Naturalizing propositions, cognitive complexity, and animal minds
| dc.contributor.committeeChair | Boylan, David | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Schwartz, Jeremy | |
| dc.creator | Chapa, Jaime | |
| dc.creator.orcid | 0000-0002-7194-5824 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-11T20:51:14Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-01-11T20:51:14Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2021-12 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-12 | |
| dc.date.submitted | December 2021 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-01-11T20:51:15Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper I mount two attacks on the current naturalized accounts of structured propositions. The first attack concerns the exclusion of the possibility that the contents of animal mental states can be propositional due to King’s view relying on syntactic structure and language users to ground propositions. The second attack concerns the cognitive complexity required for quantified propositions and what that means for the possibility that the contents of animal mental states. After characterizing the pitfalls of the current views, I forward a multiply realizable view of propositions in chapter two. I also discuss how, on this view, propositions could arise from perception. Doing this allows me the machinery to answer the objections posed to the views from chapter 1. I discuss how we can acquire logical connectives through perception which can be later used to compose more complex propositions. I also suggest, in a similar fashion, how we can grant cognizers quantified propositional contents. I then go on to elaborate on how my view is better fit to deal with the worries and criticisms forwarded in chapter one. Once I detail my positive view, I discuss some of the natural objections that arise for perceptual realization of propositions, namely how we can explain the presence of propositions which have as a component, referents that pick out seemingly unperceivable objects/entities. I do this by reiterating the more general view I forward in chapter two, that propositions are multiply realizable. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2346/88711 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.rights.availability | Access is not restricted. | |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | |
| dc.subject | Propositions | |
| dc.title | Naturalizing propositions, cognitive complexity, and animal minds | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.type.material | text | |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Texas Tech University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts |