An Analysis of Doxastic Morali

Date
2022-12
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Abstract

This thesis investigates the morality of beliefs. In the first chapter, I use a variety of examples to show that accepting moral norms on beliefs may seem intuitive. I turn to doxastic wronging in the second chapter, a narrow thesis. I examine the objectification-based and harm-based accounts and discover that both contain flaws. In the third chapter, I attempt to provide a more promising account, which I refer to as a recognition-based account. In the fourth chapter, I consider two objections. Finally, I conclude.


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Keywords
doxastic morality, ethics of belief, recognition
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