Governance, CEO power, and acquisitions

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dc.creatorOler, Derek (TTU)
dc.creatorOlson, Bradley
dc.creatorSkousen, Christopher J.
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-14T18:45:28Z
dc.date.available2023-09-14T18:45:28Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.descriptioncc-by-nc
dc.description.abstractWe examine whether governance matters for acquisitions. Acquisitions are frequently beneficial to the CEO of the acquiring firm, but can often be value-destructive to acquirer shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees. We find that corporate governance does not appear to influence whether a firm will become an acquirer after controlling for CEO power, but superior governance is associated with greater relatedness between the target and acquirer. We also find that the effect of CEO power on a firm's acquisition activity varies according to the source of that power. Our results suggest that the relationships between governance, CEO power, and acquisition activity are complex.
dc.identifier.citationOler, D., Olson, B., & Skousen, C.J.. 2010. Governance, CEO power, and acquisitions. Corporate Ownership and Control, 7(3 E). https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3c4p3
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3c4p3
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2346/96159
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectAcquisitions
dc.subjectCEO power
dc.subjectCorporate governance
dc.subjectDiversification
dc.titleGovernance, CEO power, and acquisitions
dc.typeArticle

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