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dc.creatorFitzpatrick, Kevin
dc.date.available2012-06-01T15:16:14Z
dc.date.issued2007-05
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2346/22646
dc.description.abstractMany contemporary philosophers believe that skeptical arguments are important as they reveal flaws in our reasoning, the removal of which helps us to fine tune 'good' epistemology. However, few, if any, seem to take the position of skepticism seriously, at least as a potential position to hold. In the following pages I will try to lay out why I take skepticism seriously, why I cannot escape it and why my ignorance may have some significance for other philosophers. The skepticism that I wish to defend is best described as a complete form of radical skepticism, hereafter referred to as radical skepticism or just skepticism. By 'complete' I mean that there is no belief or belief forming process that is immune from its skeptical doubts, including the skeptical doubts themselves. A proponent of this form of skepticism is unable to find any was to give any belief at any time the status of being rational.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectAccess
dc.subjectRadical skepticism
dc.subjectInternalism
dc.subjectExternalism
dc.titleComplete radical skepticism
dc.typeThesis
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Art
thesis.degree.levelMasters
thesis.degree.grantorTexas Tech University
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHazlett, Allan
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWebb, Mark O.
dc.contributor.committeeChairWeiner, Matt
dc.rights.availabilityUnrestricted.


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