Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.creatorHunter, Young Y.
dc.date.available2011-08-02T20:28:27Z
dc.date.issued2011-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2346/ETD-TTU-2011-08-1751en_US
dc.description.abstractA key feature of democracy is the idea that democratic leaders are accountable to the citizens within their states. That is, scholars assume that democratic leaders are accountable to voters, and the policies democracies develop are influenced by citizens that comprise democratic electorates. However, scholars have largely failed to consider how the ability of the public to hold democratic leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions shapes the foreign policies of democracies. Researchers have rarely considered the role of voters in affecting the foreign policies of democracies across different types of democratic states. Furthermore, democratic leaders are not accountable to their publics to the same degree when comparing democracies. Institutional and political differences among democracies create significant variations in levels of political accountability for democratic leaders. Thus, I seek to investigate the more precise linkages between voters, political parties and democratic leaders in determining when democracies are more or less likely to initiate interstate conflicts with other states. In this dissertation, I address two areas that have been neglected in previous research: the failure of scholars to consider the effect party systems have on political accountability and conflict initiation within democracies; and, the neglect of researchers in considering the role electoral systems have in structuring the manner by which elected leaders are accountable to the public and the resulting effect on the foreign policies democracies pursue. Through a cross-national quantitative analysis, I examine how party systems and electoral systems affect political accountability for democratic leaders, and how in turn, variation in levels of political accountability affect the foreign policies of democracies. The results from the quantitative analysis indicate that as party systems are more stable, and electoral systems promote candidate-centered incentives, democracies are less conflict prone because democratic leaders are more beholden to the public.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPublic accountabilityen_US
dc.subjectParty systemen_US
dc.subjectElectoral systemen_US
dc.subjectCandidate-centereden_US
dc.subjectParty-centereden_US
dc.subjectConflicten_US
dc.subjectConflict initiationen_US
dc.subjectDemocracyen_US
dc.titlePublic accountability and conflict initiation within democracies
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Science
thesis.degree.grantorTexas Tech University
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Science
dc.contributor.committeeMemberPatterson, Dennis
dc.contributor.committeeMemberRider, Toby J.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWilliams, Laron
dc.contributor.committeeChairBiglaiser, Glen
dc.degree.departmentPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.rights.availabilityUnrestricted.


Ficheros en el ítem

Thumbnail

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem