Congress and the judiciary: The role of ideology in the federal sentencing guidelines

Previous studies have shown that ideology plays a role in federal judicial sentencing. However, there is a lack of research on the role of ideology and judicial sentencing in the federal appellate courts of appeal. In addition, when Congress passed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it limited judicial discretion. When the Supreme Court handed down the decision in United States v. Booker (2005), it made the guidelines advisory only and gave judges more discretion. This question in this study is how does ideology play a role in implementing the sentencing guidelines and the effects of the Booker (2005) decision? I argue that congressional representatives passed the guidelines due to their ideological preferences. I also argue that since Booker (2005), judges are more likely to favor the defendant in appellate court cases. I found that the more conservative a congressional representative is, the more likely he or she will favor the guidelines. In addition, I found that overall, federal appellate judges will favor the defendant more since the Booker (2005) decision. Moreover, I found that liberal judges will favor the defendant more than conservative judges. This study builds on the effects of ideology and decision making in Congress and the judiciary.