Complete radical skepticism
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Many contemporary philosophers believe that skeptical arguments are important as they reveal flaws in our reasoning, the removal of which helps us to fine tune 'good' epistemology. However, few, if any, seem to take the position of skepticism seriously, at least as a potential position to hold. In the following pages I will try to lay out why I take skepticism seriously, why I cannot escape it and why my ignorance may have some significance for other philosophers. The skepticism that I wish to defend is best described as a complete form of radical skepticism, hereafter referred to as radical skepticism or just skepticism. By 'complete' I mean that there is no belief or belief forming process that is immune from its skeptical doubts, including the skeptical doubts themselves. A proponent of this form of skepticism is unable to find any was to give any belief at any time the status of being rational.