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dc.creatorPardos-Prado, Sergi
dc.creatorSagarzazu, Iñaki
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-04T19:49:38Z
dc.date.available2018-06-04T19:49:38Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationPardos-Prado, S., & Sagarzazu, I. (2019). Economic performance and center-periphery conflicts in party competition. Party Politics, 25(1), 50–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818816978en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2346/73894
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818816978
dc.description.abstractThe reasons pushing parties to politicize non-economic dimensions of competition, and the consequences of this for the representation of public opinion,are badly understood in the party competition literature. This is a pressing research gap, especially given the recent and significant re-activation of territorial or center-periphery conflicts in Western Europe. In this paper, we first argue that bad macro-economic performance increases the incentives of incumbent parties to deviate the attention towards territorial conflicts in order to avoid electoral punishment. Secondly, we also argue that the opposite is true for public opinion: itis precisely during periods of bad economic performance and high economic concern,when the electorate moves away from territorial interests. The dynamic emerging from our findings is thus far from an ideal bottom-up representation: elites divert the attention towards territorial conflicts to mask periods of poor economic performance,which is precisely when public opinion is less interested in center-periphery issues.We validate our claims using text analysis of party attention in Spain, and time series models covering four electoral cycles (1996-2011).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEmeralden_US
dc.subjectCompetitionen_US
dc.subjectMacroeconomicsen_US
dc.subjectPolitical partiesen_US
dc.subjectPublic opinionen_US
dc.titleEconomic Performance and Center-Periphery Conflicts in Party Competitionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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