Examining the link between dollars and decisions: A multi-state study of campaign contributions and judicial decision making

This research examines how the rising costs of judicial campaigns and greater interest group involvement affect the impartiality of elected judges. I seek to answer two questions. First, what effect is the growing cost of judicial campaigns having on case outcomes? Second, are interest groups able to affect judicial votes through greater participation in the judiciary? These questions are important because judicial elections have changed more than any other type of election over the past twenty years. In some states, they are as expensive and combative as congressional elections. Candidate spending has skyrocketed and interest groups and political parties are becoming more active. Nevertheless, there is still relatively little social science research on how the growing levels of interest group participation and campaign spending are affecting judicial decision making and the impartiality of elected judges.
In answering these questions, I focus on the effects that campaign contributions and amicus participation have on judicial decisions. I argue that elected judges, like other politicians, rely on interest groups to help them win reelection. Consequently, contributions and greater interest group involvement affect the impartiality of elected judges, and these influences are manifested in case outcomes. To test these assertions, I undertake three separate empirical analyses—one that addresses the effects of campaign contributions and two that investigate how amicus participation affects judicial decisions. The findings provide evidence that elected judges are influenced by campaign contributions and interest group participation. In this sample of judges from a diverse set of state supreme courts, elected judges often vote strategically to appease campaign contributors and special interests.