Militarized conflict intervention: Incentives, constraints and strategic behavior

Political leaders must navigate delicate confluences of domestic and international pressures. On the domestic front, public, private, and partisan elite blocs jockey for attention and influence. On the international front, allies, enemies, and misfortunes demand constant strength and foreign policy finesse. Pressed between, executives are both constrained by and capable of manipulating both sides with a wealth of tools. This is particularly true under conditions of international military intervention, especially at the start when publics are prone to rally and when leaders have the lion’s share of information and latitude. This dissertation examines the conditions and limits of domestic support for international conflict, the rhetorical strategies that presidents employ to maximize it, and the interposing role of private economic actors in eliciting it despite low public tolerance for economic motives and sparse means to improve it.

First, it examines public attitudes toward international conflict onset filtered through the lens of domestic conditions. Building on diversionary theory, it argues that during domestic good times, the public is likely to rally around the flag from a standing posture of trust in the president’s competence. Conversely, during bad times the public will be reticent to rally from a position of anxiety and scrutiny of the executive’s performance. Second, it pivots to analyze how presidents lead public opinion upon conflict onset with frames in rhetoric. Positioned at the fore of intelligence in an unfolding intervention, leaders can structure the public discourse in politically favorable terms. Examining how US presidents justify the reasons for the international use of force, I demonstrate that they emphasize popular frames and censor unpopular ones to gain an edge in approval. Finally, I explore how foreign direct investors operating in conflict zones bid for external intervention, undercutting public preferences and presidential rhetoric. I argue that extractive and vertically integrated projects, having distinct in-country opportunities and constraints on exit, have incentives and influence to pull leaders into conflict to protect illiquid assets. Overall, I present novel theory and robust empirical evidence clarifying the complex triangular linkages between strategic leader behavior, domestic, and international politics.