementing Turkism with its program of *laiklik*. This phase of *laiklik*, as opposed to the first phase, directly echoed the Turkist program of Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp wrote in 1923 that “in order to give a greater rapture and exhilaration to our religious life, it is necessary that the Qur’an (except for the litanies)...and the services, as well as the prayers, supplications and sermons which follow the rituals, be read in Turkish.”<sup>177</sup>

However, as with the program of *halka doğru*, the Kemalist state deviated from Gökalp’s program in that the state’s main concern was not “to give greater rapture and exhilaration” to Muslims in Anatolia but, instead, to further *legitimize* its own Turkist program. Mustafa Kemal, the “mehdi” of Turkism, publically read a Turkish Koran in 1932, the same year as Turkish *ezans* and sermons were made mandatory. There is another reason why the Kemalist state used *laiklik* to effectively *Turkify* Islam in Turkey. The Kemalist state characterized itself as an *enlightening* state, where access to *positivist* education was to raise its citizens to the heights of European civilization. Using words like *enlightened* and *positivist* to describe itself meant that the Kemalists believed in the

---

<sup>176</sup> Ahmet Vehbi Ecer, “Atatürk’ün Din ve İslam Dini Hakkındaki Görüşleri,” in *Atatürk Düşüncesinde Din ve Laiklik*, ed. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık Ltd. Şti, 1999), 132.

<sup>177</sup> Gökalp, ed. Devereux, 120.

power of logic to solve society's problems. For example, if the violent uprisings in 1925 and 1930 against the Kemalist state were the result of "illogical" ignorance that bred fanaticism, then this was seen as a societal problem and it was therefore the state's duty, in the eyes of its governing elite, to guide the masses towards a "logical" and "enlightened" Islam that would not be antithetical to the state's programs. To reiterate Suna Kili's view that "the Atatürkist principle of laicism was not against an enlightened Islam but rather against an Islam that was opposed to modernization" certainly affirms this *mission civilisatrice* of the Kemalist state towards its population.<sup>178</sup> Islam's Kemalists patrons saw issuing Turkish Korans, as well as mandating that all rites be done in Turkish, as implementing this more enlightened and modern religion. Commenting on the need to render Islam more enlightened, Mustafa Kemal wrote that "if our [the Turks'] religion is not a religion which corresponds to reason, it would not be the most perfect religion, it would not be the seal of religions."<sup>179</sup>

Given this view of the Kemalist state's policy towards religion, it is ironic that so many outside sources characterized the Kemalists as irreligious or even atheists. In May of 1934, the French Ambassador, Albert Kammerer, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs detailing the tenets of "*Kemalisme et materialisme*." Kammerer wrote that

The men in Ankara, in order to steer a profound and quick revolution...have officially freed themselves from all religious preoccupations. Not only is the new regime exclusively and rigorously *laïc*, but its leadership professes atheism. In Ankara, one is struck...by an

---

<sup>178</sup> Kili, 242.

<sup>179</sup> Ecer, 133. "*Eğer bizim dinimiz akıl ve mantıkla uyuşan bir din olmasaydı, en mükemmel din olmazdı, en son din olmazdı.*" I translated "en son din olmazdı" to mean the "seal of religions" rather than "the last religion." I took this stylistic liberty to illustrate the parallels between Kemalist and traditional Islamic views of Islam, the last, and therefore, final revelation of God.

ultra-positive spirit of science, [and] in the single force of [human] intelligence and human boldness.<sup>180</sup>

Kammerer's characterization of the Kemalists as adhering to "ultra-positivism" is certainly correct. As stated, the Kemalists used positivism to reconstruct Islam into a "Turkish" faith totally subservient to the Turkifying state. However, unless the Kemalists governing elites personally professed atheism to Kammerer, it would be unlikely to label them as such given their program of *laiklik*. Kammerer characterized the state as "rigorously *laïc*," however, this is not totally accurate; the Kemalists state was "rigorously *laik*" in the full *Turkish* sense of the term. The 1905 Law establishing state-laïcité in France affirmed "The [French] Republic neither recognize[d] nor fund[ed] nor subsidize[d] any religion [*culte*]." <sup>181</sup> Therefore, in France all religious expression was vigorously shut out from all forms of public discourse. This became the French concept of secularism, called *laïcité*.

The Kemalists concept of secularism, *laiklik*, indeed used the language of the French law. Mustafa Kemal stated that, "*Laiklik* [did] not mean only the separation between the affairs of religion and world. It also [meant] freedom of conscience, expression and religion for all countrymen." <sup>182</sup> This certainly echoed the wording of the French Law, "The Republic assures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religion under the sole restrictions laid down [in the below text] in the interest

---

<sup>180</sup> Albert Kammerer, May 27, 1934. "Kemalisme et materialisme." Microfilm Series: P2250. Pp. 267. *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques*. La Courneuve, Paris.

<sup>181</sup> Assemblée Nationale, "Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État," <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/eglise-etat/sommaire.asp#loi>. (accessed March 14, 2011). "*La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte.*"

<sup>182</sup> Ecer, 134.

of public order.”<sup>183</sup> Writing a treatise on religious tolerance, entitled *Taassupsuzluk*, in 1930, Mustafa Kemal stated that

In the Turkish Republic, everyone can worship God as he wishes. Nothing will be done<sup>184</sup> to anyone on account of his religious ideas. The Turkish Republic has no official religion. In Turkey there will be no one who will attempt to force others [towards] his ideas and this [force] will not be allowed.”<sup>185</sup>

In this treatise and in his other speeches, Mustafa Kemal certainly advocated for the Republic’s religious neutrality. In certain actions, too, the Turkish Republic mirrored the efforts of France in establishing religious neutrality. Such actions included the decision in 1928 to remove any mention of Islam from the Turkish Constitution as well as the Republic vigorous crackdown on any form of “religious propaganda” in schools. It should be noted that even the *Turkified* Islam the Kemalists sought to promote was in no way part of the curriculum of schools. The abolition of shari’a law and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code, both in 1926, to replace it also show the sincerity of the state to secularize Turkish society.

What differentiated Turkish *laiklik* from French *laïcité* was the establishment of the *Diyanet* in 1924, as well as the efforts of the Kemalists to *Turkify* Islam. The existence of both seems to show a contradiction in the logic of the Kemalists. However,

---

<sup>183</sup> Assemblée Nationale, “Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État,” <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/eglise-etat/sommaire.asp#loi>. (accessed March 14, 2011). “*La République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercice des cultes sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après dans l’intérêt de l’ordre public.*”

<sup>184</sup> Mustafa Kemal, “Taassupsuzluk (Tolerans),” in *Atatürk Düşüncesi Din ve Laiklik*, ed. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık Ltd. Ştd, 1999), 3. Note: Mustafa Kemal used the present passive form *yapılmaz*, however, for ease of translation, I will render it “nothing will be done”

<sup>185</sup> Mustafa Kemal, “Taassupsuzluk (Tolerans),” in *Atatürk Düşüncesi Din ve Laiklik*, 3.

in the aftermath of anti-secular rebellions, the Kemalists were convinced that their legitimacy rested on their ability to promote an “enlightened” and “modern” Islam. What Kemalist *laiklik* amounted to was an official program of secularization and a semi-official program of Turkifying Islam. The *Diyanet*, an official government organization, was to oversee the Turkification of Islam in Anatolia. The *Diyanet* oversaw compliance with the state’s call for Turkish *ezans*, trained and licensed imams, and even wrote religious sermons for these imams to deliver. Eventually, in 1937, the Turkish Constitution would be changed to read “The Turkish Republic is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secular and Reformist. Its official language is Turkish and its capitol is Ankara.”<sup>186</sup> This change to the constitution enshrined the six principles of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism) that emerged in the 1930s as the specific goals of the state’s Turkist program. The state officially became a *laik* state with this change to the constitution in 1937, though it had functioned as such since the 1928 omission of Islam, or any religion for that matter, from the constitution.

## Conclusion

The program of *laiklik* stood as the Kemalist state’s innovation to the ideology of Turkism. Neither Gökâlp nor any other Turkist of the Late Ottoman Empire provided a comprehensive program for secularizing Turkish society. Gökâlp indeed championed the post-1922 caliphate, “freed” from the corruption of the Ottoman sultanate, as independent

---

<sup>186</sup> Kemal Gözler, *Türk Anayasaları* (Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999), 73-79. Featured on: Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi, “1924 Teşkilat-ı Esâsiyye Kanûnu.” <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr>.

and legitimate. The Kemalists would go “off script” however, by abolishing the Caliphate, much to the anger of many, in 1924. The period from 1924 to 1930 would mark the first phase of Turkish *laiklik*, whereby the governing elites would emphasize the *separation* of religion from state. After numerous and violent rebellions against the Kemalists, the elites, newly infused with a zeal to pursue complete *Turkification* of society, decided to become “patrons” of a *Turkish*, modern and enlightened Islam. Though the state would remain without an official religion, only to be declared officially *secular* in 1937, this Kemalist-sanctioned *Turkish* Islam would be implemented within Anatolia.

This *functional* program of secularism, while in theory resembling French *laïcité*, can only be labeled as *laiklik*. The word *secular* is a loaded term. To be secular, according to most standards in the west, is to disestablish an official religion from the respective state. The Kemalists certainly disestablished Islam from the state in 1928. However, their semi-official policy of creating a uniquely *Turkish* Islam complicates the view that Kemalist Turkey was indeed a *secular* state. From 1924 to 1937, the Turkish state was secular by *de facto* omission of Islam as the official religion. It was only with the inclusion of *laik* when characterizing the state that Turkey became secular *de jure*. However, because of the semi-official policy of *Turkifying* Islam, de-facto and de-jure secularism does not completely characterize *laiklik*. One must then label Turkey’s secularism simply as *laiklik* and accept the nuances that existed. To borrow from Stephen Kotkin’s argument about *Stalinism* being “true” *socialism* in the Soviet Union, Kemalist *laiklik* became “true” secularism” in Turkey.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

In his analysis on the role of nationalism and high cultures, Ernest Gellner wrote that “it is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way around.”<sup>187</sup> This certainly was the case with the Turkish nation state. Before its creation, the bureaucratic, military and intellectual elites of the Ottoman Empire began to differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups. This differentiation became the basis for Turkism, the comprehensive ideology that “engendered” the Turkish nation-state. The Kemalist state’s Turkist ideology was the lifeblood for the creation of Turkey as is known today. Turkism and its application by the Kemalist state is a potent example of nationalism engendering the nation. Turkism had its initial dreamers (Ahmet Vefik, Süleyman Paşa), its theorist (Ziya Gökalp) and its enactors (Mustafa Kemal, the People’s Party, the youth). Along the way, the ideology was re-evaluated and reinterpreted to keep up with the succession of historical circumstances that faced the budding nation-state.

Prominent historian of the Late-Ottoman/early Republican period, Erik J. Zürcher, claimed that the Kemalists were a radical faction of the Turkish national movement who seized power during the War of Independence and, upon founding the republic, subsequently sought to spread their vision of Turkish nationalism among the populace. Using the theoretical writings of Ziya Gökalp as their blueprint, the Kemalists sought to radically reconstruct Anatolian society along Turkist lines; they enacted this through a

---

<sup>187</sup> Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism and High Cultures,” in *Oxford Readers: Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 64.

state-sponsored, top-down revolution devised primarily through the single-party state apparatus.

Chapter One explained how the Kemalist state used Gökalp's theory of *halka doğru* to spread Turkism in the countryside. Though Gökalp envisioned a reciprocal exchange between urban elite and rural peasants in the Turkification of society, the state in reality bypassed reciprocity and imposed its vision of Turkism on the peasants. The height of this movement came in 1934, the same time the Kemalist state pushed for the spread of its version of secularism, *laiklik*. Therefore, the various programs of Turkism overlapped: the spread of a Turkified Islam was dependent on the masses knowledge of its liturgical language: Turkish, or rather the state-constructed and "purified" *Öztürkçe*. Both *halka doğru* and *laiklik*, then, sought the same ends: the spread of Kemalist-constructed Turkism. This showed the extent to which Turkish identity came from the metropole, Ankara, to the periphery, the countryside.

Chapter Two dealt with the perpetuation of Mustafa Kemal as the nation's "collective representation." Again, this idea, at least in the Turkist sense, originated with Gökalp who argued that "collective representation" was a sociological process by which an individual could become *the* embodiment of the nation through making himself its symbol. If Mustafa Kemal, and the state he led, could present him as something more than a mere man, as a Turkish *übermensch*, *khan*, or *mehdi*, then the programs needed to implement Turkism would be easily enacted and accepted by the population. One can see that Mustafa Kemal's image as Turkism's, and more importantly, *Turkey's* "savior" did result in successfully implementing Turkish *laiklik*. Had their "mehdi" not declared that Islam should be secularized and Turkified, the populace would not have gone along with

the state's attempts to change Islam, indeed would have continued to violently resist such a program. This was evident to the Kemalists in the wake of the anti-secularist Şeyh Sait rebellion of 1924 and the Menemen Incident of 1930. However, in light of Mustafa Kemal's personal "guidance" in implementing the patronizing phase of Kemalist *laiklik*, the program became more *tolerated* among the populace, if not wholly accepted.

Chapter Three deals with this program of *laiklik*. In this chapter, I argue that secularism for the Kemalist state took a *functional* path, rather than an intentional one. No clear initiative from Gökalp or other Ottoman-era Turkists was available to the Kemalists. Gökalp vaguely hinted at separation of Islam from the state in the interest of regaining the "dignity" of the faith. Upon the separation of the sultanate from the caliphate in 1922, Gökalp extolled the new, independent, and *Turkish* caliphate as harboring moral authority for the new nation-state and for the rest of the Muslim world. Writing in his 1923 *Principles*, Gökalp did advocate for the complete Turkification of Islam in Turkey, with the Koran, prayers and rites being read, recited and conducted in Turkish alone. The Kemalist state would indeed achieve this Turkification of Islam.

The apparent "improvisation" of the Kemalist state with regard to *laiklik* came when the governing elites abolished the caliphate, şeyhülislam and şeriat courts in the effort to eradicate the last vestiges of the Ottoman past. In the introduction to Gökalp's writings on this subject, Niyazi Berkes claims that Gökalp would mostly likely have come to approve of the abolition of the caliphate. Given, Gökalp's complete abhorrence of anything Ottoman (he emphasized the *Turkish*, not *Ottoman*, character of the post-1922 caliphate), this would not be an unfounded assumption. However, history does not operate on ahistorical assumptions, but instead on the documented past. The simple truth

is that Gökalp left no “documentation” sanctioning the abolition of the Caliphate. Therefore, we must view the abolition of this institution as the Kemalist state’s innovation of and contribution to Turkism.

The Kemalist state abolished the caliphate due to ideological concerns that Turkism, the source of the state’s legitimacy, would have to compete with the Islamism the caliphate represented. The Kemalists chose to eliminate the head of this competing ideology and bring Islam under the fold of the secularizing state. The Kemalists labeled this *laiklik*. The state went from a period of strict separation of Islam from the public sphere (1924-1930) to taking on the role of “patron” and “reformer” of Islam to fit its Turkist ideology. However, this new role was only an un-official one as the state preferred to leave any mention of Islam out of its constitution and discourse.

The use of the state apparatus to implement ideology is a defining characteristic of 20<sup>th</sup> century modernist regimes, be they Islamist, Ba’athist, Bolshevik, Facist, or Nationalist. This state-centered, top-down approach to fomenting revolution was indicative of *modernism*, in that it was believed that state institutions could revolutionize society. The Kemalist state fits firmly within this paradigm. In showing how the state spread its particular *-ism*, Turkism, by state-enacted social revolution, I hope to contribute to the overall dialog of the role of the 20<sup>th</sup> century state in enacting revolution. I hope to provide insight not only into *how* the Kemalist state implemented Turkist ideology, but also, and more importantly, *the way in which* this ideology was re-evaluated and reconstructed in order to be applied by the state apparatus. Ideology is a fluid concept and the Kemalist state’s application of Turkism is a clear example of how it changes depending on the particular circumstances it encounters.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Archival Material

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques. La Courneuve,  
Paris.

### Previously Published

Akşin, Sina. *Turkey From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of  
the Turkish Nation from 1789 to Present*. New York: New York  
University Press, 2007.

Atabaki, Touraj and Erik J. Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization  
Under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill  
University Press, 1964.

Brass, Paul. "Elite Competition and Nation-Formation," in *Oxford Readers  
Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 83-89, Oxford  
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United  
States, 1928, Vol. III*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943.

Edgar, Adrienne Lynn. *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan*.  
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Feldman, Noah. *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 2008.

- Gallagher, Charles F. "Language Reform and Social Modernization in Turkey." in *Can Language Be Planned? Sociolinguistic Theory and Practice for Developing Nations*, edited by Bjorn H. Jernudd and Joan Rubin, Honolulu: Bow Historical Books, 1971.
- Gellner, Ernest. "Nationalism and Modernization," in *Oxford Readers Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 55-63, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism*. Translated by Robert Devereux. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968.
- Ziya Gökalp. "Social Functions of Religion," in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, edited by Niyazi Berkes, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Göksel, Aslı and Celia Kerslake. *Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Hoare, Quinton and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Kazancıcıl, Ali and Ergun Özbudun. *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*. Edited by Ali Kazancıcıl and Ergun Özbudun. Hamden: Archon Books, 1981.
- Kedourie, Elie. "Nationalism and Self Determination," in *Oxford Readers: Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 49-55, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

- Kili, Suna. *The Atatürk Revolution: A Paradigm of Modernization*. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003.
- Kotkin, Stephen. *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Landau, Jacob. *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. Edited by Jacob M. Landau. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Martin, Terry. *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- McCarthy, Justin. *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997.
- Payne, Matthew J. *Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2001.
- Süleyman Paşa. "Tarih-i Alem," in *Yeni Lise Kitapları: Metinli Türk Edebiyatı III*, ed. Abdurrahman Nisari, 159, Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1951.
- Vekif, Ahmet. "Şecere-i Türki," in *Yeni Lise Kitapları: Metinli Türk Edebiyatı III*, Edited by Abdurrahman Nisari, 83-85, Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1951.
- Roy, Olivier. *Secularism Confronts Islam*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008.

Zürcher, Erik J. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

### **JSTOR Articles**

Brockett, Gavin D. "Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-1938," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), pp. 44-66. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283969>.

Haddad, Mahmoud. *Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. Vol. 117, No. 2. (Apr. – Jun. 1997), 253-277.

Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. *The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey*. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May, 1998), 47-73. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/195847>.

Lewis, Bernard. "Recent Development in Turkey," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1951), pp. 320-331. Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2606422>.

Webster, Donald E. "State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey,"  
*American Sociological Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1939), pp. 247-256.  
Published by: American Sociological Association. Article Stable URL:  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2084211>.

### **Newspaper Articles**

"Article 6 -- No Title." *New York Times (1857-1922)*; Jul 26, 1908; ProQuest  
Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007).

"En Eski İstanbullu," April 11, 2009, in *Okuma Kitabı TK S30*, ed. Dr. Özlem  
Öğüt, Dr. A. Sumru Özsoy, Dr. Sabahat Sansa, Dr. Eser E. Taylan.  
Boğaziçi University's Türk Dili ve Kültürü Programı, 2010.

Manal Lotfi. "Turkish Exceptionalism: Interview with Serif Mardin." *Asharaq*  
*Alawsat*. December 12, 2007.

Rihbany, Abraham Mitrie. "What the Turks Demand!" *The Christian*  
*Science Monitor* (1908-Current file); Apr 9, 1924; ProQuest Historical  
Newspapers Christian Science Monitor (1908 – 1997).

"Sultan, in Panic, Gives Constitution." *New York Times (1857-1922)*; Jul 25,  
1908; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 -  
2007).

### **Websites**

Assemblée Nationale, "Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des  
Églises et de l'État," [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/eglise-  
etat/sommaire.asp#loi](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/eglise-etat/sommaire.asp#loi), (accessed March 14, 2011).

Kemal Gözler, *Türk Anayasaları*. Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları. Taken from:

Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi, “1924 Teşkilat-ı Esâsiyye Kanûnu.”

<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr>, (accessed March 14, 2011).