Teacher salary and quit performance by union and bargaining power
Zusammenfassung
This study examines the effects of collective bargaining and the different levels of bargaining power associated with the nature of the bargaining laws of the state on teacher salaries and salary changes; and on teachers" quit behavior. A large scale micro data set, specific to public school teachers is utilized—"Longitudinal Career Histories of Public School Teachers from Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina, 1972-1986." The data also includes information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual's work place. Its longitudinal capabilities also allow for the investigstion of the dynamics involved in the process. The Ordinary Least Squares estimation techniques are used for the statistical analysis of salaries and salary changes. Logistic regression techniques are used for determining the factors affecting the quit probability of teachers.
The study shows that the performance of the models for salary determination are improved significantly over previous studies, due to the unique qualities of the data used. However, data problems weakened the robustness of the quit regressions. Collective bargaining increased the teachers" salaries by approximately 20% in a strong bargaining state, and by 6% in a weak bargaining state. Collective bargaining also increased the rate of salary rises. Contrary to previous research, collective bargaining is not found to be associated with a reduction in a teacher's probability to quit.