Veto players and dispute settlement
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This thesis explains why some dyads succeed in reaching a negotiated settlement to their dispute than others. The main argument in this thesis is that the number of veto players directly affects the likelihood of the dyads reaching a negotiated settlement. first, two contradicting arguments (positive and negative effects theories) are presented in this thesis regarding the effects of domestic veto players on the negotiated settlements of dispute and later on the two hypotheses derived from both of the comparative arguments are tested in the statistical model and results are reported. After the statistical tests of both the arguments, I find support for the positive effects theory indicating that dyads with higher number of veto players are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement than otherwise. The positive effect of veto players is a valuable finding which contradicts the traditional view held by the existing literature about their negative effects on negotiations. The theory is tested in a logit model with the data from the MID dataset ranging from 1816 till 2001. There are 2670 dyadic disputes in the dataset compiled for this study.