UnFoxing Judicial Review of Agency Policy Reversals or "We Were Told to Like the New Policy Better" Is Not a Good Reason to Change

Date

2020

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

University of Richmond Law Review

Abstract

Looks at agency changes in policy based on presidential influence in light of the Fox case. Part I of this Article provides context for the debate over the Fox power by tracing the evolution of leading efforts over the last century to legitimize agency policymaking and close the "democracy deficit" that it purportedly creates. Part I focuses in particular on the courts' development of arbitrariness review as a means of controlling agency policymaking, and it also pays particular attention to the "presidentialist" model that White House control of agency policymaking democratizes and legitimizes it. Part II takes a close look at the Fox litigation itself. This discussion reveals that Justice Scalia's Fox power, like presidentialism, presupposes that extra-statutory political influences wielded by elected officials and their proxies can legitimize agency policy changes. Part III criticizes this framework for resting on an unrealistic understanding of democratic governance and electoral accountability, and it explains why Justice Breyer was right to insist that agencies should give (expert) answers to his "Why change?" query.

Description

Keywords

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., Democracy deficit, Nondelegration doctrine, Transmission-belt model, Administrative law, Interest representation model, Administrative rulemaking, Reasoned decisionmaking, Presidentialism, Judicial review of agency policy reversals, Fox power

Citation

54 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1045