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dc.creatorShaw, William G.
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-14T20:16:43Z
dc.date.available2018-09-14T20:16:43Z
dc.date.issued1970
dc.identifier.citation2 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 151en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2346/74577
dc.description.abstractExamines the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Santana, which vacated its previous judgement that the standard of proof for juvenile proceedings is the statutory quantum of preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision was due, the Court reasoned, to the juvenile proceedings’ primary function of assisting and rehabilitating youth, rather than the depravation of liberty, and thus rendering juvenile trials neither adversary nor criminal in nature. Following this decision, the United States Supreme Court held in in re Winship that due process required that juveniles be adjudicated using the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. The Santana decision was then vacated and remanded in light of Winship. The author questions the effect that retroactive application of Winship would have on those convicted as juveniles who are now adults.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherTexas Tech Law Reviewen_US
dc.subjectStandard of proofen_US
dc.subjectBurden of proofen_US
dc.subjectJuvenileen_US
dc.subjectBeyond a reasonable doubten_US
dc.subjectPreponderance of evidenceen_US
dc.subjectState v. Santanaen_US
dc.subjectin re Winshipen_US
dc.subjectCase noteen_US
dc.titleThe Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: Santana in the Aftermath of Winshipen_US
dc.title.alternativeJuvenile Courts—The Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: Santana in the Aftermath of Winshipen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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