Color and after-image experiences

I criticize Boghossian and Velleman's argument that according to content-dispositionalism visual experiences present after-images as disposed to look colored under standard conditions and their argument that visual experiences cannot present afterimages as disposed to look colored under standard conditions. They claim that the color content of after-image and external object experiences is the same. I argue that the color content of these two experiences is not the same because the standard conditions under which the two experiences present dispositions to look colored are different and standard conditions contribute to the color content of visual experiences. They also claim that the presentation of after-images in visual experiences as material objects is a necessary condition for the possibility that visual experiences present after-images as disposed to look colored under standard conditions. I argue that if it is not necessary to experience glares of reflected light as material objects for the possibility that visual experiences present glares as disposed to look colored under standard conditions, then by analogy, it is probably not necessary to experience after-images as a material objects for the possibility that visual experiences present after-images as disposed to look colored under standard conditions. I conclude that Boghossian and Velleman are not entitled to the claim that content-dispositionalism mistakenly describes after-image experiences.