Public Accountability and Conflict Initiation

within

Democracies

by

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ABSTRACT

A key feature of democracy is the idea that democratic leaders are accountable to the citizens within their states. That is, scholars assume that democratic leaders are accountable to voters, and the policies democracies develop are influenced by citizens that comprise democratic electorates. However, scholars have largely failed to consider how the ability of the public to hold democratic leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions shapes the foreign policies of democracies. Researchers have rarely considered the role of voters in affecting the foreign policies of democracies across different types of democratic states. Furthermore, democratic leaders are not accountable to their publics to the same degree when comparing democracies. Institutional and political differences among democracies create significant variations in levels of political accountability for democratic leaders. Thus, I seek to investigate the more precise linkages between voters, political parties and democratic leaders in determining when democracies are more or less likely to initiate interstate conflicts with other states.

In this dissertation, I address two areas that have been neglected in previous research: the failure of scholars to consider the effect party systems have on political accountability and conflict initiation within democracies; and, the neglect of researchers in considering the role electoral systems have in structuring the manner by which elected leaders are accountable to the public and the resulting effect on the foreign policies democracies pursue. Through a cross-national quantitative analysis, I examine how party systems and electoral systems affect political accountability for democratic leaders, and how in turn, variation in levels of political accountability affect the foreign policies of democracies. The results from the quantitative analysis indicate that as party systems are more stable, and electoral systems promote candidate-centered incentives, democracies are less conflict prone because democratic leaders are more beholden to the public.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin (having sprung from the pure source of the concept of law), also gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.

--- Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch

Introduction

From 1983 – 1993 Venezuela's party system was considered one of the most stable party systems in Latin America.[1] During this period, Venezuela experienced relatively peaceful relations with its neighbors in Latin America and was involved in only two interstate disputes involving the use of force.[2] However, the stability of Venezuela's party system began to erode in the early to mid nineties.[3] Partly as a result of economic turmoil and societal discontent, Venezuela's once stable party system became one of the most unstable party systems in Latin America, and Venezuelan politics became dominated by non-programmatic platforms and populist appeals to the citizenry.[4] While Venezuela remained democratic during this period, accountability for political parties and politicians declined significantly. As Roberts (2003, 36) notes, "With the rise of Chávez at the end of the 1990s,… the most distinctive features of this new leadership are its implacable hostility to the political establishment and an aversion to intermediary institutions that can hold a leader accountable to mass constituents." Furthermore,

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[1] Based on the two measures that are commonly used to capture party system stability which are: electoral volatility and party replacement (Przeworski 1975; Mainwairing and Scully 1995; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Stockton 2001; Birch 2001, 2003; Birnir 2005; Casas-Zamora 2005; Ishiyama 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). From 1983 – 1993 the average volatility of votes received among parties was approximately 10% per election and the percentage of votes won by new parties was 8%.

[2] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

[3] From 1994 – 2004 the average electoral volatility in terms of votes received among parties was 33.01% and the percentage of votes won by new parties was 15%.

[4] (Roberts 2003)

the altering of Venezuela's party system had direct effects on the behavior of democratic leaders in Venezuela and the policies the Venezuelan government pursued, both domestically and internationally. Indeed, while Venezuela was involved in only three interstate disputes from 1983 – 1993, from 1994 – 2004, Venezuela was involved in nine interstate disputes, with seven involving the use of force, and itself initiated seven disputes.[5] How can the de-stabilization of party systems in countries such as Venezuela lead to more aggressive foreign policies by democratic governments? Furthermore, how does the institutional and political landscape within democracies affect the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders? I argue that the answer lies in the manner through which democratic leaders are held accountable to the public, and how the differences in levels of political accountability affect the likelihood democracies will originate militarized interstate disputes with other states.

Specifically, to understand when democratic states are more or less likely to initiate conflict, I assert that scholars must consider the manner by which democratic leaders are held accountable by the electorate. Assuming that a primary objective of democratic representatives is to remain in office, examining how institutions and political factors influence the degree democratic leaders are accountable to the public can shed light on the domestic sources of conflict initiation within democracies.

My theoretical argument is that when democratic representatives are more accountable to the public - as evinced by stronger linkages between political parties, candidates and voters - democratic leaders should be less likely to originate disputes with foreign states due to concerns leaders have regarding their electoral futures. That is, as democratic leaders are more accountable to voters regarding their foreign policy decisions, there is a greater likelihood they

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[5]These data were obtained from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart 2004).

will be removed from office by the public for involving their states in risky or unpopular

conflicts. In contrast, as democratic representatives are less accountable to the public, where

linkages between political candidates, parties and voters are weaker, democratic leaders should

be more likely to initiate interstate disputes because they have fewer concerns regarding re-

election. Therefore, electoral accountability is a critical factor that affects the decisions of

democratic leaders regarding their foreign policy choices, and is the primary focus of this

research project.

Theoretical Perspectives on Conflict Initiation

Since 1990 there have been over 800 incidences of militarized interstate disputes

involving democratic states.[6] Scholars have offered numerous explanations regarding why

democracies engage in conflict. Many scholars have examined interstate level factors such as

power, alliances, trade dependency and territory; all of which are important to the study of

conflict because the structure of the interstate system affects the behavior of states. However,

factors associated with the interstate system do not fully explain conflict onset because they do

not take into consideration domestic level variables. That is, domestic level analyses often reveal

how political and institutional factors within states structure the decisions of leaders regarding

conflict. According to Reiter and Stam (2003, 336): "they (domestic political institutions) are

among the most powerful predictors of conflict initiation."

A majority of studies in international relations treat democracies as having uniform

qualities based on a dichotomous categorization that stipulates a state is either democratic or

non-democratic. Democratic institutions are assumed to constrain democratic leaders and affect

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[6] This finding is based on data from the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995) and the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004) where a dispute is considered to involve the use of force which is coded as a 4 or 5 on the hostility level scale for the hostility level variable within the MID dataset.

conflict onset in a similar manner across all democratic regimes. However, this dichotomization neglects key domestic features within democracies that influence the likelihood democratic states will engage in interstate conflicts. The studies that do unpack democratic states have focused on broad institutional factors such as: whether a democracy is a presidential or parliamentary regime, if the government in power is a majoritarian, minority, or coalitional government, or the ideological composition of the government. These studies, while informative, fail to examine the process through which democratic leaders are held accountable by the public. Thus, scholars have largely neglected the impact varying levels of public accountability within democracies have on the likelihood of conflict initiation. That is, international relations scholars have seldom asked the question: if democratic leaders are accountable to their electorates to varying degrees, how do the differences in political accountability affect the likelihood democracies will initiate militarized disputes with other states? Thus, my focus is on the rational incentives democratic leaders have to pursue either risky or conservative foreign policies based on the degree they are held accountable by the public.

Two factors that influence political accountability within democracies that have been neglected within the literature on domestic institutions and conflict are: the degree party systems are stable within democracies and the incentives politicians have to cultivate personal vote strategies. The degree party systems are stable within democratic states influences the manner through which political parties and candidates are held accountable by voters. The stability of party systems affects levels of accountability within democracies by providing the electorate with parties that are entrenched within society that voters can hold responsible for foreign policy decisions through elections. Thus, as party systems are stable, there are higher levels of political

accountability for elected leaders[7], and democratic leaders should be more conservative in their foreign policies. As Reiter and Tillman (2002) find, as a greater percentage of the population votes, democratic leaders are constrained to a larger extent resulting in more conservative foreign policies and fewer initiated conflicts.   However, while a larger electorate and higher levels of voter turnout can increase political accountability, if parties cannot effectively aggregate the interests of voters consistently over time, citizens will have difficulty holding leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions. Thus, analyzing the size of electorates and levels of voter turnout does not fully explain how voters can hold their elected leaders responsible for foreign policy outcomes. Scholars also must consider the nature of the party systems within democracies that aggregate the interests' of voters.

I argue that democracies with stable party systems have more established and effective means of holding leaders accountable for policy decisions[8] because parties serve as a connection between leadership within the government and society.[9] As party labels are clear, and the votes received among parties is stable from election to election, and as parties exist for longer periods, the electorate can more easily trace the policy decisions stemming from government leaders and hold elected officials accountable in upcoming elections for specific policy decisions.[10] In such systems, democratic leaders should be hesitant to involve their states in risky or costly conflicts due to higher levels of accountability present in stable party systems. In contrast, party labels become vague in less stable party systems which entail greater volatility in terms of the votes received among parties, and where new parties enter and exit the party system frequently.[11] In these systems, there are lower levels of accountability and government leaders will pursue riskier

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[7] Hankla (2006).
[8] Hankla (2006)
[9] Bratton (1999); Karp and Banducci (2007)
[10] Hankla (2006)
[11] Hankla (2006)

foreign policies. Thus, party system stability is an important component of political

accountability that has been ignored when examining how domestic institutions influence the

foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders.

Another domestic political factor that has been overlooked regarding political

accountability and conflict initiation within democracies is the degree electoral systems within

democracies promote candidate or party-centered incentives. Electoral systems are a critical

element regarding accountability for elected leaders because they structure the strategies

politicians must adopt in order to acquire and maintain political office.[12] Furthermore, the design

of electoral systems can affect all types of government policies within democracies including

foreign policies. As Leblang and Chan (2003, 397) state: "Among all the factors considered, the

nature of the electoral system has had the most consistent and pronounced effect on war

involvement by the established democracies." Leblang and Chan (2003) examine how Single

Member district (SMDs) and Proportional Representation (PR) systems affect the frequency of

conflict within democracies. They find that states with PR systems have fewer incidences of

conflict because a larger number of veto players leads to more moderate foreign policies by

democracies. However, while investigating the effect PR and SMDs have on conflict contributes

to the study of the relationship between domestic institutions and conflict initiation, additional

electoral system factors affect levels of political accountability.

One factor that influences political accountability is the incentives political candidates

have to cultivate personal or party-centered electoral strategies. In systems that promote

candidate-centered electoral strategies there are higher levels of accountability for individual

politicians for specific policy outcomes.[13] That is, the selectorates for elected representatives in

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[12] Persson and Tabellini (2008)
[13] Persson and Tabellini (2008)

candidate and party-centered systems are different. The selectorates in candidate -centered

systems are comprised of the public (electorate) to a larger extent because voters directly choose

their candidates based on voter preference. In contrast, the selectorates in non-candidate

centered systems are made up of party leaders and elites to a greater degree because party elites

have more influence over the selection and placement of candidates on voters' ballots that

ultimately affects which candidates are elected. Thus, in democracies with electoral systems that

promote candidate-centered electoral incentives, *individual* politicians are held responsible to a

greater degree by the public for unpopular policy decisions, including prolonged, costly or

unpopular military engagements. Therefore, in candidate-centered systems, politicians will be

less hesitant to pursue risky foreign policies due to increased political accountability for

individual democratic leaders and concerns regarding their political futures.

The stability of party systems and the nature of electoral systems within democracies

shape the incentives of politicians to represent the interests of the public. Democratic leaders that

are held accountable to the public to a lesser degree will pursue riskier foreign policies because

they have fewer concerns regarding reelection due to weaker linkages between voters, parties

and political candidates. Put simply, democratic leaders will pursue more aggressive and risk

acceptant foreign policies when the public lacks clear and consistent mechanisms to punish

political leaders for bad behavior.   Thus, IR scholars could benefit from more precisely

identifying the processes through which institutional and political factors affect levels of public

accountability for elected leaders and how variations in levels of political accountability structure

the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders.

The layout of the remainder of this introductory chapter is as follows. First, I will

examine the differences between democracies and autocracies regarding their propensity for

interstate conflict as well as discuss the processes through which each regime type selects into interstate conflicts. Next, I will focus on the existing explanations of conflict initiation pertaining to democracies. Here, I will consider the approaches to conflict initiation that focus on political accountability and political constraints and how they influence the likelihood democracies will initiate interstate conflicts with other states. I will explain why existing approaches fail to consider key aspects of political accountability: such as the stability of party systems and the nature of electoral systems. I conclude by briefly discussing my theoretical argument regarding public accountability and conflict initiation before proceeding to a more detailed description of my argument in chapter two and chapter three.

Why Democracies: Relaxing the Homogeneity Assumption

Many studies within international relations have investigated the propensity for interstate conflict of democracies and non-democracies and have found that democratic and non-democratic states engage in conflict with similar frequencies.[14] However, numerous works support the argument that significant differences exist between democratic and non-democratic states regarding the processes that occur domestically that lead to interstate conflict.[15] Thus, although democracies may be as conflict prone as non-democracies[16], the type of conflicts democracies select into are different than in autocracies due to the disparate institutions present in democratic and autocratic states.[17]

A large amount of literature supports the argument that the disparate types of domestic institutions within democracies and non-democracies leads to variation regarding their conflict

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[14] Chan (1984); Weede (1984)
[15] Dixon (1993); Russett (1993); Dixon (1994); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Hermann and Kegley (1995); Weart (1998); Leeds and Davis (1999); Reiter and Meek (1999)
[16] Chan (1984); Weede (1984); Macmillan (2003)
[17] Filson and Werner (2004)

behavior in the interstate system monadically.[18] For example, democratic leaders are considered

to have greater constraints in terms of using force against other states because the probability

they will be removed from office if a war becomes costly is higher than for autocratic leaders.[19]

Furthermore, scholars have found that significant differences exist when comparing autocracies

and democracies and the conflicts they do select into.[20] Democracies tend to select into conflicts

with lower costs that are perceived to be winnable.[21] The rationale is that autocracies and

democracies have different selectorates.[22] The selectorates in autocratic regimes are generally

smaller than the selectorates in democratic regimes.[23] The selectorate in democratic regimes is

the electorate. In the event of a military loss or protracted conflict, leaders in a democracy can

be removed from office more easily by their selectorates compared with autocratic leaders.[24]

Thus, democratic leaders are more selective regarding the issues they choose to war over.

Scholars argue that differences also exist between regime types regarding their likelihood

of being targeted in interstate conflicts.[25] Democracies are more likely to be targeted in interstate

disputes because of their domestic institutions that produce higher sensitivity costs for waging

lengthy wars.[26] Meaning, democratic leaders are more likely to be removed from office than

their autocratic counterparts if a war becomes protracted.[27]   Thus, democracies are more likely

to offer negotiations during costly wars, which increase the likelihood they will be attacked by

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[18] Dixon (1993); Russett (1993); Dixon (1994); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Hermann and Kegley (1995); Weart (1998); Leeds and Davis (1999); Reiter and Meek (1999)
[19] Goemans (2000)
[20] Reiter and Meek (1999)
[21] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Reiter and Meek (1999); Filson and Werner (2004)
[22] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995)
[23] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995)
[24] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995)
[25] Filson and Werner (2004)
[26] Filson and Werner (2004)
[27] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Filson and Werner (2004)

non-democracies and decreases the likelihood they will initiate risky conflicts.[28] Conversely,

autocracies are found to be more prone to initiate disputes than democratic states because their

institutions produce lower sensitivity costs for conflict.[29]

In reviewing the literature on democracy and conflict it appears democracies are

fundamentally distinct from autocracies regarding the processes by which they select into

conflict, the conflicts they select into, and the duration of the conflicts for which they are

involved. The accountability mechanisms are significantly different in democratic and autocratic

regimes, thus affecting their conflict behavior. Therefore, we can proceed from the assumption

that critical differences exist when comparing democracies and autocracies and can move to

investigating the institutional and political variation within democracies to better account for the

factors that influence when a democracy is likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute.

Political Accountability

The idea that democratic leaders are held accountable politically for foreign policy

decisions is a central element within the literature on conflict initiation and democracies. An

important domestic factor that can affect conflict initiation within democracies is political

accountability. Political accountability – as it relates to conflict onset - refers to the likelihood a

leader is removed from office as a direct result of an unpopular policy decision.[30] Furthermore,

political accountability refers to the constraints imposed upon leaders within democracies. In

more precise terms, political accountability explanations of conflict initiation consider the

domestic, political opposition leaders must work through in attempting to implement their

foreign policies, as well as the future political consequences leaders may face as a result of

foreign policy decisions. Political accountability models examine factors such as the

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[28] Filson and Werner (2004)
[29] Filson and Werner (2004)
[30] Goemans (2000); Rosato (2003)

institutional design of states and the number of veto players involved in the policymaking

process. In addition, scholars utilizing approaches related to political accountability examine the

likelihood leaders will be removed from office due to military losses, or as a result of engaging

their states in unpopular conflicts. Thus, political institutions and the number of veto players

within governments are critical factors in determining levels of political accountability for state

leaders. As Huth and Allee (2002, 69) state: "Political Institutions are one key factor which

determines levels of accountability, since they can restrict or expand the means and opportunities

available to opposition groups for challenging and contesting government policies."

Political Accountability and Punishment

My theoretical argument is that the foreign policies democracies advance are shaped by

the degree that democratic leaders are held accountable by the public. I contend that

democracies are more conservative in their foreign policies as elected leaders are more beholden

to the electorate. Furthermore, I argue that the outcomes of interstate conflicts matter for the

political well-being of democratic leaders, and democratic leaders that choose to involve their

states in foreign conflicts embark on a risky enterprise. In this section I will review the existing

literature pertaining to interstate conflict and punishment. I argue that democratic leaders have a

greater likelihood of being punished politically for involving their states in unpopular or risky

conflicts as they are more accountable to the electorate.

There is some debate within the international relations literature regarding whether

interstate conflict harms or assists leaders politically. Some scholars argue that interstate conflict

has neither positive nor negative political effects for state leaders (Gelpi and Greico 2000;

Chiozza and Goemans 2004). That is, some scholars argue that leaders within democracies do

not face a high risk of removal from office following lost wars or conflicts (Gelpi and Greico

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2000; Chiozza and Goemans 2004). Other research indicates that interstate conflicts can benefit state leaders politically (Lee 1977; MacKuen 1983; Norpoth 1987). These scholars contend that leaders can obtain political benefits for involving their states in wars and conflicts. Specifically, interstate conflicts may distract voters from negative economic conditions and assist state leaders in retaining power (Ostrom and Job 1986). Additional scholars argue that interstate conflicts can strengthen the power of a ruling coalition (Morgan and Bickers 1992). Furthermore, others posit that state leaders can demonstrate their qualities of leadership during times of conflict, thereby helping themselves politically (Smith 1998). Lastly, some scholars argue that if a conflict produces public goods for the state, voters will be likely to reward the domestic leadership politically (Reiter and Stam 1998).

While some scholars contend that conflict does not negatively affect the political fortunes of state leaders, a wealth of research supports the idea that interstate conflicts can hinder the ability of state leaders to remain in power (Mueller 1973; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). A large body of work supports the idea that leaders are held accountable politically based on foreign policy outcomes. Furthermore, many scholars argue that state leaders are likely to be removed from office following wars that are lost (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 2000) or that become costly (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1988; Bueno de Mequita and Siverson 1995). In addition, many international relations scholars contend that war is costly (Mueller 1973; Fearon 1995), as it can result in the loss of territory, resources, human lives and sovereignty (Morrow 1987; Williams and Brule 2008). In addition, military losses may produce a loss of human lives with few if any public goods acquired for public consumption. Therefore, military losses are likely to negatively affect state leaders politically. Furthermore, the popularity of leaders generally declines as casualties mount during a war or conflict (Mueller

1973; Gartner and Segura 1988; Bueno de Mequita and Siverson 1995; Williams and Brule 2008). As Williams and Brule (2008, 5) maintain, "War involvement can be characterized as a costly gamble that is likely to erode the domestic political position of democratic leaders." Thus, leaders should be selective regarding the states they choose to target militarily, less they suffer the political consequences of being removed from power (Schultz 2001).

As stated in an earlier section of this chapter, a large body of literature indicates that state leaders are likely to be punished for involving their states in risky or costly conflicts. In addition, many scholars have found that democratic leaders are more likely to be punished for unpopular foreign policies compared with autocratic leaders. That is, democratic leaders are more likely to be removed from power compared with autocratic leaders for involving their states in unpopular or costly military engagements.[31] As Reiter and Stam (1998) remark: "Therefore, democratic leaderships are more likely to lose power following a military defeat - an event quite likely to generate popular dissatisfaction-than are nondemocratic leaderships" (378).

An important work that examines the manner through which both autocratic and democratic leaders are held accountable by their selectorates as a result of foreign policy decisions is Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992). Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992) argue that the likelihood state leaders will be removed from power is greater for states that lose military contests. They also find that leaders that initiate conflicts and lose have a greater likelihood of being replaced. Furthermore, according to Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992), political accountability is relevant in both democratic and non-democratic states because leaders can be removed from power in both regime types due to military losses, even though the chance for removal as a result of military loss is higher in democracies.

Additional works support the argument that democratic leaders suffer greater political

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[31]Downs and Rocke (1994); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Reiter and Stam (1998)

losses compared with autocratic leaders for involving their states in costly military conflicts. Reiter and Meek (1999) contend that democracies enter into military contests that are projected to be short lived with relatively low costs because protracted military engagements that entail higher costs are likely to negatively affect democratic leaders by increasing the likelihood they will be removed from power. In addition, Goemans (2000) finds that democratic leaders have a greater likelihood of being removed from office for involving their states in conflicts that entail moderate to high costs. Furthermore, according to Snyder (1991), democracies are likely to only enter the wars they believe they can win due to the concerns democratic leaders have of being removed from office following a military defeat. Thus, according to many scholars, democratic leaders are more constrained than autocratic leaders in respect to involving their states in conflicts as a result of higher levels of political accountability domestically. As Reiter and Stam (1998, 380) remark: "because democratic leaderships fear being turned out if a war is lost, they are likely to initiate only those wars which they are confident of winning."

In reviewing the literature on political accountability and conflict we see that interstate conflict significantly affects the electoral well-being of elected leaders within democracies. While democratic leaders may occasionally benefit from interstate conflicts – the decision of leaders to involve their states in military engagements is a risky enterprise. Democratic leaders risk being punished by the public in the event they engage their states in unfavorable interstate conflicts. Therefore, democratic leaders should be selective regarding the conflicts they choose to select their states into. Furthermore, as the public has greater means to hold democratic leaders accountable for foreign policy outcomes – elected leaders should be increasingly conservative regarding their decisions to initiate conflict because democratic leaders are more

likely to be removed from office due to unpopular military adventures under these
circumstances.

Political Accountability and Veto Players

While my focus is on the relationship between public accountability and conflict
initiation within democratic states, it is important to briefly examine the literature related to veto
players, constraints and conflict onset. Arguments within the veto player literature examine the
linkage between the number and strength of veto players within governments and the manner by
which leaders are constrained regarding their foreign policy choices. However, the approach I
advance and the veto player approaches, both consider how and when democratic leaders will be
constrained in terms of their decisions to initiate conflict based on domestic level- political
factors. Therefore, I will briefly review the existing literature regarding veto players, constraints
and conflict before moving to my argument pertaining to public accountability, constraints and
conflict initiation.

The veto player approaches within the political accountability literature examine the
constraints placed on democratic leaders and how they affect the foreign policies of democracies.
These approaches consider the number of veto players present within governments and the
institutional design of states and how they work to constrain the policy choices of democratic
governments to a greater or lesser degree. Many works utilizing political accountability
approaches within international relations investigate the extent democratic leaders are held
accountable based on the distribution of political power within democratic governments. The
majority of works have found that democracies are less likely to initiate conflict with other states
when democratic governments are more constrained.[32] Constraints refer to a larger number of

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[32] Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992)

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veto players that are involved in the policymaking process as well as the institutional design of states (e.g., divided government, parliamentary systems, proportional representation systems).

There are two principal explanations for how a larger number of veto players leads to more conservative policies by democracies. One strand of literature stresses that a larger number of veto players, both institutional and political, will increase the time and effort needed to build policy consensus regarding decisions to engage in military conflicts, resulting in fewer conflicts that are initiated (i.e., when there are more veto players involved in the policy making process political actors will be forced to develop moderate stances through consensus building leading to more conservative foreign policies).[33] Furthermore, as a greater number of actors are involved in formulating policy, the time needed to appease each actor will increase, and this added time leads to more conciliatory and moderate policy stances by governments.[34] As Morgan and Campbell (1991, 191- 192) contend: "the greater the number of individuals, and more importantly, the greater the number of institutions that must approve a decision for war within a state, the less likely the leadership of that state is to decide for war."

Many scholars contend that the decision to initiate conflict by democracies is influenced by the composition of the ruling coalition in the legislature (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002). It is argued that minority governments have many more veto players embedded in the policy making process compared with majority governments, and leaders in minority governments must devote extra time and effort to building and maintaining coalitions when undertaking major policy initiatives such as initiating interstate conflicts. Therefore, minority governments are more likely to be conservative in their foreign policies compared with majority governments (Nordstrom and Clark 2005). Democratic leaders that possess majorities in the

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[33] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Huth and Allee (2002); Leblang and Chan (2003)
[34] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Huth and Allee (2002); Leblang and Chan (2003)

legislature face fewer veto players and subsequent opposition when attempting to implement foreign policies that involve the use of force. Therefore, democratic leaders should be more aggressive in the foreign policies they implement where there are fewer veto players within the government (Nordstrom and Clark 2005).

In a seminal work, Leblang and Chan (2003) investigate a wide array of institutional and political factors that have been considered to be associated with the conflict propensity of democracies. These factors include the effect presidential versus parliamentary systems, district magnitude, majoritarian versus coalition governments and phases of the electoral cycle have on conflict within established democracies. They find that the most influential factor in determining the likelihood of conflict within democracies is a state's electoral system. They argue that states with Proportional Representation systems have fewer incidences of conflict because of the need for a greater number of veto players (that is often found in PR systems) to form more moderate positions through consensus building. The moderate stances actors develop through the consensus building process leads to more passive foreign policy behavior when compared with states with Single Member Districts (where fewer veto players are involved in the policy making process).

Additional works have also found that greater institutional constraints lead to more conservative foreign policies within democracies. Morgan and Campbell (2001) contend that democracies that entail institutional structures where the power to authorize war is shared by the executive and legislative branches of government produce greater constrains regarding the ability of democracies to initiate conflict compared with democratic states in which one institutional body determines whether the state will engage in military conflict. Thus, democratic states are more constrained in terms of initiating conflict in states where the war making powers are shared

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by different branches of government. Similarly, Maoz and Russett (1993) argue that presidential democracies are more constrained in regards to engaging in interstate conflict compared with parliamentary democracies because parliamentary democracies require greater support by the legislative branch of government. Therefore, the inclusion of the legislative branch of government in the decision making structure of parliamentary democracy increases the number of veto players in the policy-making process and moderates the foreign policies of democracies.

International relations scholars have also found that democracies are more aggressive in their foreign policies where there are fewer institutional and political constraints. Auserwald (1999) concludes that democratic executives that have total control over foreign policy decisions have a greater likelihood of originating interstate conflicts compared to democratic executives that do not fully control the decision making processes regarding foreign policy formation. Clark (2000) finds that when there is unified government in the United States, U.S. presidents are more prone to originate interstate disputes.

A second explanation within the veto player and conflict literature emphasizes the vulnerability veto players create for the executive or party in power within the government.[35] These approaches stress that a greater number of players dampens the incentives democratic leaders have to initiate interstate disputes by increasing the likelihood a leader can be removed from office if a conflict is lost[36], or becomes costly.[37] Meaning, as there are a larger number of veto players within the government, the veto players represent a growing political threat to the ruling party or executive. Thus, the governing party or executive becomes constrained to a greater degree as there are a larger number of veto players because they indicate a viable political opposition is present within the government that can capitalize in upcoming elections in the

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[35] Hagan (1993); Russett (1993)
[36] Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992)
[37] Goemans (2000); Chiozza and Goemans (2003)

event of a military loss or unpopular military engagement.[38] Such an environment will lead to fewer military disputes that are initiated.

Morgan and Campbell (1991) and Morgan and Schwebach (1992) argue that leaders that have a high probability of being removed from office following a military conflict are more constrained in terms of initiating conflict. Chiozza and Goemans (2003) and Wolford (2007) also contend that states are less likely to initiate conflict where there is a high probability that the leadership within the state will be removed. Huth and Allee (2002) argue that domestic leaders that are vulnerable domestically are less likely to initiate conflict with other states due to higher levels of constraint, and states with vulnerable domestic leaders are also more likely to be targeted in interstate disputes because of the presence of greater political constraints domestically.

In review, the majority of works within the veto player and conflict literature indicate that a greater amount of constraints – both in terms of the distribution of political power as well as institutional constraints – moderate the foreign policies of democracies. However, while constraints such as a larger number of veto players within democratic governments have been found to have a pacifying affect on the conflict behavior of democracies, the public can also constrain democratic leaders and influence the foreign policies of democracies. Furthermore, previous scholars have found that public constraints are more significant than intra-legislative, or executive –legislative dynamics in regards to constraining democratic states and reducing the number of interstate conflicts initiated by democracies.[39]

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[38] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Huth and Allee (2002); Chiozza and Goemans (2003); Wolford (2007)
[39] Reiter and Tillman (2002)

Public Accountability

In a novel work within the literature on political accountability and conflict, Reiter and Tillman (2002) investigate a number of factors related to institutional, legislative and public constraints. They find that the most powerful predictor of conflict initiation is the percentage of a state's population that votes in elections. Reiter and Tillman (2002) show that elections and the public are a powerful force in terms of constraining democratic leaders and the initiation of interstate conflicts. Reiter and Tillman (2002) contend that democratic leaders are more accountable to the public and are less likely to pursue risky foreign policies where electoral systems allow for greater political participation. The mechanism linking increased political participation with conservative foreign policies is greater levels of accountability that result from increased public involvement in the democratic process. Reiter and Tillman (2002) contend that the public should be more averse to foreign wars compared with state leaders since the public has to suffer a greater portion of the burdens of war. Therefore, higher levels of political participation indicate that a greater percentage of the population can take issue with costly interstate conflicts and subsequently punish democratic leaders for involving their states in risky military adventures. As a result, according to Reiter and Tillman (2002), democracies are more conservative in their foreign policies as a greater percentage of a democracy's population votes.

Scholars have also found that election timing is important in terms of constraining state leaders and reducing the likelihood of conflict initiation. As Gaubatz (1991) finds – democratic states are more likely to be involved in wars shortly after an election because the electorate has less influence over the office of the executive during this period. Executives are less responsive to the public immediately following an election because the next election is further away. Thus,

levels of public accountability are greater during periods closely preceding an election, and democracies are more conservative during these periods of heightened political accountability

Anderson and Souva (2010) test the propositions of selectorate theory versus theories contending that capitalist markets within states are causal in affecting the foreign policies of states. Scholars such as McDonald (2007) and Gartzke (2007) argue that the presence of capitalism within states increases political accountability for state leaders which leads to more peaceful foreign policies. According to McDonald (2007), capitalist nations are more dependent on tax payers than non-capitalist states because privatization reduces the government's non-taxable revenue. Therefore, capitalist economies increase the percentage of private property which increases the size of winning coalitions within states. Thus, the reliance on tax payers in capitalist states increases the degree state leaders are accountable politically, leading to more conservative foreign policies. Anderson and Souva (2010) find that selectorate theory provides a superior explanation compared with capitalist approaches regarding the foreign policy behavior of democracies. They contend, similarly to selectoare theory, that larger winning coalitions increase levels of political accountability for state leaders and cause democratic leaders to be more selective regarding the conflicts they select into. Thus – the sizes of selectorates and winning coalitions are causal in affecting the foreign policies of states according to Bueno de Mesquaita et al. (1999), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson (2003) and Anderson and Souva (2010).

Locus of Foreign Policy-Making

My theory regarding public accountability and conflict initiation within democracies assumes that both democratic executives and democratic legislative bodies are responsible for the development of foreign policy. While some scholars contend that democratic executives are

primarily responsible for creating foreign policies – many other scholars argue that legislators

play a critical role in foreign policy formation.[40] For example, in analyzing 25 democracies from

1945 to 2000 - Koch and Gartner (2005) contend that the level of diffuseness of political

accountability for democratic legislators significantly affects whether a democracy will initiate a

militarized interstate dispute as well as the duration of militarized disputes involving democratic

states. They find that the electoral accountability – defined based on the design of electoral

institutions and the geographical scope of a member's district - interact with the number of

casualties accrued in a representatives district to determine whether a representative will support

an interstate conflict. According to Koch and Gartner's (2005) study – legislative behavior is a

central element in affecting the likelihood a democratic state initiates an interstate dispute as well

as the duration of interstate disputes.   Numerous additional studies within international relations

provide evidence that the behavior of members of parliaments, congresses and additional

legislative bodies structure the types of foreign policies that democracies ultimately initiate.

Many scholars argue that the makeup of legislative bodies – both in terms of the political

composition of legislative bodies[41] (distribution of members based on party affiliation) and the

ideological composition of members of legislatures,[42] significantly affect the foreign policies that

emerge within democratic states. Specifically, the extent that a legislature is divided based along

party lines, and the ideological composition of legislatures, affect the foreign policies of

democratic states. Thus, in the majority of democracies - democratic legislatures play an

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[40] Mueller (1973); Sigelman and Conover (1981); Parker (1995); Edwards and Swenson (1997); Bueno de Mesquita et al.(2003); Gartner,Segura, and Barratt (2004); Kam, Greenwald, and Ramos (2004); Koch and Gartner (2005)

[41] Ireland and Gartner (2001); Reiter and Tillman (2002); Nordstrom and Clark (2005)

[42] Palmer and London (2004) refers to the ideological makeup (left/right) of the ruling coalition within the government and the study accounts for members of parliament that are within the ruling coalition as well as the executive.

important role in influencing the foreign policies of democratic states because legislatures are responsible for developing foreign policies, both independently and in conjunction with the executive or executive branch of government.

There are three primary reasons that legislative members influence foreign policies within democracies. The first reason, as previously stated, is that the majority of legislative bodies have a legal and binding role in the initiation, persecution and funding of interstate conflicts. Second, members of legislatures can affect foreign policy decisions by supporting or failing to support the foreign policies of executives – either by publicly endorsing or criticizing a specific foreign policy – or through legislative votes. Lastly, legislative members are held accountable for foreign policy outcomes – as are democratic executives. As Williams, Brule and Kock (2010) find – interstate conflicts cause the expected vote share of incumbent political parties to decline. Other scholars have found that interstate conflicts can affect elections in general by influencing how voters view incumbent senators and their challengers.[43] Additional scholars have found that the number of casualties resulting from interstate conflicts within a legislator's constituency significantly affects the likelihood of re-election for legislators.[44] Thus, the foreign policy goals and proposals of legislative members are considered to be strategic and purposeful, and I argue that the behavior of legislative members significantly affects the foreign policies that are developed within democracies.

In regards to my theoretical argument - I contend that the degree party systems are stable within democracies affects both democratic executives as well as members of legislatures. That is, the effects stable or unstable party systems have on a democratic polity influence every actor within the government from the executive to legislative members. However, the extent to which

[43] Carson et al. (2001); Gartner, Segura, and Barratt (2004)
[44] Carson et al. (2001)

electoral systems promote candidate-centered electoral incentives applies more specifically to legislative members rather than to executives – seeing that many democratic executives (although not all) answer to a national constituency. In sum, the rational incentives democratic leaders (both executives and members of legislatures) have to initiate interstate conflicts should be considered when examining how democratic institutions affect the foreign policies within democracies. Furthermore, this study examines those incentives by investigating the nature of electoral accountability for democratic leaders based on the stability of party systems and the design of electoral systems.

Public Accountability and Conflict Initiation

Before moving to a detailed explanation of my theoretical argument in the next chapter – I will briefly present my argument regarding the public's view of conflict within democracies as well as highlight the process through which democratic leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy decisions by the citizenry. I contend that the public's perception of conflict can work to shape the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders. Thus, it is important to consider the public's role in the decision making process of foreign policy formation before proceeding to a more nuanced discussion of the factors that can affect levels of public accountability and the foreign policies democracies develop.

I argue that democracies will be more conservative in their foreign policies as the public can hold democratic leaders responsible for foreign policy decisions to a greater degree. There are two primary reasons that democratic leaders should be less likely to pursue risky foreign policies when the public is able to hold democratic leaders accountable for policy outcomes to a larger extent. One reason is that politicians within democracies should desire to be re-elected[45],

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[45] Mayhew (1974); Ames (1987); Geddes (1994); Ray (1995)

and if they involve their state in costly conflicts they are more likely to be removed from office[46] during the next election. As Reiter and Stam (2003, 336) remark: "Elected Leaders know that to remain in power they must avoid costly or unsuccessful policies, which in turn steers them away from launching risky military adventures." Furthermore, the desire for re-election should encourage politicians to seek risk-avoidant policies when they are held accountable to the electorate to a greater extent. "Here, we have found evidence that variation in the degree of public participation – and, therefore, variation in the degree to which the leadership is dependent on public consent – is significantly associated with variations in the propensity to initiate conflict" (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 824). Thus, as democratic leaders are more accountable to the public they should be less likely to pursue risky foreign policies because the probability they will be removed from office is greater. In contrast, in situations in which levels of accountability are lower, democratic leaders can pursue more revisionist policies because they have a diminished chance of being removed from office during the next election cycle. Thus, in democracies with lower levels of public accountability, democratic leaders should pursue riskier foreign policies due to fewer concerns regarding re-election. In simple terms, lower levels of public accountability increase the range of acceptable foreign policies that are available to democratic leaders – which includes aggressive foreign policy strategies.

The second reason higher levels of public accountability lead to more conservative foreign policies by democratic governments is because the citizenry within democracies must shoulder a greater portion of the burdens for interstate conflict compared with democratic leaders. That is, based on Kant's (1795) arguments, the citizens of a democratic polity should be less disposed towards war compared with state leaders because the citizenry has to undertake

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[46] Bueno de Mequita and Siverson (1995); Goemans (2000)

more of the costs of interstate conflict.[47] However, I do not contend that citizens will be opposed to conflict in general. Citizens often support military conflicts prior to their initiation and during their early stages - as is frequently observed with rally around the flag effects.[48] However, in the aggregate, citizens should be *less* supportive of interstate conflicts compared with democratic leaders because the citizenry has to shoulder a greater share of the burdens of interstate conflict. These burdens include possible conscription and higher taxation in order to pay for war efforts.[49] Thus, compared with state leaders, the public should be *less* supportive of interstate conflict. Therefore, as the public is more involved in the policy making process democracies should be more pacific.[50] Furthermore, democratic leaders will pursue more conservative foreign policies as the public has more direct mechanisms for holding political leaders accountability for policy decisions. Subsequently, states will be more conservative in their foreign policy as politicians are held accountable by the electorate to a greater degree, as evinced by more stable party systems and candidate-centered electoral systems. In contrast, democratic leaders should seek to adopt more aggressive foreign policies as they are less accountable to the public because there is a diminished likelihood they will punished by the electorate. Thus, the degree the public is involved in the process of electing candidates and holding politicians accountable in future elections has a direct impact on the decision of democratic leaders to initiate conflict with other states.

I argue that two factors which are central in determining levels of public accountability for elected leaders are the stability of party systems and the degree electoral systems promote candidate-centered electoral incentives. I contend that as party systems are more stable, and

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[47] Kant (1957) [1795]
[48] Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003)
[49] Reiter and Tillman (2002)
[50] Reiter and Tillman (2002); Williams (2008)

electoral systems promote candidate-centered incentives, elected leaders are increasingly accountable to the electorate. Under conditions of stable party systems and candidate-centered electoral systems, political candidates and parties are held responsible for their policy decisions to a greater degree by the citizenry. Thus, during periods of increased public accountability – democratic leaders should be more cautious regarding the foreign policies they pursue less they suffer political punishment at the hands of voters. Furthermore, as party systems are less stable, and electoral systems fail to promote candidate-centered incentives, leaders should have a freer hand to pursue their own policy ambitions because the public has a diminished ability to punish elected leaders for unpopular policy choices.

In the next two chapters, I detail the relationship between stable party systems, candidate-centered electoral systems and public accountability within democracies. I show how stable party systems and the design of electoral systems structure the rational incentives elected leaders have to pursue either conservative or risky foreign policies. My underlying logic is that the nature of party systems and electoral systems influence the manner by which elected leaders are accountable to their constituents, and this in turn – shapes the foreign policies democratic leaders develop.

Data Analysis

In chapter two and chapter three I provide an extensive discussion of my data gathering techniques and the statistical methodology used to test my thesis. However, I will briefly discuss the broad aspects of my data analysis before offering a more specific description of my research design, data collection and methodology in chapter two and chapter three. This research project focuses on the relationship between party systems, electoral systems and conflict initiation within democracies. Specifically, in regards to party systems, I focus on how party system

stability affects conflict initiation within democratic states. Thus, I examine what effect party systems have on conflict initiation as party systems are more or less stable. In addition, my focus in regards to electoral systems is to what extent they promote candidate-centered incentives. Here, I am interested in the influence candidate-centered electoral systems have on the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies. Therefore, I use a monadic, quantitative analysis to test my theoretical arguments. I examine 50 democracies from Africa, Asia, the OECD, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The data collected are from 1975 – 2001. The democracies included in my analysis include a wide range of democracies in terms of state wealth, military power, geography and population size. Thus – the results obtained from my statistical analyses are generalizable to a larger population of democratic states.

Plan of the Dissertation

In chapter two I argue that party system stability plays a central role in allowing political parties and candidates to be held accountable to a greater extent by voters for specific policy outcomes. I argue that in less stable party systems, levels of public accountability are lower due to weaker connections between voters, political parties and candidates. In this chapter, I also test my argument that stable party systems have a significant effect on the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies. Here, I measure the relationship between the level of party system stability and the likelihood a democracy initiates a militarized interstate dispute with another state in the global system. I capture the degree of party system stability within democracies by measuring the level of electoral volatility within democracies as well as the percentage of votes received by new political parties. I also provide a more detailed description of my measurements of party system stability in chapter two. In addition, I include three, brief case studies that focus on party systems within Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico and the resulting foreign policies that

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each state pursued from 1994 – 2004. Following my quantitative and case study analyses, I find that unstable party systems are significantly associated with a greater likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies. Specifically, democracies are more likely to initiate disputes with other states as party systems are less stable.

In chapter three, I expand on the relationship between electoral systems that promote candidate-centered incentives and how these systems influence the level of risk acceptance by democratic leaders regarding their foreign policy prerogatives. I contend that candidate-centered electoral systems promote higher levels of accountability for elected leaders (for specific policy outcomes) because the selectorates in candidate-centered systems are comprised of by voters to a larger extent rather than party leaders. Thus, I argue that in candidate-centered systems, democracies are more conservative in their foreign policies due to higher levels of individual accountability for elected leaders. In chapter three, I also test the relationship between candidate-centered electoral systems and the likelihood a democracy initiates a militarized interstate dispute with another state. Candidate-centered electoral systems are measured based on three components that indicate: the structure of electoral ballots, degree of vote pooling and the level of preferential voting. I describe each of these measures in more detail in chapter three. My finding is that democracies are less likely to originate militarized interstate disputes as electoral systems promote candidate -centered incentives. I also provide brief, anecdotal case studies from Ecuador and Chile to illustrate the relationship between candidate-centered electoral systems, public accountability and conflict initiation.

Chapter four reviews the arguments and findings from the previous chapters. In this chapter, I discuss the implications of the findings regarding the effects party systems and electoral systems have on public accountability and conflict initiation within democracies. I

conclude by arguing that scholars should further investigate how the citizenry within

democracies influence the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders.

CHAPTER II: PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY AND CONFLICT INITIATION WITHIN DEMOCRACIES

PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY AND CONFLICT INITIATION WITHIN DEMOCRACIES

Abstract

Parties are a vital component of democracy as they are designed to aggregate the interests of the populace. Yet, some party systems are more skilled at this function than others. In democracies with stable party systems and strong political parties, voters can more easily trace policy decisions from parties and representatives within the government to specific policy outcomes leading to higher levels of political accountability. That said, most works that have examined the effects of party system stability have yet to consider how conflict onset is impacted by this dynamic. Here, I test a model linking party system stability with the likelihood of conflict initiation in 50 democracies from 1975-2001. I find that as party systems are less stable, democracies are more likely to initiate conflicts with other states because democratic leaders are accountable to voters to a lesser degree. Thus, as democratic leaders are less accountable politically, as evinced by unstable party systems, democracies pursue riskier foreign policies.

Introduction

From 1983 – 1993 Venezuela's party system was considered one of the most stable party systems in Latin America.[51] During this period, Venezuela experienced relatively peaceful relations with its neighbors in Latin America and was involved in only two interstate disputes involving the use of force.[52] However, the stability of Venezuela's party system began to erode in the early to mid nineties.[53] Partly as a result of economic turmoil and societal discontent, Venezuela's once stable party system became one of the most unstable party systems in Latin America, and Venezuelan politics became dominated by non-programmatic platforms and populist appeals to the citizenry.[54] While Venezuela remained democratic during this period,

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[51] This is based on the two measures that are commonly used to capture party system stability: electoral volatility and party replacement (Przeworski 1975; Mainwairing and Scully 1995; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Stockton 2001; Birch 2001, 2003; Birnir 2005; Casas-Zamora 2005; Ishiyama 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).
From 1983 – 1993 the average volatility of votes received among parties was approximately 10% per election and the percentage of votes won by new parties was 8%.
[52] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
[53] From 1994 – 2004 the average electoral volatility in terms of votes received among parties was 33.01% and the percentage of votes won by new parties was 15%.
[54] (Roberts 2003)

accountability for political parties and politicians declined significantly. As Roberts (2003, 36) notes, "With the rise of Chávez at the end of the 1990s… the most distinctive features of this new leadership are its implacable hostility to the political establishment and an aversion to intermediary institutions that can hold a leader accountable to mass constituents." Furthermore, the altering of Venezuela's party system had direct effects on the behavior of democratic leaders in Venezuela and the policies the Venezuelan government pursued, both domestically and internationally. Indeed, Venezuela was involved in only two militarized interstate disputes involving the use of force from 1983 – 1993, and Venezuela was not responsible for initiating either dispute. However, from 1994 – 2004, Venezuela was involved in nine interstate disputes, seven of which it initiated, and seven that involved the use of force.[55] Thus, during the decade that Venezuela's party system destabilized, Venezuela initiated seven times as many militarized disputes compared with the previous ten year period.

How does the de-stabilization of party systems in countries such as Venezuela lead to more aggressive foreign policies by democratic governments? More specifically, how does the stability of party systems within democracies affect the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders? I argue that the answer lies in the manner through which democratic leaders are held accountable to voters, and I contend that the nature of party systems influences the foreign policies that democracies advance by structuring the degree that democratic leaders are accountable to the public. More specifically, I argue that as democratic leaders are less

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[55] Venezuela is coded as being involved in 3 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from 1983 – 1993. Two of the disputes involved the use of force, and Venezuela initiated one militarized interstate dispute during this period, and the MID did not involve the use of force. From 1994 – 2004, Venezuela was involved in 9 MIDs with 7 of the MIDS involving the use of force, and Venezuela initiated 7 MIDs during this period. These data were obtained from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart 2004).

accountable to the electorate democracies pursue riskier foreign policies because there is a diminished likelihood elected leaders will be punished by voters for ill-advised policies.

Theory

A component of democracy that directly affects the degree democratic leaders are held accountable by the public, which has been largely neglected within the literature on political accountability and conflict, is the functioning and viability of political parties, and the nature of party systems within democracies. Political parties are critical to democracy because – above all other institutions – they are responsible for aggregating the interests of the citizenry. Furthermore, the strength of political parties and the stability of party systems have significant effects regarding the degree that democratic representatives are held accountable politically, as well as the nature of the policy making process.

Party system stability directly impacts domestic politics by either strengthening or weakening connections between political parties and citizens. Where parties are weak, and party systems are unstable, parties are unable to effectively aggregate the interests of citizens. Subsequently, when parties are frequently replaced within party systems and where the volatility of votes received among parties is extreme, voters have less ability to reward or punish candidates for effective or ineffective policies. Thus, the ability of voters to link the platforms of political parties and candidates with specific policy outcomes is impeded in unstable party systems leading to lower levels of accountability for democratic representatives. As Mainwairing (1999, 6) states: "Accountability through elections depends on the ability of voters to reward or punish individual politicians and/or parties. But where party labels change frequently, where major parties disappear and others come on the scene, where politicians switch parties with impunity, where party discipline is limited, and where interparty electoral alliances are common

but neither national nor enduring, electoral accountability through parties is hampered." In contrast, voters in democracies with stable party systems have more established and effective means of holding elected leaders accountable for policy decisions[56] because the parties in stable party systems entail stronger connections between the leadership within the government and society.[57]

I argue that as party systems are stable, the electorate can more easily trace the policy decisions stemming from government leaders to specific policy outcomes and subsequently hold elected officials accountable in upcoming elections.[58] In such systems, elected leaders will be hesitant to involve their states in risky military conflicts due to higher levels of electoral accountability present in stable party systems. That is, democratic leaders should be more likely to pursue conservative foreign policies as voters can more easily punish democratic leaders for ill-advised foreign policy initiatives.[59] In contrast, in less stable party systems that entail greater volatility in the votes received among parties, and where new parties enter and exit the party system frequently, party labels will be vague.[60] In these systems, there are lower levels of electoral accountability and democratic leaders will pursue riskier foreign policies because they are less accountable to voters. As Mainwairing (1998, 75-76) states: "A vicious cycle can set in as the inchoate nature of the party system creates opportunities for populists, who then govern without attempting to create more solid institutions. In an inchoate system, predictability is low while the potential for erratic leadership is high."

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on political accountability and conflict initiation and argue that democracies are less likely to

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[56] Hankla (2006)
[57] Bratton (1999); Karp and Banducci (2007)
[58] Hankla (2006); Robbins (2010)
[59] Reiter and Tillman (2002); Palmer, London and Regan (2004)
[60] Hankla (2006)

initiate conflict with other states as democratic leaders are more accountable politically. Next, I investigate how party systems structure the processes through which democratic leaders are accountable to the public. I contend that stable party systems lead to higher levels of accountability for democratic leaders and subsequently affect the types of foreign policies that democratic leaders advance. Next, I briefly examine the cases of Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico while considering the nature of each state's party system and the foreign policies that each state pursued from 1994 – 2004. I then present my research design, methods and empirical results. Finally, I offer a discussion regarding the impact party system stability has on the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.

Public Accountability and Conflict

In this section I review the literature regarding public accountability and conflict initiation within democracies. I argue that democratic leaders have a greater likelihood of being punished politically for involving their states in unpopular or risky conflicts as they are more accountable to the electorate. My theoretical argument is that the foreign policies democracies pursue are shaped by the degree that democratic leaders are held accountable by the public. I contend that democracies are more conservative in their foreign policies as elected leaders are more beholden to the electorate, and I argue that democratic leaders advance riskier foreign policies as they are less accountable to voters.

In a novel work within the literature on political accountability and conflict, Reiter and Tillman (2002) investigate a number of factors related to institutional, legislative and public constraints on the initiation of conflict. They find that the most powerful predictor of conflict initiation is the percentage of a state's population that votes in elections. Reiter and Tillman (2002) show that elections and the public are a powerful force in terms of constraining

democratic leaders and the initiation of interstate conflicts. Reiter and Tillman (2002) contend

that democratic leaders are more accountable to the public and are less likely to pursue risky

foreign policies where electoral systems allow for greater political participation. The mechanism

linking increased political participation with conservative foreign policies is greater levels of

accountability that result from increased public involvement in the democratic process. The

authors also argue that the public should be more averse to foreign wars compared with state

leaders since the public has to suffer a greater portion of the burdens of war. Therefore, higher

levels of political participation indicate that a greater percentage of the population can take issue

with costly interstate conflicts and subsequently punish democratic leaders for involving their

states in risky military adventures. As a result, democracies are more conservative in their

foreign policies as a greater percentage of a democracy's population votes.

Scholars have also found that election timing is important in terms of constraining state

leaders and reducing the likelihood of conflict initiation. As Gaubatz (1991) finds – democratic

states are more likely to be involved in wars shortly after an election because the electorate has

less influence over the office of the executive during this period. Executives are less responsive

to the public immediately following an election because the next election is further away. Thus,

levels of public accountability are greater during periods closely preceding an election, and

democracies are more conservative during these periods of heightened political accountability.

According to many scholars, the size of leaders' selectorates and winning coalitions are

additional factors that can affect the foreign policy decisions of state leaders. Bueno de Mesquita

et al. (1999) and Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson (2003) argue that the size of a

leadership's selectorate is critical in determining the foreign policies that states adopt. They

contend that the size of a leadership's winning coalition and selectorate affects levels of political

accountability for state leaders, which influences the interstate conflicts state leaders initiate. Leaders with large winning coalitions have fewer funds to pay off their winning coalitions in the event of a military loss. They must therefore avoid costly or unpopular foreign policies because they cannot recapture the support of their winning coalitions through the payment of private goods. Thus – democracies with larger selectorates and winning coalitions induce higher levels of political accountability for democratic leaders which leads to more conservative foreign policies (Bueno de Mesquaita et al. 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson 2003). Similarly, the degree party systems are stable within democracies significantly affects levels of political accountability for democratic leaders by either strengthening or weakening linkages between voters and elected leaders. Thus, party systems affect the nature of electoral accountability within democracies which influences the types of foreign policies that democracies advance.

As previously stated, I argue that democracies will be more conservative in their foreign policies as the public can hold democratic leaders responsible for foreign policy decisions to a greater degree. There are two primary reasons that democratic leaders should be less likely to pursue risky foreign policies when the public is able to hold democratic leaders accountable for policy outcomes to a larger extent. One reason is that politicians within democracies generally desire to be re-elected[61], and if they involve their state in costly conflicts they are more likely to be removed from office during the next election.[62] As Reiter and Stam (2003, 336) remark: "Elected Leaders know that to remain in power they must avoid costly or unsuccessful policies, which in turn steers them away from launching risky military adventures." Furthermore, the desire for re-election should encourage politicians to seek risk-avoidant policies when they are

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[61] Mayhew (1974); Ames (1987); Geddes (1994); Ray (1995)
[62] Bueno de Mequita and Siverson (1995); Goemans (2000)

held accountable to the electorate to a greater extent. As Reiter and Tillman (2002, 824) contend, "Here, we have found evidence that variation in the degree of public participation – and, therefore, variation in the degree to which the leadership is dependent on public consent – is significantly associated with variations in the propensity to initiate conflict." Thus, as democratic leaders are more accountable to the public they should be less likely to pursue risky foreign policies because the probability that they will be removed from office is greater. In contrast, in situations in which levels of accountability are lower, democratic leaders can pursue more revisionist policies because they have a diminished chance of being removed from office during the next election cycle. In simple terms, lower levels of public accountability increase the range of acceptable foreign policies that are available to democratic leaders – which includes aggressive foreign policies.

The second reason higher levels of public accountability lead to more conservative foreign policies by democratic governments is because the citizenry within democracies must shoulder a greater portion of the burdens for interstate conflict compared with democratic leaders. Based on Kant's (1795) arguments, the citizens of a democratic polity should be *less* disposed towards war compared with state leaders because the citizenry undertakes more of the costs of interstate conflict.[63] Therefore, I assume that the citizenry within democracies is *less* supportive of interstate conflict compared with state leaders because the public has to shoulder a greater portion of the burdens of war. As Reiter and Tillman (2002) state: "This proposition assumes that the public is generally conflict-averse, or is at least more conflict-averse than state leaders, as the public must bear a disproportionate share of the costs of any war effort (mainly through conscription and higher taxes)" (812). However, I do not contend that citizens will be opposed to conflict in general. Citizens often support military conflicts prior to their initiation

[63] Kant (1970) [1795]

and during their early stages - as is frequently observed with rally around the flag effects.[64] I

argue that in the aggregate, citizens should be *less* supportive of interstate conflicts compared

with democratic leaders because the citizenry bears a greater share of the costs of interstate

conflict.[65] Therefore, as elected leaders are more accountable to the public that is *less* supportive

of conflict in general, democratic leaders should develop more passive foreign polices because

the public has more control over which candidates are elected. Furthermore, risky policies that

involve the use of military force become a larger political gamble for elected leaders as the

public has more effective means to punish democratic leaders for unpopular policies.

 In summary, the public plays a critical role in affecting the foreign policies within

democracies. The degree that elected leaders are accountable to their constituents structures the

rational incentives democratic leaders have to pursue risky or conservative foreign policies. In

addition, while examining the percentage of democratic populations that are eligible to vote

reveals important information regarding the degree of public accountability involved in the

policy making process, the ability of political parties to aggregate the demands of the public is an

important feature of democratic governance that significantly affects the nature of political

accountability within democracies. That is, levels of voter turnout may be high in a number of

democratic states, but if party systems are not stable, voters will have less ability to connect the

policy decisions of parties and politicians within the government to specific policy outcomes.

Furthermore, if voters turnout in higher numbers but are not aware of the political platforms and

policy agendas of the parties and candidates competing for office - accountability linkages

between democratic leaders and the public will be weaker. Thus, party system stability is a

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[64] Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003)
[65] Reiter and Tillman (2002)

critical component of democracy that affects the degree that democratic leaders are accountable to the public.

Party System Stability and Conflict Initiation

Stable party systems allow voters to hold democratic leaders accountable to a greater degree for policy outcomes for two primary reasons. First, in stable party systems, political parties are entrenched within society which increases the ability of the public to more readily distinguish parties, their candidates, and their policy platforms from each other in stable party systems.[66] In unstable party systems, voters are less likely to be able to identify parties and candidates with specific policies and subsequent policy outcomes. Thus, party labels are clearer in stable party systems where parties and their policies are widely recognized by the electorate.[67] As Mainwairing (1998, 75-76) states: "In more institutionalized systems, party labels are powerful symbols, and party commitments are important. Parties give citizens a way of understanding who is who in politics without needing to read all the fine print. By doing so, they help to facilitate accountability, a central element of democratic politics. Even if voters cannot evaluate individual legislative candidates, they can evaluate party labels and can differentiate among the parties."

Another reason democratic leaders are more accountable in stable party systems is due to nature of campaigning by political parties and candidates in stable party systems compared with unstable party systems. In stable party systems, there is more programmatic representation, meaning politicians and political parties present clear and consistent policy proposals to the public which voters can evaluate at each election.[68] In well-institutionalized party systems, most citizens use the information shortcuts provided by party labels (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger

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[66] Bratton (1999); Karp and Banducci (2007)
[67] Hankla (2006)
[68] Mainwaring and Zoco (2007)

1994; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Thus, voters can more readily identify the policy proposals

of politicians and parties and evaluate their subsequent policy outcomes in stable party systems

due to the more programmatic nature of representation in stable party systems.

While stable party systems have the effect of increasing accountability for democratic

leaders due to clearer party labels and more programmatic policy agendas, unstable party

systems decrease accountability a number of ways.   According to Birch (2001), there are four

principal consequences of party system instability. First, party system instability reduces

political accountability for parties and candidates because voters have more difficulty voting

specific political parties and candidates out of office because the ideologies of politicians and

parties no longer exist along a clear, unified party divide. Subsequently, voters are less aware of

the precise policies and platforms of politicians and parties. Secondly, party system instability

decreases the commitment voters, politicians and activists have to their party. Third, party

system instability increases uncertainty by making future policy commitments more difficult.

Lastly, party system instability increases the costs of the electoral game causing democratic

leaders to become less committed to democratic practices. Thus, when party systems are less

stable the citizenry cannot easily distinguish between political parties, candidates and their

platforms, and the public has less ability to hold democratic leaders accountable for policy

decisions.[69] "For voters in weakly institutionalized party systems it is much more difficult to

hold political parties accountable than in institutionalized party systems" (Jones, 2005, 4).

Citizens have a more difficult time holding elected leaders accountable in unstable party systems

because voters are less certain regarding what policy initiatives political parties and elected

leaders will advance once in power (Jones 2005). Thus, holding leaders accountable for foreign

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[69] Mainwairing (1998); (1999); Birch (2001)

policy decisions becomes more arduous for voters in unstable party systems because voters are less aware of the policy platforms and proposals of political parties and candidates.

In less stable party systems voters also have difficulty connecting the policy decisions of democratic leaders to specific policy outcomes due to the non-programmatic nature of political parties in unstable party systems. That is, party platforms and policy initiatives in unstable party systems tend to be more populists and non-specific in nature compared with the policy proposals of parties and candidates in stable party systems (Jones, 2005, 3).[70] Therefore, as levels of public accountability are lower in less stable party systems, democratic leaders will have more discretion to pursue their own foreign policy ambitions due to fewer concerns regarding re-election.

In summary, democracies should be more risk-acceptant in their foreign policies in unstable party systems. When the citizenry within a democracy has less effective means of holding democratic leaders accountable for specific policy outcomes, as is the case in destabilized party systems, democratic leaders will be more risk-acceptant regarding the foreign policies they pursue and more likely to initiate conflicts.

Conceptualizing party system stability however, is critical to testing my argument. Two measures scholars commonly employ to capture party system stability are electoral volatility[71] and party replacement.[72] Electoral volatility is measured based on the absolute change in the vote shares received among the parties that have participated in consecutive elections.[73] The summed change is then divided by the total vote share of the same parties in consecutive

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[70] Jones (2005); Mainwaring and Zoco (2007)
[71] Przeworski (1975); Mainwaring and Scully (1995); Roberts and Wibbels (1999); Kuenzi and Lambright (2001);
Stockton (2001); Birch (2003), (2001); Birnir (2005); Casas-Zamora (2005); Ishiyama (2007);
Mainwaring and Zoco (2007)
[72] Birch (2001), (2003); Birnir (2005)
[73] Birch (2001), (2003)

elections.[74] In using the electoral volatility measure, one is able to determine how the vote shares received among parties vary from election to election. If there are significant changes in volatility, then it is accurate to assume that voters are weakly attached to the party system and political parties are struggling to maintain voter attachments. Thus, high volatility levels indicate party systems are unstable. Therefore, my hypothesis related to electoral volatility and dispute initiation is:

Hypothesis 1: Democracies will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force) as levels of electoral volatility are greater.

The second component of party system institutionalization is party replacement. Some scholars have measured the number of new parties that enter a party system as being an indication of party system stability.[75] However, measuring the number of new parties does not provide information regarding the electoral significance of new parties.[76] A more accurate measure takes into account the percentage of votes won by new parties.[77] Thus, I measure party replacement as the percentage of votes won by new parties. As levels of party replacement are higher, party systems are less stable. Therefore, my hypothesis related to party replacement and dispute initiation is:

Hypothesis 2: Democracies will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force) as the percentage of votes won by new parties is greater.

Research Design

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[74] Birch (2001), (2003)
[75] Birnir (2005); Tavits (2006)
[76] Birch (2001), (2003)
[77] Birch (2001), (2003)

The dataset used to test the effect of party system stability of the initiation of conflict is comprised of 50 democracies from Africa, Asia, the OECD, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The countries included have a score of "6" or higher on the Polity2 measure found in the Polity IV database and a list of the countries and years used in the study can be found in the appendix in Table 11A. Sufficient or accurate data are not available for all democracies and therefore some democratic states are excluded from the analysis. The data collected span from 1975 – 2001.

I employ a monadic approach in the present analysis for three reasons. First, my theoretical argument is that the level of party system stability within democracies is causal in affecting the likelihood democracies will initiate militarized disputes with other states. While state specific information related to the alternate state in a conflict dyad is relevant, the primary focus in this analysis is on the domestic, political conditions within the democratic states being examined. Second, conflict is a rare event, and a dyadic analysis would include numerous observations of politically irrelevant dyads that provide a problem concerning model fit.[78] Furthermore, incorporating only politically relevant dyads may neglect a large number of conflict observations between non-politically relevant dyads.[79] Thus, a monadic design offers the most useful approach to modeling the affect party system stability has on the likelihood of conflict initiation due to theoretical and methodological concerns.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Initiation

The primary dependent variable in this analysis is the *revisionist state* variable taken from the Correlates of War Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004) which is a dichotomous measure that indicates whether a state initiates a militarized dispute for a given year. States that initiate a conflict are coded 1 and non-initiators are coded 0. The disputes included are ones that

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[78] Ward, Siverson and and Cao (2007); Williams (2008)
[79] Lemke and Reed (2001); Williams (2008)

are coded as having a use of military force (hostility level 4 "Use of Force", or 5 "War") in the

Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). The *revisionist state*

variable is considered to be superior to the *originator variable* found in the Correlates of War

Dataset because the originator variable simply captures whether a state is the first mover in a

dispute, and the *revisionist* variable includes additional information regarding what state is

responsible for escalating tensions prior to a dispute.[80] As Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996,

178) write, The MID "revisionist" variable is a better measure of initiation because the MID

dataset coders based this 'indicator of what constitutes a revisionist state on the prevailing status

quo of the issues in dispute prior to the onset of any militarized action and recorded as revisionist

the state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante'" (see also Souva and Prins (2006,

191). Thus, the *revisionist state* variable is considered an appropriate indicator of conflict

initiation, and has been used extensively in previous research.[81]

Party System Institutionalization

Conceptualizing the extent that party systems are stable within democracies based on

Mainwaring's (1999) seminal work has been difficult for researchers due to data concerns.

However, as previously stated, two measures scholars have employed in order to capture party

system stability are *electoral volatility*[82] and *party replacement*.[83] *Electoral volatility* is

measured based on the absolute change in the vote shares received among the parties that have

participated in consecutive elections.[84] The summed change is then divided by the total vote

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[80] Souva and Prins (2006)
[81] Souva and Prins (2006)
[82] Przeworski (1975); Mainwaring and Scully (1995); Roberts and Wibbels (1999); Birch (2001), (2003); Kuenzi and Lambright (2001); Stockton (2001); Birnir (2005); Casas-Zamora (2005); Ishiyama (2007); Mainwaring and Zoco (2007)
[83] Birch (2001), (2003); Birnir (2005)
[84] Birch (2001), (2003)

share of the same parties in consecutive elections.[85] The *electoral volatility* formula is listed below:

$$V = \frac{\Sigma \left| c_{i,t+1} - c_{i,t} \right|}{\Sigma c_{i,t+1} + \Sigma c_{i,t}}$$

Where V indicates the aggregate volatility and where c_i represents the vote share for party i at election t, and $c_{i,\,t+1}$ indicates the vote share of party i at the second, or next, election.[86]

Data for electoral returns for Postcommunist states were gathered from the University of Essex. Data for African states were collected from the African Elections Database. Data on Latin American elections were obtained from the Political Database of the Americas. Election results for the additional countries in the analysis were obtained through electoral commissions from numerous states, Adam Carr's website and Election World.

The second component of party system stability is *party replacement*. Some scholars have measured the number of new parties that enter a party system as being an indication of party system stability.[87] However, measuring the number of new parties does not provide information regarding the electoral significance of new parties.[88] A more accurate measure takes into account the percentage of votes won by new parties.[89] Thus, I measure party replacement as the percentage of votes won by new parties. Both measures are lagged one period in order to fully capture their substantive effects on dispute initiation and in order to control for possible

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[85] Birch (2001), (2003)
[86] Birch (2001), (2003)
[87] Birnir (2005); Tavits (2006)
[88] Birch (2001), (2003)
[89] Birch (2001), (2003)

endogeneity effects.[90] More specifically, I expect a small delay in the effect both variables

(*party replacement* and *electoral volatility*) have on the likelihood of dispute initiation. In

summary, the likelihood that a democracy initiates a militarized interstate dispute involving the

use of force is expected to be greater as *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* increase due to

lower levels of political accountability present in less stable party systems.

Control Variables

I include a number of control variables in order to capture the nature of the interstate

environment of the democratic states being examined.[91] A more detailed description of the

variables included in this analysis can be found in the chapter appendix in Table 9A. One of the

factors that can affect the likelihood of interstate conflict is the number of democratic and

autocratic states that are contiguous to a given state. That is, some literature suggests that states

that are surrounded by autocratic states are more likely to increase their military expenditures

and there is a greater probability of interstate conflict as states share borders with autocratic

states.[92] This literature argues that autocratic states are generally viewed by other states as being

more aggressive than democratic states, thus prompting an arms buildup in the region and an

enhanced probably of conflict. Thus, I include the *number of contiguous democracies*[93], and the

number of contiguous autocracies[94] in the analysis.

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[90] Lagging independent variables in studies with a binary indicator of conflict is consider appropriate given a time series estimation procedure is employed (Melander 2005; Powers 2006)

[91] Williams (2008)

[92] Goldsmith (2003); Lektzian and Prins (2008)

[93] (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset)

[94] (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset)

Many researchers argue that alliances are also important factors affecting the likelihood of conflict initiation.[95] There is debate within the literature regarding whether alliances increase the likelihood of interstate conflict,[96] or decrease the likelihood of conflict,[97] and some scholars contend that alliances both increase and decrease the probability of conflict.[98] Additional research suggests that the effect of alliances on conflict is dependent on factors such as polarity,[99] territory and the distribution of capabilities in the interstate system. Thus, I control for alliances by measuring the *total number of alliances*[100] of each democracy, and the *similarity of alliance portfolio* each democracy has with the system leader.[101]

Many scholars also consider power to be central to the study of conflict.[102] In addition, some researchers contend that as states acquire more power they have a greater likelihood of initiating conflict with other states.[103] Thus, I include several measures in attempting to capture the concept of state power. One indicator that is frequently used to measure the power of a state

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[95] Bueno de Mesquita & Singer 1973; Geller & Singer 1998; Sprecher and Krause 2006
[96] Levy 1981; Vasquez 1993
[97] Gelpi 1999; Vasquez & Elman 2003
[98] Smith (1995)
[99] Singer & Small (1968); Bueno de Mesquita (1978); Wayman (1984)
[100] Gibler, Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816 – 2000." Journal of Peace Research 41(2): 211 – 222.
[101] To capture the nature of alliances with the system leader I use the tau- s alliance variable. The tau S correlation is determined by the alliance relationship between the state in question and the system leader (Britain until 1945, and the US following 1945) based on the S correlation calculation. "The S correlation calculation performed by EUGene is based on the calculation used by Signorino and Ritter (1999). Like the Kendall tau-b, S evaluates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. Unlike tau-b, S also takes into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation. For example, the fact that a state has identical alliances with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states is accounted for in the S calculation, but not in tau-b. Signorino and Ritter note that while tau-b is an excellent measure of rank order similarity, it has inherent flaws that allow a variety of alliance portfolio tables to have identical tau-b results which impact studies looking beyond rank order similarity" (Bennett and Stam, 2007, p. 16).
[102] (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 2001; Palmer and Morgan 2006)
[103] Palmer and Morgan (2006)

is the Composite Index of National Capabilities (*CINC*).[104] The *CINC* score provides

information pertaining to the amount of capabilities each state in the interstate system has

relative to every other state. As a state's *CINC* score increases, this indicates that a given state

possesses more relative power compared with every other state in the global system. Therefore,

while I am not conducting a dyadic analysis, utilizing the *CINC* score is appropriate for a

monadic study because the increase or decrease in the *CINC* score provides information

regarding the level of capabilities of each state from year to year relative to the capabilities

present in the entire global system. In addition, I include a number of additional measures to

gauge the level of state power in order to provide for robustness. One measure is a*nnual*

percentage gross domestic product growth. Some scholars contend that GDP is an adequate

proxy measure of state capacity.[105] Furthermore, as a state increases or decreases in GDP, this

indicates the potential level of change in state capacity and state power for a given year. In

addition, many scholars contend that the domestic economic environment and the level of

economic growth within democracies influence the likelihood of conflict onset.[106] Thus, I

include *annual percentage GDP growth*[107] in order to provide an indicator of the economic

conditions within democratic states. The *annual percentage GDP growth* measure is lagged one

period in order to capture the delayed impact changing economic conditions may have on the

probability of dispute onset. I also include *total population*[108] and *military spending*[109] as

measures of state strength. Examining a state's total population[110] reveals information regarding

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[104] (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project)
[105] (Fearon and Laitin 2003)
[106] (Oneal and Tir 2006)
[107] World Development Indicators (2008)
[108] World Development Indicators (2008)
[109] World Development Indicators (2008)
[110] While a measure of total population is included in the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score, I believe it is important to include a separate measure of total population that is separate

the potential size of its standing army. That is, states with larger total populations can provide for larger standing armies in times of war, given that they have adequate resources to convert eligible segments of the general population into the military. Furthermore, states that spend larger amounts on the military will have greater military capabilities. In addition, as levels of military spending increase, states may be readying themselves for a potential conflict. Thus, including the additional measures of a*nnual percentage GDP growth*, *total population* and *military spending* are important for the examination of conflict initiation. In addition, some scholars argue that states that are major powers are more likely to be involved in interstate conflicts.[111] Thus, I control for whether a democratic state is considered to be a major power by including the dichotomous *major power status* measure from the Correlates of War Dataset. [112]

The distribution of power within the interstate system can also be an important factor when investigating the causes of interstate conflict. More specifically, polarity (whether the interstate system is unipolar, bipolar or tripolar) can influence overall stability and the likelihood of interstate conflict between states.[113] Furthermore, seeing that the analysis is from 1975 – 2001, it is important to account for the distribution of power in the interstate system because some years of observation are during the cold war - in a bipolar system- and other years are not. Thus, I include the *syscon* variable from the Correlates of War Dataset to capture the change in the concentration of power within the interstate system[114] from year to year. The *syscon* variable

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from the CINC score in order to fully account for the effect larger populations may have on overall state capacity and state power. Furthermore, the total population measure is taken from a separate data source, which provides for an additional robustness check.

[111] Palmer and Morgan (2006)

[112] (Singer, Remer, and Stuckey 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820 – 1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19 – 48.

[113] (Deutsch and Singer 1964; Waltz 1964; Waltz 1979; Thompson 1986; Wagner 1986; Mansfield 1988; Niou, Ordershook and Rose 1989)

[114] The syscon variable within the Correlates of War measures the concentration of relative power among the major powers in the world system. Values closer to 0 indicate there is more disperse relative power

is lagged one period in order to account for any destabilizing effects transitions from one form of polarity to another may have on the likelihood of conflict, as well as to control for the overall change in the distribution of power and its effect on system stability. In order to control for contagion effects stemming from an interstate war or conflict, I also control for whether a democracy is involved in an *interstate war*[115], the *number of interstate war deaths* associated with an interstate war[116], the *number of Militarized Interstate Disputes involving the use of force*[117], and the *number of Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes*.[118] The conflict variables: *interstate war*[119], the *number of interstate war deaths*[120], and the *number of Militarized Interstate Disputes involving the use of force* are lagged one period in order to account for their delayed effect on the likelihood of conflict initiation.

There also is a large body of literature within the international relations literature that suggests that the degree of political fractionalization within democratic governments significantly affects the likelihood of conflict onset.[121] I include additional measures to assess the degree of political polarization within democratic governments that include the *level of*

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among the major power states in the interstate system (e.g., multipolar systems). Values closer to 1 indicate a single state or two states possess a greater distribution of power in the interstate system compared with the remaining states (e.g., bipolar or unipolar systems) (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project).

[115] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[116] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[117] (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21: 133 – 154).

[118] (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21: 133 – 154).

[119] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[120] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[121] (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Hagan 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Huth and Allee 2002)

government fractionalization[122] and the *degree the party of the executive controls the legislature.*[123] Scholars also contend that the type of electoral system within democracies[124] and the type of democratic regime[125] play an important role in predicting the likelihood of conflict initiation. Thus, I also control for the nature of electoral systems within democracies and the type of democratic regime that include *district magnitude*[126], whether an electoral system is a *Proportional Representation System (PR)*[127], or *Mixed Member System (MMS)*[128], and whether a democracy is a *presidential* or *parliamentary system.*[129] Furthermore, some scholars contend that the proximity of elections can affect the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.[130] Thus, I also include an indicator regarding whether a given year of observation is an *election year* for a democratic executive. I also include regional dummy variables in order to control for regional effects.

Estimation Method

I have cross-sectional time series data with a rare-events dichotomous dependent variable. In order to assess the impact party system stability has on the probability that a democracy initiates a militarized interstate dispute (MID) involving the use of force, I use a random effects logit model with cubic splines and a lagged dependent variable in order to control for temporal dependence as recommended by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) and Beck and Katz

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[122] The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties (Database of Political Institutions, Keffer et al 2004)
[123] Does the party of the executive have an absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers? (Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et all 2004)
[124] (Leblang and Chan 2003)
[125] (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Elman 2000)
[126] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[127] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[128] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[129] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[130] Gaubatz (1991)

(2004).[131] As they argue, there is much confusion regarding how to deal with the issue of time in peace studies. Utilizing splines has been considered a feasible method to employ in a large N rare events study that uses MLE estimation.[132] Splines deal with time by creating a trend variable that captures different periods. Thus, this may be the most acceptable method in respect to a large N rare events study that uses MLE estimation.[133] Furthermore, I conducted a Hausman test following my estimation of both models using fixed and random effects estimations and found that a random effects model was appropriate for the given data.[134]

Empirical Results

The analysis indicates strong support for the argument that party system stability influences dispute initiation. As indicated in Table 1A, Model 2, *electoral volatility* has a statistically significant and positive effect on dispute initiation which provides support for the first hypothesis that democracies will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes as levels of electoral volatility are greater. As shown in Table 1A, Model 1, *party replacement* has a statistically significant and positive impact on the initiation of MIDs involving the use of force. Democracies are more likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute as new political parties capture a greater percentage of votes within democracies. This provides support for my second hypothesis that democracies will be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes as the percentage of votes won by new parties is greater. These results also offer support for the general argument that democracies with less stable party systems are more likely to purse revisionist activity in the interstate system.

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[131] I used xtlogit with Stata version 11 to estimate the models in this analysis because the dataset consists of cross sectional, time-series data.
[132] Mansfeield and Pevehouse (2000) provide additional explanations regarding the use of splines in time-series, cross-sectional data with a rare event, binary dependent variable.
[133] Beck and Katz (2004)
[134] After comparing the results of the fixed effects and random effects models, the P-value for both models was greater than .05 indicating a random effects model was appropriate for the given data.

The substantive effects of *party replacement* and *electoral* v*olatility* on the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the use of force are determined by generating the predicted probabilities using the estimates from the logit estimations from Models 1 and 2 in Table 1A. The predicted probabilities are shown in Models 11 and 12 in Table 4A. The predicted probabilities were calculated by computing the baseline probability of a dispute initiation where the *revisionist state* variable was assumed to equal 0, and the independent variables were held at their mean values. As expected, the predicted probabilities are small due to the presence of a rare events, binary dependent variable. We see that when *party replacement* is set at its mean value there is a .06% probability of a dispute initiation. When *electoral volatility* is set at its mean value there is a .09% probability of dispute initiation. These finding provide support for the argument that democracies with less stable party systems are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes involving the use of force in the interstate system.

The control variables included to capture the state of the interstate system: the *number of fatal MIDs,* the *change in the concentration of power in the interstate system*, *alliance with system leader* and the *total number of contiguous autocracies* have a positive and statistically significant association with the probability of dispute initiation in both models, as listed in Table 1A. The *number of fatal MIDs* and the *total number of contiguous autocracies* were expected to be associated with a greater number of disputes based on previous literature. Furthermore, the *major power status* of a democracy is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of dispute initiation, as predicted, but only in Model 2. The most surprising finding is that the *CINC* score has a negative and significant relationship with the probability of dispute initiation in both models.

Alternate Specifications

After testing for collinearity within the models, I discovered that the variables *mixed member* electoral system and *district magnitude* were collinear with each other as well as with the *presidential* regime variable. While neither variable is collinear with the primary independent variables, or dependent variables, I run additional models in which I exclude *mixed member* electoral systems and *district magnitude* in order to alleviate concerns that the results are affected by collinearity. As seen in models 19 and 20 in Table 8A, the results are substantially unchanged when excluding the *mixed member* electoral system and *district magnitude* measures. *Party replacement* and *electoral volatility* continue to exert a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of an initiated MID involving the use of force when the collinear variables are excluded.

Following the initial estimation of the effects of *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* on the probability of dispute initiation, I estimate eight additional models by excluding countries that could have biasing effects on the prediction of an initiated dispute involving the use of force based on the results from Cook's D test that determines the potential effect exerted by outlier cases. Table 2A reports the results for Models 3 and 4 with the United States excluded, and Models 5 and 6 exclude Great Britain. The effects of the two independent variables (*party replacement and electoral volatility*) are unchanged across all models. Table 3A reports the results with Israel excluded from Models 7 and 8, and Models 9 and 10 exclude the United States, Great Britain and Israel. Once again, the results are not substantially changed for the *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* measures.

In order to provide for additional robustness, I estimate the effect of the party system stability measures (*party replacement* and *electoral volatility*) on the *originator variable* in the Correlates of War Dataset using a random effects logit model with cubic splines and a lagged

dependent variable. The *originator* variable is intended to capture if a state is the first mover in an interstate conflict. However, the *originator* variable is considered to be inferior to the *revisionist state* variable in determining what state is responsible for escalating tensions that lead to the initiation of a militarized dispute.[135] As seen in Model 13 and Model 14 in Table 5A, *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* have a positive and significant association with the likelihood that a democracy originates a militarized interstate dispute involving the use of force.[136] *Electoral volatility* is positive and significant at the 95% level and the *party replacement* measure is significant at the 90% level. However, the confidence interval of the *party replacement* variable crosses zero, so we cannot be fully certain in the relationship between the *party replacement* measure and the *originator* dependent variable.

I also conduct multiple Generalized Least Square (GLS) regressions with random effects to assess the impact of *electoral volatility* and *party replacement* on the *number of militarized interstate disputes* a state is involved in order to provide for additional robustness. The models include the *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* measures along with the standard control variables and the dependent variable is a count variable that indicates the *number of militarized interstate disputes* a state is involved in for each country-year. The disputes included are ones that are coded as having hostility levels ranging from 1 "No Militarized Action" to 5 "War" based on the hostility level variable in the Correlates of War Dataset.[137] The results displayed in Table 7A in Models 17 and 18 show that *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* are both positive and significant at the 95% level. The results indicate that democracies are involved in a

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[135] Souva and Prins (2006)

[136] The change in predicted probabilities of the effect of party replacement and electoral volatility on the probability a democracy initiates a conflict involving the use of force (with the originator dependent variable) are displayed in Model 15 and Model 16 in Table 6A.

[137] Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004)

greater *number of militarized interstate disputes* as there are higher levels of *electoral volatility* and *party replacement* within democracies.

In order to account for potential endogeneity in the analysis, I lag the *party replacement* and *electoral volatility* variables one period in all of the models in which I use random effects logistic estimations. In addition, given that I have a rare-events, binary dependent variable, the traditional Hausman test for endogeneity is inappropriate. Furthermore, using Hausman's (1978) instrumenting approach (exogeneity test) to detect endogeneity among the independent variables is also inappropriate given that I have a binary dependent variable. Thus, I utilize a reverse engineering approach by including the dependent variables (*revisionist state*, *originator*) as independent predictors of *party replacement* and *electoral volatility*. The results indicate that the dependent variables used to capture conflict initiation (*revisionist state* and *originator*) fail to have any substantive effect on electoral volatility and party replacement. Thus, conflict initiation does not appear to influence the level of party system stability within the democracies included in the dataset.

In summary, the empirical results indicate that less stable party systems are associated with a greater likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies. As there is more electoral volatility within party systems, and as new parties capture a greater percentage of votes, democracies are more likely to pursue revisionist activity in the interstate system. I argue that unstable party systems are associated with an increased probability of dispute initiation due to lower levels of accountability endemic to less stable party systems. In these systems, the ties between voters and politicians are weak, and voters have significantly less knowledge regarding the political party and leaders to hold responsible for specific policy outcomes. In such circumstances, democratic leaders have more flexibility to pursue revisionist type policies

because the likelihood that voters will remove political leaders from office as a result of unfavorable policy outcomes is hindered in unstable party systems.

Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico – A Brief Comparison

In this section I provide brief, anecdotal case studies from Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico to show how the level of party system stability affects the initiation of conflict within democracies as well as influences the nature of the leadership within democratic states. I compare these cases based on their many similarities including levels of wealth, resources devoted to their respective militaries, and comparable interstate threats,[138] which helps to hold potential explanations constant. However, an area where Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico diverge is in their propensity for interstate conflict. From 1994 – 2004, Uruguay and Mexico were involved in zero interstate disputes while Venezuela was involved in nine interstate disputes.[139] To fully understand why states such as Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico pursued significantly different foreign policy strategies, we must examine the manner through which the public can hold democratic leaders accountable through their party systems.

Venezuela's party system began to erode in the 1990s after years of experiencing strong party system stability. From 1983 – 1993, the average level of electoral volatility[140] within the Venezuelan party system was approximately 10%, and the average percentage of votes won by new parties was 8%. Venezuela was considered to have one of the most stable party systems in

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[138] See CIA World Factbook (2009) and World Bank (2008)

[139] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

[140] Two measures commonly used by comparative researchers to gauge party system stability are electoral volatility and party replacement (Przeworski 1975; Mainwairing and Scully 1995; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Stockton 2001; Birch 2001, 2003; Birnir 2005; Casas-Zamora 2005; Ishiyama 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Electoral volatility is the change in the percentage of votes received among parties that have competed in consecutive elections. Higher levels of electoral volatility are associated with less stable party systems. The party replacement measure is simply the percentage of votes won by new parties. Party systems are considered to be less stable where new parties capture a greater percentage of votes.

Latin America. During this period, Venezuela was involved in only two interstate disputes involving the use of force, and in both disputes, Venezuela was not the initiator. However, from 1994 – 2004, Venezuela's party system destabilized in a dramatic manner. As Coppedge (2007, 137) writes, "Venezuela's party system has been transformed more completely than any other. From 1973 to 1988, competition was dominated by the center-left Acción Democrática party and the center-right Social Christian party COPEI. After nearly two decades of economic decline, however, voters lost faith in these two parties and began searching for alternatives. First abstention grew, then the party system fragmented, first in 1993, then even more in 1998." From 1994 – 2004, the average percentage of electoral volatility increased to 33% (which was a 22% increase compared with the previous decade), and the average percentage of votes won by new parties rose to 15% (7% increase compared with the pervious ten year period). As Roberts (2003) states: "This populist resurgence was especially astonishing in Venezuela, given the strength of the established institutions that had to be displaced to create political space for new populist figures. Indeed, for most of the 1980s, as other Latin American nations were struggling to establish or consolidate democratic regimes and rebuild party systems following periods of authoritarian repression, Venezuela surely would have been considered a "least likely case" for a regime threatening party system breakdown and populist resurgence" (38). During these ten years (1994 – 2004), Venezuela was involved in nine interstate disputes, out of which seven involved the use of force. Furthermore, Venezuela initiated seven of the disputes. Thus, Venezuela initiated seven times as many militarized disputes from 1994 -2004 compared with the previous ten year period.

Uruguay, in comparison, was involved in zero interstate disputes and maintained a stable party system throughout the decade (1994 – 2004), with the average level of electoral volatility

remaining at 10% and the rate of party replacement was 14%. According to many scholars, Uruguay has one of the most stable and institutionalized party systems in Latin America (Cason, 2002, 91). The Uruguayan elections of 1999 and 2000 cemented the opinion by many that Uruguay continued to have one of the most stable and institutionalized party system in Latin America. In these elections the Colorados Party, the National Party (Blancos), and the Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista Party (Broad Front-Progressive Encounter, FA-EP) continued to capture consistent shares of votes at both the local and national level (Cason 2002).

In considering the nature of the political parties in Uruguay – we see that the Uruguayan political parties have strong connections with the electorate, which further aids electoral accountability. "In terms of overall party roots in society, one extreme is represented by Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, all of which have political parties with deeply entrenched roots in society. In contrast, party roots in society are quite shallow in countries at the other extreme of the combined Party Roots measure, such as Guatemala, Argentina, and Venezuela" (Jones, 2005, 8-9). In sum, Uruguay's stable party system has provided political stability and consistency that has allowed its voters to hold their elected leaders responsible for policy decisions in a manner that has furthered democratic governance and accountability for Uruguayan elected leaders. As Cason (2002) states: "Uruguayan democracy is much stronger than most others in Latin America, and this strength is related to the party system" (92).

Mexico, surprisingly, also maintained a relatively stable party system throughout the decade. The average percentage of electoral volatility remained at 12% and the party replacement rate was 5%. Furthermore, from 1994 – 2004, Mexico was involved in zero interstate disputes. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Mexico transitioned from an autocratic regime dominated by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) to a more

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competitive multi-party system (Dominguez, Lawson and Moreno 2009). In the mid to late

1990s, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)

began gaining seats in congress, and in 2000 the PAN acquired the office of the presidency

(Greene 2002). The multi-party system[141] that emerged in Mexico in the mid to late 1990s was

one in which Mexico's political parties began placing themselves along clear and unified policy

dimensions, which was a surprise to many observers (Greene 2002). While Mexico's new

democratic, multi-party system was still in its nascent stages of development, the new party

system lead to the formation of political parties that allowed voters to consistently link policy

platforms and agendas of Mexican parties to substantive policy outcomes from election to

election (Greene 2002).[142] In speaking of the type of political representation within Mexico in

the new multi-party system, Bruhn and Greene (2007, 36) state: "…. representatives who

legislate in this manner present voters with clear, easily distinguishable choices and may give

voters the opportunity to "balance" the presidency with a Congress that seriously debates public

policy choices, should they choose to think about politics in this way."

One of the primary reasons that the new party system in Mexico contained parties with

consistent political messages and well defined policy positions was because the opposition

parties in Mexico had to clearly define their ideological positions in order to compete with the

once dominant PRI. That is, the large resource advantages enjoyed by the PRI and its supporters

created a political environment in which one of the few strategies for political success for the

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[141] Scholars disagree regarding whether Mexico should be considered a two-party or three-party system. While 8 different political parties are represented in the Mexican Congress, a majority of scholars argue that only three political parties (PRI, PAN and PRD) are considered viable in terms of receiving votes and influencing government policy in the Mexican party system (Prud'homme 2010).

[142] Mexico's party system is referred to as being in its early stages of development because many observers consider Mexico to have been autocratic until 1997. Thus, while parties did exist and compete in Mexico's party system prior to this period, the parties did not compete in a democratic party system until 1997.

PRD and PAN was to clearly separate their policy positions and agendas from that of the PRI, and from each other (Greene 2002). The effect was that the parties became more programmatic and consistent in their policy positioning and campaigning. As Greene (2002, 781) argues, "These advantages give opposition parties incentives to diverge from the position of the median voter. In doing so, they offer programmatic incentives to the voters and are better able to recruit policy-oriented activists who supply labor for the resource-poor challengers." Thus, while Mexico's new party system was not fully developed in the mid to late 1990s, it did allow political parties to effectively position themselves along ideological divides where voters could accurately connect the policy platforms of the parties with specific policy outcomes, thus inducing higher levels of electoral accountability.

In returning to the case of Venezuela, the impact of the destabilization of Venezuela's party system had a dramatic impact on the nature of the policy making process within the state. Partly as a result of economic turmoil and societal discontent, Venezuela's once stable party system became one of the most unstable party systems in Latin America, and Venezuelan politics became dominated by non-programmatic parties and populist appeals to the citizenry.[143] As Roberts and Wibbels (1999, 575) note, there is a "pervasive sense that political representation has become destructured or unhinged, creating a volatile situation in which political identities and organizational loyalties are recomposed from one election to the next." Examples abound that of the destruction of Venezuela's traditional party system (McCoy 1999; Cason, 2002, 90). The Venezuelan case is of significance because it illustrates how the erosion of a party system within a democracy can decrease the degree democratic leaders are accountable to voters. Subsequently, when party systems are unstable, democratic leaders have the opportunity to

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[143] Roberts (2003)

pursue riskier policies domestically and internationally. More specifically, democratic leaders can be bolder in their policy pursuits because they are less fettered by their constituencies.

In speaking of the effects of the deinstitutionalization of the party system in Venezuela and the resulting effect on democratic governance, Roberts (2003, 36) states: "With the rise of Chávez at the end of the 1990s, moreover, it became clear that even more traditional statist and nationalist variants of populism retained a capacity to mobilize mass support where established party systems had been undermined by acute political and economic crises and deepening social inequalities. The most distinctive features of this new leadership are its implacable hostility to the political establishment and an aversion to intermediary institutions that can hold a leader accountable to mass constituents." Therefore, as levels of political accountability declined in Venezuela, based on the destabilization of the party system, the democratic leaders that emerged pursued more aggressive foreign policies.

Venezuela's foreign policies from the mid 1990s to 2004 were characterized by hostile actions and aggressive posturing directed against its neighboring states and some of it occurred prior to the arrival of President Hugo Chávez in 1999. In a series of conflicts beginning in April 1997 over technical discrepancies with Trinidad and Tobago regarding a previously established maritime border that had been agreed upon by both states in 1990, Venezuela sent armed troops to board oil platforms, tugboats and fishing boats, and Venezuelan troops fired upon Trinidad and Tobago sea vessels. State officials from Trinidad and Tobago sought to negotiate with the Venezuelan government in hopes of reducing tensions, and Trinidad and Tobago ultimately sought assistance from the Organization of American States (OAS) in attempting to resolve the hostilities. The Venezuelan government continued to pursue its claim of sovereignty in the region before the conflict subsided in August 1997. Tensions flared again in August, 1999 when

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Venezuelan national guardsmen boarded a sea vessel from Trinidad and Tobago and arrested the crew and allegedly disposed of the captain. Trinidad and Tobago claimed the sea vessel was in an area that was open to boats from both nations based on the terms of an agreement that was signed in 1998 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).

In September 1999, the Venezuelan government de-authorized a border agreement that it had previously signed with Guyana, and in October 1999, Venezuela moved its troops closer to the Guyanan border. Guyana protested the troop buildup by Venezuela and a few days later Venezuelan helicopters crossed the Venezuelan-Guyana border near Etetringbang. Guyana responded by putting its troops on full alert. Venezuela continued to hold its claim over the disputed territory and Venezuela refused to agree on a settlement (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).

In a series of disputes with Colombia, in January 1994, a Venezuelan helicopter crossed the Venezuelan-Colombian border near Arauca, Colombia and Venezuelan soldiers kidnapped seven Colombian citizens. It was not clear whether the Venezuelan troops mistook the Colombian citizens for guerillas or whether the actions taken by Venezuela were intended to support its regional claim near the border. In October 2000 – Venezuelan military forces (including ground troops and air support) crossed into Colombia in an alleged drug raid and set houses on fire, destroyed coca farms and killed livestock. In an unrelated incident in November of 2000 – National Guard troops from Venezuela (with air support) crossed into Colombia and captured four Colombian farm workers and took them to Venezuela. In a later incident in November 2000, six Venezuelan helicopters crossed the Colombian border again following a series of border classes with Colombian rebels (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).

In examining the foreign policies of Venezuela from 1994 – 2004, it is evident that Venezuela adopted a more revisionist approach in its relations with other states compared with the previous decade. The Venezuelan government repeatedly took hostile actions directed against citizens, workers and government officials from Trinidad and Tobago as a result of the Venezuelan government's dissatisfaction with a 1990 maritime border agreement, and Venezuela was obstinate throughout much of the negotiations process with the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, in an overtly aggressive move, Venezuela reneged on a previously agreed upon border settlement with Guyana and escalated tensions between the states by sending troops to the Guyanan border while refusing to reach a settlement with the Guyanan government. In addition, Venezuela increased the intensity of its hostile relations with Colombia and sent military forces across the Colombian border on numerous occasions. Thus, the foreign policies that the Venezuelan government pursued during this period were more aggressive and hostile than in previous periods, and they indicated that a noticeable shift had taken place in Venezuela's approach to foreign relations.

Some observers could argue that the aggressive foreign policies pursued by Venezuela from 1994 - 2004 could be attributed to the bold nature of the Chávez regime. However, this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, while Chávez did pursue aggressive foreign policies, Chávez's policies were a continuation of the bold foreign policies that were initiated by the democratic leaders in power prior to Chávez's arrival in office in February of 1999. Five of the nine militarized interstate disputes Venezuela was involved in from 1994 – 2004 occurred prior to Chávez coming to power, and of the five disputes Venezuela was engaged in before Chávez assumed the presidency, Venezuela initiated four out of five of the disputes. Second, the destabilization of the Venezuelan party system decreased accountability for all political leaders,

and not simply the executive. Thus, as general levels of accountability declined for democratic

leaders in Venezuela – the government was able to adopt riskier policies as a result of a decline

in electoral accountability for all elected leaders. Therefore, in examining the case of Venezuela

– an important factor that contributed to the pursuit of more aggressive foreign policies was the

emaciation of accountability for democratic leaders and not simply the extreme nature of the

Chávez regime. In simple terms, the destabilization of Venezuela's party system allowed

opportunistic democratic leaders to flourish that advanced risky domestic and foreign policies,

and Chávez was one of many such democratic leaders during this period of declining electoral

accountability that characterized the Venezuelan political system.

Conclusion

Party systems are vital to democracy. They shape the manner by which democratic

leaders are held accountable by the public which ultimately affects the policies that democratic

leaders pursue. The stability of party systems also affects the types of leaders that emerge within

democracies, as was the case in Venezuela where populist leaders arrived on the political

landscape as Venezuela's party system eroded. These new leaders usurped the political power

once funneled through Venezuela's party system. The effect was that democratic leaders in

Venezuela were less accountable politically, and Venezuela pursued significantly different

policies domestically and abroad.

In conclusion, scholars would be wise to examine the effects party systems have on

political accountability and the types of policies democratic leaders seek to advance, for as

Mainwairing and Torcal argue: "Where electoral accountability suffers, the promise that

representative democracy holds, that elected politicians will serve as agents of the voters to

advance some common good or to advance interests of specific constituencies, may break down"

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(2005, 26). Therefore, understanding how party systems affect political accountability and the

foreign policies that democracies develop is beneficial to the study of the domestic sources of

conflict initiation.

CHAPTER II APPENDIX

Table 1A. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 1	Model 2
Party Replacement (t-1)	2.3001** (1.0334)	
Volatility (t-1)		4.0710** (2.0181)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.3223 (1.4260)	1.2651 (1.4162)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0167 (.02710)	-.0162 (.0256)
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	.0039 (.5484)	.1228 (.5124)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.7666*** (.5948)	1.7545*** (.5844)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	95.39604*** (24.1485)	91.3073*** (23.6607)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	12.7164* (7.1481)	11.3930* (6.8819)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0495 (.0870)	-.0230 (.0836)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.3392*** (.1106)	.3622*** (.1064)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.04923 (.1013)	.0583 (.0949)
Major Power Status	2.1206 (.9297)	2.0146** (.9194)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-32.8148* (17.9358)	-33.6374* (18.0982)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0249 (.0373)	-.0260 (.0368)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0001 (.0005)	-.0002 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	.0869 (.3318)	.0888 (.3272)
Government Fractionalization	-.10595 (.8271)	-.7741 (.7424)

Table 1A. Continued.   The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 1	Model 2
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.0331	.1360
	(.3914)	(.3882)
District Magnitude	.0077	.0082
	(.0078)	(.0076)
PR System	.0472	.0502
	(.0814)	(.0784)
Mixed Member System	-.1842	-.2586
	(.4226)	(.4191)
Presidential System	-.3557	-.3773
	(.6094)	(.6034)
Latin America	-4.0549**	-4.0511**
	(1.6725)	(1.7458)
Postcommunist	-23.7900	-30.0559
	(79064.87)	(1334147)
Africa	24.3447	-30.3318
	(109766.8)	(2070758)
Asia	-.6830	-.4238
	(1.9830)	(2.0339)
OECD	-2.941**	-2.8189*
	(1.4192)	(1.4984)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.8645**	.7273*
	(.4235)	(.3740)
Spline 1	1.5826**	1.3523**
	(.6652)	(.6074)
Spline 2	-3.9724***	-3.4151**
	(1.4579)	(1.3487)
Spline 3	16. 15485***	14.0869***
	(5.2610)	(4.9234)
Spline 4	-32.2413***	-28.3884***
	(9.6244)	(9.2333)
Constant	-3141.657**	-2685.749**
	(1318.58)	(1203.889)
Groups	47	47
Observations	530	533
Probability X^2	.0014***	.0004***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 2A. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding the United States and Great Britain

Variables in Model	United States		United Kingdom	
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Replacement (t-1)	2.23118**		2.372991**	
	(1.0691)		(1.0886)	
Volatility (t-1)		4.4242**		4.345**
		(2.10741)		(2.1443)
Interstate War (t-1)	0.76867	0.644023	23.80284	23.52539
	(1.68176)	(1.67618)	(64415.9)	(61801.2)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	0.10011	0.108120	-23.08086	-22.9253
	(0.20031)	(0.19901)	(46612.59)	(44507.26)
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	0.41769	0.49203	-0.1237106	-0.00915
	(0.65209)	(0.6243)	(0.5724864)	(0.530909)
Number of Fatal MIDS	2.17087***	2.144***	1.861717***	1.861***
	(0.65043)	(0.63801)	(0.61938)	(0.61033)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	99.556***	95.46***	97.461***	94.959***
	(24.9587)	(24.6714)	(25.089)	(24.95185)
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	6.21998	4.230991	11.15972	9.522602
	8.32659	(8.23540)	(7.611954)	(7.609898)
Total Number of Alliances	-0.0228	0.000072	-0.0214454	0.011206
	(0.09049)	(0.08907)	(0.092484)	(0.090734)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	0.40728**	0.433***	0.3337***	0.367***
	(0.12998)	(0.12618)	(0.12408)	(0.12187)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	0.03415	0.045462	0.053977	0.068484
	0.1055	(0.10265)	(0.1083443	(0.106562)
Major Power Status	2.66438**	2.603**	2.314742**	2.0777**
	(1.11787)	(1.11208)	(1.04227)	(1.05495)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-54.364*	-55.338*	-37.54794*	-38.334*
	(29.6044)	(28.7907)	(19.6421)	(19.965)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.0265	-0.02689	-0.0238939	-0.01646
	(0.03712)	(0.0368)	(0.0447478)	(0.04516)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-0.0003	-0.00045	0.0000535	-0.00012
	(0.00061)	(0.0006)	(0.0006662)	(0.00068)

Table 2A. Continued. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding the United States and Great Britain

Variables in Model	United States		United Kingdom	
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Total Population	-0.0004	-0.00048	-0.0004367	-0.00049
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003105)	(0.000309)
Election Year	-0.0211	-0.02334	0.0400805	0.042766
	(0.3492)	(0.3460)	(0.346978)	(0.34471)
Government Fractionalization	-0.8794	-0.58030	-1.38709	-1.11467
	(0.83768)	(0.8516)	(0.890168)	(0.91470)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	0.03963	0.13261	0.0392411	0.115717
	(0.41528)	(0.4141)	(0.42538)	(0.4259)
District Magnitude	0.01011	0.010593	0.0078308	0.008049
	(0.00813)	(0.00791)	(0.008512)	(0.008459)
PR System	0.0479	0.052373	0.0480472	0.05361
	(0.09872)	(0.09668)	(0.083222)	(0.08533)
Mixed Member System	-0.109	-0.206895	-0.1682358	-0.24374
	(0.44861)	(0.45106)	(0.475042)	(0.47863)
Presidential System	-0.6242	-0.675950	-0.3688696	-0.31913
	(0.72415)	(0.71329)	0.6983605	0.709079
Latin America	-3.0364	-2.955337	-4.38770**	-4.353**
	(2.14291)	(2.17605)	(1.770549)	(1.84085)
Postcommunist	-21.99	-26.39362	-21.68269	-23.0826
	(25419.8)	(134575.7)	(24193.23)	(36042.07)
Africa	-23.059	-26.01455	-23.32902	-23.2541
	(37858.4)	(13557.9)	(59842.37)	(5708.57)
Asia	-1.0021	-1.0201*	-0.4857043	-0.11913
	(1.97113)	(2.05552)	(2.12493)	(2.19589)
OECD	-2.8058*	-2.801**	-3.02783**	-2.7546*
	(1.4857)	(1.6012)	(1.48979)	(1.5595)
Revisionist State (t-1)	0.73367	0.58335	0.86837**	0.701653
	(0.44896)	(0.4665)	(0.42729)	(0.44159)
Spline 1	1.35485**	1.1143*	1.624321**	1.3885**
	(0.66428)	(0.6093)	(0.687528)	(0.63697)
Spline 2	-3.4586**	-2.859**	-4.09156***	-3.522**
	(1.46133)	(1.3739)	(1.51098)	(1.42852)

Table 2A. Continued. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding the United States and Great Britain

Variables in Model	United States		United Kingdom	
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Spline 3	14.7657***	12.524**	16.60634***	14.48***
	(5.26908)	5.043656	(5.46293)	(5.24079)
Spline 4	-32.409***	-28.25***	-32.7746***	-28.72***
	(9.70906)	9.509488	(9.98493)	(9.777613)
Constant	-2687.9**	-2211.4*	-3223.349**	-2756.82
	(1316.87)	1208.07	(1362.673)	1262.487
Groups	46	46	46	46
Observations	519	522	517	520
Probability X^2	.0026***	.0011***	.0064***	.0035***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 3A. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom

Variables in Model	Israel		US, UK and Israel	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Party Replacement (t-1)	2.300**		2.34335**	
	(1.0334)		(1.1239)	
Volatility (t-1)		4.07102**		4.7608**
		(2.01818)		(2.23349)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.32237	1.26512	23.4443	24.46591
	(1.4260)	(1.41621)	(49149.6)	(90087.32)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-0.0167	-0.016278	-22.365	-23.4935
	(0.0271)	(0.02566)	(31067.6)	(56337.88)
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	0.00395	0.1228565	0.25766	0.31137*
	0.54841	0.5124508	(0.68888)	(0.64555)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.766***	1.7545***	2.3168***	2.2950***
	(0.5948)	(0.58446)	(0.68593)	(0.674828)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	95.39***	91.307***	101.345***	99.0990***
	(24.148)	(23.6607)	(25.9048)	(25.81804)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	12.7164*	11.3930*	3.947	1.51715
	(7.1481)	(6.88195)	(8.85837)	(8.82943)
Total Number of Alliances	-0.04503	-0.0230	0.01351	0.042749
	(0.0870)	(0.08361)	(0.09654)	(0.094986)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	0.339***	0.3622128	0.40007***	0.4405***
	(0.1107)	(0.106472)	(0.14356)	(0.140703)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	0.04923	0.0583641	0.04003	0.058073
	(0.10131)	(0.094953)	(0.11207)	(0.11050)
Major Power Status	2.1206**	2.0146**	2.92035***	2.718***
	(0.9297)	(0.91946)	(1.2352)	(1.23655)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-32.815*	-33.6374*	-61.706*	-63.2815**
	(17.9358)	(18.0982)	(32.4953)	(31.91983)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.025	-0.02600	-0.0282	-0.02118
	(0.0373)	(0.0368)	(0.04326)	(0.04344)

Table 3A. Continued. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom

Variables in Model	Israel		US, UK and Israel	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-0.0001	-0.000210	-0.0002	-0.00037
	(0.0005)	(0.00059)	(0.00069)	(0.000712)
Total Population	-0.0004	-0.000461	-0.0004	-0.00052
	(0.0002)	(0.000288)	(0.00032)	(0.00032)
Election Year	0.08695	0.088871	-0.0473	-0.05057
	(0.3318)	(0.327280)	(0.36418)	(0.36302)
Government Fractionalization	-1.0596	-0.774154	-1.2327	-0.9458
	(0.8271)	(0.74246)	(0.90423)	(0.9274)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	0.03317	0.1360709	0.04976	0.120938
	(0.39148)	(0.388223)	(0.44791)	(0.45248)
District Magnitude	0.00779	0.0082296	0.01012	0.010465
	(0.00782)	(0.007682)	(0.00881)	(0.00874)
PR System	0.04724	0.0502358	0.04783	0.055359
	(0.0814)	(0.078480)	(0.09565)	(0.10172)
Mixed Member System	-0.1825	-0.258629	-0.0759	-0.17446
	(0.4226)	(0.4191159)	(0.49912)	(0.50821)
Presidential System	-0.3558	-0.3773831	-0.6699	-0.64515
	(0.6094)	(0.603488)	(0.80998)	(0.81195)
Latin America	-4.055**	-4.051137*	-3.3499	-3.19123
	(1.6725)	(1.74588)	(2.2741)	(2.32842)
Postcommunist	-23.79	-30.05596	-22.058	-25.3055
	(74064.9)	(1334147)	(23657.4)	(61303.81)
Africa	-24.345	-30.33186	-23.144	-24.6615
	(10976)	(2070758)	(36375.2)	(65499.63)
Asia	-0.6831	-0.4238912	-0.7354	-0.62441
	(1.9830)	(2.033906)	(2.1024)	(2.19390)
OECD	-2.941**	-2.818926*	-2.8925*	-2.70538
	(1.41923)	(1.498484)	(1.5485)	(1.6551)

Table 3A. Continued. Robustness checks for the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001: Excluding Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom

Variables in Model	Israel		US, UK and Israel	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Revisionist State (t-1)	0.8645**	0.727367*	0.76232*	0.56722
	(0.423)	0.374019	(0.4553)	(0.4723)
Spline 1	1.58269**	1.352302**	1.370**	1.12751*
	(0.6652)	(0.607461)	(0.68536)	(0.627213)
Spline 2	-3.972***	-3.4151***	-3.5211***	-2.914***
	(1.4579)	(1.34875)	(1.51096)	(1.417463)
Spline 3	16.154***	14.086***	15.0233***	12.757**
	(5.2610)	(4.9234)	5.45604	(5.21239)
Spline 4	-32.24***	-28.388***	-32.707***	-28.40***
	(9.6244)	(9.23330)	(10.050)	(9.83310)
Constant	-314.7***	-2685.74**	-2718.8**	-2236.52*
	(1318.58)	(1203.889)	(1358.66)	(1243.40)
Groups	47	47	45	45
Observations	530	533	506	509
Probability X^2	.0014***	.0004***	.0082***	.0045***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 4A. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 11	Model 12
Party Replacement (t-1)	0.0678902	
Volatility (t-1)		0.09686
Interstate War (t-1)	0.0743121	0.0565
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-0.0004934	-0.00039
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	0.0001166	0.002923
Number of Fatal MIDS	0.1168362	0.095223
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	2.815689	2.172421
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	0.3753348	0.271068
Total Number of Alliances	-0.0014611	-0.00055
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	0.010013	0.008618
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	0.0014532	0.001389
Major Power Status	0.1433557	0.107982
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-0.9685564	-0.80032
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.0007372	-0.00062
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-3.25E-06	-5.0E-06
Total Population	-0.0000127	-1.1E-05
Election Year	0.0026134	0.002155
Government Fractionalization	-0.031274	-0.01842
Executive Party Control of Legislature	0.0009855	0.003329
District Magnitude	0.0002298	0.000196
PR System	0.0013943	0.001195
Mixed Member System	-0.0052786	-0.00598
Presidential System	-0.0103618	-0.00885
Latin America	-0.1161115	-0.09395
Postcommunist	-0.0630962	-0.0612
Africa	-0.0347839	-0.0288

Table 4A. Continued. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 11	Model 12
Asia	-0.0160243	-0.00872
OECD	-0.1387609	-0.10549
Revisionist State (t-1)	0.0349964	0.022637
Spline 1	0.0467143	0.032175
Spline 2	-0.1172504	-0.08126
Spline 3	0.476823	0.335162
Spline 4	-0.9516298	-0.67543

In the baseline predicted probability the independent variables are set to their mean values in Models 11 and 12. The dependent variable is assumed to equal = 0 (no dispute initiated).

Table 5A. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 13	Model 14
Party Replacement (t-1)	1.9342* (1.0046)	
Volatility (t-1)		4.2234** (2.0223)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.1970 (1.6550)	1.0439 (1.6573)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0998 (.2014)	.1092 (.2009)
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	.5268 (.5113)	.5915 (.4853)
Number of Fatal MIDS	4.1082*** (.8105)	3.9440*** (.7907)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	60.5628*** (22.7148)	57.0272** (22.2432)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	18.2884 ** (7.0734)	16.4240** (6.8683)
Total Number of Alliances	-.1974** (.0948)	-.1596* (.0919)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	. 3879*** (.1102)	.4100*** (.1105)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0491 (.1479)	-.0206 (.1440)
Major Power Status	1.7296* (.9832)	1.5016 (.9592)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	1.9157 (16.3404)	-.2197 (16.6385)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0010 (.0428)	.0080 (.0440)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0002 (.0005)	-.0002 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	.1861 (.3346)	.2830 (.3299)
Government Fractionalization	-2.3364*** (.8335)	-2.2869*** (.8313)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.2681 (.3672)	.3632 (.3703)

Table 5A. Continued. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 13	Model 14
District Magnitude	.0122 (.0100)	.0117 (.0101)
PR System	.0084 (.0177)	.0135 (.01809)
Mixed Member System	-.0953 (.4028)	-.2130 (.4094)
Presidential System	.5533 (.5768)	.5361 (.5711)
Latin America	-2.042 (1.3500)	-2.1164 (1.3508)
Postcommunist	24.4998 (170876.5)	-25.8457 (277278.6)
Africa	-28.1109 (422855.3)	-29.1630 (713848.1)
Asia	-1.3316 (1.6947)	-.8321 (1.7495)
OECD	-2.6362** (1.0437)	-2.4401** (1.0370)
Originator (t-1)	.4546 (.3710)	.2840 (3757)
Spline 1	1.2278* (.6460)	.8532* (.4870)
Spline 2	2.7063* (1.4029)	-1.8837* (1.1346)
Spline 3	9.6929* (5.0310)	6.7499 (4.3033)
Spline 4	-14.9186 (9.1534)	-9.6822 (8.5687)
Constant	-2441.575* (1280.487)	-1699.991* (965.1174)
Groups	47	47
Observations	530	533
Probability X^2	0.0000***	0.0000***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 6A. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (With Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 15	Model 16
Party Replacement (t-1)	.0689166	
Volatility (t-1)		.1471559
Interstate War (t-1)	.0752363	.0597175
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0035559	.0038074
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	.0187694	.0206112
Number of Fatal MIDS	.6290001	.5880411
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	2.157417	1.986978
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	.6514841	.5722569
Total Number of Alliances	-.0070353	-.005563
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.0138199	.0142887
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0017517	-.000718
Major Power Status	.1183107	.0922251
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	.0682445	-.007654
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.000037	.000281
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-8.63e-06	9.03e-06
Total Population	-.0000143	-.000014
Election Year	.0068923	.0104689
Government Fractionalization	-.0832322	-.079683
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.010098	.0136432
District Magnitude	.0004351	.0004079
PR System	.0003011	.0004738
Mixed Member System	-.0033609	-.007251
Presidential System	.020454	.0193812
Latin America	-.0637114	-.064346
Postcommunist	-.0777342	-.078788
Africa	-.0430963	-.042325

Table 6A. Continued. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict (With Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 15	Model 16
Asia	-.0313204	-.022148
OECD	-.1383495	-.119956
Originator State (t-1)	.018804	.0108542
Spline 1	.0437382	.0297305
Spline 2	-.0964079	-.065636
Spline 3	.3452893	.2351873
Spline 4	-.5314441	-.337356

In the baseline predicted probability the independent variables are set to their mean values in Models 1 and 2. The dependent variable is assumed to equal = 0 (no dispute initiated).

Table 7A. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the number of militarized interstate disputes a democracy is involved in, 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 17	Model 18
Party Replacement	.5874** (.2331)	
Volatility		.8777** (.4100)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	-5.1616 (4.9838)	-5.1025** (4.9724)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	3.2383*** (1.2083)	3.2026*** (1.2021)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0011 (.0168)	-.0006 (.0167)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1631*** (.0231)	.1626*** (.0231)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0116 (.0203)	-.0120 (.0202)
Major Power Status	.6844*** (.1698)	.6291*** (.1691)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	2.4868 (2.894)	2.3324 (2.8946)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0059 (.0079)	-.0066 (.0079)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0000 (.0001)	-9.530 (.0001)
Total Population	-.0001** (.0000)	-.0001** (.0000)
Election Year	-.0292 (.0737)	-.0257 (.0737)
Government Fractionalization	.0026** (.0010)	.0029*** (.0010)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-.0039*** (.0008)	-.0041*** (.0008)
District Magnitude	-.0005 (.0015)	-.0004 (.0014)
PR System	.0048 (.0033)	.0052 (.0034)
Mixed Member System	-.0532 (.0847)	-.0612 (.0848)

Table 7A. Continued. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the number of militarized interstate disputes a democracy is involved in, 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 17	Model 18
Presidential System	.0348	.0841
	(.1222)	(.1188)
Latin America	-.9853***	-.9803***
	(2740)	(.2741)
Postcommunist	-.1665	-.2268
	(.2177)	(.2249)
Africa	-.9032**	-.9188**
	(.4286)	(.4288)
Asia	.0152	.0768
	(.2456)	(.2409)
OECD	-.0506	-.0007
	(.1761)	(.1760)
Number of MID Disputes (t-1)	.1107**	.1111**
	(.0456)	(.0456)
Spline 1	.0894	.0935
	(.0787)	(.0762)
Spline 2	-.1153	-.1244
	(.1966)	(.1927)
Spline 3	-.0831	-.0520
	(.7846)	(.7755)
Spline 4	3.7884**	3.7827**
	(1.6944)	(1.6937)
Constant	-178.4531	-186.73
	(156.0295)	(151.146)
Groups	50	50
Observations	552	554
Probability X^2	0.0000***	0.0000***

 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 8A. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001 (with Mixed Member System and District Magnitude excluded)

Variables in Model	Model 19	Model 20
Party Replacement (t-1)	2.1338** (1.0161)	
Volatility (t-1)		3.4336* (1.9702)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.2858 (1.4320)	1.2308 (1.4243)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0176 (.0282)	-.0171 (.0266)
Number of MIDS (Use of Force) (t-1)	.02016 (.5400)	.1325 (.5066)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.7562*** (.5894)	1.7443*** (.5785)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	97.1598*** (24.0136)	93.6830*** (23.7611)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	11.8397* (6.7710)	10.5289 (6.7358)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0503 (.0849)	-.0304 (.0832)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.3203*** (.1040)	.3433*** (.1013)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0551 (.0868)	.0556 (.0841)
Major Power Status	1.8292** (.8720)	1.7199* (.8794)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-29.2227* (17.0454)	-29.1281* (17.0207)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0353 (.0345)	-.0362 (.0341)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0001 (.0005)	-.0001 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004* (.0002)	-.0005* (.0002)
Election Year	.1673 (.3260)	.1674 (.3229)
Government Fractionalization	-.9446 (.7782)	-.6497 (.8042)

Table 8A.   Continued. The Effect of Party Replacement and Electoral Volatility on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Conflict, 1975 – 2001 (with Mixed Member System and District Magnitude excluded)

Variables in Model	Model 19	Model 20
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.1376 (.3854)	.2465 (.3808)
PR System	.0543 (.0793)	.0558 (.0742)
Presidential System	-.2194 (.5898)	-.1762 (.5937)
Latin America	-4.0768** (1.6509)	-4.0370 ** (1.7087)
Postcommunist	-19.7801 (9401.537)	-23.1076 (41368.52)
Africa	-20.8203 (23537.74)	-24.0314 (106077.9)
Asia	-.9803 (1.8111)	-.8534 (1.8358)
OECD	-2.8624** (1.3959)	-2.7275* (1.4598)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.8353** (.4172)	.7132* (.4256)
Spline 1	1.4286** (.6226)	1.2618** (5846)
Spline 2	-3.7093** (1.3786)	-3.2997 ** (1.3179)
Spline 3	15.4279*** (5.0247)	13.9048*** (4.8677)
Spline 4	-31.5140*** (9.3421)	-28.6507*** (9.2119)
Constant	-2835.868** (1233.97)	-2505.682 ** (1158.631)
Groups	47	47
Observations	541	544
Probability X^2	.0004***	.0002***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 9A: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Dependent Variables		
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (Revisionist State Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Initiator and Target State (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey 1972);	Measure of whether a state initiates a dispute as indicated by the Revisionist State variable in the Correlates of War Dataset (0 = non originator, 1 = originator) when the hostility level of a conflict is coded 4 or 5 (4 = "use of force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (Originator Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Initiator and Target State (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey 1972);	Measure of whether a state initiates a dispute as indicated by the Originator variable in the Correlates of War Dataset (0 = non originator, 1 = originator) when the hostility level of a conflict is coded 4 or 5 (4 = "use of force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes a state is involved in	Correlates of War Dataset: Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset (v.3.10) (Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.	Count variable indicating the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes a state is involved in. The disputes included range in hostility level from 1 to 5 (1 = "No Militarized Action", 2 = "Threat to Use Force", 3 = "Display of Force", 4 = "Use of Force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Independent Variables		
Level of Party System Stability(PSI): Electoral Volatility and Party Replacement	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IDEA 2008), University of Essex (2008), African Elections Database (2008), Political Database of the Americas (2008)	Electoral volatility is measured as the absolute change in vote shares received among those parties that have participated in consecutive elections. The summed change is then divided by the total vote share accumulated by those same parties in consecutive elections. Party Replacement measures the total percentage of votes won by new parties.

Table 9A. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Interstate Control Variables		
The Number of Contiguous Democracies/Autocracies	The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Dataset, Version 3/Polity IV Dataset	Democracies and Autocracies were defined based on the polity2 scores for each state taken from the Polity IV dataset. States with score below 6 were considered autocratic. Score above 6 were considered autocratic. States were considered contiguous if they were coded as being contiguous based on the Contiguity Type Relationship (1-5) within the COW, Contiguity Dataset (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset).
Total Number of Allies	The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set	Count variable indicating the total number of alliances for each democracy for each year (Gibler, Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816 – 2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2): 211 – 222.
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	The tau S correlation is determined by the alliance relationship between the state in question and the system leader (Britain until 1945, and the US following 1945) based on the S correlation calculation. "The S correlation calculation performed by EUGene is based on the calculation used by Signorino and Ritter (1999). Like the Kendall tau-b, S evaluates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. Unlike tau-b, S also takes into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation. For example, the fact that a state has identical alliances with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states is accounted for in the S calculation, but not in tau-b. Signorino and Ritter note that while tau-b is an excellent measure of rank order similarity, it has inherent flaws

Table 9A. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	that allow a variety of alliance portfolio tables to have identical tau-b results which impact studies looking beyond rank order similarity" (Bennett and Stam, 2007, p. 16).
Interstate War	Correlates of War Interstate War Participants Dataset (version 3.0)	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a democracy is involved in an interstate war for a given year (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace* Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).
Interstate War Deaths	Correlates of War Interstate War Participants Dataset (version 3.0)	Number of Deaths attributed to an interstate war a democracy is involved in (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace* Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).
Number of MIDS (Use of Force)	Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (version 3.10)	Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes a democracy is involved in for a given year (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133 – 154).
Number of Fatal MIDS	Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (version 3.10)	Number of Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes a democracy is involved in for a given year (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133 – 154).
Relative Power (CINC)	Correlates of War Project – National Material Capabilities Dataset (version 4.0)	The CINC Score is generated by calculating the state's proportion of total system capabilities in 6 areas. The six components of the measure are: iron and steel production (thousands of

Table 9A. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Relative Power (CINC)	Correlates of War Project – National Material Capabilities Dataset (version 4.0)	tons), military expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents), total population (thousands) and urban population (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48).
Change in Concentration of Power in the Interstate System (*syscon*)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	The *syscon* variable within the Correlates of War Dataset measures the concentration of relative power among the major powers in the interstate system. Values closer to 0 indicate that relative power is more disperse among the major power states in the interstate system (e.g., multipolar systems). Values closer to 1 indicate a single state or two states possess a greater distribution of power in the interstate system compared with the remaining states (e.g., bipolar or unipolar systems) (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project).
Major Power Status of State (*Major Power*)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	Major Powers were generated using the Eugene software generator (Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. "Eugene: A Conceptual Manual." International Interactions 26: 179 – 204) in which the (Singer and Small 1966) coding scheme was utilized from the Correlates of War Dataset (Correlates of War Project. 2005. "State System Membership List, v2004.1."). The theoretical concept behind the coding scheme for major powers was developed by Small and Singer (1980). A more detailed description of the coding scheme can be obtained at : http://correlatesofwar.org

Table 9A. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Additional Controls		
Electoral Systems (Proportional Representation System and Single Member and Mixed Systems)	Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	The coding for the PR_System measure is as follows: 0=states that use a plurality or Single Member District (SMD) system, 1=states that use proportional representation systems. The coding for Mixed Electoral System is: 0= states that use either PR or SMD/plurality systems, 1=states that use a mixed system.
District Magnitude	Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	Number of representatives per electoral district
Democratic System (Presidential, non-presidential)	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004).	The system measure is a dummy variable where 1=presidential states and 0=any non-direct presidential system
Executive Control of all Relevant Houses	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004).	Does the party of the executive have an absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers? The case of an appointed Senate is considered as controlled by the executive.
Government Fractionalization	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)	The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties.
Election Year	Database of Political Institutions (Keffer et al 2004)	Is there is an executive election for a given year of observation.
GDP Growth	World Bank (WDI, 2008)	Annual Gross Domestic Product growth in Current US Dollars.

CHAPTER III: ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? CANDIDATE-CENTERED SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT INITIATION WITHIN DEMOCRACIES

ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? CANDIDATE-CENTERED SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT INITIATION WITHIN DEMOCRACIES

Abstract

IR scholars have recently begun to examine how political institutions impact a state's decision to initiate conflict. One school of thought, led by Leblang and Chan (2003), has found that certain electoral system characteristics (i.e., proportional representation systems) are associated with more pacifist behavior because PR systems often produce a greater number of actors that are involved in the policymaking process that leads to consensus building and more risk averse foreign policies. However, this finding may overlook other important electoral considerations. Specifically, I contend that politicians are more accountable individually in certain electoral systems than in others, thus impacting a state's decision to initiate conflict. Specifically, I argue that candidate-centered electoral systems lead elected leaders to develop more pacific foreign policies. I test my argument using a time-series cross-sectional analysis on 50 democracies from 1975-2001. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that candidate-centered electoral systems result in less conflict initiation than party-centric systems due to higher levels of individual accountability for democratic leaders.

Introduction

From 1980 to 2001, Ecuador initiated seven militarized interstate disputes with other states, and six of the disputes involved the use of military force.[144] Chile, in contrast, initiated zero interstate disputes during this time period.[145] Thus, the foreign policies that Chile adopted were more conservative compared to the foreign policies that Ecuador advanced, and where democratic leaders in Chile were responsible to voters, elected leaders in Ecuador were primarily accountable to political party leaders and elites.[146] "Conaghan described the Ecuadorian system

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[144] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

[145] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

[146] Chile transitioned to a fully democratic government in 1989 and instituted a mixed-member electoral system where parties presented voters with candidate lists in two-member districts, and voters selected one candidate among the party lists, and the votes were then transferred to the respective party. Each of the two parties that accrued the greatest number of votes won an elected seat. In the case that one party received twice the votes of the next closest party – that party won both seats. Therefore, Chilean voters cast a single vote for individual candidates, and while political parties presented voters with party ballots, voters could disturb the party lists. Ecuador's electoral system for the majority of the 1980 – 2001 period was a proportional representation system with closed and blocked party lists. Thus, party leaders in Ecuador presented a closed and fixed ballot to voters, and voters cast their votes for single parties rather than for individual candidates. In 1988, Ecuador altered its electoral system. The new electoral system for the 1998 election was a multimember, plurality system. Ecuador changed its electoral system again in 2002. The electoral system that was adopted for the 2002 election was a proportional representation

as one of "floating politicians and floating voters" to illustrate the loose connection between voters, politicians and political parties… ." (Araujo, et al., 2004, 27). In describing the electoral system in Chile, Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007) state: "On the other hand, in two-member districts and – in the Chilean case – when citizens vote for individuals rather than party lists, the link between electors and representatives can be close" (51). Therefore, to understand why states such as Ecuador and Chile advanced significantly different foreign policies, we need to understand how each state's electoral system influenced the manner by which elected leaders were accountable to voters. Thus, the question I address in this chapter is how do candidate-centric electoral systems affect accountability for elected leaders and the initiation of interstate conflicts?

Electoral systems play a critical role in determining the degree elected leaders are accountable to the public. The design of electoral systems dictates the methods politicians must adopt to be elected and maintain public office. Furthermore, electoral systems influence how democratic leaders represent their constituents as well as the domestic and foreign policies they are likely to pursue. As Leblang and Chan (2003) state: "Among all the factors considered, the nature of the electoral system has had the most consistent and pronounced effect on war involvement by the established democracies" (Leblang and Chan, 2003, 397). However, while electoral systems are important factors that influence public accountability and the policies democratic leaders pursue, previous studies have predominantly considered the effect Proportional Representation (PR) and Single Member District (SMD) systems have on foreign policy formation rather than examining other crucial elements related to electoral system design.

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system with open lists and voters could cast votes for specific candidates among different party lists (Payne, Zovatto and Diaz 2007).

I argue that the critical elements of electoral systems that influence the degree that democratic representatives are accountable to the public are not whether electoral systems use Proportional Representation (PR), or have Single Member Districts (SMD) or Mixed Member Districts (MMD), but rather, the extent that electoral systems promote candidate-centered electoral strategies. I argue that in electoral systems that promote personalistic incentives democratic leaders are more accountable to the public directly, and democracies are less likely to initiate conflicts with other states because elected leaders have a greater likelihood of being punished *individually* for advancing risky foreign policies.

Electoral systems that promote candidate-centered electoral incentives entail higher levels of *individual* accountability for democratic leaders than party-centered centered systems because in candidate-centered systems politicians are more responsible to voters *individually* for specific policy decisions rather than to their parties as a whole. As Persson and Tabellini (2008) write, "Politicians have stronger direct incentives to please the voters if they are held accountable individually, rather than collectively" (6). Thus, in democracies with electoral systems that promote candidate-centered incentives, individual politicians are held responsible to a larger degree in upcoming elections for unpopular policy decisions, including prolonged or costly military engagements, because the selectorates of democratic leaders are comprised more of voters rather than party elites: "…individual accountability under plurality rule strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters and is conducive to good behavior" (Persson and Tabellini 2008, 7). Thus, I argue that democratic leaders are less likely to initiate interstate disputes in candidate-centered electoral systems because of higher levels of individual accountability embedded in candidate-centered systems and due to increased concerns democratic leaders have regarding their electoral futures.

My theoretical argument is that democratic leaders that initiate aggressive foreign policies- involving the use of military force- embark on a risky political enterprise. Furthermore, if a military conflict becomes prolonged, costly or unpopular - democratic leaders have to answer to voters for their policy decisions during the next election cycle, and there is a greater likelihood that elected leaders will be removed from office following risky or unpopular foreign policies. That is, as democratic leaders are more accountable to the public themselves, rather than to their parties, the political hazard for involving their states in interstate conflicts increases because the public has more effective means of punishing specific democratic leaders for unpopular foreign policies. Thus, the rational incentives democratic leaders have to involve their states in conflict varies based on the degree democratic leaders are *individually* accountable to the public.

The layout of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. I begin by elaborating on my theoretical argument regarding political accountability and candidate-centered electoral systems. I contend that while elected leaders are accountable in both party-centric and candidate-centric electoral systems, democratic leaders are more individually accountable to voters in candidate-centered electoral systems because voters have more direct influence over the election of politicians in these systems. Next, I discuss the relationship between public accountability and conflict initiation within democracies. I argue that the public plays a key role in affecting the foreign policies that democratic leaders pursue. I contend that as democratic leaders are more directly accountable to the public they advance more conservative foreign policies because the public is *less* supportive of interstate conflicts- in the aggregate- compared with democratic leaders. Next, I examine the effect candidate-centered electoral systems have on public accountability and conflict initiation. Here, I argue that candidate-centered electoral systems create higher levels of public accountability for democratic leaders and lead to more conservative

foreign policies by democracies because elected leaders are more accountable *individually* in candidate-centered systems. I then briefly examine the cases of Ecuador and Chile while considering each state's electoral system and the foreign policies they pursued from 1980 – 2001. Next, I present my research design, methods and empirical results. Finally, I offer a brief discussion regarding the effect candidate- centered electoral systems have on political accountability and the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.

Vertical Accountability: Politicians and Parties

In this section I briefly detail the logic of my argument pertaining to the forms of political accountability found within candidate-centric and party-centric electoral systems. I contend that while elected leaders are accountable in candidate-centered and party-centered electoral systems, democratic leaders in candidate-centric systems are more accountable *individually,* which significantly influences the types of foreign policies they pursue.

Political scientists generally focus on two types of accountability when evaluating the composition and performance of democratic governments. The first type of accountability is referred to as vertical accountability. Vertical accountability considers the ability of citizens to reward or punish elected leaders through elections thereby inducing electoral accountability through citizen oversight.[147] Horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of state agencies to monitor and possibly sanction government officials for illegal or inappropriate behavior.[148] This analysis focuses on the ability of voters to hold their elected leaders responsible for policy decisions through elections. Thus, I am primarily concerned with how electoral systems affect vertical accountability within democracies.

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[147] Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)
[148] Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)

My theoretical argument is that electoral systems that promote personalistic incentives for democratic leaders lead to higher levels of vertical accountability for *individually* elected representatives thereby causing leaders to pursue more conservative foreign policies. However, I do not contend that democratic leaders in party-centric systems are not accountable. Rather, I contend that democratic leaders in candidate and party- centered systems are accountable in different ways based on the design of the electoral institutions within their states. Elected leaders in party-centered systems are accountable to party leaders and elites to a larger extent rather than voters because party leaders control the access and placement of candidates on party lists in most party -centric systems.[149] Thus, elected leaders are more beholden to party leaders and elites in these system because party leaders and elites significantly influence their electoral fate.[150] In contrast, in preferential systems, where voters have more discretion in nominating and choosing individual candidates, elected leaders are more accountable to voters because voters have more influence over the electoral fortunes of democratic leaders than in party-centric systems.[151] In simple terms, in party-centric systems, individual candidates can more easily hide within the cloaks of their political parties and avoid the wrath of voters compared with candidate-centered systems in which specific candidates must individually answer to the electorate for their policy choices. Subsequently, elected leaders should be more cautious in pursuing risky policies including the initiation of interstate conflicts involving the use of force as they are more directly accountable to voters.

Accountability and Conflict Initiation

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[149] Hix (2004); Mitchell (2000); Carey (2003); Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)
[150] Hix (2004); Mitchell (2000); Carey (2003); Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)
[151] Bowler and Farrell (1993); Farrell and Scully (2003); Farrell and McAllister (2004); Hix (2004); Paybe, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)

In this section, I briefly review the literature regarding public accountability and conflict initiation within democracies, and I argue that elected leaders have a greater likelihood of being punished politically for involving their states in unpopular or risky interstate conflicts as they are more accountable to voters. While some scholars contend that state leaders can benefit from interstate conflicts,[152] a large number of studies support the argument that interstate conflicts can negatively affect the political fortunes of democratic leaders,[153] especially in the event that an interstate conflict becomes costly or protracted.[154] Thus, although leaders may occasionally obtain temporary political benefits from interstate conflicts, in the aggregate, interstate conflict is a risky political gamble for democratic leaders. Thus, democratic leaders should be cautious in the conflicts they choose to select their states into less they suffer politically. Furthermore, as the public can more readily punish democratic leaders for ill-advised, costly or unpopular policies - democratic leaders should be increasingly conservative in the foreign policies they develop.

There are two primary reasons that democracies are more conservative in their foreign polices as democratic leaders are more accountable to the public. First, the public should be *less* supportive of interstate conflicts compared with state leaders in the aggregate.[155] While the public may support conflicts in their early stages, as is present in rally around the flag effects, the public has to often undertake more of the burdens of interstate conflict compared with state leaders which includes possible conscription and higher taxation to pay for war efforts.[156] Thus, democratic leaders should be more conservative in the foreign policies they advance as they are more accountable to the public that is less disposed towards conflict in general. The second reason democratic leaders that are more accountable to the public develop less aggressive foreign

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[152] Lee (1977); MacKuen (1983); Norpoth (1987).
[153] Mueller (1973); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995).
[154] Mueller (1973); Gartner and Segura (1998); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995).
[155] Reiter and Tillman (2002)
[156] Reiter and Tillman (2002)

policy strategies is because there is a greater likelihood they will be punished by voters for pursuing risky or unpopular foreign policies than in less accountable systems where political parties and not individual leaders shoulder more of the blame.[157]

A number of studies within international relations support the claim that democracies are more risk averse as democratic leaders are more accountable to the citizenry.[158] Gaubatz (1991) finds that democratic states are more likely to be involved in wars immediately following an election because voters have less influence over the executive during this time. In contrast, democracies are less likely to be engaged in wars in the time periods closely preceding an election because the executive is more accountable to voters during this period. Similarly, Reiter and Tillman (2002) contend that democracies are more conservative in their foreign policies as a larger percentage of democratic state's population votes. Thus, higher levels of political participation increase the degree elected leaders are accountable to the public thereby prompting democratic leaders to pursue more conservative foreign policies as evinced by a decreased likelihood of dispute initiation. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) and Bueno de Mesquita, Smith and Siverson (2003) contend that the size of leaders' selectorates and winning coalitions affect levels of accountability for state leaders as well as the foreign policies they adopt. They argue that democracies with larger selectorates and winning coalitions have higher levels of accountability for democratic leaders that leads to more conservative foreign policies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson 2003). Thus, based on a review of the literature on public accountability and conflict initiation, democratic leaders should be less likely to initiate interstate disputes as the public has more direct means to hold democratic leaders accountable for risky foreign policies.

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[157] Gaubatz (1991); Reiter and Tillman (2002)

[158] Gaubatz (1991); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999); Reiter and Tillman (2002); Bueno de Mesquita, Smith and Siverson (2003);

Candidate-Centered Electoral Systems and Conflict Initiation

Electoral systems are a critical component in shaping how elected leaders are held

accountable politically because they structure the strategies politicians must adopt in order to

acquire and maintain political office. As Persson and Tabellini (2008, 3) remark: "Electoral

systems decide how well voters can hold politicians accountable and which groups in society are

more likely to see their interests represented." And as Mitchell (2000, 337) contends:

"…different electoral institutions may provide voters with different means to attempt to control

their representatives." In a seminal work, Leblang and Chan (2003) investigate a wide array of

institutional and political factors and their association with the conflict propensity of

democracies. These factors include - the effect of presidential versus parliamentary systems,

district magnitude, majoritarian versus coalition governments, and phases of the electoral cycle

on the likelihood of conflict within established democracies. They find that the most influential

factor in determining the likelihood of conflict within democracies is a state's electoral system.

They argue that states with Proportional Representation systems have fewer incidences of

conflict because of the need for a greater number of veto players (that is often found in PR

systems) to form more moderate positions through consensus building.

Investigating whether an electoral system is a Proportional Representation or Single

Member district and the subsequent effect these systems have on conflict outcomes offers a

valuable contribution to the study of domestic institutions and conflict within democracies.

However, there are more nuanced aspects of electoral systems that warrant additional scholarly

attention. Specifically, additional electoral factors structure the mechanisms by which elected

leaders are held accountable to the public, and neglecting these elements hinders our

understanding of the manner by which variations in domestic institutions affect levels of

accountability for elected representatives. In fact, Grofman (2005, 736) addresses the notion of

the false dichotomy many scholars rely on in regards to assessing the political effects of electoral

systems based primarily on the distinction between Proportional Representation and Majoritarian

systems:

> However, recently, some authors (see especially Reed, 1994; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Grofman, 1999a, b; cf. Bogdanor, 1985:11; Lancaster, 1986) have argued that too much emphasis has been placed on PR systems versus majoritarian/plurality systems as the principal cleavage line of electoral system choice, and asserted that there are other distinctions that are, arguably, at least as important. One such continuum along which to distinguish electoral systems is in terms of the extent to which there are incentives for localistic/parochial behavior on the part of legislators elected under a particular method. Carey and Shugart (1995) offer an insightful discussion of how to classify electoral systems according to this criterion. They propose a continuum of electoral systems in terms of the incentives that each provides to "cultivate a personal vote.

Therefore, rather than rely on the difference between Proportional Representation and

Majoritarian systems, I dig deeper in the institutional process that guides politician's decision

calculus. I argue that the incentives politicians have to cultivate candidate versus party-centered

electoral strategies have direct effects on political accountability and government policies, and

scholars should consider factors related to personal vote seeking when examining electoral

systems and the subsequent policies democratic leader pursue as a result of the incentives

embedded in their electoral systems.

Three electoral factors that influence political accountability and the incentives political

candidates have to cultivate personal or party centered strategies are ballot structure, degree of

vote pooling and level of preferential voting.[159] In speaking of the importance of the design of

electoral ballots and voter choice, Farrell and McAllister (2004) state: "But there is a third

feature of electoral systems, ballot structure, and while its effects on proportionality are

negligible (Lijphart 1994), there is no disputing that it has an effect both on voters, in the sense

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[159] Carey and Shugart (1995); Johnson and Wallack (2008)

of determining the nature and extent of choice available to them on polling day, and on politicians, who are cognizant of the effect on voters and react accordingly" (2004, 2). A wealth of literature supports the notion that the design of electoral ballots directly affects candidate behavior based on the level of discretion afforded to voters.[160] "There can be little doubt that this feature of voter choice [characteristics of ballot structure] has important implications for how voters cast their ballot (not least on the degree of effort those bothering to vote are required to make in the polling station), how parties and candidates campaign, and how politicians represent their voters" (Farrell and McAllister, 2004, 3).

As voters have more discretion in choosing political candidates based on ballot design,[161] vote pooling[162] and preferential voting[163] - candidates pursue more personal vote seeking strategies.[164] In conducing individual surveys with politicians, scholars have found that electoral systems with higher levels of preferential voting create personal vote seeking strategies by politicians and produce a candidate centered approach to politics that includes the establishment of stronger candidate-electorate linkages than is found in electoral systems with less preferential voting.[165] As Hix (2004, 196) writes, "In systems in which votes cast for individual candidates – as opposed to votes cast for a party list – significantly influence each candidate's electoral fortunes, legislatures seeking reelection have strategic incentives to cultivate personal support among the electorate. By contrast, in systems in which voters cannot exercise preferences for individual candidates, legislators' reelection prospects depend on the general level of support for

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[160] Katz (1980); Bowler (1986); Cox (1990); Bowler and Farrell (1993); Ames (1995); Carey and Shugart (1995); Shugart (2001)

[161] In this context ballot design refers to the degree party leaders control party lists.

[162] Vote pooling pertains to whether votes for candidates are pooled across the whole party; votes for candidates are pooled at the sub party level; or votes for candidates are not pooled.

[163] Preferential voting indicates if votes are cast for a single party, multiple candidates, or individual candidates.

[164] Carey and Shugart (1995); Johnson and Wallack (2008)

[165] Bowler and Farrell (1993); Farrell and Scully (2003)

the policies and personalities of their party leadership." Therefore, in electoral systems in which voters choose between individual candidates, politicians have greater incentives to pursue personal votes and closer ties with the electorate due to the ability of voters to directly elect or remove candidates from office.

As mentioned, the structure of ballots and the manner by which voters choose their political representatives has direct consequences for levels of political accountability and the behavior of candidates. Political accountability, as Persson and Tabellini (2008, 6) define it: "gives voters some control over politicians who abuse their power: voters can punish or reward politicians through re-election or other career concerns, and this creates incentives for good behavior." In systems that promote candidate centered strategies, there are higher levels of accountability for individual politicians because representatives are directly responsible to their constituents. Farrell and McAllister (2004, 4) remark: "voters in candidate-centered systems might feel a greater sense of 'ownership' over the electoral process due to their determination of the fate of individual candidates." One of the reasons candidate-centered systems engineer greater individual accountability for politicians is a result of the selectorates present within personalistic systems. As Mitchell (2000, 339) remarks: "Who selects the candidates – voters, ordinary party members in primaries, constituency level party elite's or the national executive – in combination with the district magnitude, largely determine where an aspirant should direct her energies in order to secure party selection."

Scholars have conceptualized the relationship between constituents and legislators as being similar to a principal-agent dynamic[166] where voters serve as principals directing the behavior of agents (representatives). A potential problem in a principal-agent relationship is that the agent may pursue their own ambitions to the detriment of the principal, which is referred to

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[166] Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991); Mitchell (2000)

as agency loss.[167] Agency losses can occur for a number of reasons. Two reasons agents may

fail to adequately represent the interests of the principals is due to information asymmetry and

the inability of principals to monitor and control the behavior of the agents.[168] That is, agents

may be able to shirk their duties and pursue their own ambitions if principals are unable to

effectively monitor their performance.[169] In order for agency losses to be minimized or

eliminated, rational incentives need to be embedded into the contract between the agent and

principal in order to encourage responsible behavior on the part of the agent.[170] As Mitchell

(2000, 338) remarks: "Given the necessity of relying on agents (and assuming that agents have

their own desires and are not saints or automatons) the best type of contract for the principal is

one whose incentive structure renders it advantageous for the agent to pursue the principal's

goals." Thus, agency losses are affected by the incentive structures embedded in the principal-

agent contract. As electoral systems promote candidate-centered strategies for politicians there

are greater incentives for candidates to represent their constituents based on the aggregate

preferences of their constituency. More specifically, candidates are less likely to shirk their

duties, and should attempt to appease voters in their constituencies to a larger degree than in non-

candidate centered systems due to the electoral incentives for re-election that are embedded in

personalistic systems. These incentives stem from the selectorates in candidate centered systems

that are the voters that comprise a candidate's constituency. If a candidate fails to accurately

represent the views or their constituents they will be removed from office directly by voters,

which have more control over the direct election of individual candidates than in non-candidate

centered systems. In non-candidate centered systems, party leaders and elites comprise a greater

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[167] Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991)
[168] Mitchell (2000)
[169] Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991); Mitchell (2000)
[170] Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991); Mitchell (2000)

portion of a candidate's selectorates – thus making politicians more accountable to the party elite rather than their constituents. "For example in a non-preferential list system of large magnitude in which regional party elite's select the candidates, we would expect potential candidates to concentrate their efforts on these elites rather than on individual voters" (Mitchell, 2000, 339).

In summary, levels of public accountability for individual representatives are greater as candidates have more incentives to appeal to voters in personalistic systems Candidates, having a larger portion of their electoral fortunes vested in the voters within their constituency, are more directly accountable to the voters than in non-candidate centered systems. "Clearly, there are strong incentives in these candidate-oriented systems to cultivate a personal vote, so that the accountability of MPs to voters should be high" (Mitchell, 2000, 342). Conversely, public accountability for individual politicians is lower where voters have less control over candidate selection. "The accountability of MPs in closed-list systems (at least) directly to voters is low since they can be protected from the electorate's wrath by a high list position" (Mitchell, 2000, 341).

As democratic leaders are more directly accountable to the public, as is the case in democracies with candidate-centered electoral systems, democracies should be more conservative in their foreign policies. Referring to Kant's (1795) arguments, the citizens of a democratic polity should be less supportive of war compared with state leaders since the public has to shoulder more of the burdens of interstate conflict.[171] Thus, as the public is able hold elected leaders accountable individually to a greater extent, democracies will be more pacific because the public should be less disposed towards war in the aggregate. Therefore, elected leaders in democracies with candidate- centered electoral systems are more directly accountable to voters than in non-candidate centered systems, which should encourage democratic leaders to

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[171] Kant (1957) [1795]

be hesitant to pursue risky foreign policy adventures for fear of electoral punishment. Thus, based on the previous discussion, my hypothesis related to candidate-centered electoral systems and conflict initiation is the following:

Hypothesis 1: Democracies will be less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force) as their electoral systems promote personalistic incentives (as measured by the personal vote index) to a greater degree.

Furthermore, two components that comprise the personal vote index (PVI) that are related to the extent that an electoral system is candidate or party-centered are the degree of preferential voting and ballot control.[172] Preferential voting and ballot control should have independent effects on the likelihood of conflict initiation because each factor influences the extent that an electoral system promotes personal vote seeking. Furthermore, the degree to which voters can select individual candidates rather than parties affects whether an electoral system is candidate or party-centric. Therefore, levels of individual accountability for elected leaders should be greater as voters have more discretion to select specific candidate rather than political parties, and democratic leaders in these systems should be less likely to pursue risky foreign policies. Thus, my hypothesis related to preferential voting and conflict initiation is:

Hypothesis 2: As electors have greater ability to select individual candidates (as indicated by higher scores on the preferential vote measure), democracies will be less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force).

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[172] Vote pooling is another component of the PVI. However, by itself, vote pooling does not provide an accurate indication regarding the extent that an electoral system is candidate or party-centered compared with the preferential *vote* and *ballot* control measures. Meaning, while the degree that votes are pooled across parties is related to the degree that an electoral system is candidate or party centered – vote pooling is not a sufficient indicator of personalistic electoral systems as an independent measure because even if votes are not pooled an electoral system can be party-centric if party lists are closed and electors cast votes for parties rather than candidates. Subsequently, it should not have an independent effect on the likelihood of dispute initiation.

In addition, as party leaders have less control over the placement of candidates on party ballots, voters will have more discretion in electing individual candidates leading to more personalistic incentives for elected leaders and higher levels of individual accountability. In these systems, democratic leaders should pursue more conservative foreign policies. Thus, my hypothesis related to ballot control and conflict initiation is:

Hypothesis 3: As party leaders have less control over the placement of candidates on party ballots (as indicated by higher scores on the ballot measure), democracies will be less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force).

Research Design

The dataset is comprised of 50 democracies from Africa, Asia, the OECD, East Europe, and Latin America. The countries included have a score of "6" or higher on the Polity2 measure found in the Polity IV database and a list of the countries and years used in the study can be found in the appendix in Table 20B. Sufficient or accurate data are not available for all democracies. Therefore, some democratic states are excluded from the analysis. The data collected span from 1975 – 2001.

I employ a monadic approach in the present analysis for three reasons. First, my theoretical argument is that the degree that electoral systems are candidate-centered within democracies is causal in affecting the likelihood that democracies will initiate militarized disputes with other states. While state specific information related to the alternate state in a conflict dyad is relevant, the primary focus in this analysis is on the domestic, political conditions within the democratic states being examined. Second, conflict is a rare event, and a dyadic analysis would include numerous observations of politically irrelevant dyads that provide

a problem concerning model fit.[173] Furthermore, incorporating only politically relevant dyads

may neglect a large number of conflict observations between non-politically relevant dyads.[174]

Thus, a monadic design offers the most useful approach in modeling the effect candidate-

centered systems have on the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies due to

theoretical and methodological concerns.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Initiation

The primary dependent variable in this analysis is the *revisionist state* variable taken

from the Correlates of War Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004), which is a dichotomous

measure that indicates whether a state initiates a militarized dispute for a given year. States that

initiate a conflict are coded 1 and non-initiators are coded 0. The disputes included are ones that

are coded as having a use of military force (hostility level 4 "Use of Force", or 5 "War") in the

Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). The *revisionist state*

variable is considered to be superior to the *originator variable* found in the Correlates of War

Dataset because the originator variable simply captures whether a state is the first mover in a

dispute, and the *revisionist* variable includes additional information regarding which state is

responsible for escalating tensions prior to a dispute.[175]   As Souva and Prins (2006, 191) remark:

"We believe the MID "revisionist" variable is a better measure of initiation. The coders of the

MID dataset based this "indicator of what constitutes a revisionist state on the prevailing status

quo of the issues in dispute prior to the onset of any militarized action and recorded as revisionist

the state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante."[176]

Electoral Incentives: Candidate versus Party-Centered Systems

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[173] Ward, Siverson and Cao (2007); Williams (2008)
[174] Lemke and Reed (2001); Williams (2008)
[175] Souva and Prins (2006).
[176] Souva and Prins (2006).

I use the Personal Vote Index (PVI) taken from the Johnson and Wallack (2008) dataset that measures whether an electoral system is a candidate or party-centered system. Each factor, (ballot control, preferential voting and vote pooling) is coded from zero to two then combined to form an overall index ranging from zero to six. The PVI is based on the Carey and Shugart (1995) index that is constructed according to the determinants of candidate or party-centered electoral systems that are outlined in Carey and Shugart (1995). Figure 1B displays the components of the Personal Vote Index. Higher personal vote scores indicate systems where candidates have greater incentives to pursue candidate-centered strategies for election. As the PVI increases, democracies should be less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes involving the use of force as a result of higher levels of accountability for individual political candidates.

Figure 1B: Personal Vote Index

Variable	Value	Electoral Rule
Ballot	0	Party leaders present a fixed ballot.
	1	Party leaders present party ballots, but voters may disturb list.
	2	Party leaders do not control access to ballots or rank.
Pool	0	Votes for candidates pooled across the whole party.
	1	Votes for candidates are pooled at the sub party level.
	2	Votes for candidates are not pooled.
Vote	0	Voters cast votes for a single party.
	1	Voters cast votes for multiple candidates.
	2	Voters cast a single vote below the party level.

Source: Carey and Shugart (1995); Johnson and Wallack (2008).

Control Variables

I also include a number of control variables in order to capture the nature of the interstate environment of the democratic states being examined.[177] A more detailed description of the variables included in this analysis can be found in the chapter appendix in Table 19B. One of the factors that can affect the likelihood of interstate conflict is the number of democratic and autocratic states that are contiguous to a given state. That is, some literature suggests that states that are surrounded by autocratic states are more likely to increase their military expenditures and there is a greater probability of interstate conflict as states share borders with autocratic states.[178] This literature argues that autocratic states are generally viewed by other states as being more aggressive than democratic states, thus prompting an arms buildup in the region and an enhanced probability of conflict. Thus, I include the *number of contiguous democracies*[179], and the *number of contiguous autocracies*[180] in the analysis.

Many researchers argue that alliances are also important factors affecting the likelihood of conflict initiation.[181] There is debate within the literature regarding whether alliances increase the likelihood of interstate conflict,[182] or decrease the likelihood of conflict,[183] and some scholars contend that alliances both increase and decrease the probability of conflict.[184] Additional research suggests that the effect of alliances on conflict is dependent on factors such as polarity,[185] territory and the distribution of capabilities in the interstate system. Thus, I control

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[177] Williams (2008)
[178] Goldsmith (2003); Lektzian and Prins (2008)
[179] (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset)
[180] (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset)
[181] Bueno de Mesquita & Singer 1973; Geller & Singer 1998; Sprecher and Krause 2006
[182] Levy 1981; Vasquez 1993
[183] Gelpi 1999; Vasquez & Elman 2003
[184] Smith 1995
[185] Singer & Small (1968); Bueno de Mesquita (1978); Wayman (1984)

for alliances by measuring the *total number of alliances*[186] of each democracy, and the *similarity of alliance portfolio* each democracy has with the system leader.[187]

Many scholars also consider power to be central to the study of conflict.[188] Some researchers contend that as states acquire more power they have a greater likelihood of initiating conflict with other states.[189] Thus, I include several measures in attempting to capture the concept of state power. One indicator that is frequently used to measure the power of a state is the Composite Index of National Capabilities (*CINC*).[190] The *CINC* score provides information pertaining to the amount of capabilities each state in the interstate system has relative to every other state. As a state's *CINC* score increases, this indicates that a given state possesses more relative power compared with every other state in the global system. Therefore, while I am not conducting a dyadic analysis, utilizing the *CINC* score is appropriate for a monadic study because the increase or decrease in the *CINC* score provides information regarding the level of capabilities of each state from year to year relative to the capabilities present in the entire global system. In addition, I include a number of additional measures to gauge the level of state power in order to provide for robustness. One measure is a*nnual percentage gross domestic product*

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[186] Gibler, Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816 – 2000." Journal of Peace Research 41(2): 211 – 222.

[187] To capture the nature of alliances with the system leader I use the tau- s alliance variable. The tau S correlation is determined by the alliance relationship between the state in question and the system leader (Britain until 1945, and the US following 1945) based on the S correlation calculation. "The S correlation calculation performed by EUGene is based on the calculation used by Signorino and Ritter (1999). Like the Kendall tau-b, S evaluates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. Unlike tau-b, S also takes into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation. For example, the fact that a state has identical alliances with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states is accounted for in the S calculation, but not in tau-b. Signorino and Ritter note that while tau-b is an excellent measure of rank order similarity, it has inherent flaws that allow a variety of alliance portfolio tables to have identical tau-b results which impact studies looking beyond rank order similarity" (Bennett and Stam, 2007, p. 16).

[188] (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 2001; Palmer and Morgan 2006)

[189] Palmer and Morgan (2006)

[190] (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project)

growth. Some scholars contend that GDP is an adequate proxy measure of state capacity.[191]

Furthermore, as a state increases or decreases in GDP, this indicates the potential level of change

in state capacity and state power for a given year. In addition, many scholars contend that the

domestic economic environment and the level of economic growth within democracies influence

the likelihood of conflict onset.[192] Thus, I include *annual percentage GDP growth*[193] in order to

provide an indicator of the economic conditions within democratic states. The *annual*

percentage GDP growth measure is lagged one period in order to capture the delayed impact

changing economic conditions may have on the probability of dispute onset. I also include *total*

population[194] and *military spending*[195] as measures of state strength. Examining a state's total

population[196] reveals information regarding the potential size of its standing army. That is, states

with larger total populations can provide for larger standing armies in times of war, given that

they have adequate resources to convert eligible segments of the general population into the

military. Furthermore, states that spend larger amounts on the military will have greater military

capabilities. In addition, as levels of military spending increase, states may be readying

themselves for a potential conflict. Thus, including the additional measures of a*nnual*

percentage GDP growth, *total population* and *military spending* are important for the

examination of conflict initiation. In addition, some scholars argue that states that are major

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[191] Fearon and Laitin(2003)

[192] Oneal and Tir (2006)

[193] World Development Indicators (2008)

[194] World Development Indicators (2008)

[195] World Development Indicators (2008)

[196] While a measure of total population is included in the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score, I believe it is important to include a separate measure of total population that is separate from the CINC score in order to fully account for the effect larger populations may have on overall state capacity and state power. Furthermore, the total population measure is taken from a separate data source, which provides for an additional robustness check.

powers are more likely to be involved in interstate conflicts.[197] Thus, I control for whether a

democratic state is considered to be a major power by including the dichotomous *major power*

status measure from the Correlates of War Dataset. [198]

The distribution of power within the interstate system can also be an important factor

when investigating the causes of interstate conflict. More specifically, polarity (whether the

interstate system is unipolar, bipolar or tripolar) can influence overall stability and the likelihood

of interstate conflict between states.[199] Furthermore, seeing that the analysis is from 1975 –

2001, it is important to account for the distribution of power in the interstate system because

some years of observation are during the cold war - in a bipolar system- and other years are not.

Thus, I include the *syscon* variable from the Correlates of War Dataset to capture the change in

the concentration of power within the interstate system[200]from year to year. The *syscon* variable

is lagged one period in order to account for any destabilizing effects transitions from one form of

polarity to another may have on the likelihood of conflict, as well as to control for the overall

change in the distribution of power and its effect on system stability. In order to control for

contagion effects stemming from an interstate war or conflict, I also control for whether a

democracy is involved in an *interstate war*[201], the *number of interstate war deaths* associated

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[197] Palmer and Morgan (2006)

[198] (Singer, Remer, and Stuckey 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820 – 1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19 – 48.

[199](Deutsch and Singer 1964; Waltz 1964; Waltz 1979; Thompson 1986; Wagner 1986; Mansfield 1988; Niou, Ordershook and Rose 1989)

[200] The syscon variable within the Correlates of War measures the concentration of relative power among the major powers in the world system. Values closer to 0 indicate there is more disperse relative power among the major power states in the interstate system (e.g., multipolar systems). Values closer to 1 indicate a single state or two states possess a greater distribution of power in the interstate system compared with the remaining states (e.g., bipolar or unipolar systems) (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project).

[201] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

with an interstate war[202], the *number of Militarized Interstate Disputes involving the use of force*[203], and the *number of Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes*.[204] The conflict variables: *interstate war*[205], the *number of interstate war deaths*[206], and the *number of Militarized Interstate Disputes involving the use of force* are lagged one period in order to account for their delayed effect on the likelihood of conflict initiation.

There is a large body of literature within the international relations literature that suggests that the degree of political fractionalization within democratic governments also significantly affects the likelihood of conflict onset.[207] Thus, I also include additional measures to assess the degree of political polarization within democratic governments. These measures include the *level of government fractionalization*[208], and the *degree the party of the executive controls the legislature*.[209] Scholars also contend that the type of electoral system within democracies[210] and the type of democratic regime[211] play an important role in predicting the likelihood of conflict initiation. Thus, I also control for the nature of electoral systems within democracies and the type of democratic regime. These measures include whether an electoral system is a

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[202] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[203] (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21: 133 – 154).

[204] (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21: 133 – 154).

[205] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[206] (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).

[207] (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Hagan 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Huth and Allee 2002)

[208] The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties (Database of Political Institutions, Keffer et al 2004)

[209] Does the party of the executive have an absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers? (Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et all 2004)

[210] (Leblang and Chan 2003)

[211] (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Elman 2000)

Proportional Representation System (PR) or Majoritarian System[212], and whether a democracy is

a *Presidential* or *Parliamentary system*.[213] Furthermore, some scholars contend that the

proximity of elections can affect the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.[214]

Thus, I also include an indicator regarding whether a given year of observation is an *election*

year for a democratic executive. I also include regional dummy variables in order to control for

regional effects.

Estimation Method

I have cross-sectional time series data with a rare-events dichotomous dependent

variable. In order to assess the impact personalistic electoral systems have on the probability that

a democracy initiates a MID involving the use of force, I use a random effects logit model with

cubic splines and a lagged dependent variable in order to control for temporal dependence as

recommended by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) and Beck and Katz (2004).[215]As they argue,

there is much confusion regarding how to deal with the issue of time in peace studies. Utilizing

splines has been considered a feasible method to employ in a large N rare events study that uses

MLE estimation.[216] Splines deal with time by creating a trend variable that captures different

periods.[217] Furthermore, I conducted a Hausman test following my estimation of both models

using fixed and random effects estimations and found that a random effects model was

appropriate for the given data.[218]

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[212] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[213] Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)
[214] Gaubatz (1991)
[215] I used xtlogit with Stata version 11 to estimate the models in this analysis because the dataset consists of cross sectional, time-series data.
[216] Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) provide additional explanations regarding the use of splines in time-series, cross-sectional data with a rare events, binary dependent variable.
[217] Beck and Katz (2004)
[218] After comparing the results of the fixed effects and random effects models, the P-value for both models was greater than .05 indicating a random effects model was appropriate for the given data.

Empirical Results

The analysis of militarized interstate disputes involving the use of force for 50

democracies between 1975 and 2001 indicates strong support for the argument that candidate-

centered electoral systems are associated with a decreased likelihood of dispute initiation

involving the use of force. As indicated in Table 1B, Model 1, the *personal vote index* has a

statistically significant and negative effect on dispute initiation involving the use of force which

provides support for the first hypothesis (*Hypothesis 1: Democracies will be less likely to*

initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force) as their electoral systems

promote personalistic incentives (as measured by the personal vote index) to a greater degree).

The control variables included to capture the nature of the interstate system: the *number of fatal*

MIDS, the *change in the concentration of power in the interstate system*, the *major power status*

of democracies and the *executive party control of the legislature* have a positive and statistically

significant association with the probability of dispute initiation in Model 1, as listed in Table 1B.

The *number of fatal MIDS,* the *major power status of democracies* and the *executive party*

control of the legislature were expected to be associated with a greater number of disputes based

on previous literature. States that have conflict in previous periods are more likely to have

conflict in future periods, and some scholars suggest that states that are major powers are more

likely to be involved in interstate conflicts in order to protect their global interests.[219]

Furthermore, prior scholarship suggests that democracies are more conflict prone as the party of

the executive controls the relevant houses of the legislature.[220] In addition, *government*

fractionalization has a negative and significant relationship with the likelihood of dispute

initiation involving the use of force, as was expected. This finding supports previous research

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[219] Palmer and Morgan (2006)
[220]Nordstrom and Clark (2005)

that indicates that democracies with a greater number of veto players within their governments are associated with more conservative foreign policies.[221]

As shown in Table 2B, Model 2, preferential *vote* has a statistically significant and negative impact on the initiation of MIDs involving the use of force. Democracies are less likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute involving the use of force as electors have more discretion in selecting individual candidates. This provides support for my second hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2: As electors have greater ability to select individual candidates (as indicated by higher scores on the preferential vote measure) democracies will be less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (involving the use of force). Ballot* control also has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute involving the use of force at the 90% level, as is shown in Table 2B, Model 3. Thus, democracies are less likely to initiate MIDs involving the use of force as party leaders have less control over the placement of candidates on party ballots and voters have more discretion in electing individual candidates. These results support the three primary hypotheses (hypothesis 1, 2 and 3) that democracies with candidate-centric electoral systems are associated with a decreased probability of dispute initiation involving the use of force and offer support for the argument that democracies with electoral systems that promote higher levels of individual accountability for elected leaders are less likely to purse revisionist activity in the interstate system.

The control variables included in Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 2B: the *number of fatal MIDS,* the *change in the concentration of power in the interstate system*, and *executive party control of the legislature* have positive and statistically significant associations with the probability of dispute initiation involving the use of force in both models displayed in Table 2B. Furthermore, *government fractionalization* has a negative a statistically significant relationship

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[221] Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992)

with the probability of dispute initiation involving the use of force in Model 2 and Model 3. Based on the previous discussion, these results confirm existing research regarding the factors that are frequently cited as affecting the likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.

The substantive effects of the *personal vote index*, preferential *vote* and *ballot* control measures on the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the use of force were determined by generating the predicted probabilities using the estimates from the logit estimations in Models 1, 2 and 3 in Tables 1B and 2B. The predicted probabilities are displayed in Models 21, 22 and 23 in Tables 16B and 17B. The predicted probabilities were calculated by computing the baseline probability of a dispute initiation where the revisionist state variable is assumed to equal 0, and the independent variables are held at their mean values. As expected, the predicted probabilities are small due to the presence of a rare events, binary dependent variable. We see that when the *personal vote index* is set at its mean value there is a -.0038% probability of a dispute initiation involving the use of force. When preferential *vote* is set at its mean value, there is a -.0094% probability of dispute initiation. There is a -.0088% probability of dispute initiation when *ballot* control is set at its mean value. These findings provide support for the argument that democracies with candidate-centered electoral systems are less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes involving the use of force.

Additional Specifications

In order to provide for robustness, I estimate the effect of the *personal vote index* and the preferential *vote* and *ballot* control measures on the *originator variable* in the Correlates of War Dataset using a random effects logit model with cubic splines and a lagged dependent variable. The *originator* variable is intended to capture if a state is the first mover in an interstate conflict. However, the *originator* variable is considered to be inferior to the *revisionist state* variable in

determining what state is responsible for escalating tensions that lead to the initiation of a militarized dispute.[222] As seen in Model 4 in Table 3B, the *personal vote index* has a negative and statistically significant association with the likelihood that a democracy originates a militarized interstate dispute involving the use of force at the 95% level. The *vote* preference measure also has a negative and statistically significant association with the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the use of force at the 95% level as is displayed in Model 5 in Table 4B. In addition, the *ballot* control measure has a negative and significant relationship with the likelihood of dispute initiation at the 90% level as is shown in Model 6 in Table 4B.

After testing for collinearity within the models, I discovered that the variables *level of government fractionalization* and the *degree the party of the executive controls the legislature* were collinear with each other. While neither variable is collinear with the primary independent variables, or dependent variables, I ran additional models in which I excluded *level of government fractionalization* in order to alleviate concerns that the results are affected by collinearity. As seen in Models 15- 20 in Tables 12B – 15B, the results are substantially unchanged when excluding *level of government fractionalization*. When *level of government fractionalization* is excluded, the *personal voted index,* preferential *vote* and *ballot* control measures continue to exert a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of an initiated MID involving the use of force with both indicators of conflict initiation (*revisionist state* and *originator*).

In order to determine that the results are not driven by the specification of the primary independent variable (*personal vote index*) in this analysis, I test the effect of personalistic electoral systems on the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the use of force by using an alternate measure of the personal vote index. As shown in Figure 3B in the chapter appendix,

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[222] Souva and Prins (2006)

the alternate measure is an indicator of personalistic electoral systems where each component of

the personal vote index (*ballot* control, vote *pooling* and preferential *voting*) is coded from zero

to one, and the values are combined into an overall index ranging from zero to three.[223] Higher

values indicate that electoral systems are more personalistic. Furthermore, this measure has been

employed in previous studies that have examined the factors associated with candidate and party-

centered electoral systems.[224] As seen in Model 10 in Table 7B, the *alternate personal vote index*

measure has a statistically significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of dispute

initiation involving the use of force at the 95% level. The *alternate personal vote index* measure

also has a negative and statistically significant association with the likelihood of an initiated

dispute involving the use of force with the *originator* dependent variable at the 95% level, as is

displayed in Model 11 in Table 8B.

In order to provide for additional robustness, I also estimate the effects of the *personal*

vote index, the *alternate personal vote index* indicator and the preferential *vote* and *ballot* control

measures on the likelihood of dispute initiation with all militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). I

conduct this alternate specification test in order to ascertain that the previous results are not

being driven by including only those militarized interstate disputes that involve the use of force.

The disputes included in the additional models are ones that are coded as having hostility levels

ranging from 1 "No Militarized Action" to 5 "War" based on the hostility level variable in the

Correlates of War Dataset.[225] As seen in Model 9 in Table 6B – the *personal vote index* has a

negative and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of dispute initiation at the

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[223] The data for the *Alternate Personal Vote Index* measure were taken from Johnson and Wallack's (2008) Personal Vote Dataset, and Johnson and Wallack's (2008) coding scheme is based on the criteria specified for classifying candidate and party-centric electoral systems in Carey and Shugart (1995).
[224] Robbins (2010)
[225] The disputes included range in hostility level from 1 to 5 (1 = "No Militarized Action", 2 = "Threat to Use Force", 3 = "Display of Force", 4 = "Use of Force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

95% level. The *alternate personal vote index* indicator also has a statistically significant and negative association with the likelihood of dispute initiation at the 95% level as is shown in Model 12 – Table 9B. As is displayed in Model 7 in Table 5B – the preferential *vote* measure has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of an initiated MID at the 95% level. The *ballot* control measure is negatively associated with the likelihood of an initiated dispute, but the relationship is not statistically significant as is shown in Model 8 in Table 5B.

Because many scholars contend that *district magnitude* can be related to the degree that an electoral system is candidate or party-centric,[226] I also estimate the effect that *district magnitude* has on the likelihood of an initiated dispute involving the use of force using a random effects logit model with cubic splines and a lagged dependent variable. As seen in Model 13 in Table 10B - *district magnitude* has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the use of force at the 90% level. Thus, as expected, as *district magnitude* increases, which indicates that an electoral system is more party-centric, democracies are more likely to initiate disputes involving the use of force. In addition, some scholars argue that examining the effect *district magnitude* has on the incentives of politicians to cultivate personal vote strategies is contingent on prior electoral system characteristics that influence whether the electoral system is candidate or party-centered.[227] More specifically, these scholars contend that as *district magnitude* increases in a candidate-centered system, politicians have greater incentives to pursue personal vote seeking strategies in order to distance themselves from an increasing number of candidates, many of whom are in their own party. Thus, increases in *district magnitude* should lead to more personalistic incentives for politicians in candidate-

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[226] Carey and Shugart (1995)
[227] Edwards and Thames (2007)

centered electoral systems due to greater intra-party competition between candidates.[228]

Therefore, I interact the *personal vote index* measure and a *logged district magnitude* measure

and estimate the effect of the interaction term on the likelihood of dispute initiation involving the

use of force. The district magnitude measure is logged in order to account for the large variation

in *district magnitude* across democracies and is a common practice in studies that interact *district*

magnitude with other electoral system indicators.[229] As shown in Table 11B in Model 14, and in

Figure 2B - the interaction term is negatively associated with the likelihood of dispute initiation

and is statistically significant at the 90% level. Thus, democracies are less likely to initiate

disputes involving the use of force as district magnitude increases in electoral systems that are

more candidate-centered.

In summary, the empirical results indicate that more candidate-centric electoral systems

are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict initiation within democracies.

Democracies are less likely to initiate disputes with other states as electoral systems promote

personalistic incentives for democratic leaders to a greater degree. Therefore, the findings

provide support for the argument that democracies advance more conservative foreign policies as

elected leaders are more directly accountable to voters.

Ecuador and Chile: A Brief Comparison

I provide brief, anecdotal case studies from Ecuador and Chile in this section to illustrate

how the extent that electoral systems are candidate or party-centric within democracies affects

the manner by which elected leaders are accountable to the public as well as the types of foreign

policies democratic leaders advance. Ecuador and Chile have comparable resources, fairly

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[228] Edwards and Thames (2007)
[229] Edwards and Thames (2007)

similar levels of wealth and occupy the same region.[230] However, the two states pursued significantly different foreign policies from 1980 to 2001. From 1980 to 2001, Ecuador originated seven interstate disputes with other states (six involving the use of force).[231] Chile, in contrast, initiated zero interstate disputes during this time period.[232] To understand why states such as Ecuador and Chile advanced significantly different foreign policies, we need to examine how each state's electoral system influenced the process by which democratic leaders were accountable to voters.

From 1980 to 2001, Ecuador had a party-centered electoral system and individual representatives were primarily accountable to party leaders and elites rather than to voters. During this time period, Ecuador initiated seven militarized interstate disputes with other states. The majority of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) Ecuador was involved in from 1980 – 2001 were with the nation of Peru.[233] While there had been political and military tensions between the two states for many years, Ecuador initiated every dispute it had with Peru from 1980 – 2001, and Peru initiated zero of the disputes. Furthermore, six of the disputes involved the use of force.

Chile, in contrast, transitioned from an authoritarian state in the 1980s to a democratic regime in 1989. The electoral system that was designed in the new Chilean democracy provided personalistic incentives for the elected leaders within Chile to a greater extent compared with many surrounding Latin American countries such as Ecuador, and Chilean representatives were primarily accountable to voters rather than party leaders. Furthermore, from 1990 to 2001, Chile

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[230] Ecuador's Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity) is $115.3 billion (65th largest in the World) (2010, US Dollars) and Chile's Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity) is $260 billion (46th largest in the World) (2010, US Dollars) (CIA World Factbook).
[231] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
[232] Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
[233] One dispute during this period was between Ecuador and the United States.

was involved in zero militarized interstate disputes. Thus, elected leaders in Chile and Ecuador were held accountable by different selectorates within their states leading to disparate forms of political accountability and contrasting foreign policy strategies.

Ecuador's electoral system from 1980 to 2001 was a proportional representation system with closed and blocked lists (Payne, Zovatto and Diaz 2007).[234] In more specific terms, party leaders in Ecuador presented a closed and fixed ballot to voters, and electors cast their votes for single parties rather than for individual candidates. Ecuador's electoral system had three primary effects on levels of accountability for individual candidates. First, it was difficult for voters to have reliable knowledge regarding the policy agendas and prior performance of specific political representatives because there were multiple seats at stake within a given district. Second, candidates had incentives to cultivate personal ties with segments of a district rather than the district as whole because gaining a seat required only a portion of the total vote share. This effect further reduced ties between voters and representatives. Lastly, since electors had only one vote per election they could not hold all of the representatives or candidates accountable in their district. Thus, voters could only evaluate one representative per election thereby reducing levels of accountability for individual representatives.[235] Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007) address the effect electoral systems such as Ecuador's (i.e., closed and blocked party lists) have on the relationship between voters and elected leaders:

> At the other end of the scale, in proportional representation systems with closed and blocked party lists, the connection between the elector and representative is looser and more distant. In such systems, party leaders or members in a convention put together an ordered list of candidates for each district. Citizens cast a vote for the party list of their

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[234] In 1998, Ecuador altered its electoral system. Prior to 1998, Ecuador's electoral system was a proportional representation system with closed and blocked lists. The new electoral system for the 1998 election was a multimember, plurality system. In 2002, Ecuador changed its electoral system again. The system adopted for the 2002 election was a proportional representation system with open lists and voters could cast votes for specific candidates among different party lists (Payne, Zovatto and Diaz 2007).
[235] Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)

choice (thereby affecting the share of seats won by that party), but have no role in deciding which individual candidates are elected. Candidates and incumbents do not have a strong incentive to cultivate relations with their constituents, and electors are discouraged from learning the identities of individual candidates or tracking the conduct of those who get elected (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Legislators enhance their reelection chances by winning the favor of party leaders and thus earning a high position on the party list. While individual electors can potentially hold the party accountable through their legislative votes, it is not realistically possible for them to hold legislators accountable on an individual basis (39).

Therefore, Ecuador's electoral system had the effect of weakening ties between individual democratic leaders and voters and lessening the ability of voters to hold specific representatives accountable for their policy initiatives.

Chile, in contrast, created an electoral system in which voters had discretion in electing individual candidates leading to closer times between voters and democratic leaders. Chile's electoral system is referred to by many scholars as a binominal system that is considered to be a mixed-member electoral system. Parties present voters with candidate lists in two-member districts, and voters choose one candidate among the party lists, and the votes are then transferred to the respective party. Each of the two parties that have accrued the greatest number of votes wins an elected seat. In the case that one party receives twice the votes of the next closest party – that party wins both seats.[236] In summary, Chilean voters cast a single vote for individual candidates among the party lists. Furthermore, while political parties present voters with party ballots, voters can disturb the party lists. Therefore, while Chile's electoral system does not provide for a fully candidate-centered system, there are many incentives for Chilean politicians to cultivate personal vote strategies in attempting to acquire and maintain elected office, and Chile's electoral system promotes strong ties between voters and elected leaders. As Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007) state: "On the other hand, in two-member districts and – in the

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[236] Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007)

Chilean case – when citizens vote for individuals rather than party lists, the link between electors and representatives can be close" (Shugart, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995)" (51).

The primary differences in the Ecuadorian and Chilean electoral systems and their effect on electoral accountability were that democratic leaders in Ecuador were primarily accountable to party officials while Chilean leaders were more directly accountable to voters. This had the effect of weakening ties between voters and individual representatives in Ecuador and strengthening the links between voters and individual democratic leaders in Chile. As Payne, Zovatto and Diaz (2007) state: "A key issue already mentioned is whether the elector is limited to voting for a party list or is given the option of expressing a preference for an individual candidate or candidates on the list. Proportional representation systems with closed and blocked lists score low in participation, since the link between constituents and their individual representatives is weak." (49-50). On the other hand, Chile's electoral system provided for a stronger connection between voters and individual representatives because individual candidates were selected by voters.

Chile's candidate- centered electoral system also increased the quality of information that voters received regarding the policy positions of elected officials and candidates compared with Ecuador's party-centered electoral system. That is, in personalistic systems such as Chile's, candidates have incentives to highlight their own policy stances and voting records while criticizing their opponents' policy positions because candidates must distance themselves from their opponents to a greater degree compared with candidates in party-centric systems. Thus, Chile's personalistic electoral system had the effect of increasing the amount and quality of information pertaining to the policy positions and voting records of individual candidates, which made it easier for voters to evaluate the performance of individual politicians. As Payne,

Zovatto and Diaz (2007) state: "Systems that allow for personal preference voting over candidates within parties, such as open lists in Brazil, Peru, Chile, or Colombia, provide stronger incentives for the delivery of information about voting records… ." (62). Thus, as the Chilean case demonstrates, it is easier for voters to hold elected leaders accountable as they have more accurate information regarding the policy stances and prior voting records of democratic leaders.

   In summary, Ecuador's electoral system created a political environment where elected leaders were able to pursue riskier policies, including the initiation of interstate conflicts, because democratic leaders could more easily avoid direct punishment by voters. More specifically, while Chile's electoral system provided a direct link between voters and elected leaders, and increased electoral accountability for individual leaders, Ecuador's electoral system was one where democratic leaders were answerable to their parties to a larger extent rather than voters. Thus, leaders in Ecuador did not have to fear punishment by the electorate to the same degree as did leaders in Chile. Ecuadorian representatives were concerned with appealing to their party leaders rather than voters in order to maintain their elected positions. As Carey (2003, 195) discusses in regards to the difficulty voters often have in holding elected leaders accountable in party-centered systems: "The basic problem can be described as follows. As politicians advance within the party leadership, their access to power and perks increases dramatically, but their electoral vulnerability decreases in a corresponding manner because leaders occupy the top positions on party electoral lists. The leadership's susceptibility to electoral punishment is mitigated, even if the party as a whole loses electoral ground. Therefore, the leaders who stand to gain the most from violating public trust and pillaging state resources stand to suffer the least electorally if their party is punished." Thus, in examining the case of Ecuador, the effect that the Ecuadorian electoral system had on the foreign policies that the

Ecuadorian government pursued was that democratic leaders in Ecuador could advance riskier foreign policies compared with Chilean leaders because they were less accountable to voters who could not directly punish them for risky policy initiatives.

Conclusion

The foreign policies that democracies develop are shaped by the processes through which elected leaders are held accountable by voters. Democratic leaders that rely on party leaders and elites to acquire and maintain their elected positions have a freer hand to pursue risky foreign policies because they can more easily avoid direct punishment by voters. In contrast, democratic leaders that rely on constituent support are more cautious in engaging their states in military conflicts as they are held accountable individually for their policy initiatives to a greater degree. Thus, scholars should further consider the role electoral systems play in affecting political accountability for democratic leaders and the foreign policies they advance, for as Satori (1997) states: "electoral systems [are] the most manipulative instruments of politics" (Mitchell, 2000, 336).

CHAPTER III APPENDIX

Table 1B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 1
Personal Vote Index	-.2895** (.1328)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.9274 (1.4708)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0207 (.0298)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.6975*** (.6078)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	86.6455*** (23.2698)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	2.7010 (6.9034)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0141 (.0835)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1381 (.1321)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0413 (.0939)
Major Power Status	1.8561** (.9394)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-5.4909 (18.1303)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0231 (.0361)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0006 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	.0182 (.3308)
Government Fractionalization	-.5847** (.2667)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.5814** (.2665)
Majoritarian System	-.1960 (.5048)

Table 1B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 1
Presidential System	.3395 (.5611)
Latin America	-3.2992* (1.7839)
Postcommunist	-26.5279 (89660.73)
Africa	-28.5927 (179475.9)
Asia	-1.3440 (1.7994)
OECD	-3.0102** (1.4046)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.7271** (.3566)
Spline 1	1.4194*** (.5033)
Spline 2	-3.8247*** (1.1530)
Spline 3	16.0312*** (4.3310)
Spline 4	-32.9902*** (8.5213)
Constant	-2811.995*** (997.461)
Groups	48
Observations	581
Probability X^2	.0005

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 2B. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 2	Model 3
Vote	-.7639**	
	(.3755)	
Ballot		-.7215*
		(.3587)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.8132	1.7316
	(1.4623)	(1.4457)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0206	-.0200
	(.0311)	(.0298)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.6437***	1.6864***
	(.6027)	(.6064)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	87.6937***	88.1008***
	(23.1588)	(23.1437)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	6.7042	5.0311
	(6.7338)	(6.8607)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0178	-.0274
	(.0824)	(.0835)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1143	.1162
	(.1258)	(.1268)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0890	.0917
	(.0803)	(.0821)
Major Power Status	1.1490	1.3784
	(.8271)	(.8450)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-17.1700	-9.1695
	(17.2860)	(18.4321)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0114	-.0131
	(.0351)	(.0362)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0006	.0006
	(.0005)	(.0005)
Total Population	-.0003	-.0003
	(.0002)	(.0002)
Election Year	.0338	.0533
	(.3288)	(.3291)
Government Fractionalization	-.4755*	-.6069**
	(.2666)	(.2665)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.4722*	.6034**
	(.2665)	(.2663)
Majoritarian System	.0730	.2438
	(.4862)	(.4900)

Table 2B. Continued. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 2	Model 3
Presidential System	.1253 (.5438)	.3518 (.5729)
Latin America	-3.4371* (1.7695)	-3.8356** (1.8006)
Postcommunist	-27.2183 (250758.5)	-28.2314** (277741.4)
Africa	-28.8096 (4773)	-30.3461 (532938.4)
Asia	-.2997 (1.7327)	-1.3618 (1.8357)
OECD	-2.5160* (1.3440)	-3.2087** (1.3919)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.7367** (.3561)	.7551** (.3552)
Spline 1	1.4533*** (.5068)	1.4383*** (.5027)
Spline 2	-3.9390*** (1.1620)	-3.8712*** (1.1532)
Spline 3	16.4480*** (4.3656)	16.2071*** (4.3349)
Spline 4	-33.5552*** (8.5642)	-33.2446*** (8.5154)
Constant	-2881.559*** (1004.344)	-2850.296 *** (996.258)
Groups	49	49
Observations	589	589
Probability X^2	.0004***	.0004***

Table 3B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 4
Personal Vote Index	-.3306** (.1493)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.8099 (1.6882)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0967 (.2011)
Number of Fatal MIDS	3.5590*** (.7875)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	39.7888* (21.4449)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	9.4883 (6.9715)
Total Number of Alliances	-.1386 (0894)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.2785** (.1385)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0759 (.1408)
Major Power Status	2.3914** (1.1170)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	15.7180 (19.0601)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0099 (.0403)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0001 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	.1383 (.3318)
Government Fractionalization	-.8709*** (.2713)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.8684** (.2712)
Majoritarian System	-.2716 (.4709)
Presidential System	.8567 (.5311)

Table 3B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 4
Latin America	-2.6442
	(1.6490)
Postcommunist	-28.2601
	(300627.9)
Africa	-31.6633
	(638762.2)
Asia	-1.4549
	(1.7018)
OECD	-3.4745***
	(1.2277)
Originator State (t-1)	.2233
	(.3774)
Spline 1	.9228**
	(.3949)
Spline 2	-2.0656**
	(.9497)
Spline 3	7.4465**
	(3.7019)
Spline 4	-12.20468
	(7.7845)
Constant	-1831.095**
	(782.6224)
Groups	48
Observations	581
Probability X^2	.0000***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 4B. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 5	Model 6
Vote	-.8281** (.3715)	
Ballot		-.7104* (.3727)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.7234 (1.6727)	1.5771 (1.6541)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0915 (.2018)	.1000 (.2050)
Number of Fatal MIDS	3.5134*** (.7847)	3.5606*** (.7824)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	40.1182* (21.3187)	41.5493 * (21.2819)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	13.8758** (6.7555)	12.5112* (6.8418)
Total Number of Alliances	-.1317 (.0886)	-.1402 (.0897)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.2766** (.1326)	.2682** (.1324)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0009 (.1225)	-.0090 (.1228)
Major Power Status	1.5261* (.8774)	1.7051** (.9021)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-.1559 (18.0591)	6.3613 (19.1266)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0155 (.0397)	.0163 (.0409)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0000 (.0005)	.0001 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	.1382 (.3292)	.1725 (.3284)
Government Fractionalization	-.7503*** (.2669)	-.8678* (.2623)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.7477*** (.2667)	.8651* (.2622)
Majoritarian System	.0056 (.4535)	.1564 (.4545)

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Table 4B. Continued. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 5	Model 6
Presidential System	.63304 (.5209)	.8578 (.5459)
Latin America	-2.6785* (1.6091)	-3.2584** (1.6610)
Postcommunist	-26.0301 (230156.6)	-27.0521 (241186.6)
Africa	-28.7916 (467699.6)	-30.2016 (494207.4)
Asia	-.0070 (1.6061)	-1.0607 (1.7217)
OECD	-2.6463** (1.1137)	- 3.4318** (1.1786)
Originator (t-1)	.2514 (.37408)	.2955 (.3729)
Spline 1	.9137* (.3896)	.9104** (.3881)
Spline 2	-2.0853** (.9408)	-2.0795** (.9382)
Spline 3	7.5473** (3.6783)	7.6245** (3.6715)
Spline 4	-12.2646 (7.7434)	-12.7043 (7.7310)
Constant	-1816.372 (772.0652)	-1808.437** (769.0148)
Groups	49	49
Observations	589	589
Probability X^2	.0000***	.0004***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 5B. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 7	Model 8
Vote	-.7075**	
	(.3479)	
Ballot		-.4291
		(.3134)
Interstate War (t-1)	21.7193	21.5921
	(12006.24)	(12172.76)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0050	.0058
	(99.3355)	(100.3261)
Number of Fatal MIDS	.5233	.5836
	(.6574)	(.6626)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	59.2313***	60.4748**
	(19.7958)	(19.7585)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	7.5471*	7.7067
	(5.2652)	(5.2703)
Total Number of Alliances	.0334	.0317
	(.0702)	(.0705)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1765	.1784
	(.1200)	(.1222)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0606	.0549
	(.0727)	(.0741)
Major Power Status	1.6381**	1.6679**
	(.7533)	(.7574)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-50.3738***	-50.6972***
	(16.9675)	(17.3274)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0268	.0262
	(.0347)	(.0352)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0001	-.0002
	(.0005)	(.0005)
Total Population	-.0003	-.0003
	(.0002)	(.0002)
Election Year	-.0811	-.0636
	(.2828)	(.2824)
Government Fractionalization	-.5482**	-.6470**
	(.2552)	(.2502)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.5461**	.6446**
	(.2550)	(.2501)
Majoritarian System	-.1768	.0427
	(.4810)	(.4923)

Table 5B. Continued. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 7	Model 8
Presidential System	.2611 (.4819)	.3702 (.4889)
Latin America	-3.9839*** (1.5136)	-4.4465*** (1.5348)
Postcommunist	-.4158 (.7815)	-.6671 (.7966)
Africa	-17.9301 (3441.721)	-18.2567 (3416.517)
Asia	3.3878** (1.3271)	3.0274** (1.3633)
OECD	-1.3044 (.9131)	-1.6920* (.9145)
Revisionist State (t-1)	-.0727 (.3438)	-.0617 (.3485)
Spline 1	.6664** (.3085)	.6645** (.3086)
Spline 2	-2.0466*** (.7692)	-2.0206*** (.7697)
Spline 3	9.4680*** (3.0648)	9.3955*** (3.0656)
Spline 4	-22.0316*** (6.5077)	-22.0135*** (6.5026)
Constant	-1324.634** (611.2044)	-1320.886** (611.5163)
Groups	49	49
Observations	589	589
Probability X^2	.0183**	.0289**

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 6B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 9
Personal Vote Index	-.2527** (.1235)
Interstate War (t-1)	22.6899 (18776.49)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0040 (151.5751)
Number of Fatal MIDS	.5801 (.6607)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	59.2549*** (19.8304)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	6.5901 (5.3494)
Total Number of Alliances	.0283 (.0707)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1912 (.1218)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0500 (.0710)
Major Power Status	1.9923** (.7911)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-43.2823** (17.4814)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0254 (.0351)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0002 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	-.0784 (.2832)
Government Fractionalization	-.6120** (.2521)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.6099** (.2520)
Majoritarian System	- .3015 (.4840)
Presidential System	.3715 (.4789)

Table 6B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 9
Latin America	-3.8928** (1.5575)
Postcommunist	-.6301 (.7929)
Africa	-19.2336 (5330.323)
Asia	2.9744** (1.3346)
OECD	-1.4698 (.9406)
Revisionist State (t-1)	-.0780 (.3462)
Spline 1	.6697** (.3094)
Spline 2	-2.0430*** (.7713)
Spline 3	9.4298*** (3.0715)
Spline 4	-21.8723*** (6.5222)
Constant	-1330.549** (613.0984)
Groups	48
Observations	582
Probability X^2	.0219**

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 7B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 10
Personal Vote Index (Alternate Measure)	-.4088** (.1910)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.9994 (1.4848)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0216 (.0315)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.6717*** (.6067)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	86.3142*** (23.2179)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	3.3842 (6.8654)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0160 (.0828)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1095 (.1264)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0753 (.0827)
Major Power Status	1.3864 (.8477)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-6.4360* (17.9737)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0171 (.0354)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0006 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	.0364 (.3298)
Government Fractionalization	-.5701** (.2658)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.5669** (.2656)
Majoritarian System	-.1861 (.5107)
Presidential System	.3162 (.5589)

Table 7B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 10
Latin America	-3.3745*
	(1.7665)
Postcommunist	-27.2428
	(166827.2)
Africa	-29.1236
	(324203.4)
Asia	-1.2537
	(1.7802)
OECD	-2.8335*
	(1.3737)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.7392*
	(.3565)
Spline 1	1.4322***
	(.5045)
Spline 2	-3.8611***
	1.1552
Spline 3	16.0938***
	(4.3368)
Spline 4	-32.8615***
	(8.5184)
Constant	-2837.442***
	(999.684)
Groups	48
Observations	582
Probability X^2	.0004***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 8B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 11
Personal Vote Index (Alternate Measure)	-.4417** (.2104)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.9185 (1.6978)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0875 (.1996)
Number of Fatal MIDS	3.5515*** (.7894)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	39.3929* (21.3995)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	10.4749 (6.9157)
Total Number of Alliances	-.1354 (.0890)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.2566* (.1339)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0319 (.1258)
Major Power Status	1.8214* (.9639)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	12.4574 (18.8217)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0120 (.0399)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0000 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	.1433 (.3310)
Government Fractionalization	-.8438*** (.2694)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.8412*** (.2693)
Majoritarian System	-.2568 (.4744)
Presidential System	.8176 (.5288)

Table 8B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 11
Latin America	-2.7324* (1.6183)
Postcommunist	-27.1473 (240157.5)
Africa	-30.2382 (495265.6)
Asia	-1.1904 (1.6632)
OECD	-3.1789*** (1.1574)
Originator (t-1)	.2388 (.3772)
Spline 1	.9256** (.3941)
Spline 2	-2.0816** (.9482)
Spline 3	7.4506** (3.6971)
Spline 4	-11.9975 (7.7748)
Constant	-1837.161** (780.8956)
Groups	48
Observations	582
Probability X^2	.0000***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 9B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 12
Personal Vote Index (Alternate Measure)	-.3378* (.1806)
Interstate War (t-1)	21.80813 (11575.49)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.0041 (96.0556)
Number of Fatal MIDS	.5657 (.6622)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	59.2664*** (19.8288)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	6.8703 (5.3590)
Total Number of Alliances	.0265 (.0711)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1862 (.1233)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0586 (.0728)
Major Power Status	1.7708** (.7737)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-44.5025** (17.5975)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0254 (.0348)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0002 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	-.0752 (.2833)
Government Fractionalization	-.6158** (.2546)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.6137** (.2544)
Majoritarian System	-.3221 (.4990)
Presidential System	.3751 (.4864)

Table 9B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 12
Latin America	-3.9099** (1.5645)
Postcommunist	-.5779 (.7975)
Africa	-18.2945 (3378.295)
Asia	2.9383** (1.3524)
OECD	-1.3814 (.9461)
Revisionist State (t-1)	-.0847 (.3458)
Spline 1	.6724** (.3100)
Spline 2	-2.0449*** (.7727)
Spline 3	9.4173*** (3.0761)
Spline 4	-21.7872*** (6.5269)
Constant	-1335.916** (614.2429)
Groups	48
Observations	582
Probability X^2	.0266**

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 10B. The Effect of District Magnitude on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 13
District Magnitude	.0118* (.0069)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.4621 (1.4568)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0179 (.0270)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.5308*** (.5684)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	86.6143*** (22.5343)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	9.4865 (6.6953)
Total Number of Alliances	-.01870 (.0837)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.3623*** (.1093)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0557 (.0928)
Major Power Status	1.6495* (.9633)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-27.7589 (18.8989)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.04304 (.0327)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0003 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0002 (.0002)
Election Year	.1520 (.3131)
Government Fractionalization	-.4761* (.2752)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.4734* (.2750)
Majoritarian System	-.0952 (.5605)
Presidential System	.0208 (.6457)

Table 10B. Continued. The Effect of District Magnitude on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 13
Latin America	-3.0594* (1.6272)
Postcommunist	-19.9565 (7896.923)
Africa	-21.9173 (15380.33)
Asia	-.1190 (1.9499)
OECD	-1.9772 (1.3335)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.6306* (.3753)
Spline 1	1.3333*** (.4850)
Spline 2	-3.5816*** (1.1168)
Spline 3	15.2460*** (4.2068)
Spline 4	-31.8709*** (8.2804)
Constant	-2647.628*** (961.2746)
Groups	50
Observations	633
Probability X^2	0.0001***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 11B. The Effect of District Magnitude and the Personal Vote Index on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 14
Log D.M. (x) Personal Vote	-.3063* (.1840)
Personal Vote Index	.1748 (.2777)
Log District Magnitude	.8809* (.4876)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.7298 (1.5055)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0210 (.0303)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.6296*** (.6235)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	92.3759*** (24.3736)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	9.2629 (8.3856)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0559 (.0885)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.1417 (.1376)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0712 (.0973)
Major Power Status	.8041 (1.1801)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-16.0604 (21.5839)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0140 (.0397)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0007 (.0006)
Total Population	-.0003 (.0003)
Election Year	.0949 (.3384)
Government Fractionalization	-.6014 (.8492)

Table 11B. Continued. The Effect of District Magnitude and the Personal Vote Index on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 14
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.6029 (.4264)
Majoritarian System	.2349 (.8345)
Presidential System	.6848 (.6498)
Latin America	-4.2008* (2.1581)
Postcommunist	-26.7513 (76276.29)
Africa	-29.5098 (202081.9)
Asia	-1.0962 (2.1460)
OECD	-3.0920* (1.6660)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.5435 (.4183)
Spline 1	1.4638** (.5738)
Spline 2	-3.9621*** (1.3008)
Spline 3	16.3665*** (4.8181)
Spline 4	-31.9798*** (9.1490)
Constant	-2904.59** (1137.516)
Groups	47
Observations	543
Probability X^2	.0058***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 12B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 15
Personal Vote Index	-.3082 ** (.1510)
Interstate War (t-1)	2.0755 (1.4786)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0192 (.0246)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.7094*** (.6086)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	79.7535*** (23.1594)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	5.3570 (7.2053)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0147 (.0857)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.2393* (.1297)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0544 (.0894)
Major Power Status	2.2179** (.9436)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-12.7645 (19.6708)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0249 (.0355)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0004 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)
Election Year	-.0738 (.3283)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-.0027 (.0020)
Majoritarian System	-.2400 (.5702)
Presidential System	.1247 (.6236)

Table 12B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 15
Latin America	-3.2555* (1.8756)
Postcommunist	-21.3885 (11361.42)
Africa	-22.91747 (22228.36)
Asia	-.6589 (1.9152)
OECD	-2.8008* (1.4957)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.7016* (.3870)
Spline 1	1.3538*** (.5021)
Spline 2	-3.6287*** (1.1486)
Spline 3	15.23251*** (4.3122)
Spline 4	-31.8960 *** (8.5030)
Constant	-2683.695*** (995.1256)
Groups	48
Observations	586
Probability X^2	.0031**

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 13B. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 16
Personal Vote Index	-.3875** (.1555)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.7905 (1.7149)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.1660 (.2040)
Number of Fatal MIDS	3.4378*** (.8161)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	29.6414 (21.2463)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	10.2700 (7.2562)
Total Number of Alliances	-.1012 (.0930)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.4033*** (.1379)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	-.0465 (.1282)
Major Power Status	2.5642** (1.0538)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	5.4169 (20.76463)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0105 (.0421)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0001 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	.0264 (.3284)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-.0019 (.0018)
Majoritarian System	-.3871 (.5672)
Presidential System	.7216 (.6203)

Table 13B. Continued. The Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 16
Presidential System	.7216 (.6203)
Latin America	-2.4504 (1.7178)
Postcommunist	-19.6819 (7429.352)
Africa	-21.9567 (15064.03)
Asia	-.2473 (1.8449)
OECD	-2.7774** (1.2847)
Originator (t-1)	.2974 (.3915)
Spline 1	.8137** (.3946)
Spline 2	-1.7671* (.9465)
Spline 3	6.2281* (3.6792)
Spline 4	-10.2633 (7.7362)
Constant	-1616.581** (781.9499)
Groups	48
Observations	586
Probability X^2	.0002**

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 14B. The Effect of the Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 17	Model 18
Vote	-.8793** (.3843)	
Ballot		-.6357* (.3470)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.9469 (1.4534)	1.8416 (1.4384)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0187 (.0257)	-.0177 (.0241)
Number of Fatal MIDS	1.6457*** (.6014)	1.6912*** (.6005)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	79.8814*** (22.8257)	80.1355*** (22.7862)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	8.3966 (6.9219)	7.5327 (7.0195)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0120 (.0837)	-.0187 (.0844)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.2107* (.1224)	.2350* (.1230)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0841 (.0824)	.0748 (.0835)
Major Power Status	1.5888* (.8325)	1.9160*** (.8571)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-24.4168 (18.2011)	-19.84507 (19.1042)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0181 (.0348)	-.0224 (.0355)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	.0005 (.0005)	.0003 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0003 (.0002)
Election Year	-.0662 (.3253)	-.0469 (.3245)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-.0028 (.0020)	-.0030 (.0020)
Majoritarian System	.0410 (.5110)	.1912 (.5027)

Table 14B. Continued. The Effect of the Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 17	Model 18
Presidential System	-.0634	.0597
	(.5648)	(.5974)
Latin America	-3.3157*	-3.7963**
	(1.8169)	(1.8566)
Postcommunist	-17.7688	-19.4639
	(2669.463)	(4849.799)
Africa	-18.9318	-21.0187
	(5181.066)	(9350.303)
Asia	.3324	-.6321
	(1.8297)	(1.9234)
OECD	-2.3299*	-3.0934**
	(1.3961)	(1.4777)
Revisionist State (t-1)	.7532*	.7908**
	(.3879)	(.3899)
Spline 1	1.3750***	1.3379***
	(.5019)	(.4963)
Spline 2	-3.7116***	-3.5782***
	(1.1470)	(1.1335)
Spline 3	15.5422***	15.0421 ***
	(4.3037)	(4.2542)
Spline 4	-32.2553***	-31.5014***
	(8.4739)	(8.3969)
Constant	-2727.744***	-2653.344***
	(994.6532)	(983.5768)
Groups	49	49
Observations	593	593
Probability X^2	.0013***	.0019***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 15B. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 19	Model 20
Vote	-1.0258** (.3789)	
Ballot		-.6541* (.3813)
Interstate War (t-1)	1.6663 (1.6909)	1.4927 (1.6898)
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	.1472 (.2037)	.1643 (.2073)
Number of Fatal MIDS	3.3565*** (.7952)	3.4093*** (.8003)
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	30.0344 (21.0132)	31.2752 (21.0327)
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	14.5836** (6.9351)	13.7860* (7.1598)
Total Number of Alliances	-.0967 (.0913)	-.1051 (.0929)
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.3868*** (.1332)	.3939** (.1371)
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0099 (.1176)	-.0043 (.1201)
Major Power Status	1.8568*** (.9012)	2.0210** (.9469)
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-11.5095 (19.5322)	-6.5396 (20.4791)
GDP Growth (t-1)	.0114 (.0410)	.0100 (.0421)
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	-.0000 (.0005)	-.0001 (.0005)
Total Population	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0002 (.0002)
Election Year	.0189 (.3257)	.0545 (.3251)
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-.0021 (.0019)	-.0022 (.0018)
Majoritarian System	-.0452 (.5243)	.0417 (.5397)

Table 15B. Continued. The Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force: Excluding Government Fractionalization (with Originator Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 19	Model 20
Presidential System	.4425	.6826
	(.5739)	(.6332)
Latin America	-2.5553	-3.1507*
	(1.6403)	(1.7369)
Postcommunist	-22.2159	-20.03932
	(43197.47)	(11005.68)
Africa	-24.02262	-22.1995
	(88235.51)	(22100.98)
Asia	1.1163	.1186
	(1.7662)	(1.8894)
OECD	-2.1455*	-2.9231**
	(1.1635)	(1.2839)
Originator (t-1)	.3392*	.3717
	(.3866)	(.3919)
Spline 1	.8194**	.7897**
	(.3889)	(.3857)
Spline 2	-1.8279*	-1.7355*
	(.9350)	(.9296)
Spline 3	6.4951*	6.2003*
	(3.6438)	(3.6282)
Spline 4	-10.5757	-10.2302 ***
	(7.6733)	(7.6534)
Constant	-1630.962**	-1571.253***
	(770.7177)	(764.4452)
Groups	49	49
Observations	593	593
Probability X^2	.0001***	.0003***

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01, one-tailed tests;

Table 16B. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 21
Personal Vote Index	-.0038
Interstate War (t-1)	.0763
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0002
Number of Fatal MIDS	.0530
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	1.1720
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	.0387
Total Number of Alliances	-.0001
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.0014
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0008
Major Power Status	.0456
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-.0686
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0002
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	8.92e-06
Total Population	-5.55e-06
Election Year	.0004
Government Fractionalization	-.0079
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.0078
Majoritarian System	-.0024
Presidential System	.0045
Latin America	-.0423
Postcommunist	-.0552
Africa	-.0212
Asia	-.0112
OECD	-.0672
Revisionist State (t-1)	.0134
Spline 1	.0192
Spline 2	-.0520

Table 16B. Continued. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Personalistic Electoral Systems on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 21
Spline 3	.2174
Spline 4	-.4455

In the baseline predicted probability the independent variables are set to their mean values in Model 21 . The dependent variable (revisionist state) is assumed to equal = 0 (no dispute initiated).

Table 17B. Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 22	Model 23
Vote	-.0094	
Ballot		-.0088
Interstate War (t-1)	.0591	.0534
Interstate War Deaths (t-1)	-.0002	-.0002
Number of Fatal MIDS	.0467	.0485
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	1.0891	1.0820
Alliance with System Leader (S- Lead)	.0832	.0617
Total Number of Alliances	-.0002	-.0003
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	.0014	.0014
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	.0011	.0011
Major Power Status	.0229	.0302
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	-.2132	-.1126
GDP Growth (t-1)	-.0001	-.0001
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	8.47e-06	8.05e-06
Total Population	-4.91e-06	-4.50e-06
Election Year	.0004	.0006
Government Fractionalization	-.0059	-.0074
Executive Party Control of Legislature	.0058	.0074
Majoritarian System	.0009	.0030
Presidential System	.0015	.0044
Latin America	-.0401	-.0460
Postcommunist	-.0506	-.0527
Africa	-.0194	-.0196
Asia	-.0033	-.0106
OECD	-.0451	-.0672
Revisionist State (t-1)	.0123	.0125
Spline 1	.0180	.0176
Spline 2	-.0489	-.0475

Table 17B. Continued.   Change in Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Preferential Vote and Ballot Control on the Probability a Democracy Initiates a Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (with Revisionist State Dependent Variable), 1975 – 2001

Variables in Model	Model 22	Model 23
Spline 3	.2042	.1990
Spline 4	-.4167	-.4083

   In the baseline predicted probability the independent variables are set to their mean
   values in Models 22 and 23. The dependent variable is assumed to equal = 0
   (no dispute initiated)

Table 19B: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Dependent Variables		
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (Revisionist State Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Initiator and Target State (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey 1972);	Measure of whether a state initiates a use of force dispute as indicated by the Revisionist State variable in the Correlates of War Dataset (0 = non originator, 1 = originator) when the hostility level of a conflict is coded 4 or 5 (4 = "use of force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Dispute involving the Use of Force (Originator Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Initiator and Target State (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey 1972);	Measure of whether a state initiates a use of force dispute as indicated by the Originator variable in the Correlates of War Dataset (0 = non originator, 1 = originator) when the hostility level of a conflict is coded 4 or 5 (4 = "use of force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes (All Levels, Revisionist State Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset (v.3.10) (Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.	Measure of whether a state initiates a dispute as indicated by the Revisionist State variable in the Correlates of War Dataset. The disputes included range in hostility level from 1 to 5 (1 = "No Militarized Action", 2 = "Threat to Use Force", 3 = "Display of Force", 4 = "Use of Force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes (All Levels, Originator Variable)	Correlates of War Dataset: Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset (v.3.10) (Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.	Measure of whether a state initiates a dispute as indicated by the Originator variable in the Correlates of War Dataset. The disputes included range in hostility level from 1 to 5 (1 = "No Militarized Action", 2 = "Threat to Use Force", 3 = "Display of Force", 4 = "Use of Force", 5 = "War") in the Militarized Dispute Dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Stuart, 2004)

Table 19B. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Independent Variables		
Personal Vote Index	Personal Vote Dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2008)	Ordinal level scale that combines the three Personal Vote Indicators (VOTE, POOL, BALLOT) where each indicator is ranked from 0 to 2. Higher scores indicate that electoral systems are more candidate-centered (Johnson and Wallack 2008)
Personal Vote Index (Alternate Measures)	Personal Vote Dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2008)	Ordinal level scale that combines the three Personal Vote Indicators (VOTE, POOL, BALLOT) where each indicator is ranked from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate that electoral systems are more candidate-centered (Johnson and Wallack 2008)
Preferential Vote	Personal Vote Dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2008)	Measure ranging from zero to two indicating the degree of preferential voting in an electoral system (0=voters cast votes for a single party; 1 = voters cast votes for multiple candidates; 2 = voters cast a single vote below the party level) (Johnson and Wallack 2008)
Ballot Control	Personal Vote Dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2008)	Measure ranging from zero to two indicating the level of control party leaders have over party ballots (0=party leaders present a fixed ballot; 1=party leader present party ballots, but voters may disturb list; 2=party leaders do not control access to ballots or rank).
District Magnitude	Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	Number of representatives per electoral district
Log of District Magnitude*Personal Vote Index (Interaction Term)	Personal Vote Dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2008); Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	Log of District Magnitude (x) Personal Vote Index

Table 19B. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Interstate Control Variables		
The Number of Contiguous Democracies/Autocracies	The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Dataset, Version 3/Polity IV Dataset	Democracies and Autocracies were defined based on the polity2 scores for each state taken from the Polity IV dataset. States with score below 6 were considered autocratic. Score above 6 were considered autocratic. States were considered contiguous if they were coded as being contiguous based on the Contiguity Type Relationship (1-5) within the COW, Contiguity Dataset (Stinnett, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman. 2002, The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3); (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, Polity IV Dataset).
Total Number of Allies	The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set	Count variable indicating the total number of alliances for each democracy for each year (Gibler, Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816 – 2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2): 211 – 222.
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	The tau S correlation is determined by the alliance relationship between the state in question and the system leader (Britain until 1945, and the US following 1945) based on the S correlation calculation. "The S correlation calculation performed by EUGene is based on the calculation used by Signorino and Ritter (1999). Like the Kendall tau-b, S evaluates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. Unlike tau-b, S also takes into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation. For example, the fact that a state has identical alliances with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states is accounted for in the S calculation, but not in tau-b. Signorino and Ritter note that while tau-b is an excellent measure of rank order similarity, it has inherent flaws

Table 19B. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

| Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	that allow a variety of alliance portfolio tables to have identical tau-b results which impact studies looking beyond rank order similarity" (Bennett and Stam, 2007, p. 16).
Interstate War	Correlates of War Interstate War Participants Dataset (version 3.0)	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a democracy is involved in an interstate war for a given year (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace* Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).
Interstate War Deaths	Correlates of War Interstate War Participants Dataset (version 3.0)	Number of Deaths attributed to an interstate war a democracy is involved in (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace* Science, 18/1: 123 – 144).
Number of MIDS (Use of Force)	Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (version 3.10)	Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes a democracy is involved in for a given year (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133 – 154).
Number of Fatal MIDS	Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (version 3.10)	Number of Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes a democracy is involved in for a given year (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 – 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133 – 154).
Relative Power (CINC)	Correlates of War Project – National Material Capabilities Dataset (version 4.0)	The CINC Score is generated by calculating the state's proportion of total system capabilities in 6 areas. The six components of the measure are: iron and steel production (thousands of

Table 19B. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Relative Power (CINC)	Correlates of War Project – National Material Capabilities Dataset (version 4.0)	tons), military expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents), total population (thousands) and urban population (Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48).
Change in Concentration of Power in the Interstate System (*syscon*)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	The *syscon* variable within the Correlates of War Dataset measures the concentration of relative power among the major powers in the interstate system. Values closer to 0 indicate that relative power is more disperse among the major power states in the interstate system (e.g., multipolar systems). Values closer to 1 indicate a single state or two states possess a greater distribution of power in the interstate system compared with the remaining states (e.g., bipolar or unipolar systems) (Singer Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Correlates of War Project).
Major Power Status of State (*Major Power*)	Eugene Dataset (Bennett and Stamm III, 2010)	Major Powers were generated using the Eugene software generator (Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. "Eugene: A Conceptual Manual." International Interactions 26: 179 – 204) in which the (Singer and Small 1966) coding scheme was utilized from the Correlates of War Dataset (Correlates of War Project. 2005. "State System Membership List, v2004.1."). The theoretical concept behind the coding scheme for major powers was developed by Small and Singer (1980). A more detailed description of the coding scheme can be obtained at : http://correlatesofwar.org

Table 19B. Continued: Variables, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variables	Data Source	Operationalization
Additional Controls		
Electoral Systems (Proportional Representation System and Single Member and Mixed Systems)	Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	The coding for the PR_System measure is as follows: 0=states that use a plurality or Single Member District (SMD) system, 1=states that use proportional representation systems.

The coding for Mixed Electoral System is: 0= states that use either PR or SMD/plurality systems, 1=states that use a mixed system. |
District Magnitude	Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2004).	Number of representatives per electoral district
Democratic System (Presidential, non-presidential)	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004).	The system measure is a dummy variable where 1=presidential states and 0=any non-direct presidential system
Executive Control of all Relevant Houses	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004).	Does the party of the executive have an absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers? The case of an appointed Senate is considered as controlled by the executive.
Government Fractionalization	Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2004)	The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties.
Election Year	Database of Political Institutions (Keffer et al 2004)	Is there is an executive election for a given year of observation.
GDP Growth	World Bank (WDI, 2008)	Annual Gross Domestic Product growth in Current US Dollars.

Figure 2B. The Marginal Effect of District Magnitude on the Likelihood of Dispute Initiation (Involving the Use of Force) in Personalistic Electoral Systems

Figure 3B: Personal Vote Index: Alternate Measure

Variable	Value	Electoral Rule
Ballot	0	Party leaders present a fixed ballot.
	1	Party leaders present party ballots, but voters may disturb list;
		Party leaders do not control access to ballots or rank.
Pool	0	Votes for candidates pooled across the whole party.
	1	Votes for candidates are pooled at the sub party level;
		Votes for candidates are not pooled.
Vote	0	Voters cast votes for a single party.
	1	Voters cast votes for multiple candidates;
		Voters cast a single vote below the party level.

Source: Carey and Shugart (1995); Johnson and Wallack (2008).

CHAPTER IV: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONFLICT INITIATION WITHIN DEMOCRACIES

Overview

This dissertation began with Kant's assertion that democracies should be hesitant to adopt aggressive foreign policies due to the reliance democratic leaders have on the citizens that comprise their states. Philosophers such as Kant believed that citizens of democratic polities would be reticent to trumpet the horns of war because they would have to suffer the burdens of foreign military adventures. Thus, democratic leaders, being constrained by a pacific citizenry, should avoid initiating costly military campaigns. History has shown however that democracies do engage in wars and military conflicts with a similar frequency as autocratic states, although the mechanisms that lead each regime type into military conflicts are often different. What scholars such as Kant failed to consider is that citizens in democracies are able to hold their leaders accountable in different ways based on the political and institutional design of their states, and this variation in political accountability significantly influences the propensity of conflict initiation by democratic states. That is, democracies are not created equal regarding their ability to promote electoral accountability for their democratically elected leaders. Consequently, scholars must examine the linkages between citizens and democratic leaders in order to more fully understand the factors that affect when democracies are more or less likely to initiate interstate conflicts. In order to accomplish this task, scholars should seek to understand how the institutional design and shifting political conditions within democracies affect the degree to which democratic leaders are accountable to the public.

An approach similar to the one discussed in the previous chapters provides for a deeper understanding of the domestic sources of conflict initiation within democratic states. Examining the rational incentives democratic leaders have to pursue specific foreign policies based on levels

of public accountability helps us to predict when democracies are more or less likely to initiate military conflicts. I have based my study on quantitative work as well as brief case studies from 5 Latin American states.

The critical element in understanding how varying levels of public accountability affect the initiation of interstate conflicts is the rational incentives democratic leaders have to involve their states in conflict. Democratic leaders, being ever mindful of re-election, take into consideration their own political well-being when deciding how to formulate their foreign policy positions. As Schumpeter (1975) states: "[I]n modern democracies…politics will unavoidably be a career. This in turn spells recognition of a distinct professional interest in the individual politician…Many a riddle is solved as soon as we take account of it" (285).

Furthermore, the degree of public involvement in the policy-making process affects the range of foreign policy options that are considered to be acceptable. While citizens within democracies are not fully passive bodies in regards to their disposition towards interstate wars as Kant propositioned, in the aggregate, democratic citizens are less enthusiastic concerning the prospects of foreign wars compared to state leaders because the citizenry often bear the brunt of the costs of foreign conflicts. Thus, the variation in the extent that democratic leaders are dependent on the public in order to maintain their elected positions is a significant factor that influences foreign policy formation.

Democratic leaders have more freedom to embark on risky military campaigns as there are weaker connections between elected leaders and citizens. Thus, democracies pursue more aggressive foreign policies where citizens have less ability to hold democratic leaders and political parties accountable for their foreign policy initiatives. The logic behind this finding is that when democratic leaders are less accountable to the public there is a reduced likelihood that

they will be punished for advancing risky foreign policies. In contrast, in cases in which there are strong linkages between citizens and elected leaders, democracies adopt more conservative foreign policies because democratic leaders have a greater likelihood of being punished for pursuing aggressive foreign policy strategies.

In review, the causal factor linking varying levels of electoral accountability to the foreign policies that democracies adopt is the concern democratic leaders have with their political livelihood. Ultimately, democratic leaders desire to retain their elected positions. Furthermore, the ability of elected leaders to maintain their positions is reduced when democratic leaders pursue risky military adventures coupled with higher levels of electoral accountability. However, the constraining effect the public has over their elected leaders is weaker when leaders are less directly accountable to the public. It is under these conditions of declining electoral accountability that democratic leaders are most likely to initiate foreign conflicts because it is during such periods that they are better protected from electoral punishment by the public.

Declining Accountability and Conflict Initiation

This research project has important implications regarding the effect political parties and electoral systems have on public accountability and the foreign policies of democracies. First, unstable party systems are likely to result in the weakening of ties between citizens and political parties and candidates, thereby reducing levels of electoral accountability for elected leaders. Furthermore, as the Venezuelan case demonstrates in chapter two, democratic leaders advance more aggressive foreign policies where political parties are incapable of effectively aggregating the interests of the public. Therefore, in unstable party systems, the policy platforms and agendas of political parties and candidates are often vague and tenuous which reduces the ability of the public to hold parties and candidates responsible for policy outcomes. More specifically,

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voters cannot hold political parties and representatives accountable for policy initiatives when they are unable to decipher the parties responsible for specific policy proposals and outcomes. Thus, democratic leaders are able to advance bolder policies in unstable party systems because the public has less ability to punish elected leaders for aggressive policy pursuits.

In a similar finding, elected leaders are less directly accountable to the public and are more likely to adopt risky foreign policies in democracies with non-candidate-centered electoral systems. In these systems, voters often do not have the option of voting for individual candidates, which reduces accountability linkages between voters and representatives. Furthermore, in non-candidate-centered systems, voters have difficulty holding individual leaders responsible for foreign policies. In addition, voters are generally less aware of the policy stances of specific leaders than in candidate-centered systems due to the nature of campaigning in non-candidate centered systems. Thus, in non-candidate-centered systems, democratic leaders are less constrained by the public in terms of the foreign policy options they can pursue because of less direct forms of political accountability. This effect was seen in the case of Ecuador where the Ecuadorian electoral systems failed to promote direct accountability between voters and elected leaders, which allowed democratic leaders in Ecuador to advance risky foreign policies because individual leaders did not have to fear direct punishment at the hands of voters as did individual leaders in candidate-centered systems such as Chile.

Enhanced Accountability and Conflict Initiation

The period in which democratic leaders are most likely to pursue conservative foreign policies is when there are clear and direct linkages between democratic leaders and citizens. These linkages are strongest when party systems are stable and democracies have candidate-centered electoral systems. Democratic leaders are cautious in adopting risky foreign policies

under these conditions because leaders are more vulnerable to punishment by the public that is able to effectively evaluate the policy proposals and outcomes associated with specific political parties and leaders.

Stable party systems increase accountability for democratic leaders through three primary mechanisms. First, in stable party systems, parties and candidates present their political ideologies and agendas to the public in a more precise and systematic manner. Second, the nature of political campaigning is more programmatic in stable party systems because parties in stable party systems have generally entrenched themselves in society through their ideological consistency, thereby inducing predictable patterns regarding their policy positions. Thus, in stable party systems, citizen can more easily evaluate the policy agendas, proposals and outcomes associated with parties and candidates, both retrospectively and prospectively, due to the nature of political parties and campaigns in stable party systems.

In stable party systems democratic leaders develop more conservative foreign policies because they are evaluated by voters based on their specific policy proposals and the outcomes associated with their policy initiates, rather than based on populists rhetoric, as is frequently the case in unstable party systems. Thus, in stable party systems, democratic leaders face a greater likelihood of punishment by voters in the event they adopt risky or ill-advised foreign policy strategies. This finding was most evident in the case of Uruguay in which the three dominant political parties: the Colorados, the Blancos, and the Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista parties established firm roots within society and received consistent vote shares in numerous local and national elections, which contributed to the stability of Uruguay's party system and led democratic representatives to pursue conservative foreign policies.[237] Thus, a hallmark of the

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[237] Cason (2002)

political stability in Uruguay was the strength of its party system which allowed voters to consistently evaluate the performance of political parties and candidates, which increased public accountability and encouraged democratic leaders to pursue well-founded foreign policy initiatives.

While stable party systems are found to enhance public accountability for political parties and democratic leaders, candidate-centered electoral systems increase forms of direct accountability for individual leaders and reduce the likelihood of conflict initiation in democracies, as is shown in chapter three. As the case of Chile demonstrates, in candidate-centered systems, individual democratic leaders must answer to the public themselves, and in the event that democratic leaders advance risky or unpopular foreign polices they cannot withdraw within their parties in hopes of avoiding the wrath of the electorate. Rather, individual leaders must answer to voters for their own policy stances at each election which has the effect of increasing direct forms of electoral accountability for democratic leaders and encouraging leaders to be cautious in embarking on risky military adventures.

Promoting Accountability

Based on the previous findings, several recommendations can be made in attempting to promote prudent foreign policies by democracies. Many of these recommendations depend on increasing the degree elected leaders are held accountable to the public. First, the design of electoral systems significantly affects how much elected leaders are accountable to their constituents. Configuring electoral systems that provide for representation, strong political parties and accountability is a difficult balancing act in many democratic states. However, electoral systems that attempt to create representation and strong political parties to the detriment of accountability often alienate voters and achieve neither goal of representation nor strong

political parties. Venezuela provides an important example of the consequences that can occur when electoral systems fail to provide voters with opportunities to evaluate individual political candidates: "closed list legislative elections in Venezuela and national party organizations that dominated political resources and career opportunities precluded the development of meaningful links between legislators and constituents and undermined accountability" (Carey, 2003, 194). Thus, while electoral system engineers may attempt to foster strong political parties by creating closed party lists and low levels of preferential voting, voters will not be invested in the parties or candidates competing for office when they have minimal influence over the candidates that are elected. Thus, in electoral systems that fail to provide voters with opportunities to evaluate democratic leaders - political parties weaken, electoral accountability declines and the goal of political representation becomes less relevant.

While Single Member District (SMD) electoral systems generally allow voters to select individual candidates with a greater frequency than proportional representation (PR) systems – the design of electoral ballots and party lists (e.g., whether lists are open or closed) are more critical elements in determining the degree of voter choice. Closed list systems provide voters with little ability to determine the candidates that are selected for office. Thus, voters may often disengage from the political process in these systems.

A more ideal design would allow voters to select the candidates competing for office in nominating elections and in general elections. Furthermore, electoral systems could allow for proportional representation and open lists in democracies where many different ethnic, racial and political groups sought representation, and the degree of preferential voting afforded to voters could be further determined based on the type of ballot presented to voters (e.g., ability to select individual candidates and the degree of vote pooling). Such systems would provide electoral

engineers the ability to specify the structure of ballots and degree of vote pooling based on the specific needs of their states. The important aspect of the design of electoral systems is that voters have a vested interest in the political process based on their ability to evaluate democratic leaders rather than having political parties present pre-determined candidates to voters while failing to provide them with discretion in terms of electing specific leaders.

In regards to party system stability within democracies, the responsibility for creating or maintaining stable party systems lies with voters and political parties. Parties that offer clear, consistent and distinct policy choices to voters allow citizens to more accurately form their political ideologies and effectively evaluate parties and candidates from election to election. Thus, the political platforms that parties and candidates campaign on must be consistent with their policy agendas once in power. If this is accomplished, then parties can form strong links with members of their societies while engendering high levels of public accountability for parties and politicians. However, there are often threats to party system stability that can undermine electoral accountability.

Economic and societal turmoil can give way to situations in which parties are viewed as being incapable of capturing the interests of the public as well as maintaining economic and political stability. This effect was seen in Venezuela, where the design of the Venezuelan electoral system coupled with economic and social instability led to the breakdown of its party system. Opportunistic, populist leaders arrived on the political landscape during this period and greatly reduced the strength of Venezuela's political parties and undermined the entire Venezuelan party system. Therefore, In order to prevent the demise of party systems during economic and social crises, voters and politicians must resist the temptation to give in to populist solutions that promise immediate remedies to present crises if those responsible for

implementing the solutions threaten the political institutions that have been in place for many years prior.

More specifically, citizens should be wary of voting parties or candidates into office that appeal to the masses with populist rhetoric rather than relying on programmatic policy agendas. While populist pandering often permeates many political campaigns cross-nationally, the parties and candidates that come to power by way of extreme populist rhetoric are more likely to usurp the power of state to the detriment of political parties. This can have the effect of weakening parties as well as changing the very nature of parties that operate within the party system. Thus, the ability of the public to evaluate the policy proposals and initiatives of parties is greatly impeded when populist parties govern in unstable party systems.

The solution to this dilemma is for voters to seek out political candidates and parties that address their concerns with sensible, realistic policy solutions without threatening the integrity of the political system. Accomplishing this task can be arduous for citizens, because if voters can bypass the temptation to adhere to the populist ideations of leaders, and decide instead to elect more pragmatic and less extreme candidates, there is no guarantee that the parties or leaders elected into office will not pursue radical policies that threaten to undermine the party system. Thus, voters must constantly stand guard against politicians that threaten to weaken the very institutions that allow them to hold their democratic leaders accountable. If voters, democratic leaders and political parties can preserve the integrity of their political parties and maintain their party systems, politicians will continue to be accountable to citizens and leaders will pursue judicious foreign policies.

Conclusion

The primary emphasis in previous studies linking democratic institutions with conflict initiation has been on the moderating effect a larger number of veto players within the policy making process have on the foreign policies of democratic governments. However, the literature has largely neglected the role democratic institutions play in affecting the manner by which democratic leaders are held accountable by the public, and how differences in levels of public accountability structure the foreign policy decisions of democratic governments. More specifically, the process through which democratic leaders are accountable to the electorate directly affects the types of foreign policies democracies pursue. However, the degree democratic leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy decisions varies within democracies based on institutional and political factors.

This dissertation has attempted to uncover the specific institutional and political arrangements that influence the degree democratic leaders are accountable to the public, and how in turn, varying levels of public accountability affect the foreign policies of democracies. The underlying premise of this research has been that scholars must seek to further understand the rational incentives democratic leaders have to pursue conservative or risky foreign policies. As Geddes remarks: "One can explain much of the behavior of states as the outcome of rational choices by self interested officials acting within particular institutional and circumstantial contexts" (1994, 8). Thus, the foreign policy choices of democratic governments are ultimately determined by individual leaders that are influenced by the political environments that structure their behavior. Therefore, the study of the domestic sources of conflict initiation will be greatly enhanced as scholars continue to understand how institutional and political variation within democracies motivates the decisions of democratic leaders.

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APPENDIX

Table 10A. **Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Party System Stability Analysis in Chapter II**

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Revisionist State	.0875	.2826	0	1
Party Replacement	15.20	20.57	0	99.9
Electoral Volatility	14.64	11.68	.45	87.12
Interstate War	.0030	.0550	0	1
Interstate War Deaths	.3396	9.1319	0	268
Number of MIDS	.2566	.7104	0	11
Number of Fatal MIDS	.0165	.1306	0	2
Originator	.1332	.3398	0	1
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	.0183	.0096	.0096	.0499
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	.4362	.1912	.0303	1
Total Number of Alliances	16.3652	10.9787	1	57
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	1.8722	2.1046	0	11
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	2.6392	2.3487	0	13
Major Power Status	.0313	.1743	0	1
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	.0051	.0160	0	.1817
Annual % GDP Growth	3.0933	4.5767	-32.12	26.36
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	3.2161	3.9524	0	12.12
Total Population (in millions) metric	10,950.811	6,580.4687	100	2,231,000.00
Election Year	-10.9274	31.4219	-99	1
Government Fractionalization	-59.4380	236.8733	-999	1
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-65.6247	248.3375	-999	1
District Magnitude	.1852	45.3227	-99	150
PR System	-11.8926	33.1259	-99	1
Mixed Member System	-11.5585	32.1673	-99	1

Table 10A. **Continued. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Party System Stability Analysis in Chapter II**

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Presidential System	-14.1724	35.1134	-99	1
Latin America	.2771	.4476	0	1
Postcommunist	.2300	.4209	0	1
Africa	.0615	.2404	0	1
Asia	.06159	.2404	0	1
OECD	.4258	.4945	0	1

Table 11A.

The Countries and Years Election Data were collected for are listed below:

Country	Years
Albania	1995-2004
Argentina	1985-2004
Australia	1983-2004
Austria	1983-2004
Belgium	1981-2004
Bolivia	1985-2002
Botswana	1989-2004
Brazil	1990-2002
Bulgaria	1992-2001
Canada	1980-2004
Chile	1993-2001
Colombia	1982-2002
Costa Rica	1982-2002
Czech Republic	1996-2002
Denmark	1981-2001
Dominican Republic	1986-2002
Ecuador	1984-2002
El Salvador	1988-2003
Estonia	1996-2004
Finland	1983-2003
France	1981-2002
Germany	1980-2003
Greece	1981-2004
Honduras	1981-2001
Hungary	1992-2004
India	1984-2004
Ireland	1982-2002
Israel	1981-2003
Italy	1983-2001
Japan	1983-2003
Latvia	1995-2002
Lithuania	1996-2004
Luxembourg	1984-2004
Mexico	1988-2003
Moldova	1995-2001
Mozambique	1999-2004
Namibia	1994-2004
Netherlands	1981-2003
New Zealand	1981-2002
Norway	1981-2001
Panama	1999-2004
Paraguay	1993-2003
Philippines	1992-2004
Poland	1993-2001
Portugal	1980-2002
Romania	1996-2004
Russia	1995-2003
Slovakia	1994-2002
Spain	1982-2004
Sweden	1982-2002
United Kingdom	1983-2001
United States	1982-2004
Uruguay	1975-2004
Venezuela	1975-2004

Table 18B. **Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Candidate-Centered Analysis in Chapter III**

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Revisionist State	.0875	.2826	0	1
Personal Vote Index	2.3618	2.0669	0	6
Personal Vote Index (Alternate Measure)	1.6479	1.2687	0	3
Vote	.6915	.5547	0	2
Ballot	.8310	.7501	0	2
District Magnitude	.1852	45.3227	-99	150
Log of District Magnitude	1.8840	1.3328	-.1053	5.0106
District Mangitude (x) Personal Vote Index	2.3318	3.1939	-.5268	16.2518
Interstate War	.0030	.0550	0	1
Interstate War Deaths	.3396	9.1319	0	268
Number of MIDS	.2566	.7104	0	11
Number of Fatal MIDS	.0165	.1306	0	2
Originator	.1332	.3398	0	1
Change in the Concentration of Power in Interstate System (1 year movement)	.0183	.0096	.0096	.0499
Alliance with System Leader (S-Lead)	.4362	.1912	.0303	1
Total Number of Alliances	16.3652	10.9787	1	57
Total Number of Contiguous Autocracies	1.8722	2.1046	0	11
Total Number of Contiguous Democracies	2.6392	2.3487	0	13
Major Power Status	.0313	.1743	0	1
CINC (Relative Capabilities)	.0051	.0160	0	.1817
Annual % GDP Growth	3.0933	4.5767	-32.12	26.36
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP	3.2161	3.9524	0	12.12
Total Population (in millions) metric	10,950.811	6,580.4687	100	2,231,000.00
Election Year	-10.9274	31.4219	-99	1
Government Fractionalization	-59.4380	236.8733	-999	1

Table 18B. **Continued. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Candidate-Centered Analysis in Chapter III**

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Executive Party Control of Legislature	-65.6247	248.3375	-999	1
Majoritarian System	.5301	.4991	0	1
Presidential System	-14.1724	35.1134	-99	1
Latin America	.2771	.4476	0	1
Postcommunist	.2300	.4209	0	1
Africa	.0615	.2404	0	1
Asia	.06159	.2404	0	1
OECD	.4258	.4945	0	1

Table 20B: The Countries and Years Electoral System Data were collected for are listed below:

Country	Years	Country	Years
Albania	1996 – 2004	Jamaica	1990 – 2004
Argentina	1985 – 2004	Japan	1988 – 2004
Australia	1988 – 2004	Kenya	2002 – 2004
Austria	1988 – 2004	Latvia	1991 – 2004
Bahamas	1988 – 2004	Lesotho	1994 – 2004
Belgium	1988 – 2004	Lithuania	1991 – 2004
Belize	1987 – 2004	Macedonia	1994 – 2004
Bolivia	1982 – 2004	Madagascar	1992 – 2004
Botswana	1988 – 2004	Mali	1992 – 2004
Brazil	1985 – 2004	Malta	1988 – 2004
Bulgaria	1990 – 2004	Mauritius	1988 – 2004
Canada	1988 – 2004	Mexico	1997 – 2004
Cape Verde	1993 – 2004	Moldova	1994 – 2004
Chile	1989 – 2004	Namibia	1999 – 2004
Columbia	1988 – 2004	Netherlands	1988 – 2004
Croatia	2000 – 2004	New Zealand	1988 – 2004
Cyprus	1988 – 2004	Nicaragua	1990 – 2004
Czech Republic	1994 – 2004	Norway	1988 – 2004
Denmark	1988 – 2004	Panama	1989 – 1999
Dominican Republic	1988 – 2004	Papua New Guinea	1988 - 2004
Ecuador	1988 – 2004	Peru	1989 – 2004
El Salvador	1984 – 2004	Philippines	1980 – 2004
Estonia	1991 – 2004	Poland	1991 – 2004
Finland	1988 – 2004	Portugal	1991 – 2004
France	1988 – 2004	Romania	1988 – 2004
Germany	1990 – 2004	Russia	1996 – 2004
Ghana	2001 – 2004	Senegal	2000 – 2004
Greece	1988 – 2004	Slovakia	1983 – 2004
Guatemala	1996 – 2004	Slovenia	1991 – 2004
Guyana	1992 – 1997	South Africa	1993 – 2004
Honduras	2000 – 2004	South Korea	1988 – 2004
Hungary	1990 – 2004	Spain	1988 – 1999
India	1975 – 2004	Sweden	1988 – 2004
Indonesia	1999 – 2004	Thailand	1992 – 2004
Ireland	1988 – 2004	Turkey	1988 – 2004
Israel	1988 – 2004	Ukraine	1995 – 2004
Italy	1988 – 2004	United Kingdom	1988 – 2004
		Uruguay	1988 – 2004
		United States	1985 – 2004
		Venezuela	1991 – 2004