UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1949-1968

by

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INTRODUCTION

Changes have recently occurred in United States policy toward the People's Republic of China.\(^1\) This gradual thaw in a long present frozen condition of relations between two of the largest and most powerful nations of the world has been of great significance due to the fact that it was so different from the policy that was applied to the People's Republic during almost the entire decade of the 1950's. The possibility presented for even greater changes in United States China policy in the future adds to the importance of this thaw.

Due to the gradualness with which the change in United States policy toward China has occurred it has been fairly difficult, and impossible for many, to detect any significant change.\(^2\) For that reason, and in an attempt to provide adequate evidence that a change has actually occurred, this study has attempted a detailed survey of the policy of the

\(^1\) Hereinafter the terms "People's Republic of China" and "China" will be used interchangeably to designate what is commonly referred to as mainland China. The "Republic of China" will be used to refer to the government of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa. Occasionally the terms "Washington" and "Peking" are used in place of the proper names of the nations concerned in an attempt to provide variation.

\(^2\) As an example of the inability to detect any change in policy over the years see editorial in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 1, 1967, p.2-b, in which there is the statement that, "United States policy toward China has been sterile and unchanged since 1949. . . ." The author also has a letter from Hans J. Morgenthau in which he expresses doubt that any change has occurred in the China policy of the United States.
United States toward China since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. During most of the period from 1949 to date the United States has maintained a hard stance toward China, but in the past few years, primarily since 1960, a slight thawing of policy has occurred, as indicated below. These changes have become more and more attractive to both the general population of the United States and to governmental officials as acceptable alternatives to the earlier China policy, which has received more and more criticism recently. It is these changes that this study has attempted to chronicle.

While only one main "thread" has been developed—that of what the policy of the United States toward the People's Republic of China has been—attention has been given to the more major influences upon United States China policy. With the completion of this review of United States China policy an attempt has been made at providing proof that a change in United States China policy, albeit a small one, has occurred.

It should be emphasized that the study has been limited to United States policy toward the People's Republic of China. The policy of the People's Republic toward the United States, and United States policy toward the Republic of China, has

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been examined only when it appeared directly, and materially, related to United States policy toward the People's Republic. Due to the fact that the purpose of the paper has been limited to establishing that a change in China policy has occurred, no attempt has been made to evaluate United States China policy.
CHAPTER I

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT

OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In order to have a proper perspective from which to examine United States policy toward China during the period 1949-1968, it is necessary to take a brief look at what that policy had been in years past. While, speaking in historical measurements of time, the total period of relations between the United States and China is relatively short, these relations have been very detailed and complicated, especially during the first half of the Twentieth Century. Herbert Feis chose a very descriptive title when he gave the title The China Tangle to his book describing American Chinese policy in the years between Pearl Harbor and the dispatch of General George C. Marshall in late 1945 to China in an attempt to solve the "China problem". This earlier history of United States Chinese policy is so complex that space will permit only a cursory survey to be made here. It is hoped that


this brief study will be sufficient to enable the reader to understand the impact of past policy upon the specific period to be studied in this paper.

The establishment of a precise date for the beginning of contact by the United States with China can be made in several ways. Among the most novel is one which utilizes the frontier thesis which has had such an effect upon American historians. This approach holds that Americans began moving toward China almost as soon as there were Americans—at the successful conclusion of the American Revolution. At this point, this line of reasoning holds, Americans began the steady westward expansion that brought the passing of the frontier at home in the 1890's. With the need for a frontier continuing, "... we established a new theoretical frontier in the [form of the] Open Door doctrine in China; we were continuing the same process."3 The most definite method of determining a beginning of contact between China and the United States is to date it either through the first commercial contact or through the first treaty enacted between the two countries. It was in 1784 that the


3Fairbank, p.251; This same general approach is utilized by Latourette, pp.9-10.
first American ship reached China. Upon the ship's return to the United States a new trade route was opened which would play a major part in future relations between the two countries. Official contact was made in the first treaty between the two nations. This was the Treaty of Wanghia, signed in July, 1844. It was within this treaty that the first foundation of United States policy toward China was started, holding that all treaty rights given to other nations would be extended to the United States also. Specified were such things as trade, residence, religious activity, tariff and other commercial regulations, thus establishing the idea that the United States expected to receive basically the same treatment in China as was extended to other nations. This was to be the basic policy until near the turn of the century. It should be noted that during the Nineteenth Century, American interest in China was dominated by two things—trade and religion. Few, if any, activities of other types were carried on. Latourette pointed this out by saying:

Both factors, the hunger for markets and for opportunities to invest capital profitably, and the unselfish desire for the welfare of the peoples of the Far East partly expressed through Christian missions, entered into the shaping of the Far Eastern policy of the United States.

4Ibid., p.11.
This approach to Chinese policy suited the United States well until near the end of the century. Little interference in Chinese affairs was made by other nations on a scale that bothered Washington to the extent that it felt compelled to do anything. Washington's satisfaction with the situation in China was no doubt assisted by the fact that whenever such interference did seem likely, the United States could always count on Britain, for reasons of her own, to maintain the status quo. This proved equally beneficial for the United States.

As the century drew to a close, glimmerings of imperialism began occurring in China. In the words of Thomas A. Bailey "... the European Powers descended upon her 'living carcass' and extorted great lease-holds and spheres of influence." After some hesitation, Secretary of State John Hay enunciated the Open Door Policy which soon became the central feature of United States Chinese policy and remained as such until the beginning of World War II. This was done on September 6, 1899, through a series of notes sent to Germany, Russia, England, Japan, Italy, and France, with the request that they give:

... formal assurances that they would refrain from interfering with any treaty port or any vested

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7See: Fairbank, pp.250-51.
interest or the Chinese treaty tariff within their spheres of interest and that they would grant traders of all countries equality of treatment with respect to harbor dues and railroad charges. 

In short the original American Open Door policy was concerned simply with maintaining commercial relations as they were. It was a very weak pronouncement and made no insistence of territorial integrity at that time.

The Open Door of 1899 was strengthened considerably, and the major part of the foundation of American policy vis-a-vis China was established, by the addition, in 1900, of a corollary to the doctrine of 1899. This addition was brought about by the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion. This Chinese rebellion against foreign dominance gave Secretary Hay the opportunity to put some "teeth" in American policy. On July 3, 1900, a policy statement was issued stating that the United States was going to:

... seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 

Thus a major idea was added to United States Chinese policy, that of maintaining Chinese territorial and administrative conditions as they then stood. The established policy was

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9Tang Tsou, p.3.
now one of maintaining ". . . by diplomacy, the twin principles of equal commercial opportunity and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. . . ." With only minor adjustments, and periodic reaffirmations, this two part policy remained the official attitude of the United States toward China until the outbreak of World War II.

The most significant aspect of American Chinese policy during the first decade of the new century was the fact that the policy described above was not backed up by force. Instead, Washington relied time after time upon words as the means of maintaining desired policy in China. This approach, as might be expected, eventually brought about a situation that called for much more than mere pronouncements, but it was significant that the power of words worked as long as it did.

This "foreign policy without force" was most severely tested by the Japanese and it was the Japanese who eventually forced the hand of the United States in China. The first major test of United States policy occurred with the Russo-Japanese War. The reaction here was simply to request the belligerents to ". . . preserve the neutrality and 'administrative entity' of China. . . ."13

11Ibid., p.3.
12Tang Tsou, p.7.
In 1908, the Open Door policy was strengthened by the conclusion of the Root-Takahira Agreement between the United States and Japan which followed a "flexing of muscles" in the form of Roosevelt's sending the American fleet around the world. In this agreement, and it was only an agreement and not a treaty, the United States and Japan agreed:

1. to maintain the status quo in the Pacific and to respect each other's territorial possessions in that region;
2. to uphold the Open Door in China; and
3. to support by pacific means the "independence and integrity of China."14

The central theme of protecting the commercial rights of United States citizens, while at the same time maintaining Chinese integrity was apparent here as it was throughout this period. It might also be noted that the words "by pacific means" indicated that the United States was not yet ready to maintain the status quo in China through the use of armed force.

After Japan extended the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915, demands which if fulfilled would make China nothing more than a puppet of Japan, the United States once again verbally expressed its viewpoint of the proper relationship between China and the other powers. This was done through a note from Secretary of State Bryan to the Japanese Ambassador stating that:

It is difficult for the United States ... to reconcile these requests [the Twenty-one Demands] with the

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14White Paper, p.5.
maintenance of the unimpaired sovereignty of China which Japan, together with the United States and the Great Powers of Europe, has reaffirmed from time to time during the past decade and a half in formal declarations, treaties and exchanges of diplomatic notes. The United States, therefore, could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military or economic domination over China by a foreign power . . . which would . . . exclude Americans from equal participation in the economic and industrial development of China and would limit the political independence of that country.

On the contrary the policy of the United States, as set forth in this note, is directed to the maintenance of the independence, integrity and commercial freedom of China and the preservation of legitimate American rights and interests in that Republic.15

Once again there was the restatement of the United States' two-fold China policy—commercial access for the United States and the continuation of the status quo as concerned the Chinese nation.

With the alliance of the United States and Japan on the same side during World War I, a shaky "truce", following the general lines of the by then traditional United States policy toward China, existed between what seemed to be the two major participants in the future of China.

In 1922, through the Nine-Power Treaty, the United States was able to strengthen its basic China policy to what seemed to be the strongest point up to that time. This was done by gaining the concurrence of the signatory nations to Washington's ideals, thus giving the policy a much

15 Ibid., p.436.
broader base. The treaty stated that:

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from contemnancing action inimical to the security of such States.16

By getting other major powers to enter into an agreement which was so closely aligned to United States policy in connection with China, it was naturally assumed that the policy had become a much broader based, and thus a stronger, policy. Whether or not this was the case, the traditional policy had once again been reaffirmed by the United States. With this accomplished, Washington acted at most as a mildly interested bystander for almost a decade as this policy was not severely tested by anyone to the degree that made the United States take any action.

This short period of relaxation proved to be the lull before the storm, however, as, beginning in 1931, Japan began taking actions that came into direct conflict with at least part of Washington's dual policy toward China—that

16 Ibid., p.440.
of maintaining the territorial integrity of China. It also was quite probable that at least some interference with commercial access to China would occur. This test of United States policy was provided by the invasion of parts of China by Japanese troops starting on September 18, 1931.\footnote{Meribeth Cameron, Thomas Mahoney, and George McReynolds, \textit{China, Japan and the Powers: A History of the Modern Far East} (2d ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p.466.} The United States met the Manchurian Crisis, as it was called, with steps short of armed force, just as it had always done in the Far East. This time Washington sought to work through the League of Nations, even though it was not a member. After a short time, a slightly new approach was added, but still one composed only of words. This was the announcement in early January, 1932, of the Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition. This was done by notifying both Japan and China that the United States did not:

\begin{quote}
\ldots\text{intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between these governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy.}\ldots\footnote{Ibid., p.468.}
\end{quote}

Again a reluctance to use force was apparent on the part of the United States.
The basic policy did not change with the assumption of power by the Roosevelt Administration in 1933, even though Japan seemed to be embarking upon a progressively more aggressive policy toward China; a policy which definitely conflicted with that of the United States. By such progressive steps Washington was brought to the point of Pearl Harbor, at least partially by its past statements concerning China policy. In the words of John K. Fairbank:

Through the Open Door policy and the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 we were committed to the support of the territorial integrity of China. . . . As a result, we were stuck during the uneasy decade that followed 1931 with a Far Eastern policy which sought to maintain China's integrity, as was constantly reiterated on paper, but which was unable to do so in fact. Paper policies that are not backed up invite aggression. It was no accident that we were brought into World War II by Japanese action. The strategic weakness of our own policy toward China had contributed to international instability.19

United States policy toward China naturally underwent several changes with its entry into the war. These changes were not, however, nearly what the Chinese had hoped; for even then, the attention of the United States was centered primarily upon the European front and not on the Far East.

The major change, or more properly, addition, in United States China policy brought on by entry of the United States into the war was that of trying to make China a major power—such as would befit an ally. This was attempted in several ways. First, there was the fact that the aid

19Fairbank, p.9.
that had been extended before Pearl Harbor was increased through such avenues as Lend-lease and others.\textsuperscript{20} There was also the relinquishment of "extraterritorial and related rights in China" brought about by treaty on May 20, 1943.\textsuperscript{21} A legislative measure that gave increased standing to China was the act repealing exclusion of immigration from China to the United States, establishing an annual quota, though a minimal one, for Chinese immigrants, and making it possible for Chinese living in America to become naturalized citizens.\textsuperscript{22} Other actions that indicated a basic change in Washington's attitude toward China included the Declaration of Four Nations, an early step toward establishment of the United Nations; the Cairo Conference, which declared that lands seized from China by Japan would be returned to China; and, of course, the Yalta Conference, at which some concessions were given Russia from China, without China's knowledge, in return for Russian entry into the Pacific Theater.

From the foregoing brief survey of basic American policy toward China during the war, it is noticeable that American Chinese policy had been altered.\textsuperscript{23} This change

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p.36.
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p.37.
\textsuperscript{23}For a very interesting and quite detailed study of total, meaning military, economic, and diplomatic, American Chinese policy during the war years the reader is once again referred to Feis, \textit{The China Tangle}. 
in general, was from a policy of words which was somewhat vague and full of generalizations--"territorial integrity", "Open Door", etc.--to a policy actively aimed at creating and/or maintaining a strong, stable ally in the Far East. It can almost be said that this was a policy change from idealism to realism, if it can be considered realistic to have expected China to become a major power at the conclusion of the war.

From the end of the war to the fall of the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1949, is a period about which there are two very distinct sides of opinion. This is a period about which there have been many accusations, and one about which it is still extremely hard to be completely neutral. Because of this, the period will receive only a cursory treatment here; one that is taken primarily from official government records.\(^{24}\)

With the conclusion of World War II, the United States found itself in a somewhat new position, that of a major world power, and one who had to take an active part in world affairs. In connection with China, the United States had one major policy with two major problems. Both the policy and the problems were indicated in a document

\(^{24}\) The reader who desires to find the substance of both sides of the argument is referred to such works as: Freda Utley, The China Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951); Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963); and, Tang Tsou, the most objective of the three.
entitled "U. S. Policy Toward China" which President Truman presented to General Marshall before he embarked upon his ill-fated mission to China as "personal representative" of the President. This indication of policy and problems stated that:

> It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace.\(^2^5\)

The policy continued to be to make China a world power; the two problems were, first, to make a weakened China into a world power, and second, to unite a deeply divided China.

Spasmodically through several decades a struggle had been going on within China between the government of Chiang Kai-shek, referred to as the Nationalist Government or the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party. This struggle had not ceased during the war, which greatly diminished the ability of China to fight the war and also cast a shadow upon ideas of ever making China a world power. With the conclusion of the war the Chinese struggle burst into a full-scale civil war. The United States thus had to unite China in some way before it could realize its goal of having China as one of the "policemen" of world peace.

In a major policy statement on December 15, 1945 President Truman called for:

... a cessation of hostilities in China, but pledged that there would be no American military intervention to influence the Chinese civil fighting. ... 

The President concluded by promising America's assistance, as China moved toward peace and unity, in the rehabilitation of the country, in the improvement of the industrial and agrarian economy, and in the establishment of a military organization "capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order". 26

This statement remained the bulwark of United States policy toward China up to the Communist takeover in 1949. The policy was one of wanting China to be a major power, but one reminiscent of past policy in that there was no intention of intervention by force to bring about this policy.

Before undertaking a study of how the United States attempted to bring about this policy without utilizing force, mention should be made of a third problem that quickly confronted United States policy-makers in regard to China. This was the presence of a great deal of corruption, especially on the lower levels, in the government of Chiang Kai-shek. This had presented some problem during the war and seemed to get worse as the struggle against the Communists intensified with the end of the war. It was to confront these problems—the difficulty in making China

26White Paper, p. 133.
a world power, the internal fighting in China, and the rising corruption in the Nationalist regime—and to bring about the realization of the goal of making China a world power that Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in late 1945 as his special representative to bring about "... the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods. ..."

Marshall arrived in China near the end of December, 1945, and immediately began trying to bring about a compromise between the two sides of the civil conflict. It seemed clear, using hindsight, that Washington wanted the Nationalists to come out as at least partial victors in the struggle. It also seemed clear that some concessions would have to be made to the Communists due to their very real strength, but that they should not be allowed complete victory. Feis reports that the Chinese government "... was not to be abandoned, i.e., left entirely without help, no matter how the effort to bring about a peaceful settlement fared." Thus, it seems that there was at least some consideration of possible active intervention if it became entirely necessary. This possibility faded away, however, as corruption, inflation, and a general lack of confidence in Chiang on the part of the Chinese people grew.

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27Truman, p.87.
28Feis, p.421.
At first, while Marshall seemed to be having real success in bringing about his purpose in China, American hopes began to ascend. Three "major agreements" had been realized by as early as February, 1946. First of these was a cessation of hostilities, which proved to be short lived. The second and third agreements were for governmental and military reorganization, respectively, which would take in a portion of the Communists. This made possible the convening of the Political Consultative Conference at which Kuomintang, Communist and other groups were to be represented. Even with these apparent successes the Marshall mission was doomed to failure; the truce broke down, with full scale fighting the result, and the Conference met little success before being abandoned. Each side became more and more entrenched. As one author has put it:

The mission on which General Marshall was sent to China . . . consequently became involved in a long drawn out game of Chinese checkers, in which each contestant jumped the other, play by play, and gradually eliminated from the board all the means by which the United States might have influenced the end result.

The failure of the Marshall effort was a blow to United States policy in China, but one which had been partially expected.

29 McGeorge Bundy (ed.), The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp.163-64. It should be pointed out, for establishment of credibility, that Bundy is the brother of Acheson's son-in-law.

On August 10, 1946, signs of United States dissatisfaction with the situation in China were evident in two related statements. In China, General Marshall and Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart said that "... China is in a serious economic condition and ... the fighting threatens to 'pass beyond the control of those responsible'". On the same day President Truman expressed discontent in a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that:

The rapidly deteriorating political situation in China, during recent months, has been a course of grave concern to the American people. While it is the continued hope of the United States that an influential and democratic China can still be achieved under your leadership, I would be less than honest if I did not point out that latest developments have forced me to the conclusion that the selfish interests of extremist elements, both in the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, are obstructing the aspirations of the people of China.

American faith in the peaceful and democratic aspirations of the Chinese people has not been destroyed by recent events, but has been shaken. The firm desire of the people of the United States and of the American Government is still to help China achieve lasting peace and a stable economy under a truly democratic government. There is an increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by failing to understand the liberal trend of the times. The people of the United States view with violent repugnance this state of affairs.

It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that

genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America.32

Though the threat was apparent, the policy remained essentially the same—hope for a united, powerful China.

No real improvement was made in connection with the internal affairs of China, thus bringing another statement from the President on December 18, 1946. This statement also condemned the situation in China, but it held promise of future aid when the situation warranted. It was, however, very careful to indicate that no intervention by the United States would be forthcoming until changes for the better were made. This statement stated that:

Our United States position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.

When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China and which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations between American and Chinese businessmen.33

With no real likelihood of improvement, Marshall decided that he should leave China. Truman agreed, not only because he could see no chance of a success by Marshall in China, but also because he was naming him Secretary of State to

33Ibid., p.694.
replace the ill Secretary Byrnes. Truman did not blame Marshall at all for the failure of the mission, instead he felt that "the Marshall mission had been unable to produce results because the government of Chiang Kai-shek did not command the respect and support of the Chinese people." It seemed that the blame for the failure of American policy in China was being placed more and more upon the weaknesses of the Nationalist government.

Still not ready to write-off the Chinese, Truman sent General Albert Wedemeyer to China in July of 1947 in hope that some new circumstance might be found that could save the American Chinese policy. Wedemeyer found no improvement and in his report to the President mentioned the "apathy and lethargy" he found and the fact that the Central government would have to make drastic reforms in order to regain the confidence of the people to the point that a stable government might be established. He did recommend, however, a resumption of aid to China. This paradoxical policy was undertaken, though without much chance for success. This was done primarily because of domestic pressure put upon Washington to save the "democratic" government of China.

It should be mentioned that the Wedemeyer Report was not

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34 See: Truman, p.110.

35 Ibid., p.111.

made public until 1949, so as to not weaken the morale of the Nationalists even more. 37

The situation in China deteriorated rapidly for the Nationalists from 1947 on. Starting in the North, which had long been their stronghold, the Communists steadily pushed the Nationalists back. On September 1, 1948, the Communists announced the creation of a North China People's Govern- ment. 38 On November 1, 1948, the key to Manchuria, Mukden, fell to the Communist forces. On November 5, the American citizens in all except southern China were advised to leave the country. 39

The year 1949 was, of course, no better for the Nationalists. They were well aware of their predicament and were grasping at straws in an effort to save their government. An example of this was the 'retirement' of Chiang Kai-shek on January 21. This was unsuccessful, however, as a rapid series of major cities falling into the hands of the Communists began. Peiping on January 31, the Nationalist capital of Nanking on April 24, and Shanghai on May 25, were all a part of this rapid collapse of the Nationalists. After a short attempt at negotiations, during which the Nationalists rejected the demands of the Communists,

37 Congressional Quarterly Service, p.45.
39 Congressional Quarterly Service, p.45.
and even after additional American economic aid, the Nationalist government finally had to leave the mainland of China and establish itself on the island of Formosa on December 8, 1949. The Communists declared themselves the government of China as the People's Republic of China on September 21, with the formal inauguration on October 1, 1949. The American Ambassador to China had returned to Washington in August.

The final collapse of the Nationalist government was not unexpected in the United States. This likelihood had been apparent for sometime and the government had made preparations toward this end by a slight shift in policy. This shift was along the lines of explaining why the loss of China was unavoidable. As one observer put it:

The first step in this direction was the publication by the Department of State of the China White Paper, designed to close the chapter on support of the Kuomintang so as to open the way for a fresh approach to the China problem. 40

As this White Paper, issued August 5, 1949, was more aligned with United States China policy after the establishment of the People's Republic of China than with that policy which existed before the fall, discussion of it will take place in Chapter II.

In recapitulation, it can be said that for the large bulk of the period of United States Chinese policy covered in this Chapter the basic policy was to protect American

40Vinacke, p.92.
commercial rights in China. In order to do this it had been necessary to protect the status quo in China as much as possible. Many factors entered into the creation of this policy, e.g., religion, and misconceptions of the Chinese people, but it is apparent that commerce played the greatest role. It should be stressed that the two-fold policy of commercial access and territorial and administrative integrity was not strongly enough desired to bring about the use of force of any kind to back it up. When tested the United States protested verbally and then did nothing else.

With the outbreak of World War II, American Chinese policy received some additions. Primary among these was the determination to make China a true world power so as to enable her to help maintain world peace after the conclusion of the war. Various means were utilized to do this.

With the conclusion of the war, though, another change in policy was necessitated by internal conditions in China. With civil war raging in China, the United States attempted to unite the two sides in order to improve prospects of reaching the ultimate goal of its Chinese policy, that of seeing China as a world power. Failure to do this brought about a gradual withdrawal of the United States from support of the official government of China in order to let the situation clarify. Before this could
occur, however, the Communists seized control of the mainland and the United States was presented with a complete new problem where its China policy was concerned.
The establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, and the subsequent removal of the Nationalist government to the island of Formosa had been expected by United States policy-makers for some time. In preparation for this eventuality certain steps had been undertaken by United States officials to make the transition that would have to be made in basic China policy as smooth a transition as possible—in terms of both foreign policy and domestic politics.

The first real step in the process of disengagement from the collapsing Nationalists was undertaken through a "comprehensive review" of United States Far Eastern policy which Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced in mid-July of 1949. This review of policy was under the direction of Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup and was held to be top-secret. In fact, the text was not released until 1951. The review was clearly an indication that probable changes in policy concerning China were under consideration. It was not to be a complete reversal of policy though, as

Acheson indicated in a memorandum to Ambassador Jessup concerning the review of policy. In this Acheson stated:

You will please take as your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the Continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area.²

The policy review was apparently an attempt to make a thorough study of possible policy alternatives as far as the Far East, and China in particular, were concerned. An attempt was being made to "settle the dust" that had made it impossible for hard decisions to be made upon what changes should be carried out in United States China policy.³

With the review of policy underway, the next major step in the gestation of the "new" policy toward China was the publication, on August 5, 1949, of the unique document popularly known as the China White Paper.⁴ This document has often been identified as the first substantive step


³In early 1949, Secretary Acheson had made the remark that he "... could not see clearly as to what the outcome in China was going to be until ... 'the dust settled', that is, until the situation had become more clear." U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p.1776. Hereinafter referred to as Military Situation in the Far East.

undertaken by the United States in withdrawal of support from the Nationalist government. That this would be the affect of the White Paper, regardless of the intent, was brought out by several events. For instance, President Truman said, in reference to the White Paper, at a news conference that:

My primary purpose in having this frank and factual record released at this time is to insure that our policy toward China and the Far East as a whole shall be based on informed and intelligent public opinion.

In the present situation, the mutual interests of the United States and China require full and frank discussion of the facts. It is only in this way that the people of our country and their representatives in Congress can have the understanding necessary to the sound evolution of our foreign policy in the Far East.

The statement indicated that new information was being presented which would explain why a policy change was necessary.

The clearest indicators that major changes in United States China policy were in the offing were found in the letter of transmittal from Secretary of State Acheson to President Truman which accompanied the White Paper. This letter attempted to place the responsibility for the defeat of the Nationalists solely upon the Nationalists themselves.

Supra, p.27.

In doing this, which would make United States withdrawal of support almost mandatory, Acheson said that in order to save the government of Chiang Kai-shek the United States would have had to make a:

... full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people... which would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy and would have been condemned by the American people.7

He then concluded by saying that:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

And now it is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as it now exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking.8

It was clear that the Nationalists were to be blamed for their plight and that the United States was preparing for any eventuality—including the very real prospect of the total collapse of the Government which it had long considered to be China.

Even though withdrawal of support from the ally that had so long received major attention was near, Washington


8Ibid., p.xvi.
was not ready to make a complete change in China policy. Instead it was hoped that a shift of policy from one government to another could be accomplished without major changes in the policy per se. Acheson indicated this in the letter of transmittal by saying that:

... our policy will continue to be based upon our own respect for the United Nations Charter, our friendship for China, and our traditional support for the Open Door and for China's independence and administrative and territorial integrity.\(^9\)

Acheson did indicate some antipathy toward Russian influence over the Chinese Communists but he felt that China, due to its cultural tradition and "democratic individualism", would eventually throw off the "foreign yoke".\(^10\) As of that time, there was no clear indication of any plans to recognize the Communist regime, but early steps were being laid which would permit this if it should become necessary.

The issuance of the White Paper, as could have been expected, created quite a controversy at home, particularly in the ranks of the Republican Party.\(^11\) Shortly after publication of the White Paper, Acheson, due at least in part to the adverse reaction to it, spelled out the

\(^9\)Ibid., p.xvii.

\(^10\)Ibid., p.xvi; There was also the possibility foreseen by a few of the more "liberal" advisors that a form of "Chinese Titoism" would develop and push the Russians out of the picture.

"basic principles of United States policy toward the Far East" saying that:

I am convinced . . . that the basic elements of our traditional policy toward the Far East remain valid now as in the past. . . . These [that concern China] are:

1. The United States desires to encourage in every feasible way the development of China as an independent and stable nation able to play a role in world affairs suitable for a great and free people.

3. The United States is opposed to the subjection of China to any regime acting in the interest of a foreign power, whether by open or clandestine means. 12

The statement seemed to take a little of the sting out of the policy shift that was soon to be forced upon the United States for it indicated that there would be no support of the Communist regime as long as it was controlled by foreign hands. Other statements were also made which seemed to reinforce the idea that withdrawal of support from Chiang did not mean a total reversal of United States China policy, but instead that it was hoped that it could just be a shift in recipients of that policy. 13 This could be done if the Chinese Communists should turn out to be the "agrarian reformers" that they were sometimes typified as being, or if the people of China could, and would, throw off both the Nationalists and the Communists and replace them with a

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democratic system of government.\textsuperscript{14} Either of these two alternatives would have been particularly suitable to Washington.

With the formal establishment of its government, the Chinese Communist Party asked to be recognized by other nations as being the rightful government of China. Russia and the rest of the Communist bloc recognized almost immediately, as did many other nations in the next few weeks. The United States, not yet sure how the situation in the Far East would eventually congeal, decided to postpone recognition in favor of a period of watchful waiting, which was not an entirely new tactic with the United States.\textsuperscript{15}

In seeking to find a workable alternative to their current China policy the State Department scheduled a special conference on China policy for October 6, 7, and 8, 1949. This proved to be a very opportune date for such a conference as it came right on the heels of the establishment of the Chinese Communist government. This "Round Table Discussion on American Policy Toward China" was held for the purposes of providing ideas and information to the

\textsuperscript{14}It is interesting to note that, according to an Associated Press story, the Soviet leaders just this year have questioned the degree of true Communism in the Chinese Communists. Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, June 12, 1968, p.12-c; On the desire to see the Chinese people overthrow the Communists see: Bundy, pp.182-83.

\textsuperscript{15}The question of recognition of the Communist regime will be treated separately below, pp.50-58.
policy-makers in the hope that some new solution, or ideas that could lead to a solution, of the China problem could be found. Secretary Acheson said:

... very frankly ... he had not yet formulated a policy and it is in the hope and expectations that with the aid of such groups as this we can get light in the formulations of a new policy.\(^\text{16}\)

Due to developments in Korea, and within China itself, little attention was paid to the recommendations at the time of the conference. At least, very few of the suggestions offered were acted upon.

In recognition of the change in the situation in China, Ambassador Philip Jessup, along with representatives of four other nations, proposed and got approved in the General Assembly at the United Nations on December 8, 1949, a resolution which attempted to reduce the magnitude of that change. The resolution called upon all States to:

... respect the political independence of China and to be guided by the principles of the United Nations in their relations with China;

... respect the right of the people of China now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control;

... respect existing treaties relating to China; and

... refrain from (a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create a foreign controlled regime within the territory of China, (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China.\(^\text{17}\)

Hoping that such resolutions might be successful, as they

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\(^{16}\)Round Table, p.1554. The conference consisted of twenty-five men who were considered well informed on China.

had been in the past, Washington was aware that developments were still occurring in China which had to be prepared for, whether they were approved of or not. There was the probability that the Nationalist Government, which the United States still verbally supported, would soon lose its last foothold, Formosa. In preparation for this the State Department on December 23, 1949, sent out advisory information to its people in the field about the "... probable fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces. . . ." In advising its personnel about this likelihood, the State Department said that all efforts should be undertaken to counter the false impression that:

- Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Nationalist Government;
- its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing Communism;
- the United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

This action indicated that the policy toward China was still in a state of flux—not willing to recognize the new government, but trying to get out from under the old. This was more clearly indicated in a report by the New York Times on January 1, 1950, which said that the President and the National Security Council had agreed on three points:

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18 U.S., Department of State, Public Affairs Area-Policy Advisory Staff: Special Guidance No. 28 (December 23, 1949), as quoted in: Military Situation in the Far East, p.1667.

19 Ibid., p.1668.
(1) United States occupation of Formosa was out of the question.
(2) Recognition of the Chinese Communists should be withheld. And,
(3) A new study on giving economic aid to the Nationalists should be made.20

That the United States was determined not to give large scale assistance to Formosa was made very clear by a major statement on China policy by President Truman on January 5. It seemed that 1950 might be a year in which the recently wavering China policy might solidify, probably more toward a reluctant acceptance of the Communist regime. In his statement, the President declared that:

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed force to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the Island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance.21

Further indications that the United States had made a decision concerning what it was going to do in regard to China as soon as domestic factors would allow were brought out by two separate actions in mid-January. First of these

was the stand taken by the United States in the United Nations upon the question of seating the Communist Chinese delegation in place of the Nationalist delegation. The United States did not support the move but it did not take the strongest possible stance against it. United States Ambassador Ernest Gross in a major action said that:

The United States would vote against the Soviet proposal to replace the Nationalist delegation, . . . but, since it regarded the matter as procedural, would not consider its negative vote a veto and would accept any Council decision taken by a seven-member majority.22

Then on January 12, in an address to the National Press Club, Secretary Acheson said:

We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop following Russian actions against the Chinese. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.23

These actions seemed to indicate that the United States was not yet ready to take concrete steps itself toward the Communist regime, but that it would try to stay out of Chinese affairs while not blocking any actions other governments wished to take toward recognition. There was

22Ibid., p.105.

no clear indication of acceptance of the Communist regime on the part of the United States, but there was no rejection of it either. Washington seemed to be opening the way for the Communist Government to prove itself as deserving of the United States' attention, though not necessarily full diplomatic recognition. Such actions would, no doubt, require better treatment of Americans, particularly diplomatic personnel in China, as well as being able to show evidence of the capacity of continuing in power.

If the United States had actually opened the door for normal relations with the People's Republic of China, the Communists stumbled on the first step, for almost at the same time the American actions were taken, the Communists were doing exactly opposite what the United States had expected. On January 14, 1950, Communist officials, adding to the disrespect already shown American diplomats in China—such as the arrest and detention of one group for almost a month in late 1949—seized United States consular property in Peiping. This action decided American policy toward the Communist government for the time being. In a communication to the President the Department of State stated that:

The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of this situation which constitutes a flagrant violation of our treaty rights and of the most elementary standards of international usage and conduct.
The Department is now preparing instructions for the recall of all American official personnel from Communist China.\(^{24}\)

Secretary Acheson expressed to the Chinese people that Americans were not leaving them of their own accord, but because of the treatment they had received at the hands of Communist authorities.\(^{25}\) In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California on March 15, the Secretary began building toward containment of China by saying that the people of China:

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\ldots \text{can only bring grave trouble on themselves and their friends, both in Asia and beyond, if they are led by their new rulers into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders. Such adventures violate not only the tradition and interest of the Chinese people, they would violate the traditions and interests of their Asian neighbors, of the American people, and—indeed—of all free peoples.}^{26}\]

Though starting toward containment of the Chinese People's Republic, the Secretary did not attempt, at that time, to isolate it. He indicated that no attempt would be made to deviate from past trade practices between China and the United States. That a close friendship with the people of China still continued was pointed out by the President when

\[^{24}\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp.119.}\]
\[^{25}\text{Bulletin, Vol. XXII (March 27, 1950), p.469.}\]
\[^{26}\text{Ibid.}\]
he spoke of attempts at getting food to China through use of American religious, educational, and charitable organizations still in China.\(^{27}\)

The focus of American attention in the Far East was abruptly jerked from China to Korea on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Almost immediately the United States involved itself in this conflict by sending armed forces into South Korea. At the same time, the President ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to position itself between the mainland of China and Formosa. This action, later referred to by critics of the Administration's China policy as the "leashing of Chiang Kai-shek", was taken because:

\[\ldots\ \text{Formosa should be neutralized and should not be a point of danger upon the left flank of the United Nations position.}\]

\[\text{And, therefore, the President neutralized it by saying that the Seventh Fleet would prevent any attack upon Formosa, and Formosa should not make any attack upon the mainland.}\ \ldots\ \text{The President also pointed out that what he had said had nothing to do with foreclosing the political decisions of the future of Formosa.}\]

With the action underway in Korea, the China problem was temporarily pushed aside. It was occasionally reemphasized, but no real changes were made in the policy as long as


\[^{28}\text{Bulletin, Vol. XXIII (September 18, 1950), p. 463.}\]
there were no real changes in the situation in China. Dean Rusk, as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, on September 9, indicated that the United States was not completely against the Communists, while at the same time conveying the idea that Washington was leaning a bit more toward the Nationalists or at least away from the Communists. This dissatisfaction with conditions in China was pointed out by Rusk's saying:

... we insist upon the cessation of hostilities between Formosa and the China mainland and should support the peaceful settlement of the Formosa problem by international action. ... We shall continue our economic assistance program for Formosa and shall furnish selected military assistance to put it in a better position to defend itself if an attempt is made to dispose of the Formosa problem by armed attack.

... we shall try to find a way to sustain the historic friendship between the American and Chinese peoples and to make it clear that we have no aggressive designs whatever upon China. We must make it equally clear that we shall take a most serious view of acts of aggression which might be set in motion in mainland China on behalf of a Communist conspiracy and that we shall not accept the right of any clique in China to preside over the dismemberment of China for the benefit of Soviet imperialism.

All wavering of policy toward China was thoroughly eliminated after the active Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in late October, 1950. Any thought of switching United States support to the Chinese People's Republic was abruptly ended.


both within and outside official government circles. United States policy toward China entered a period during which a severe hardening occurred. Primarily due to Chinese intervention in Korea, but for other reasons also, the official policy toward the Communists became frozen in a very hard stance against them. The New York Times recognized this switch in policy by stating that:

Last January, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was ridiculing the Chinese Nationalists in public, exhorting the Dutch and the French to recognize that a revolution had taken place in Asia, and emphasizing that the first rule of United States policy in the Far East was to refrain from doing anything that would drive the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists together. Now Mr. Acheson is all for giving more help to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, insisting that military considerations must determine United States policy toward the future of Formosa, conducting a policy of economic sanction against the Peiping regime, and urging the United Nations to get together on a policy of collective action against that regime.31

All aspects of policy toward China were now directed against the Communist regime—recognition, admission to the United Nations, trade, etc.—and toward the Nationalist regime on Formosa. This was seen not only in executive actions but also by legislative moves. There was a resolution passed by Congress in late January urging that the United Nations brand Communist China as an aggressor and, also, that the Communists should not be admitted to the United Nations.32

32 See more on Communist China and the United Nations below, pp.58-64.
In support of the Nationalists, Congress in early February gave notice that it was prepared to extend "certain military material" to them for use against possible attack. Assistant Secretary Rusk expressed the executive branch's feeling by saying:

... we cannot accept the forcible seizure of Formosa by those who are engaged upon a program of aggression.

... we are continuing our economic assistance program in Formosa and are furnishing selected military assistance to put it in a better position to defend itself if an attempt is made to settle the issue by armed attack.\(^{33}\)

A consultant to the Secretary who was to soon have a great deal to do with China policy, John Foster Dulles, referred to the People's Republic as a "puppet regime", but emphasized the friendship between the United States and the people of China, saying that it must be continued, and that:

While we thus adopt a negative attitude toward Mao Tse-Tung and his ilk, we should adopt a positive attitude toward the many Chinese who remain loyal to the welfare of China and to the friendship between China and the United States which has in the past served China so well.\(^{34}\)

The process of freezing policy toward the Communists was continued by a very harsh attack on them in a speech by Assistant Secretary Rusk to the China Institute on May 18, 1951, which the *New York Times* called "... the firmest support given by the United States Government to


the Chinese Nationalists since they were dealt with adversely in the State Department's White Paper of 1949. In this speech Rusk said such things as:

... we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct—the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly embarked.

We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.

If the Rusk statement was not enough to make very clear the definite trend in United States policy toward China, the banning of all trade with Communist China by American ships and planes and the freezing of Communist Chinese assets within the United States were.

The hardening of our policy toward Communist China was carried even farther by the announcement on May 1, 1952, that all passports issued will be stamped "... not valid for travel to ... China ..." and other Communist bloc

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Thus China was being not only contained but also isolated by United States policy. As far as Formosa was concerned, Washington was adopting a line much different from that it had followed for the past several years. The new Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, John Allison, expressed this by saying:

This traditional friendship at present can only be shown through the Chinese Government on Formosa. . . . The United States is committed to the defense of Formosa from aggression from the mainland, and it is our continuing policy that Formosa not fall into Communist hands. The United States Government remains of the opinion that the Nationalist Government still represents China.

In September Allison reemphasized Washington’s support of the Government on Formosa by saying that:

Formosa is getting stronger. The Government of Formosa is making real strides in economic and social progress and the people of Formosa are getting progressively a larger share in the Government. American economic and military aid is flowing into the island in increasing quantities, and whereas a year or a year and a half ago there was a definite threat of invasion from the mainland, that does not seem imminent today.

He went on to indicate that the Seventh Fleet continued to prevent aggression from the mainland. No mention was made of the possibility of a Nationalist invasion of the mainland.

\[38\textbf{Bulletin}, \text{Vol. XXVI (July 21, 1952), p. 736.}\]

\[39\textbf{Bulletin}, \text{Vol. XXVII (July 21, 1952), p. 102.} \text{Rusk had returned to private life and some speculation of a split between himself and Secretary Acheson. The split was later denied by both men.}\]

\[40\textbf{Bulletin}, \text{Vol. XXVII (September 29, 1952), p. 471.}\]
Thus ended the Truman administration as far as China policy was concerned. That policy had seen a remarkable shift from its beginning with the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1951, to the accession of the Republican Party and General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency of the United States in early 1953. The shift had been from an almost total disavowal of support for the Nationalist regime and a corresponding near acceptance of the Chinese Communists as the best alternative government for China, to a firm support of, and large scale assistance to, the Nationalists with an almost total rejection of the Communists only three years later.

During the development of this change in basic China policy there were two main problems or aspects of that policy that have not been given adequate attention in the foregoing study of the Truman Administration's China policy. These problems were: whether to give diplomatic recognition to the Communists, and what to do about the China seat in the United Nations. Both of these will now be looked at individually so that a better understanding of them may be achieved than would have been possible had they been worked chronologically into the broad study above.

The first of these two problems to confront the Truman Administration was that of recognition. Should they recognize the People's Republic of China as the true government of China or not?
There is now a general consensus of opinion among most China observers that the United States was giving serious consideration to the recognition of the Communist regime as the official government of China during the period before the outbreak of the Korean War. As Tang Tsou says, "By ordinary logic, one would expect that the State Department's program of disentanglement from the Nationalist Government would be accompanied by a policy of recognizing the Chinese Communists as the governing authority in China." Ordinary logic, however, did not prevail in this case, for the problem and its complexities were by no means ordinary ones.

Shortly before the establishment of the People's Republic the Secretary of State had made an address on waging peace in the Americas in which he discussed the act of recognition by the United States and the implication of such an act. This, though aimed at hemispheric governments, surely could be applied to recognition of other governments as well. In fact, one of the participants in the "Round Table Discussion" of Far Eastern policy suggested at that conference that just such a statement could be useful in preparation for recognition of the Communist regime.  

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42 Round Table, p.1666.
He apparently did not know that such a step had already been taken on September 19, when Secretary Acheson said:

We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries because we are on the same planet and must do business with each other. We do not establish an embassy or legation in a foreign country to show approval of its government. We do so to have a channel through which to conduct essential governmental relations and to protect legitimate United States interests.

When a freely elected government is overthrown and a new and perhaps militaristic government takes over, we do not need to recognize the new government automatically and immediately. We can wait to see if it really controls its territory and intends to live up to its international commitments. We can consult with other governments, as we have often done.

But if and when we do recognize a government under these circumstances, our act of recognition need not be taken to imply approval of it or its policies. It is recognition of a set of facts, nothing more. We may have the greatest reservations as to the manner in which it has come into power. We may deplore its attitude toward civil liberties. Yet our long-range objectives in the promotion of democratic institutions may, in fact, be best served by recognizing it and thus maintaining a channel of communication with the country involved.43

Whether intended or not it seemed that preparation for recognition of the Chinese People's Republic was being made even before its formal establishment. When that establishment was made the immediate actions of Washington seemed to fit into the pre-established pattern perfectly. The new government was not recognized "automatically and immediately"; instead consultation with other governments upon the question was carried out and a period of observation was begun to see if the new government really did control its area. Speaking

of this period in 1951, Secretary Acheson said, "... we frequently expressed to friendly Governments, including the British Government, the view that hasty recognition would be unwise and that there should be a full exchange of views between concerned Governments before action toward recognition was taken by anyone." In reference to the ability to control the area claimed by the People's Republic, a spokesman for the Department of State said that:

We still believe that this problem should not be pursued with any great haste; that there is no great urgency; and, in fact, the Chinese Communists do not control a substantial part of China; and, furthermore, they have given no indication of their willingness to undertake the type of responsibilities which ... normally develop upon a government.

Thus, as far as official United States policy was concerned at the time of the establishment of the Communist regime no rapid recognition would be forthcoming. Instead discussions would be held with other governments, and Washington would have to be confident in the permanency of the new regime before formal recognition would take place. There was no indication at all that recognition would not take place when and if, the basic conditions were fulfilled.

It should be indicated that considerable pressure against recognition of the Chinese People's Republic was being exerted upon the Truman Administration by both the Congress and public opinion. Former Secretary of State

45 Round Table, p.1566.
George C. Marshall expressed to at least one of the conferees at the Round Table Discussion that "... a lot of the things ... talked about [at the Round Table Discussion] ... you cannot get the American public to take right now or the Congress to take and, therefore, the reasoning is in a vacuum." As the New York Times reported, "Recognition of the Chinese Communists is unwise at this time because it is strongly opposed on Capitol Hill and because the Chinese Communists have not yet demonstrated that they are prepared to abide by China's present international commitments." On January 2, 1950, Senator William Knowland of California, a long-time critic of the Truman Administration's actions vis-a-vis China, made public a letter from former-President Hoover which listed several reasons for not extending recognition to the new regime nor withdrawing it from the old one. For such reasons recognition was withheld beyond what would have been normally expected to be an adequate period for consultation and observation.

By early 1950, the Communist regime had control over most areas of China and was clearly the governing authority

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46 Ibid., p.1659. Instead of getting better, the political climate on the Chinese question became worse and worse culminating in the McCarthy era.


over that expanse of land. On March 27, 1950, an addition was made to the official reason for Washington's not having extended recognition to the Communist regime in China, which soon became the reason for refusal to recognize that regime. This was expressed by saying that:

The United States cannot give serious consideration to the recognition of the Peiping regime in view of the manner in which the latter has treated American consular representatives and United States business representatives in areas under its control. Until that government has given a clearer indication of its intention to live up to its international obligations and to treat American diplomatic and consular representatives and other American nationals in a manner prescribed by international custom established after a hundred years of experience in international intercourse we cannot recognize it. . . . .

It was during this period that the greatest degree of flux was being experienced in Washington as to what to do in connection with China. There were strong advocates for recognition of the People's Republic, with such arguments as the idea that Mao could become the Tito of China. In opposition to this there were equally vocal proponents of the Nationalist regime on Formosa.

Many students of the period felt that the United States was actively trying to arrange things, both at home and abroad, with a view toward recognition of the People's Republic. These people have said that all indications, regardless of the clamor at home against such action, pointed

50See: Round Table, p. 1592.
toward recognition of the new regime in China at the first opportune time. Such beliefs are, however, refuted by statements from the decision-makers who would have been making such policy if it had been underway. Such a statement was made in October, 1951, by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup when he said that:

The United States has never considered the recognition of Communist China; it has continued to recognize the National Government of China.

The United States has consistently asserted its influence against recognition of Communist China by other governments.

The United States has never agreed with any other government that the United States would under any given circumstances recognize Communist China.

The Department of State has never recommended to the President or to the National Security Council that the United States recognize Communist China.

Regardless of what the intentions had been concerning recognition of the Chinese People's Republic, the

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intervention of Chinese "volunteers" in the Korean situation in October, 1950, brought about the freeze in United States policy toward China discussed above. A central part of that freeze was the removal of all consideration of recognizing the People's Republic as the Government of China. This was seen in the statement by Dean Rusk mentioned before in which he said, "we do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they claim to be ... we recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted." Further reasons for this complete opposition to recognition of the Chinese Communists included the fact that they had been declared aggressors by the United Nations.

The Truman Administration ended with a very definite policy against recognition of the Chinese People's Republic. The Republic of China on Formosa would continue to be the de jure government of China as far as the United States was concerned.

The second of the major problems to confront the Truman Administration where China policy was concerned was that of what should be done about China in the United Nations—a body the United States had worked hard to get China into on an equal basis with the other powers after World War II. The alternatives here, simply stated, were either to replace the representatives of Nationalist China with those from

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the People's Republic, or else to maintain the seat of the Nationalists and to reject the claims to that seat expressed by the Communists.\textsuperscript{54} The question of admitting the People's Republic to the United Nations was, of course, closely related to the question of recognition of that regime. This was seen in the close parallels that existed between the handling of the two problems. When the United States seemed near to recognizing the Communists it was also more favorably inclined to its admission to the United Nations. When, after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, United States policy hardened against recognition it also hardened against United Nations admission for the People's Republic of China.

During the short portion of 1949 that remained after the establishment of the People's Republic of China there was little activity upon the question of which Chinese government should hold the China seat in the United Nations. The United States had already taken an action which served its purposes for the remainder of that year. This was the resolution Ambassador Austin had supported, along with several other nations, in September which contained such principles as respecting the political independence of China, allowing the Chinese people to choose their own government, and refraining from attempting to acquire spheres of

\textsuperscript{54}There was no serious talk of the "two-Chinas" plan as a means of solving the problem at that time.
influence. In short, no decisions were made on whether or not to admit the Chinese Communists to the United Nations during 1949.

In the early part of 1950 attempts were being made to extend this period of not making a decision on the admission of the People's Republic of China. This was seen on January 10, when the Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed that the People's Republic be admitted in place of the Republic of China. The United States reaction to this move was to say that it would "... vote against the Soviet proposal... but, since it regarded the matter as procedural, would not consider its negative vote a veto and would accept any Council decision taken by a seven-member majority."\(^{55}\)

In other words, the United States had still neither decided to support or to reject the bid of the People's Republic of China for the Republic of China's seat. Washington would vote against such, since it did not recognize the Communist government, but it would not veto this action if seven members of the Security Council wanted it. According to an observer who is considered by some to be a little partial toward the People's Republic, there was also a "verbal commitment" from the United States delegate that he would accept any decision made upon this question by the General Assembly.\(^{56}\) This too, would have removed the matter from a possible veto by the


\(^{56}\)Snow, pp.653-45.
United States. Washington, it was clear, did not, at that
time, oppose admission of the Communists to the extent that
it felt compelled to utilize its veto.

This general feeling of only limited objection to a
shift in the representation of China in the United Nations
was also indicated by a statement in a book published in
April, 1950, by a "sometime" participant in foreign policy
decision-making, particularly where China was concerned, who
would soon become a central part of this process and have a
profound effect upon United States China policy. In War or
Peace, John Foster Dulles said that:

I have now come to believe that the United
Nations will best serve the cause of peace if its
Assembly is representative of what the world actually
is, and not merely representative of the parts which
we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all
the nations should be members without attempting to
appraise closely those which are "good" and those
which are "bad".

If the Communist government of China in fact
proves its ability to govern China without serious
domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted
to the United Nations.57

Dulles qualified this slightly by indicating that there should
be a period during which a government that has won its place
through civil war proves that it is indeed in power, but
such a statement, even with the qualification, from one who
was soon to become so strongly against such action indicates

57John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The
that there was a general air of receptibility to the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, and especially with Chinese intervention in it, United States policy quickly turned against admission of the Communists to the United States. Before the Chinese intervention, but after the policy of the United States toward China began to freeze in all aspects, an attempt was made in the United Nations to tie the settlement of the Korean conflict and the settlement of the China question together for purposes of reaching an early conclusion on both of the questions. In reply to this attempt Secretary Acheson said:

In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits.58

Though desiring a settlement in Korea, Washington was not going to let that be a bargaining point for the recognition of, and admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

With Chinese intervention in Korea, and the subsequent declaration of the People's Republic of China as an aggressor on January 30, 1951, the United States found itself more and more adamant in its refusal to admit the People's Republic. This policy became personified by the phrase "You can't shoot your way into the United Nations!"59

refused to allow admission of the regime because to do so would be submission to pressure and in contrast to the Charter of the United Nations. The United States would, and did, allow representatives from the People's Republic to sit in the United Nations for purposes of trying to find a solution in Korea but it was not going to let that regime become a member of the United Nations if it could possibly stop it. This policy was based primarily on the fact that China was a declared aggressor and thus not qualified for membership according to the Charter of the very body concerned.

The United States, formerly a bystander with no definite stand on admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations, was by early 1951 assuming a position of leadership in a fight to keep the People's Republic out at all costs. Acheson pointed out this leadership position by saying that:

... I think the important thing to do is to continue what we have been doing and I think very successfully doing, and that is giving the lead in bringing together the majority in all these organizations of the U. N. with the view that a claimant for seating cannot shoot his way into the U. N. and cannot get in by defying the U. N. and fighting its forces. That is a very powerful position, much more powerful than legal arguments based on the words of describing a nation, and I have every belief and hope that it will continue to prevail.

Thus, the United States felt it had hit upon a method of maintaining its new position on the question of admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations which would overpower legalistic arguments for such admission.

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It was acting in this leadership position of attempting to keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations that Secretary Acheson said to the General Assembly of the United Nations:

I think that the minds of all of us—or almost all of us, at any rate—revolt at the necessity of the proposal even that we should be called upon to debate and consider here the seating of a regime at the very moment when that regime is engaged in defying to the greatest extent that it possibly can the authority of the General Assembly and of this world organization, at a time when that regime is engaged with its troops in killing the countrymen of at least a score of delegations seated in this hall—those countrymen are defending the cause, the prestige, the honor of the United Nations, and the cause of world peace—that we should consider this at a time when this regime is under indictment by this very organization in which it is now proposed to sit—under indictment as a party to aggression in Korea; that we should consider seating this regime at the time when its international conduct is so low that it would take considerable improvement to raise it to the general level of barbarism.61

Such a harsh attack upon even the idea of seating the Communist delegation clearly indicated a major shift in policy. From being just moderately opposed to the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations as the rightful occupant of the China seat, to that of being strongly opposed to such admission was definitely the evolution of the Truman Administration's China policy where the United Nations was concerned.

The Truman Administration, due in part to Korea and in general to a phobia of communism, ended almost 180°

from the position it had taken on China policy at the time of the establishment of the People's Republic of China.  

Where once the United States had been attempting to withdraw from support of the Nationalist regime, with the probable granting of, at least, recognition to the People's Republic of China, it ended up by strongly supporting the Republic of China on Formosa and serving as leader of verbal attacks upon the People's Republic of China. At the end of the Truman Administration there was no possibility that it would recognize, nor allow the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. United States China policy had become frozen in a very determined opposition to the People's Republic in all aspects. It was a policy of both containment and isolation of that government. It was such a policy that the Eisenhower Administration inherited in early 1953.

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62 As the fear of communism and the affects of that fear upon foreign policy do not fit into the purpose of this paper, which is to describe policy and not its causes, they have not been covered. This does not indicate that this fear, especially as mirrored by the McCarthy era, has not been of extreme importance. For the reader interested in this subject many works, both excellent and not so excellent, are available. Among these are: Richard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959); Owen Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950); and the issues of The Reporter for April 15, 1952, and April 29, 1952.
With the beginning of the Presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower in January, 1953, few real changes in United States Chinese policy were expected. The situation remained essentially the same as it had been during the latter part of the Truman Administration—the Korean War, with Chinese participation, was still going on, a hard line policy had been laid down where China was concerned, with no trade, no recognition and no admission to the United Nations. Thus there appeared to be little that could be done toward changing policy unless the new administration decided to remove all limitations with an invasion of China and whatever else might follow. Few expected such a reckless action.

Normally it would be possible to look at the men chosen by a new president to fill high positions in relation to a problem and then get some idea of how the problem would be met. In the case of the Eisenhower choices of men to handle foreign policy, and especially Far Eastern policy, it was impossible to gain a clear idea of what approaches to the China problem might be used. His choice as Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, who less than three years earlier had written that Communist China should be admitted...
to the United Nations if it "... proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance. ... "\(^1\) Dulles had made the observation before the freezing of relations with China by the United States, but still it seemed probable that he would be no harsher, if as harsh, toward China than the Truman Administration had been. Dulles' attitude appeared to indicate that no changes toward hardening policy toward the People's Republic of China were likely, but this was offset by the naming of Walter S. Robertson, a known "hawk" toward Communist China, as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. It seemed that Congressional and other domestic pressures, particularly the climate of the nation as concerned Communism and the "loss" of China, were pushing Eisenhower toward a harder policy toward the People's Republic. This resulted in Dulles' statement to members of Congress that he "... no longer backed such a concession to Red China [as admission to the United Nations]".\(^2\) In this same connection Dulles also:

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\ldots \text{promised to give favorable consideration to any candidate his questioners might recommend as Assistant Secretary in charge of Far Eastern Affairs. The choice of Walter Robertson resulted.}^3
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\(^3\)Ibid., p.20
It was made clear shortly after the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration that both Dulles and Robertson were going to press actively for a harder stance toward the People's Republic on the part of the United States. This proved to be very important, for Eisenhower exercised little personal power in the making of foreign policy. As Hans J. Morgenthau has said, "President Eisenhower very soon trusted Dulles so completely and admired his ability as Secretary of State so unreservedly that he gave him, for all practical purposes, a free hand to conduct the foreign policy of the United States as he saw fit."\(^4\)

The first indication that the Truman Administration's policy toward China was going to be hardened even more by the new administration came in Eisenhower's State of the Union Message on February 2, 1953 in which he said in reference to Truman's so-called "leashing of Chiang Kai-shek" that:

... there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. This order implies no aggressive interest on our part.\(^5\)


This action of the President was widely interpreted as being the start toward a new policy toward China which was to be much more aggressively against the Communist Chinese than the Truman policy had been. "This announcement implied a fundamental change in the Far Eastern Policies of the United States from the preservation of the status quo to the active attempt to restore Chiang Kai-shek's rule on the Asiatic mainland." At least this was the assumption made by many. Subsequent events proved, however, that the policy-shift had been more a shift in words than a change in actual policy. Dulles' biographer reported that:

... no one in the Administration expected Chiang to respond to it [the unleashing] by attacking the mainland. He didn't have the capability, unassisted, for anything more than commando raids, and the United States had no intentions of backing any assault-with-intent-to-conquer.

Another observer has reported that:

In actuality, no such change occurred. Quite to the contrary, the Eisenhower Administration seems to have been at least as anxious as its predecessor to limit the military activities of Chiang Kai-shek to strictly defensive measures.

Thus it seemed that what at first had appeared to be a major change in policy was more a political move for domestic consumption than actually a change in policy objectives.

6Morgenthau, p.294.
8Morgenthau, p.294.
It could be interpreted as being at most only a slight increase in hostility toward China as far as results were concerned.

That the new leadership in Washington was not planning on making major changes in policy toward China was indicated in the President's first news conference at which he indicated that he was not considering a blockade on mainland China. Had a hard stand against the Communists been underway, such a blockade would have surely been an integral part.

Instead of altering the Truman China policy drastically the new Administration seemed to be content with a continuation of the basic policy with just a few adjustments. The main adjustment was aimed not at the People's Republic but at the Republic of China on Formosa. Relations with that regime were improved and military assistance was speeded up. The purpose of this increased emphasis upon the Republic of China was indicated by Secretary Dulles in a statement to the two Congressional committees most concerned with foreign policy as he said:

We must materially strengthen the effectiveness of Chinese forces on Formosa. Defense measures in Formosa are closely dependent on economic stability,

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and it is also important that we assist directly in improving economic conditions. If Formosa can be made militarily strong and economically healthy, it may exercise a powerful attraction upon the enslaved people of Asia.  

Instead of using force to tear down the Communist government of the mainland, it seemed to be the policy instead to build up the Republic of China to such an extent that it would prove so attractive as to make the Communist regime look bad, or at least less desirable, to the peoples of Asia.

Where the People's Republic was concerned there was little shift in policy. Upon the question of recognition of that government the President held much the same attitude as the previous Administration, though a slight difference in semantics was apparent. Eisenhower pointed out that in his view, "... ever since Wilson's time... we have more or less gone on the theory that recognition means also tacit approval."  

He indicated that this meaning of recognition differed from that of many other countries and that this caused the United States to view such cases as Communist China differently from other nations, but that this did not indicate a great rift in relations with other nations. Apparently the approach to recognition to be employed by the new Administration was to be essentially the same as that used by its predecessor. On the closely

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12 Presidential Papers, 1953, p.296.
related issue of Communist China and the United Nations it also appeared that no great divergence from past policy was to be undertaken. For instance, in late May of 1953, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out a bill which included a rider saying that there would be no United States contributions to the United Nations if Communist China were admitted. Eisenhower's reaction to this was to oppose publicly both the rider and the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations. He said, to a group of Congressmen, that:

Communist China is not yet in the United Nations. But it is not wise to tie our hands irrevocably about affairs in advance.

The rider... is the wrong instrument. If we are to have a workable world organization, every nation must expect to undergo defeats in the UN from time to time.  

The United States, it seemed, would contrive to oppose United Nations admission for the People's Republic but it would not make any threats or utilize any major force upon others to abide by that viewpoint. That this was the goal of the United States was brought out at the United Nations in September when the Eisenhower Administration had its first opportunity to deal with the problem directly in the United Nations. At that time Secretary Dulles moved that the Assembly postpone for that year the "consideration

of any proposal to unseat the representatives of the National Government of the Republic of China." The reason this should be done was the fact that Communist China had been guilty of aggression and that her troops still remained in Korea contrary to terms of the recent armistice. That flexibility was desired in United States policy upon this question was indicated by Dulles' statement that:

... the motion I propose deals with the current year and should not be interpreted as indicating any expectations on the part of the United States to change its position after the current year. It is merely that we believe that it is appropriate that a body of this character should deal with one year at a time.¹⁴

This action was essentially the same as had been being followed by the past administration, but room was being left for change one way or the other if that should prove desirable.

One significant action that hardened United States China policy against the People's Republic beyond anything that the Truman years had seen was the announcement on June 8, 1953, that the Commerce Department was going to attempt to "... prevent any foreign ship or aircraft scheduled to call at Communist Chinese ports from fueling at U. S. ports without prior approval by the Department."¹⁵ It was indicated that application for such approval would normally be refused. This was the first actual hardening of Chinese

policy to be carried out by the Eisenhower Administration. All other pronouncements and actions had thus far been less than substantive and no real change in policy had been brought about. Now, by attempting to hinder trade with China by other nations, the United States was assuming a harder stance toward China than had been the case before. The freeze in China policy established by the Truman Administration was being made harder.

The fact that little hardening of policy toward China, other than the fueling restriction mentioned above, was being carried out by the Eisenhower Administration seemed to be upsetting those who had believed that a new administration would offer greater resistance to Communism than the Truman Administration had. Secretary Dulles certainly did not allay the uneasiness of these people when the New York Times carried a story reporting that:

Mr. Dulles said that it would be out of order to consider the recognition of Communist China at this time, but he implied that the United States might consider a change in this policy if the Peiping regime changed its aggressive ways.

He said that the Eisenhower Administration had never taken the position that it would never recognize any Communist regime in China. . . .

Mr. Dulles did not define the Administration's position any further though he told the reporters that it was technically possible for Red China to be brought into the United Nations General Assembly while Nationalist China still was sitting in the United Nations Security Council.16

The Dulles statement and a review of the actions taken by

the Eisenhower Administration since its inauguration indicated that a high degree of flux was present where China policy was concerned. Basically a continuation of the Truman policy seemed to be underway with a corresponding attempt to decide if it should be continued as it was, should be softened, or should be hardened.

A decision was apparently made during the Fall of 1953, for a noticeable change toward a hardening of United States China policy became apparent. First there was a strong statement by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in which he said:

Our course is what we conceive of as a middle one, calculated to limit the capability of the enemy for further aggression and to build up the strength of our friends.

Recognition has assumed a political and psychological significance which is new. It has become a symbol. Recognition in this case would mean in the eyes of millions, especially in Asia, not necessarily approval but acceptance, accommodation and reconciliation.

Nonrecognition means refusal to accept the Communist triumph as definitive. It means to many that the will to resist Communist expansion is alive; that Communism is not the inevitable "wave of the future" for Asia. . . .

We believe that the regime, if allowed to carry on foreign trade freely, would disregard the normal consumer requirements of the Chinese people and continue to impose the severest limitations on imports of consumer goods, while concentrating on strategic and industrial imports essential to the build-up of a war economy which might later be used against us.

Hence, the conclusions that the United States ban on trade, shipping, and financial relations with Communist China must be maintained. . .

By maintaining a policy of pressure and diplomatic isolation we can at least slow the growth of the
war-making potential of Communist China and retard the consolidation of its diplomatic position. A relationship of dependence on the senior partner as complete as we can make it will not make the embrace any more congenial for either the Soviet senior partner or the Chinese Communist junior partner.  

With this statement the direction of future United States China policy was indicated. It would be toward a hardening of the basic China policy as laid down during the last of the Truman Administration. That no softening of that policy was in prospect was further emphasized by the action of the Vice President as reported by the *New York Times*:

> Mr. Nixon appeared to be motivated in his discussion of United States policy toward China [before several officials of the State Department], by a desire to combat recent reports that the Eisenhower Administration was taking a "new look" at the question of recognizing the Peiping regime.

Thus the three basic tenets of the China policy of the Eisenhower Administration were laid down toward the end of his first year in office. These three were: refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China, strong opposition to its admission to the United Nations, and as tight a restriction on trade with the People's Republic by both the United States and its allies as possible. The reasoning behind the first two of these basic points of United States China policy was put simply by Secretary Dulles in a speech to the Overseas Press Club of America in which he said:

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Those responsible for United States policy must ask and answer: "Will it help our country if, by recognition, we give increased prestige and influence to a regime that actively attacks our vital interests?" I can find only the answer: "No."

As one of the United Nations members who must pass on representation, we must ask, "Will it serve the interests of world order to bring into the United Nations a regime which is a convicted aggressor, which has not purged itself from that aggression, and which continues to promote the use of force in violation of the principles of the United Nations?" I can find only the answer, "No." 19

The reasoning behind the third major component of United States Chinese policy was expressed by a representative of the Office of Chinese Affairs as he said:

... we cannot favor a relaxation of trade controls justly imposed against a convicted aggressor which has given no indication of having altered its aggressive course but on the contrary remains a constant threat to its neighbors and desires to build up its industrial base to support a war machine with the avowed purpose of "liberating" the rest of the world. We believe that to do so would, on the one hand, further confirm the Chinese Communists in their dedication to their present loyalties and courses of action and, on the other, tend to produce disillusionment and disencouragement on the part of other Asian nations and anxious to maintain their freedom and in many instances their newly won independence. 20

Thus the basic China policy of the Eisenhower Administration was established. This policy remained essentially the same, with only small variations from time to time, through the rest of the Eisenhower years.

On April 2, 1954, a statement was made which was destined to become the main justification of the China policy of the Eisenhower Administration whenever it was questioned at home. This was contained in an address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science by the Office in Charge of Political Affairs of the Office of Chinese Affairs when he said:

International politics, like domestic politics, is in the last analysis an art of the possible. I do not mean by this that a solution "to the China problem" is impossible. I mean that the solution is not likely to be easy or quick. Time, however, can be on our side. The greatest thing the Communists have to fear is truth.21

The idea that the United States' needs where China was concerned could best be served by the passage of time became central to United States China policy during the rest of the Eisenhower Administration. The United States would continue to refuse to recognize the Communist regime, would do all possible to keep it out of the United Nations, and stifle trade with it whenever possible and in the course of time that regime would either collapse or else mellow to more what the United States desired in China. This idea was later put in the form of, appropriately enough, an old Chinese proverb and became the symbol of United States China policy. Walter Robertson used this in early 1955 by saying:

There is a proverb of old China that I might mention in closing. It is in the form of a question and

"What is the cure for muddy water?" the question goes. "Time," is the answer; Time is on our side, as it always is on the side of the true and the free. . . . Man was not made for, nor will he permanently endure, the cruel enslavement imposed by the ruthless bloody regimes of international communism. But his liberation will be immeasurably hastened provided we keep our heads clear and our courage strong, provided we make our working partnership with the other free nations a growing reality.22

The idea that "Time is the cure for muddy water.", became a major part of the United States China policy and became the reason for the three tenets of that policy mentioned above. Nonrecognition, nonadmission, and restricted trade became mere means toward the end which would be the collapse of the People's Republic of China and its subsequent replacement by a democratic government more suitable to the needs of the United States.

There were, of course, several crises during which the overall policy of abiding time seemed shaken, and also there were several reaffirmations of the basic policy. Several of these, both crises and policy reaffirmations, deserve some mention, however, basic policy remained the same throughout the remainder of the 1950's.

One of the more minor crises, but one which required a great deal of action on the part of the Administration to quiet the fears of the public and the hopes of several foreign nations, was occasioned by the presence of representatives of the People's Republic at the Geneva Conference in

1954. The United States made quite clear to all concerned that the presence of that regime at a conference at which it was present did not constitute recognition. Instead, it was held that Communist China was there to take part in a final settlement of the Korean question and for no other reason. It was pointed out that the United States would deal with it where necessary, but that it would be with the understanding that no significance was indicated other than the necessity of communication. It was said in this connection that, "It is . . . one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is quite another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good."23 Specifically concerning the presence of China at the Geneva Conference the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs said:

Communist China will be present as a regime which we are dealing with on a local basis and only in regard to strictly limited subjects where the regime is necessarily a party at interest through its aggressive interventions. Far from dealing with it as a great power, we do not even deal with it as a legitimate government. We should not erroneously assume that Communist China has been accorded any special status.24

Continuing to insist that the presence of both the United States and the People's Republic at Geneva meant no change in policy, the Eisenhower Administration consented to the Communists' attendance at Geneva. Little was achieved by the United States at Geneva, though the handling of the

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Indochina problem would later prove quite important to the United States. Probably the most significant development at the conference as far as United States-Chinese relations were concerned was the beginning of what would later develop into ambassadorial level talks between the two nations. This beginning occurred when U. Alexis Johnson and a Chinese representative at the conference talked about such possibilities. The resulting series of low level talks led to the beginning of talks in August, 1955, on the ambassadorial level.

Before the ambassadorial talks could get underway one of the periodic crises in United States China policy occurred. This was the Formosa Crisis of 1954-1955. The crisis occurred primarily in 1955 but indications of its coming were evident in the latter part of 1954. The crisis was brought about by the continuing desire on the part of the People's Republic to consolidate its control over all of China, including Formosa and the various offshore islands still controlled by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States was equally determined that Formosa would not be taken. About the rest of the islands it was not completely clear as to what action the United States would actually take should they be seized, though the "bluff" was that such seizure would be prevented. In late 1954, buildups of

Communist Chinese forces were detected across from Formosa, along with increased agitation by the Communists for Formosa's "liberation". Also there was the conviction of eleven Americans for espionage and the sentencing of them to terms ranging from four years to life.\footnote{Eisenhower, p.465.} In an effort to halt any Communist expansion, the United States and the Republic of China entered into a mutual defense treaty which stated that an attack on one would endanger the "peace and safety" of the other. It did not, however, extend to the islands nearest the mainland. Such measures did not deter the Communists from their decision to proceed with the taking of Formosa. Shelling and bombing of many of the island areas was undertaken by the People's Republic. The United States decided that a stronger stand was necessary on its part and consequently decided to announce that it would "... assist in holding Quemoy and possibly the Matsus, as long as the Chinese Communists profess their intentions to attack Formosa."\footnote{Ibid., p. 467.} The President then went to the Congress and asked for a resolution empowering him to defend the areas vital to United States needs. The result was the adoption in late January, 1955, by nearly unanimous votes in both houses, of the Formosa Resolution. This resolution, an ancestor of today's Tonkin Gulf Resolution, contained the statement:
... that the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.28

This resolution, the mutual defense treaty, and some mention of atomic weapons all served notice on the Communists of a toughened United States position and they gradually ceased this activity.29 By late spring the Communists were saying that they were "... willing to strive for the liberation of Formosa by peaceful means."30 Thus was ended the most serious crisis between the United States and the People's Republic of China since Korea. Though war had been very likely the United States had not substantially hardened its policy against the Communists, but instead had merely increased its vocal support of the Republic of China. In fact it was shortly after the crisis that relations between the two countries achieved a slight thaw.

As was mentioned earlier, there was some talk of establishment of contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China at the Geneva Conference of 1954. Then in April, 1955, at the Bandung Conference, a meeting of

28 Eisenhower, p. 608.
29 Ibid., p. 477.
30 Ibid., p. 482.
Asian and African nations, the Premier of the People's Republic, Chou En-lai, proposed, "... direct discussions with the United States..."\(^3^1\) This proposal was, in the words of Secretary Dulles:

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... acceptable to the United States so long as we dealt only with matters of concern to the two of us, not involving the rights of third parties. That reservation applied particularly, so far as the United States was concerned, to the Republic of China. ... \(^3^2\)
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Thus contact on a fairly high level was to be established between the two countries that had been so at odds during the past several years. There was even some talk of negotiations at the level of foreign ministers, but it was more likely that the ambassadorial level would be used as was finally the case.\(^3^3\) The meetings began on August 1, 1955 in Geneva, at the ambassadorial level, with it being made expressly clear by the United States that such contact was not to be interpreted as diplomatic recognition. Reasons expressed by the United States for this apparent change in policy to a degree were that:

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Developments ... indicate the possibility of obtaining beneficial results from a continuance of the talks which have been going on at Geneva for the past year and their restoration to the original ambassadorial level. [Periodic low-level contacts had been made at Geneva during the year since the contact of United States and People's Republic representatives at the Geneva Conference of 1954.]
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\(^{3^2}\)Ibid.  
Four of the 15 United Nations prisoners of war have been released. A few more United States civilians have been released. These results though meager, are something. Chinese Communist warlike activities have not resumed and there has been something approximating a de facto cease-fire in the Taiwan (Formosa) area. The former belligerent Communist propaganda about Taiwan and against the United States has recently been somewhat subdued.

In addition various governments which have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China have indicated their own belief in the desire of the Chinese Communists to pursue a peaceful path.34

The talks got off to a good start, with a Chinese announcement of the release of the American airmen held, and, on September 10, an agreement to return civilians being detained in both countries to their respective countries.35 After these early successes, however, the talks bogged down over what issues should be undertaken next. The Chinese wanted to talk about ending the trade embargo against it by the United States, and, also, the prospects of a foreign minister's conference between the two nations. The United States refused, saying that the next topic must be that of renouncing the use of force by the two parties in the future, particularly in relation to Taiwan.36 With this disagreement the talks reached a stalemate. The talks were continued, and are still being held periodically in Warsaw, but no further achievements were forthcoming. A very slight thaw in United States China

policy had occurred, but after only a short while it all but disappeared. The talks continued at the ambassadorial level, but no progress was made toward further normalization of relations between the two countries.

Another aspect of the Eisenhower policy toward China was its handling of American newsmen and others who desired to travel to China. The policy here started off very hard and frozen, then a slight thaw began occurring here also during the latter stages of the Eisenhower Administration.

In February, 1955, for instance, the firmness of United States policy against travel to the mainland of China was indicated in a letter from Secretary Dulles to the families of United States military personnel imprisoned in China, in which he said:

The increasingly belligerent attitude and actions of the Chinese Communists in recent days have forced this government to the reluctant conclusion that it would be imprudent for the time being to issue passports valid for travel to Communist China to any American citizen. This decision is made only after careful deliberations and in the belief that it is in the best interests of our nation. In the interest of peace we do not think it prudent to afford the Chinese Communists further opportunities to provoke our nation and strain its patience further.37

The old policy of no travel to China as established by the Truman Administration was to be continued in relation to individuals regardless of how strong their reasons for wanting to go to China might be. The same policy was applied in

the case of newspaper reporters who desired to travel to China in order to write about it firsthand. The reasoning here was:

The United States welcomes the free exchange of information between different countries irrespective of political and social differences. But the Chinese Communist regime has created a special impediment. It adopted the practice of taking American citizens into captivity and holding them in effect as political hostages.

So long as these conditions continue, it is not considered to be in the best interests of the United States that Americans should accept the Chinese Communist invitation to travel in Communist China. 38

The President reaffirmed such policy by saying:

No one in the world would rather send American newspapers, everybody here that wanted to go, to China than I would. I believe in the exchange of information, exchange of visitors of all kinds, and particularly, representatives of public media.

But for over a year we have the spectacle of the Communist Chinese holding a group of our prisoners as sort of hostage; and they want, by holding them, to get us to make some other move that apparently is to be interpreted as meaning we have accepted that, and we are not going to be protesting it.

As long as these men are kept as sort of hostages for an advance in our relationship with the Chinese, I simply can't go along with it. 39

It seemed that the policy was quite fixed against any travel by American citizens to China regardless of the purpose of the travel. This, however, did not keep several newsmen from going to China anyway. In reaction to this the Department

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of State made those individuals' passports valid only for their return to the United States and reported their actions to the Treasury Department for possible action. 40

Gradually the Americans being held in China were being released but the State Department continued to maintain that no changes in the travel policy would be made until they were all out. Secretary Dulles at a news conference replied to a question concerning travel to China that:

We have got all of the civilians out except 10. [The fliers that were so integral to this question earlier had been released] I don't believe that the bodies of American citizens ought to be made a subject for that kind of barter. So long as the Chinese Communists make the connections, we cannot escape the consequences of that connection or escape the fact that, if we give in to it, it puts a premium for all time and at all places upon seizing and imprisoning Americans illegally and then bargaining as to the terms upon which they will be allowed to get out. That kind of blackmail I don't propose to satisfy. 41

Then in the Spring of 1957, after continued pressure from the news media, a slight change in the policy of not allowing newsmen and others to travel to China was detected. The first public sign of this change was in a news conference on April 2, when the Secretary said the Administration was "actively considering" the subject. 42 At a later news conference the Secretary elaborated upon the subject by saying:

The Department would be glad to have the American public get information about Communist China firsthand through United States correspondents. On the other hand, we are not willing to permit Americans generally to go into Communist China. . . . The question is whether we can have a passport policy which will permit responsible news gathering and at the same time not permit a general influx of Americans into Communist China.

We do not think that any objective reporting will be of advantage to the Communist regime or a disadvantage to us. I have tried to make clear, but apparently didn't succeed in doing so, that our policy is not in any respect designed to cut off a flow of news about what conditions are, what the facts are, within Communist China.43

Though some change, or loosening, of policy was indicated it was made clear that this was to be a one-way change only. The Secretary, after making the statement concerning the possibility of a change in policy to allow United States newsmen travel to China, added that:

'Ve have no intention of inviting Communist Chinese newspaper people to come to this country. I don't know that that has been suggested to us. But since any such passports would have to be issued by a regime that we do not recognize as a government, it would not be practical to give a visa for such people who had credentials only stemming from the Chinese Communist regime to come to this country.'44

This limited policy change was brought about by the State Department on August 22, 1957, by the statement that:

Heretofore it has been the policy of the United States Government to authorize no travel by United States citizens to the Communist ruled mainland of China. . . .

44Ibid., p.771.
During this period new factors have come into the picture, making it desirable that additional information be made available to the American people respecting current conditions within China. The Secretary of State has accordingly determined that it may prove consistent with the foreign policy of the United States that there be travel by a limited number of American news representatives to the mainland of China in order to permit direct reporting by them to the American people about conditions in the area under Chinese Communist control.

In view of this determination, the Department of State has asked each of the newsgathering organizations which has demonstrated sufficient interest in foreign news coverage to maintain at least one full-time American correspondent overseas, whether it wishes to send a full-time American correspondent to the China mainland to be stationed there on a resident basis for six months or longer.

It is to be understood that the United States will not accord reciprocal visas to Chinese bearing passports issued by the Chinese Communist regime.

It is emphasized that this experiment is founded upon the desire to have the American people better informed through their own representatives about actual conditions in the areas under Chinese Communist control. It does not change the basic policy of the United States toward communism in China. Generally speaking, it is still not consistent with United States policy, or lawful, that there be travel by Americans to areas of China now under Communist control.

The end policy was just as the early thinking on the subject had indicated it would be—applicable only to representatives of the news media and unilateral in its application.

China's reaction to this "experiment" in United States China policy was to demand reciprocity, which the United States rejected and then China refused to allow the vast majority of United States newsmen who had gained permission to travel to China to enter. No real change in the status quo had occurred;

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United States newsmen were still barred from reporting on China from the source, but by a different government than had been the case before. One American journalist who did go to China had this to say about the change in policy on the part of the Administration:

In 1957, Mr. Dulles finally made up a selected list of "news media" he considered "qualified" to send representatives to China—if they could get visas. Peking declined to receive his "accredited" correspondents unless the United States would accept an equal number of Chinese correspondents. Mr. Dulles flatly rejected that proposal, saying that American immigration laws prohibited the issuance of visas to Communists. The evasion was transparent; exceptions had already been made for Soviet and other Communist correspondents. But there the matter rested until after Mr. Dulles' death.46

Regardless of Mr. Snow's views, the "experiment" was a slight thawing of policy. This was especially apparent when the Department of State began modifying the stand on non-reciprocity. As early as August 27, only five days after establishment of the new policy, Secretary Dulles said:

We would not put a visa actually on the passport issued by a regime that we do not recognize. We might and could give a separate piece of paper to permit an individual to come into the United States.47

This was an indication that the change in policy was a bit more pronounced than it had first appeared to be. There could be cases in which Chinese reporters might be allowed entry into the United States after all.

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The thaw was even extended to civilians in extreme cases when the Department of State decided that it:

... in view of the prolonged and tragic separation of these six men from their families despite all efforts to bring about their release, is prepared to issue to members of their immediate families passports not restricted as regards travel to Communist China. However, in line with the basic policy toward communism in China, ... it remains the general policy of the Government not to issue passports for travel to Communist China.48

The general policy established above continued in effect for the next few years with very little travel being done on the part of United States newsmen—which was subject to Chinese manipulation so as to make it appear that they were not accepting American policy on the subject—and with no travel to the United States by Chinese newsmen. All along there were continuing signs of additional softening on the part of the United States on the issue. The major change occurred just before and after the resignation of Secretary of States Dulles in April, 1959. Indications of this were given in several ways. For example, in late Spring of 1959, the State Department extended for another year the validation for travel to China on the passports of correspondents of thirty news organizations. In reference to the continuing refusal of the Chinese to allow the entry of these correspondents into China the Department said it had:

... repeatedly made it clear that, if any bona fide Chinese Communist newspaperman should apply for a visa, the Secretary of State is prepared to consider

recommending to the Attorney General a waiver under the law so that a visa could be granted ... If the Chinese Communists were indeed interested in reciprocity, they would have an equal number of Chinese newsmen apply for visas. 49

This very clear indication that visas probably would be granted, should the Chinese apply for them, was made official a little over a year later when Ambassador Jacob D. Beam expressed to the Chinese Ambassador at one of their recurrent ambassadorial level talks in Warsaw that:

The Government of the United States of America, subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations in force in the United States and in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity, will admit to the United States newsman of the People's Republic of China in order to permit direct reporting about conditions in the United States. 50

Thus the most significant of the areas in which a slight thaw occurred during the Eisenhower Administration was that of newsmen and their travel to Communist China. The People's Republic refused to take advantage of this adjustment and so made it appear that no real thaw had occurred, but the verbal change in policy was of great enough scope to indicate that a change had occurred in at least one area of United States China policy. Little came of it, but it had occurred.

The last major crisis to confront United States China policy during the Eisenhower Administration was again in the islands off the mainland. Starting in the late Summer of 1958 the Communists once again began harrassing the offshore

islands, particularly the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, with the proclaimed goal of "liberation" of Taiwan. These actions presented the United States again with the problem of what to do and to what extent it should defend Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. Eisenhower rejuvenated the Formosa Resolution of 1955, which indicated clearly that the United States would intervene if either Formosa or the nearby Pescadores were invaded, but gave the President the power to decide what action to take in case of other invasions such as at the Quemoys and the Matsus. The United States decided that its response to Chinese actions would be gauged by those actions. As President Eisenhower related in his autobiography:

We assumed that under the circumstances of the moment, we would probably have to come to the aid of our ally, Chiang, no matter where an assault occurred. If the assault were directed toward Formosa, our assistance would be full-out. To save the offshore islands against a first phase attack limited initially to those islands alone, a lesser response would be required and would conform to the terms of the Formosa Resolution.

There were times during the crisis in which the United States seemed almost willing to give up the offshore islands in order to ease the situation. But as a whole the United

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52 Ibid.

States policy was not disclosed in preference to "keeping the communists guessing" in regard to the offshore islands, but making it clear that they would protect Formosa and the Pescadores. The next move was by the communists. This turned out to be a suggestion for resumption of the pending ambassadorial talks in Warsaw with a discussion of the Formosa problem. This was done but no agreement could be reached. Additional aid to Formosa, along with a strong public stand against appeasement made by the President, and rejection of Chinese admission by the United Nations brought about a temporary ceasefire by the Communists. During this time Formosa fortified and stocked the islands heavily. Then China resumed firing upon the islands. On October 23, Chiang and Secretary Dulles proclaimed that the Republic of China would not use force to regain its lost lands, instead this would be accomplished by peaceful means. The Communist reaction to this statement was the surprising one that it would bombard the islands on only every-other day as long as the United States did not give escort protection to the ships of the Republic of China. With this the crisis gradually eased off and war was averted. The last major crisis of the Eisenhower Administration's China policy was safely passed.

The slight relaxation in United States China policy during the Eisenhower Administration mentioned above did not carry over to the three main components of that policy—recognition of, admission to the United Nations for, and trade with the Communist regime. This fact was brought out
by periodic statements of United States policy upon these subjects, most of which were very repetitious. Because of this tendency toward repetition, only the major speeches, statements, etc., have been utilized in the following developments of that basic China policy through the remainder of the Eisenhower Administration.

The question of whether or not to recognize the People's Republic of China, or even to make any significant change in the stand on recognition that had been established before the Eisenhower presidency, was the problem of China policy to which the Administration felt most called upon to address itself. As was indicated above the early policy was to not recognize the regime in the hope that "time would clear the muddy water". This question, as well as the two other main parts of the Administration's China policy, was given central prominence in a major speech made by Secretary Dulles in June, 1957. This address, to the international convention of Lions International, was referred to by the New York Times as "... the Administration's first comprehensive delineation of its China policy in three years." 54 That the speech was intended to be a major statement of United States China policy, as it was so termed by the State Department, was indicated by the fact that it was nationally televised. Dulles said in the opening paragraphs of the speech that:

... we have abstained from any act to encourage the Communist regime—morally, politically, or materially. Thus:
We have not extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime;
We have opposed its seating in the United Nations;
We have not traded with Communist China or sanctioned cultural interchanges with it.55

Dulles went on to itemize and briefly discuss the reasons for not extending recognition to the China regime. Included in these were such ideas as: it would remove any reason for rebellion within mainland China; it would leave nothing to represent "home" to the millions of overseas Chinese other than the Communists; it would dishearten free Asia; it would make possible the entry of the Communists into the United Nations; and, the Republic of China would feel "betrayed" by its friend.56 The Secretary ended by referring to the passing of time as a means of easing or removing the China problem by saying that:

We can confidently assume that international Communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing.
If we believed that this passing would be promoted by trade and cultural relations, then we would have such relations.
If we believed that this passing would be promoted by our having diplomatic relations with the present regime, then we would have such relations.
If we believed that this passing would be promoted by some participation of the present regime in the

56Ibid., p. 92-93.
activities of the United Nations, then we would not oppose that.\textsuperscript{57}

It was made quite clear that no thaw in the United States China policy had occurred to the extent that it made any significant change in the three main components of that policy. Some thaw might have been permissible in areas of lesser importance, but none, was yet possible, or even desirable under current conditions, in connection with recognition, trade, or admission to the United Nations.

That no change had occurred by late Summer of 1958 was indicated by a memorandum on United States policy of nonrecognition of Communist China that was sent to each of the United States missions abroad. In this last major indication of United States China policy during the tenure of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, and for all practical purposes the last major pronouncement upon China by the Eisenhower Administration, there was the explanation that:

\begin{quote}
Basically the United States policy of not extending diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime in China proceeds from the conviction that such recognition would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to the free world as a whole and would be of material assistance to Chinese Communist attempts to extend Communist dominion throughout Asia.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

This memorandum went on to speak of the significance of diplomatic recognition of a new government by the United

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., p.95.

States in the eyes of the world and how withholding of that recognition would make it much harder for a government distasteful to the United States to survive. There was also mention of the fact that recognition of Communist China would bring about the seating of that regime in the United Nations and that this would "... vitiate, if not destroy, the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace." The statement of policy ended by admitting that:

It is true that there is no reason to believe that the Chinese Communist regime is on the verge of collapse; but there is equally no reason to accept its present rule in mainland China as permanent. ... Dictatorships often create an illusion of permanence from the very fact that they suppress and still all opposition, and that of the Chinese Communists is no exception to this rule. The United States holds the view that communism's rule in China is not permanent and that it one day will pass.60

This belief then, was the touchstone of the Eisenhower Administration's China policy.

The Republicans had inherited from the Truman Administration a policy that was frozen hard against the People's Republic of China, with its major aspects being the non-recognition of that regime, a refusal to trade with it, and a continuing effort to block its admission to the United Nations. This new Administration took that policy and almost immediately made it appear that it was taking a harder line

59 Ibid., p.387.
60 Ibid., p.389.; Italics mine.
by "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek. This action proved to be more ostentatious than important. Certainly no additional hardship was worked upon the Communists on the mainland by the action. As the years passed, the Eisenhower Administration, under the tutelage of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Robertson, maintained a hard line against the Communists in the three major aspects mentioned above. However, in more minor areas very slight signs of change were noticed. These slight changes amounted to being a very minor thaw in official United States policy toward China, but no such thaw was apparent in sufficient degree to justify a belief that it applied to the total China policy of the United States. In addition to the thaws detected being in relatively unimportant areas, there was also the fact that the other side did not react to them in such a way as to continue, or escalate, the process. Where the three major components of United States China policy were concerned the Administration developed the approach that if it could maintain its position of nonrecognition, no trade, and opposition to the admission of the regime to the United Nations over a long enough period, then the People's Republic would pass from the scene and be replaced by a government more suitable to the United States. With this approach the administration, in effect, froze United States China policy even harder than the condition in which it had been. By letting time clear the muddy water, as the phrase went, they were blocking all
other attempts at solving the problem. In their estimation there was no need to make efforts at normalizing relations between the two nations because time would take care of that. At best it seemed to be an extremely negative policy to be applied to such a major problem. It was this basically hard frozen policy toward the People's Republic of China that was the legacy of the Eisenhower Administration to the incoming President, John F. Kennedy.
CHAPTER IV

CHINA POLICY DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION: 1961-1963

As had always been the case under the presidential system of the United States when a change in presidents, and, more important, parties occurred in January, 1961, there was a great deal of speculation upon what changes might be made in policy from that of the previous administration. Where United States China policy was concerned there was a great deal of speculation of this sort both during and after the election of 1960. On the surface it looked as if there was going to be a slight movement away from the policy that had been established toward the People's Republic of China by the two previous administrations. Both of the major parties' platform planks concerned with Communist China, however, reaffirmed the basic China policy then being practiced. The Democrats, meeting in early July, 1960, included in their platform the statement that:

We reaffirm our pledge of determined opposition to the present admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

Although normal diplomatic relations between our governments are impossible under present conditions, we shall welcome any evidence that the Chinese Communist Government is genuinely prepared to create
a new relationship based on respect for international obligations, including the release of American prisoners.\(^1\)

Though continuance of the basic policy of not recognizing and of opposing admission to the United Nations for China was indicated, one major difference from the China policy of the then current administration was apparent. This was the shift toward the more positive attitude of holding out the prospect of improved relations with Communist China if it should become more "respectful" as a member of the community of nations. The Democratic platform was not supporting the doctrine of abiding time until the muddy water that was Communist China might somehow be cleared. The Republican Party meeting in convention later that month wrote into its platform the following plank on Communist China:

Recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations have been firmly opposed by the Republican Administration. We will continue in this opposition because of compelling evidence that to do otherwise would weaken the course of freedom and endanger the future of the free peoples of Asia and the world.\(^2\)

They were, it was clear, not planning on any changes in the China policy maintained by their party leaders during the past several years.

The slight difference in the two presidential candidates' stands upon China policy indicated by their respective party platform statements on the subject continued to be


\(^2\)Ibid., July 26, 1960, p.21.
noticeable throughout the campaign. No real difference in the immediate application of the basic points of United States China policy was noticeable between the two candidates. It was in their approach to future changes in that policy to something more normal that the two differed. Vice President Nixon would not make any active attempt to bring about that normalization, but instead would allow time to normalize the situation in China, which would in turn allow normalization of relations between the two countries. Senator Kennedy on the other hand indicated that he would make certain moves to bring about normalization instead of relying upon time to bring it about. Of the two approaches, the Kennedy one was the nearest to being a thaw in relations with China. Senator Kennedy, for instance, had said that:

As a first step toward improving "communications with mainland China . . . perhaps a way could be found to bring the Chinese into the nuclear test ban talks at Geneva. . . .

If that contact proves fruitful, further cultural and economic contact should be tried. 3

Mr. Nixon, maintaining the line of the Administration said:

Looking to the future, I would say that while the United States must maintain its position, that we will resist the recognition and resist admission to the U.N. of the Chinese Communist Government because it, by its action, has made it an outlaw Government, not deserving admission and not deserving recognition; that our policy will change when they change their policies. But until they change theirs we cannot change ours. 4

This basically identical policy, but with different approaches to the solution of the problem, continued to be noticed in the campaign efforts of the two candidates. In the second and third of the nationally televised debates between the two, for instance, it was apparent that both were unalterably opposed to the abandonment of Formosa and nearby areas, but they differed substantially upon the worth of the islands nearer the coast of mainland China.\(^5\)

With the election, and the Kennedy victory, many observers felt that basic changes were going to occur in United States China policy. The hope, or fear depending upon who was expressing an opinion, was that normalizing of relations between the two countries would be brought about as soon as possible. Such thoughts, however, were quickly dispelled in several ways. One such action was the appointment of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State. Rusk had been Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Truman Administration from March, 1950, through March, 1952.\(^6\) It was during this period that United States policy toward China had experienced its initial freezing and it was certain that Rusk had played a fundamental part in that action. This


fact indicated that the new administration might not be as likely to change the situation vis-a-vis China as had been expected. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Rusk indicated that under current conditions he could not foresee recognition, nor admission to the United Nations, for Communist China.\(^7\) He did not, however, appear to be particularly adamant against the possibility of change in the present relationship, and he made no mention of letting time take its course as seemed to be the favored approach of the more "hawkish" people on the question of United States China policy.

Proponents of a change in the condition of relations with China were a bit more pleased by the appointment of Chester Bowles as Under Secretary of State. It was expected that he would be more receptive of a change than Rusk. In fact, he had only recently authored an article in *Foreign Affairs* which, to many, seemed indicative of a desire to normalize or at least change the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.\(^8\) When questioned about his outlook upon the China question by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Bowles indicated that on recognition of Communist China:

> I do not believe we should, and have said so on many occasions.

\(^7\)Ibid., pp.7 and 29.

More than that, I would not think it was possible under any circumstances at present. The condition that Mao Tse-tung would attach to any such recognition would be that Formosa become part of Communist China, and, obviously, we will not stand for that.  

Bowles, then, apparently was not going to press for any major change in China policy at the moment. He reacted in a more favorable way, to those seeking policy changes, however, when asked if he did not think it time to start thinking in a positive way about the problem of China. He replied:

I think it is very important that we be clear what we not do [sic], but I also think we have got to think more carefully about what we can do. We are not cut off from all action. There are various things we can do over the years. They would not be easy, nor can we be sure they will succeed, but I think we have to have more than a negative policy.

Of the two major officials where foreign policy would be concerned in the Kennedy Administration it thus seemed that both were in favor of minor changes in United States China policy, particularly in the long range approaches to that policy, but that the basic policy would have to continue, for the time being, to be opposition to recognition of, admission to the United Nations of, and trade with the People's Republic of China.

That this was to be the case was quickly illustrated by the earliest actions of the new President upon United

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10Ibid., pp.9-10.
States China policy. Though the President hardly mentioned
China in the State of the Union Message, he did indicate
that it and the Soviet Union remained the first "great
obstacle" of the United States and that neither had yielded
"its ambition for world domination." \(^{11}\)
Secretary Rusk in
an appearance on the "Today" show stated that he did not
see ". . . any prospect that recognition of Communist China
is a realistic possibility or desirability." \(^{12}\) He did go
on to indicate that in any realistic disarmament action
Communist China would have to be included. He said, however,
that that was for the future and would not go into any
detail upon the prospect. The only indication of any thawing
of China policy was a proposal, at the first meeting of the
Kennedy Administration between United States and Chinese
officials in Warsaw, that the two countries agree to exchange
newspaper correspondents. \(^{13}\) Otherwise the new administration
continued a basically hard line toward the People's Republic.
In doing this the new regime naturally emphasized its support
of the Republic of China. As Secretary Rusk said:

We recognize and support the membership [in the United
Nations] of the Government of the Republic of China

\(^{11}\) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:

\(^{12}\) U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. XLIV (February 27, 1961), p.309. Hereinafter referred to
as Bulletin.

\(^{13}\) Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign
Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City,
and will continue to do so. The authorities in Peiping have indicated that they are not interested in relationships unless Formosa is abandoned. It may be that the question comes up as to whether they have any interest in membership in the United Nations under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{14}

That this view was upheld by all major members of the Administration was indicated by statements on the subject by both the President and the Vice President, with the President saying:

\begin{quote}
\ldots I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that the United States supports the Taiwan, Formosa, Government in its membership in the United Nations \ldots \textit{[and]} \ldots I would say that the United States is opposed under present conditions—continues to be opposed under present conditions—to the admission of Red China.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

The strongest of such statements came from Vice President Johnson in a joint communique with Chiang Kai-shek, as he said:

\begin{quote}
The United States has no intention of recognizing the Peiping regime; The United States opposes seating the Peiping regime at the United Nations and regards it as important that the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations should be maintained. \ldots \textit{[and]} The Congress also lent its support to this old policy line through passage of its, by now, annual resolution to the effect that recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations should be withheld.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Presidential Papers}, p. 260.
It was upon the question of admission to the United Nations of the People's Republic that the first real test of the new Administration's China policy came. For ten years the United States had been successful in gaining a moratorium upon the question of Communist Chinese admission to the United Nations. This policy of delaying consideration of the question from year to year had gained less and less support in the past few years. By 1961 it was questionable whether such an approach would work again. Thus the Kennedy Administration was pressed to either find a new method of handling the problem or else to risk the possibility of the seating of the People's Republic. That a search for a new method of handling the question was underway was indicated by continued statements against the People's Republic's admission and continued support of the Republic of China. President Kennedy, in a joint statement with the Vice President of the Republic of China, for instance, reiterated:

... firm United States support for continued representatives of the Republic of China in the United Nations, of which she is a founding member. He also reaffirmed the United States' determination to continue to oppose admission of the Chinese Communist regime to the United Nations.17

There was also the reaction of Secretary Rusk to a suggestion from Ambassador to India John K. Galbraith, who had hoped for changes in China policy, for acceptance of the existence

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17Presidential Papers, p.546.
of China in which Rusk said, "Your views, so far as they have any merit, have already been fully considered and rejected." 18

The President was also opposed to the admission of Communist China under the conditions at that time. In the words of one of his close advisors who turned biographer:

... since the day of his inauguration the Red Chinese—unlike the Soviets—had spewed unremitting vituperation upon him. He saw no way of persuading them to abandon their aggressive design short of a patient, persistent American presence in Asia and the Pacific. Consequently, even if Red China had not become an emotional and political issue in the United States, he said, any American initiative now toward negotiations, diplomatic recognition or UN admission would be regarded as rewarding aggression. He was prepared to use whatever means were available to prevent the seating of Red China in Nationalist China's seat at the UN. 19

The problem was not whether to admit the People's Republic, but instead, how the question could be avoided for at least another year. In speaking to his administration's Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, about the handling of the problem Kennedy said, "If we can buy twelve months, it will be more than worth it." 20 That this opposition to admission of the People's Republic might not be permanent was then indicated by his saying to Stevenson:

18Galbraith's reaction to Rusk's reaction was to say, "I was rather pleased by it because it was the first strong declarative sentence I'd ever heard from Rusk." David Holberston, "The Importance of Being Galbraith," Harper's, CCXXXV (November, 1967), pp.53-54.


You have the hardest thing in the world to sell. It really doesn't make any sense—the idea that Taiwan represents China. But, if we lose this fight, if Red China comes into the UN during our first year in town, they'll run us both out. We have to lick them this year. We'll take our chances next year. It will be an election year; but we can delay the admission of Red China till after the election. So far as this year is concerned, you must do everything you can to keep them out. Whatever is required is OK by me.21

So for the first year, the policy of opposing admission of the People's Republic was to be the same though a new method would have to be used. As far as the general public was concerned it appeared that no change in basic policy was likely, only in methods used to achieve that policy.

The method by which the United States attempted to delay for one more year the consideration of the seating of Communist China in the United Nations was one derived largely by Chester Bowles.22 It involved the admission of Outer Mongolia and the African nation of Mauritania to the United Nations. It was feared that the Republic of China, due to its desire for recognition by the Soviet Union as the nation to be dealt with instead of the People's Republic, might veto the admission of Mongolia. This then might bring about a Soviet retaliation in the form of vetoing the admission of Mauritania. This, it was feared, would, in the eyes of several African nations, be blamed upon the Republic of China and they would thus vote for the admission of the People's

21 Ibid., p.483.
22 Ibid., p.480.
Republic. So the United States decided to support the admission of both Mongolia and Mauritania in an effort to maintain as many votes on its side as possible.

The plan was partly a failure and partly a success in the end. The United States was unable to gain the customary moratorium, but it was able to keep the People's Republic out of the United Nations for at least another year. In blocking the admission of the People's Republic Ambassador Stevenson said that:

The United States believes, as we have believed from the beginning, that the United Nations would make a tragic and perhaps irreparable mistake if it yielded to the claims of an aggressive and unregenerate "People's Republic of China" to replace the Republic of China in the United Nations.23

The United States, under a new administration had apparently continued the same policy toward China as had been exercised by the previous administration but by a somewhat different means. Though the means had differed the policy was still opposition to the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. Along with this there was also the continued policy of refusing either to recognize the People's Republic or to trade with it.

That there was to be no immediate change in policy was apparent, but there were hidden undercurrents for change in that policy. As Sorensen reported, "... he [Kennedy] felt dissatisfied with his administration's failure to break

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new ground in this area [China policy], asked [sic] the State Department to consider possible new steps and did not regard as magical or permanent this country's longstanding policy of rigidity. He quoted the President as saying:

I would hope that . . . the normalization of relations . . . peaceful relations . . . between China and the West . . . would be brought about. We desire peace and we live in amity with the Chinese people. . . . But it takes two to make peace and I am hopeful that the Chinese will be persuaded that a peaceful existence with its neighbors represents the best hope for us all.

Thus it was clear that the man who had been quite critical, in a 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, of the policy of the United States toward China during the 1950's was still desirous of changes in that policy.

Though desirous of change the President was not yet able to actively work to bring it about. This was due primarily to two reasons: the domestic situation was not yet ready for changes of real significance in United States China policy and there were also developments on the international level that seemed to delay any such changes. The domestic causes were nothing new, having been around under varying names since the earliest days of the McCarthy era. The international developments primarily responsible

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24 Sorenson, p.665.
25 Ibid.
were an increased belligerence on the part of the Republic of China against the People's Republic during "the year of the tiger" [1962], and later in the year, the short clash between the People's Republic and India. Each of these tested United States policy and in each instance prevented any changes, at that time, in the policy of the past decade.

During this period there was a severe shortage of food in China and there was some talk that the United States should adjust its harsh policies against the Communist regime out of humanitarian reasons. The "hawks" on China policy insisted that to do this would be taking Mao off his self-created "hotseat". The Administration finally got around both sides of the argument by saying that the United States had not been asked to provide food and that if it should be asked to it would then have to study the situation before making a decision. 27 As had been expected the Chinese refused, in advance, any United States assistance, thus removing the problem altogether.

On October 30, 1962, the United States clearly indicated that its basic China policy had not changed when it once again spoke against admission to the United Nations for the People's Republic. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that the Communist regime had committed aggression against India, Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and Tibet; and that:

27Hilsman, p.317.
For the sake of the Chinese people, therefore, we must avoid giving their Stalinist rulers any encouragement that would have them believe the United Nations—contrary to the fundamental human rights expressed in its charter—will turn its head the other way while they starve their people into submission, or that would encourage them to believe they can shoot their way into our council halls.  

Largely due to the increased belligerence of the Communist regime, the question of admission for the People's Republic was defeated by a vote of fifty-six to forty-two, with twelve abstentions.

It was in 1963 that signs of impending changes in United States China policy first began appearing in the Kennedy Administration. The Sino-Soviet split, coupled with the repressed desires of many of the members of the Kennedy Administration, was, in the opinion of one of the more important figures as far as Kennedy's Far Eastern policy was concerned, the event that brought about the possibility of several changes in secondary policy that could eventually lead to substantive changes in United States China policy. Roger Hilsman, who had replaced W. Averell Harriman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs when Harriman was moved to Under Secretary of State in March of 1963, felt that, because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the United States could best proceed with a policy that


"combined firmness with flexibility." It was with an eye toward the creation of such a policy that Harriman told Hilsman, "You must immediately . . . begin to think about laying the groundwork for what the President might do about China policy in his second administration."

Though taking time out to block admission to the United Nations for the People's Republic once again, the Kennedy Administration began laying plans that called for a gradual step-by-step change in United States China policy. As early as May 31, 1963, the New York Times had written about the tendency toward change that was noticeable in Kennedy's China policy by saying that:

They contend that the United States must look, not for the collapse of Communist China from within, but toward the emergence of a new generation of leaders in Peking more interested in the internal development of their society than in foreign adventure.

The activity toward this end though, did not start until late Fall of 1963.

30 Hilsman, pp.346-47.
31 Ibid., p.347.
33 New York Times, May 31, 1963, p.2; Those interested in content analysis will note with interest that reference was being made more and more, by both official and un-official sources, to "Peking" rather than "Peiping". The significance of this is that Peking, meaning Northern Capital, was changed by Chiang Kai-shek to Peiping, meaning Northern Peace. Upon the fall of 1949 of the Nationalist forces the Communists renamed the city Peking again, but United States officials, in deference to Chiang, continued to refer to it as Peiping. Chiang and his followers insist that the city is not the capital of China.
At a press conference on November 14, 1963, President Kennedy served notice of a desire on the part of the United States for improved relations with China by saying:

"We are not planning to trade with Red China in view of the policy that Red China pursues. When the Red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States, with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. We are not wedded to a policy of hostility to Red China."  

The reappraisal of policies was already underway, for Assistant Secretary Hilsman, and others concerned with the Far East, were undertaking a "full-dress review" of United States China policy. The form of the policy decided upon, after the review, included such steps as lifting restrictions on Americans traveling to Communist China, recognition of Mongolia, bringing Communist China into the disarmament talks at Geneva, and a reexamination of United States restrictions on trade with Communist China. These moves were intended to illustrate to other nations that the United States was willing to be flexible in its policies toward China and that, in fact, it was China who was blocking normalization of relations between the two countries. The Administration did not expect the People's Republic to react to any of the proposed moves, but if such did occur it would be gladly accepted. The real aim though was, in the words of Hilsman:

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35Ibid., pp. 348-49.
... first, that the other countries in Asia would more and more come to see that it was the Chinese who were the cause of their own isolation and not United States policy. ... Second, we expected that over time there would be subtle and steady political pressure on the Chinese at least to pretend to be more forthcoming as they tried to line up African and Asian opinion and found the questions about who was isolating whom more and more difficult to answer.36

One other aim behind the proposed policy changes by the United States was to lay the groundwork for better relations with the "second-echelon" of leaders coming up in the People's Republic. The reasoning here was that by removing rigidity from United States China policy, even while knowing that the People's Republic would not reciprocate with a corresponding relaxation of policy, flexibility would be achieved by the time the younger leaders in the Communist regime, who hopefully would prefer better relations, reached positions of ultimate leadership in China. By removing the rigidity before that event there would be no delay in improvement of relations when it did occur. If there should be a relaxation or thawing of policy by the current regime then that would be fine, although unexpected, and the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China would be achieved earlier than expected.

It was decided that Hilsman, being the person responsible for policy with the People's Republic, would initiate the new policy in a speech in San Francisco, the site of many major addresses upon China policy, on December 13, 1963.

36Ibid., p.350.
It seemed that after more than ten years a real thaw in the state of United States-Chinese relations was about to take place. The Kennedy Administration had been expected by many to make major changes in China policy, but in the first two years it had not done so to any significant degree at all. Instead its members largely parroted the old policy that had been established by the two earlier administrations. By the third year of the Kennedy Administration though, decisions had been made that at least early steps toward normalization of United States China policy were to be undertaken. These steps were well underway when the world was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. The onus of United States China policy was thus shifted to Lyndon B. Johnson. Would he continue the steps barely underway toward changing that policy or would he revert back to the easy, safe policy that had remained frozen so long? The answer was not long in coming.
The citizens of the United States, along with the rest of the world, wondered what changes would be brought about by the abrupt and unexpected change of Presidents brought about by the events of November 22, 1963. It happened that there were few noticeable changes in policy resulting from the change because the theme of the new President during the time of shock and sorrow was one of continuity. President Johnson continued with the same cabinet members, much the same advisors, and with the same general policies as had the administration of John F. Kennedy. This continuity was quite significant where United States China policy was concerned, because the Kennedy Administration had been on the verge of beginning, after over two years in office, steps which it hoped would lead to normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The Hilsman speech, which had been scheduled for delivery on December 13, 1963, served as the first step toward a change in United States China policy, and whether or not President Johnson allowed delivery of the speech would be an indication of the stance of the new President upon changes in
United States China policy. The decision made, according to Hilsman, was that the speech itself would be given, but that:

... the program of initiatives—recognizing Mongolia, lifting travel restrictions, attempting to bring Communist China into the disarmament talks at Geneva, and re-examining trade restrictions—the program with which we had thought to follow up the speech would have to be postponed. President Johnson had a major task of getting a firm grip on the government and establishing himself in the eyes of the American people and the world as the effective leader of the United States, and he could not afford these concrete actions until the task was accomplished. The program of initiatives would clearly have to wait until after the 1964 elections, at the least.¹

It was held that it would be a good idea to go ahead with the speech, even though the initiatives would have to wait, because if public reaction to it was too adverse the new President could disavow it, but if it received a warm response he could quite easily step behind its main ideas. The speech was given as scheduled on December 13, 1963, to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. It had the approval of the White House staff, but the President did not read it himself, nor did the Secretary of State personally read the speech, although he did receive a verbal summary of it from Hilsman.²

The speech, which was relatively well received around the nation, was referred to by the New York Times as being,

²Ibid., p.355.
"... a coherent statement of the Johnson Administration's attitudes and policies toward Communist China." In the speech Hilsman pointed out that fourteen years had passed since the fall of the Nationalist Chinese regime and that it was time finally to "take stock", in a dispassionate manner, of the problem caused by that fall. In the Administration's attempt to do this he pointed out that the government did not ignore the Communist government, but that it had been trying to establish contact in many ways, all of which had been rebuffed. He, however, did indicate that some changes had occurred in the attitudes and actions of the leaders in Peking. Most important of these was that they had shown "... an ability to temper their grandiose slogans and frenetic schemes." He pointed out that one of the greatest faults of the communist leaders was their parochialism, which was self-imposed. Hilsman mentioned many of the troubles of Communist China—civilian unrest, economic failures, etc.—and then pointed to the "extraordinarily impressive" record of the Republic of China. In all of this he seemed to be trying to paint as realistic a picture of the situation in China as he could. This was then brought out by his saying that he had a reason for doing it; in that:

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Policies based upon a misapprehension of reality may lead us far from the goals we seek. There has perhaps been more emotion about our China policy than about our policy toward any single country since World War II. Yet our nation must look squarely at China, pursuing policies which will protect the interests of our country, of the free world, and of men of good will everywhere.\(^5\)

After expressing the fact that the prime objective of the United States concerning the People's Republic was to prevent the spreading of its control and influence throughout Asia, and explaining the reasons for the differences in United States policy toward China as opposed to policy toward Russia, Hilsman concluded by saying:

> We do not know what changes may occur in the attitudes of future Chinese leaders. But if I may paraphrase a classic canon of our past, we pursue today toward Communist China a policy of the open door: We are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change and not to slam it shut against any development which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.

> We hope that, confronted with firmness which will make foreign adventure unprofitable, and yet offered the prospect that the way back into the community of man is not closed to it, the Chinese Communist regime will eventually forsake its present venomous hatreds which spring from a rigid class view of society.\(^6\)

The speech, then, attempted to do two main things—to point out that the policy objectives of the United States would remain the same, and, second, to indicate, and set the stage for, changes in the means of reaching those objectives. There was to be no change in opposition to the spread of

\(^5\)Ibid., p.15.

\(^6\)Ibid., p.17.
communism by the Chinese government, but there were different ways in which this could be done. Hilsman said that "the key difference between this speech and the policy it outlined and Secretary Dulles' 1957 speech and the policy it outlined lay in the basic assumption on the question of Chinese Communist control." Dulles had wanted to sit back and let time bring about the downfall of the Communist regime, but that policy was no longer being followed. Instead attempts were being made to ease relations for the present time and also to plan for the future, especially when new leadership would appear on the scene in China. Another objective of the speech was to influence the public toward a more realistic and knowledgeable attitude toward the People's Republic. A short while after the speech, Hilsman indicated that the speech "... was not intended to alter policy ... but simply to introduce an element of dispassion and objectivity into American discussion of the China issue." It was clear, however, that the speech represented an attempt to "... prepare the way for future changes in American policy." As Hilsman had known before giving the speech, the goals of real changes in policy could not be made for a period, due

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7 Hilsman, p.351.


to political reasons, but the speech could at least clear the way for such changes when they did become possible.

That the changes were not then possible and that they were not to be made soon was quickly indicated by actions of the Johnson Administration during its first few months in office. To make early changes in United States China policy even more unlikely, there was some intransigence on the question in high places within the State Department. Secretary Rusk, for instance, indicated that he did not "... see any change in the attitude of Peiping toward peace with the rest of the world, registered by actions, which can demonstrate any attempt to live in solid peace with their neighbors."\textsuperscript{10} He also said that "at the present time we are not too hopeful about any change from that capital."\textsuperscript{11}

Reaction to the recognition of the People's Republic of China by France, in early 1964, provided further proof that the basic policy of United States policy toward the People's Republic of China was not changing. Regret that France had taken such action in the face of United States opposition was expressed, along with the statement that:

The United States will stand firmly by its commitments to the Government of the Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam [Indicating a new element that was becoming more and more important in United States Far Eastern policy], as well as all other countries in our


\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
common endeavor to prevent and deter aggression and to promote the interest of peace.\textsuperscript{12}

President Johnson reaffirmed the lack of change in United States China policy by saying:

As for China itself, so long as the Communist Chinese pursue aggression, so long as the Communists preach violence, there can be and will be no easing of relationships. ... America must base her acts on present realities and not on future hopes. It is not we who must reexamine our views of China. It is the Chinese Communists who must reexamine their views of the world.

Nor can anyone doubt our unalterable commitment to the defense and liberty of free China. ...\textsuperscript{13}

Largely for political reasons—both domestic and foreign—the Johnson Administration was unable to make any basic or even semi-basic changes in China policy. There was also the fact that 1964 was an election year, which even further limited any possible policy changes. This did not, however, mean that more and more pressure would not be put upon the Administration for such changes. From many different sources there was an increasing clamor for changes and readjustments in United States China policy. Such actions seemed to be coming at much more regular intervals than in the recent past. One of the first really noticeable of these actions was contained in a speech given on the Senate floor by the chairman of its prestigious Committee on Foreign


Relations on March 25, 1964. In a speech, entitled "Old Myths and New Realities", Senator J. William Fulbright expressed that:

The Far East is another area of the world in which American policy is handicapped by the divergence of old myths and new realities. Particularly with respect to China, an elaborate vocabulary of make-believe has become compulsory in both official and public discussion. We are committed, with respect to China and other areas in Asia, to inflexible policies of long standing from which we hesitate to depart because of the attribution to these policies of an aura of mystical sanctity. . . . The point is that whatever the outcome of a rethinking of policy might be, we have been unwilling to undertake it because of the fear of many governmental officials, undoubtedly well founded, that even the suggestion of new policies toward China would provoke a vehement public outcry. 14

Fulbright, along with an increasing number of others within and outside the government, was not satisfied, it seemed, with the progress of the Administration toward changes leading to an easing of policy toward China. 15

Such changes were not to be had at that time, however.

In a government publication on Communist China, published

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in January of 1965, there was a reaffirmation of the traditional policy toward the People's Republic of China. This was the statement that:

The United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of China as the only legitimate Chinese Government and supports it as such in the United Nations and other international organizations. It opposes efforts to seat the Chinese Communist regime in these organizations.  

No signs of any change at all were indicated. This general attitude was expressed by Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, in March, 1965, as he said:

We avoid those actions which would tend to strengthen Communist China's position or contribute to the realization of its expansionist goals. Thus, we refuse to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China or to promote its seating in the United Nations. We see little to gain and much to lose through such action.

As to trade with mainland China, we maintain a complete embargo on trade and financial dealings. We do not prevail on others not to trade with mainland China, but we try to hold the line against trade in strategic items and we have urged our friends not to extend trading that amounts to aid to Communist China.

Green did, however, reveal that there might be a dichotomy within the Department's thinking on the subject of China policy. He, for example, asked if it was possible to pursue, simultaneously, a policy of trying to thwart Chinese


Communist ambitions and one of seeking to moderate those ambitions. In answering this he said he felt that the two policies were "entirely complimentary".

Through the rest of 1965 there were no changes in policy toward China, at least until near the end. *Newsweek*, in a study of United States China policy, spoke of "... an Administration whose top policymakers are all hard-liners on the China question, [and] Rusk stands out as one of the hardest." Such assumptions, and the general air of resignation evinced by those who wanted changes in China policy, seemed justified in the light of the current actions of Washington. Ambassador Goldberg had, in a recent twelve-page address to the United Nations, pleaded once more that the People's Republic not be admitted to the United Nations. He had presented all the old arguments against such actions, which would be:

... a backward step that would encourage a new imperialism which demands conformity with its views, which rejects peaceful coexistence and propounds violence and warfare as a principle of international concourse.

In early December, Secretary Rusk said, in answer to a question at a news conference, "The problem is that with


19U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Representative to the United Nations in Plenary Session, on Chinese Representation, November 9, 1965", p.12.; It should be noted that the United States fared worse than it ever had before on
contact, even with contact, it's very difficult to find a basis for improvement of relations."\textsuperscript{20} It seemed that the intransigence upon China policy was as strong as ever.

Such was not the case, however, for the closing weeks of 1965 saw the beginning of a major shift in posture by the United States vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China. The shift started in a somewhat strange manner, but start it did, and in an area of policy that had remained frozen for so long, it had to be labeled significant. This first move in what was to become a sizeable number of such moves toward a thawing of policy toward China, was undertaken when:

The United States, in an exploratory move toward closer scientific cooperation with the Communist bloc, relaxed travel restrictions ... to permit physicians and medical scientists to visit Communist China and four other countries.

\begin{itemize}
\item The medical field was chosen for the first step on the grounds that it was primarily humanitarian in nature and would raise fewer military and political complications than other fields of scientific research.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{itemize}

In a speech at Pomono College (California) on February 12, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy, indicated that no change had occurred in the question of Communist China's admission to the United Nations. The vote was forty-seven, forty-seven, with twenty abstentions—not nearly enough for admission, which requires a two-thirds majority, but somewhat of an affront to the United States.


main pillars of United States China policy—recognition, admission to the United Nations, and trade—but that:

... the problem must be considered basically in the same way we did that of the Soviet Union. We must, on the one hand, seek to curtail Peking's ambitions and build up the free nations of Asia and of contiguous areas; on the other hand, while maintaining firm resistance to their expansionist ambitions, we can, over time, open the possibility of increased contacts with Communist China, weighing very carefully any steps we take in these general areas least we impair the essential first aim of our policy, including our clear commitments.22

It seemed that the thaw might be continuing.

The trend toward a thaw was helped along considerably by holding of a series of hearings in the Congress upon United States policies toward Asia and especially toward China. The first of these was in the House by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on February 15, and 16, and March 8, 9, and 19, 1966. The second, and the more important, due primarily to its greater publicity, hearing was held by the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations. At both of these hearings there was a great amount of expression of opinions upon what the policies of the United States should be in relation to the People's Republic of China. There were, of course, witnesses who favored both sides of the question of whether the policy toward China that had been practiced for a decade and a half should be changed or not. The witnesses who got the most attention, due primarily to

the fact that they were expressing something different from what had been heard through the years, were the ones who were critical of existing China policy and were presenting possible alternative policies for consideration and, hopefully, adoption. Most prominent in this group were such academics as A. Doak Barnett, John K. Fairbank, and Robert Scalapino. Most important of these, in the light of future developments, was the testimony of Mr. Barnett. In this testimony he spoke of what he identified as a policy "aimed at containment and isolation" of Communist China. He went on to support the idea of both military and nonmilitary containment, but he questioned the validity of a policy of isolation. He strongly felt, he indicated:

... that the time has come—even though the United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam—for our country to alter its policy toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peking, but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community.23

He, and many of the other witnesses, went on to recommend major changes in policy such as the recognition of the People's Republic, its admission to the United Nations, etc., but the real importance of the hearings was that they showed a great deal of dissatisfaction with the current policy toward

China. This dissatisfaction was not the only thing that brought about the change in policy that began at about the time the hearings were concluding, but it certainly had some influence. It could even logically be assumed that the hearings had been held, at least in part, to provide some justification for changes in the China policy of the United States. Regardless of the motive or the influence of the hearings it was clear that changes were under way in United States China policy. The thaw was continuing and even increasing.

Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Bundy, in their statements to the House subcommittee holding hearings on the Asian policy of the United States, indicated no major changes in policy but they certainly did not illustrate the degree of intransigence of just a few months earlier. They were realistic in pointing out that no change in the primary elements of China policy were to be expected soon, but they did not foreclose more minor shifts in policy.

The shifts in policy not foreclosed by Rusk and Bundy were not long in appearing in the actions of Washington upon China policy. The month of March, 1966, saw more changes, albeit small ones, than had occurred in the past several years in United States China policy. Vice President Humphrey, who became one of the most vocal of the Administration's

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spokesmen upon attitudes toward the People's Republic, picked up and used, in less than a week's time, one of the phrases used by A. Doak Barnett in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Vice President, who had on March 11, congratulated the Foreign Relations Committee upon its hearings on China policy by saying that "... the American People, as well as their leaders, need to know more about Asia in general and Communist China in particular...," replied to a question on the National Broadcasting Company program "Meet the Press" by saying:

I do believe that containment of aggressive militancy of China is a worthy objective, but containment without necessarily isolation. Containment of its militancy, of its military power, just as we had to do in the post-war years in Europe, relating to the Soviet Union. But at the same time not trying to isolate from the family of mankind.

This was widely interpreted as being a significant shift in United States posture upon the China question, and indeed it did become a pet phrase of Washington officialdom. It clearly indicated that there was new thinking upon the question of China policy. The *New York Times* spoke of

"... several steps toward cracking the almost total isolation that for so long had been imposed on Peking by Washington." 

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It was also reported that the President, who had not cleared the statement of the Vice President, was pleased that he "... had taken such a lead."\textsuperscript{28}

That this new thinking was being applied to policy was brought out by the quiet authorization by the President for "scholars" to visit Communist China.\textsuperscript{29} Equally important was the fact that major officials of the Government were urging a dialogue within the nation upon the China problem. As an example of this there was the statement of Secretary Rusk that it "... is useful and important that Americans consider among themselves what our relations with China ought to be, or are, or have been. ..."\textsuperscript{30} Holding potential importance was the answer given by Ambassador Goldberg to questions about possibilities of change in the policy of the United States toward the People's Republic at the United Nations. His response was to the effect that United States policy toward China was being "reviewed" but that there had been no change as yet.\textsuperscript{31} There was even an Associated Press story out of London that in talks between Ambassador John A. Gronouski and Wang Kuo-chang the United States had told the People's Republic that "... it is ready to discuss a normalization of relations and seating of a Peking delegation in

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, March 14, 1966, p.2.
the United Nations." The report was circulated by unnamed "senior diplomats" of a government other than the two involved. Washington officials refused to either confirm or deny the report.

The apparent thawing of United States China policy continued, with the next step being the State Department's announcement, on April 14, that "several American universities had been notified that scientists and scholars from Communist China would be permitted to visit the United States." There was also the statement by the Vice President before the annual convention of the Americans For Democratic Action in which he pointed out that he had said:

... on a number of occasions that we do not seek the isolating of Communist China, but only her containment. This is the policy of our government. It is the policy we have followed with the Soviet Union—a policy that has resulted in a growing realism and even moderation among Soviet leaders. This took a good deal of time, and it will take time with Communist China as well.

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33 It should be pointed out that there is no reference to such an exchange in Warsaw in what is by far the most definitive study of the history of the ambassadorial talks: Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 ("The United States and China in World Affairs"; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968).

The proposals we have recently made had been rejected out of hand. But I am convinced that we should persist in them, prudently and patiently.

We would welcome the time when a peaceful China—willing to accept the responsibilities that go with membership in the family of nations—might be ready to live in harmony with her neighbors.35

Humphrey also seemed intent upon changing the stance of the United States toward the People's Republic as the Associated Press reported that he regarded "as excellent" a proposal for the creation of a "blue-ribbon commission" to make recommendations upon changes in United States China policy.36 The proposed commission had been put forth by Senator Edward Kennedy in a speech on the Senate floor, on May 3, in which he said:

... I think it would be extremely helpful if the President convened a blue-ribbon commission of distinguished men to make, publicly, recommendations for new directions in our China policy. Such a commission could be headed by an eminent citizen or past national leader. Its membership could be drawn from academic, business, labor and other leadership circles.37

No immediate action was taken on the proposal other than the expression of support by the Vice President.

Continued support of the newly popularized idea of "containment but not isolation", was evinced by statements

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35Speech by Vice President Humphrey, 19th Annual Convention Banquet, Americans For Democratic Action, Washington, D.C., April 23, 1966. (Text furnished author by the Vice President).


37"Speech of Hon. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts in the Senate of the United States, Tuesday, May 3, 1966," (Reprint from the Congressional Record.).
of two high officials in President Johnson's Administration. First, there was the statement by Ambassador Goldberg that China should be "brought into the mainstream" of world peace efforts even though it had imposed "self-isolation" upon itself. The second Administration figure to respond to the concept was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who said that:

"... the barriers causing isolation throughout the world must be broken down. He pleaded for "realistic relationships" with both the Soviet Union and Communist China to bridge "the vast ideological chasm separating us from them." "Breaking the isolation of a great nation, like Red China," he said, "reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstanding."

The most vocal of the members of the Administration in the new dialogue upon China policy, Vice President Humphrey, continued to indicate changes in Washington's attitude on China policy by saying:

"... we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China--just as we have to the Soviet Union and the Communist States of Eastern Europe.

The isolation of the Asian Communist states--however caused--breeds unreality, delusion, and miscalculation.

Efforts to break that isolation may, for the time being, provoke denunciation and hostility. But we shall persevere and explore means of communication and exchange, looking to the day when the leaders of Asian communism--as their former colleagues in Europe--will come to recognize the self-destructiveness and wastefulness of their present bellicose policies.

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Prudence and reason, not the slogans of the past, will guide us as we try to reduce the unacceptable risks of ignorance and misunderstanding in a thermo-nuclear age.\(^{40}\)

These men were not along in their statements reflecting a changing attitude in Washington toward the China problem. The President also played a role in this as he, in a nationally televised address, made a quiet announcement that the Government had cleared for travel to China the passport of "a leading American businessman", thus expanding even more the list of people who could travel to China as far as Washington was concerned.\(^{41}\) This action meant that about the only restriction upon travel to the People's Republic was limited to tourists. Almost anyone with a valid reason it seemed could now gain State Department approval for travel to China. The President later, in response to a news conference question, said about United States China policy:

> I feel that we should do everything we can to increase our exchanges, to understand other people better, to have our scientists and own businessmen, our authors and our newspaper people exchange visits and exchange viewpoints.

> I would hope that as a result of tearing down these barriers that someday all people in this world would be willing to be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, that all peoples would want to cease aggression and would try to live in peace and understanding with their neighbors.

> So far as I am concerned, every day I am looking for new ways to understand the viewpoint of others.

\(^{40}\)Remarks by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 8, 1966. (Text furnished author by the Vice President).

And I hope that at a not too distant date mainland China will be willing to open some of the barriers to these exchanges and be willing to perhaps come nearer to abiding by the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter.42

The first real test of the degree of change being made in United States China policy came with the Fall of 1966 and the annual question of admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. There had been speculation for much of the year that it would be upon the admission question that the first major move in United States China policy would come. The series of small changes in policy that had occurred simply added to speculation that a different policy would be followed in the United Nations General Assembly. As late as September 11, 1966, there were reports that the United States was near acceptance of a "two-China" policy in the United Nations.43 It was decided, however, that such a move would not be made. The New York Times reported that this decision had come about, after some consideration of a "two-China" approach, because Administration officials were confident that they had enough votes to defeat a move to seat the People's Republic. It was said that:

The two-China policy ... was advocated within the Administration as a positive move to cast the United States in a less intransient, more conciliatory

role toward Peking and to shift the onus away from the United States for blocking the admission of Communist China. 44

It was decided that it would be better to bear the burden of opposing admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations than to encourage or sanction its hostile policies toward others. Ambassador Goldberg did say in connection with the China issue that:

We have made it crystal clear that we do not intend to attack, invade, or attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Peking, and we have expressed our hope to see representatives of Peking join us and others in meaningful negotiations on disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and a ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons. 45

Though major changes were apparently not soon forthcoming, it seemed that the changes occurring were becoming more and more significant. In the United Nations, the United States did adjust its policy in a way that could have been quite important. This change of policy was the decision to support a resolution offered by Italy and five other nations to set up a study-commission:

... with the mandate of exploring and studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make the appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. . . . 46

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It was felt by many that United States support of the study resolution would lead to a "two-China" settlement of the China problem.\(^{47}\) Ambassador Goldberg made clear the fact that the United States would not pledge itself to the solution to be presented by the study-committee. He stated that the United States would not accept a solution that forced the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations. The United States understanding of the proposal was that it, "... does not in any way prejudice or undermine our commitments, nor indeed does it prejudge the results of the study to be made."\(^{48}\) In the voting concerning the China question, the United States was able to defeat a motion to seat the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. The resolution for the study-committee was also defeated by a vote of sixty-two to thirty-four, with twenty-five abstentions.\(^{49}\) The traditional policy of the United States in the General Assembly on the China question had been changed slightly by its support of the study-committee proposal, but to no avail as the plan was defeated.

Having made only minor adjustments in its China policy in the United Nations, the United States continued making


slight changes in its policy toward China in other areas of lesser importance. The President indicated that these lesser changes were continuing by saying:

For our part, we shall do what we can to hasten its [the day the Chinese people prevail over outmoded dogmatism] coming. We shall keep alive the hope for a free flow of ideas and people between mainland China the the United States, as I have said so recently on so many other occasions. For only through such exchange can isolation be ended and suspicion give way to trust.

We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must ultimately end in reconciliation. We hopefully look to the day when the policies of mainland China will offer and will permit such a reconciliation.50

That the Administration was serious in its attempts at easing relations between the United States and China was illustrated by its offer to exchange seed samples with the Peking regime. One report viewed the offer as:

... having more symbolic than practical significance. It was the latest in a series of attempts by Washington to find some common denominator with Peking to break through mainland China's frozen attitude of hostility and isolation.51

In a major concession to the critics of past United States China policy, it was announced by the Department of State that a panel of advisers on China was being created.52 Of its ten members, four (A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein,)


51New York Times, December 2, 1966, pp.1, 6. It might be pointed out that this seemingly insignificant offer could have had a tremendous impact upon the food supply of China.

John K. Fairbank, and Robert Scalapino) had been most critical of current China policy at the Senate hearings earlier in the year. This move, quite similar to the one suggested earlier by Senator Edward Kennedy, was interpreted by some as being "... a reflection of Washington's desire to take advantage of new thinking and to display greater flexibility in its China policy."

In the State of the Union Message on January 11, 1967, President Johnson said, concerning United States China policy, that:

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China and the world community—including working together in all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their fellowmen elsewhere depends.

We would like to be the first to welcome a China which decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would be the first to applaud her were she to apply her great energies and intelligence to improving the welfare of her people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries.

The thaw that had occurred during the preceding year was apparently continuing. The continuation of the relaxation of policy was confirmed by an Associated Press report that Government officials had told Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt that they favored "... a breaking down of barriers between the United States and Communist China. . . ."

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As a whole, however, 1967 saw very few changes in United States China policy. It nowhere near approached the number of changes that had occurred in the preceding year. This lack of further progress was attributable to several things, most important of which was the continued escalation of the Vietnam war. Another major cause of the lack of progress toward further easing of United States-Chinese relations during 1967, was the intransigence evinced by the People's Republic. No positive response to any of the many United States initiatives had been made by the People's Republic. Because of this, and also the fact that many more moves by the United States would bring it to the point where it would have to make more major changes in its policies than it desired to make without any indication of reciprocity, the United States was unable to make additional moves.

While progress toward normalization of relations with China had noticeably slowed, the Administration was definitely not retrogressing to the hard frozen conditions of earlier days. This fact was supported by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach as he said:

With regard to Communist China ... we must look to combining a policy of containment of aggression with policies of coexistence and engagement. We should not be unduly discouraged simply because the picture today is not a very hopeful one.

It would not be visionary, I think, to hope for some change someday in the view of Communist China's leaders, too. In the meantime, the United States must be prepared to work toward ways of living with Peking, however difficult that job seems today. We
have already suggested—and must keep suggesting—those steps which would increase contacts and communications. 56

After a rather dismal 1967, the Johnson Administration began 1968 on a slightly more active scale where changes in China policy were concerned. In his State of the Union Message, for example, President Johnson said that, "The United States . . . remains willing to permit the travel of journalists to both our countries; to undertake cultural and educational exchanges; and to talk about the exchange of basic food crop materials." 57 The last phrase of that sentence presented itself as a possible hint at a major change in United States China policy. Did not "food crop materials" and their exchange amount to trade between the two nations? No clarification was offered, but the possibility of some trade between the United States and the People's Republic seemed much closer than at any time since the hard freeze in United States China policy. A few months later Vice President Humphrey spoke of the future of relations with the Chinese by saying:

Surely, one of the most exciting and enriching experiences to which we can look forward is the building of peaceful bridges to the people of mainland China.

There will be frustrations. We shall be rebuffed, no doubt, time and again. But we must

keep trying. For continued national isolation breeds growing national neurosis—in China as elsewhere.58

The most recent high-level statement of the Johnson Administration's China policy, which expressed very well the position at which the United States seemed closely confined by the actions, or nonactions, of the People's Republic was by Under Secretary Katzenbach as he said:

While hoping for better relations with Communist China, we are realistic enough to expect changes to come slowly. For our ability to influence the rate at which changes occur is limited. Many of them will result ultimately from altered perceptions and a more relaxed atmosphere within mainland China itself. The winds of change are blowing throughout the world. Sooner or later they must blow even over the Great Wall of China. When they do, if they bring about a Chinese wish for improved relations, the United States will be happy to respond positively.59

That these winds were not yet breaching the Great Wall was apparent with the move of the People's Republic to postpone the 135th ambassadorial meeting at Warsaw for a six-month period.60 At this writing, the significance of this move was unknown, but it certainly cast a shadow over United States attempts at improvement of relations with China.

Thus ended the story of the Administration of Lyndon Johnson to June, 1968, as far as United States policy toward the People's Republic of China was concerned. It was a very significant period in that as it started it seemed that a

major change in what had become the traditional United States policy toward the People's Republic was just underway. With the beginning of the Johnson Administration in November, 1963, necessity put off any immediate change in policy regarding China, though a speech preparing the way for future change was permitted. After a period of waiting, the Spring and Summer of 1966 saw several changes of policy being made by the Johnson Administration. These changes were not in connection with the major elements of United States China policy— withholding recognition of, opposition to admission to the United Nations of, and refusal to enter into trade with the People's Republic of China—but they definitely were changes, and fairly radical ones when compared to the past record, from the hard frozen policy toward the People's Republic that had been practiced throughout the 1950's. These changes met almost no success so far as the reaction of the People's Republic was concerned, but they were important, even as unilateral changes, because they clearly represented a changed posture on the part of the United States and in a case where that posture had been so extremely rigid any change had to be seen as significant.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A detailed survey of United States policy toward the People's Republic of China, such as the one above, makes it quite apparent that a change has occurred in that policy. There have actually been two basic changes in United States China policy since the creation of the People's Republic. First came the freezing of policy that occurred in 1950. Second, and the one this study has been most concerned with, was the more recent thaw in the rigid policy established by the first.

United States policy toward the People's Republic of China started on a generally friendly, though cautious, note with the establishment of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949. The United States had already begun the process of withdrawing its support of, and in all probability relations with, the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, which it expected to collapse completely. While the Nationalist government remained in existence the United States felt morally bound to continue dealing with it as the Government of China, but Washington was well aware that it would soon have to deal with the Communist government as the Government of China. With this in mind, the United States continued the process of gradually withdrawing from
its relationship with the one and toward establishment of a like relationship with the other. There were numerous signs that the United States was preparing, after satisfying itself of the permanentness of the People's Republic, to extend diplomatic recognition and all that goes with it to the new regime that controlled the bulk of China.

The movement toward establishment of normal diplomatic and other relations with the People's Republic by the United States was abruptly halted by actions of the People's Republic. First, there occurred a great deal of verbal and physical harassment of the United States and its representatives. The United States reacted to such actions by hardening slightly its policy toward the People's Republic. The real freeze in policy came with the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean conflict in late 1950. This intervention resulted in a determination on the part of Washington to not extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic. There were also decisions to prevent its admission to the United Nations, and to refuse to allow trade with it by United States citizens. Along with the establishment of this hard line toward the People's Republic, there was a prohibition of all American travel to the mainland of China. The policy later came to be described as one of containment and isolation.
From 1953 on the Administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower continued, for the most part, the frozen condition of policy against the People's Republic. Momentarily it looked like the new Administration was going to take an even harder stance in its China policy by encouraging, and perhaps even supporting, Chiang Kai-shek to invade the mainland. The invasion failed to materialize, however. The primary difference in the early policy of Eisenhower from that followed by Truman was not directed toward the People's Republic, but instead toward the Republic of China. Formosa began to receive more and more economic aid from the United States. The hard line against the People's Republic was definitely maintained. This policy was even hardened in a few areas such as the United States attitude toward trade by its allies with the People's Republic. The Eisenhower years were marked by a policy toward the People's Republic that was virtually unchanging. This was best illustrated by the phrase, often used by Administration officials, that, "Time is the cure for muddy water." This was applied to China by believing that the best way to deal with the People's Republic was to let the passage of time remove the conditions in China that were objectionable to the United States. Such a policy, by its very nature, precluded any real thawing of policy toward the People's Republic, because few attempts were made to bring about this thaw. Time would take care of that.
Two slight instances of a thaw did occur in United States China policy during the Eisenhower period in the form of the establishment of ambassadorial level talks between the two nations and, after much hesitation, the approval of trips to mainland China by selected United States journalists and, in rare instances, other individuals were also allowed to travel to China. During much of this period travel was on a unilateral basis only. There was strong United States insistence, of course, that the talks between ambassadors of the two nations did not in any way imply diplomatic recognition for the People's Republic. Though these two very slight thaws did occur, there was no wavering at all by the United States upon the main element of its China policy. There was still to be no recognition extended the People's Republic. Its admission to the United Nations was still strongly objected to by the United States, and no trade by United States citizens could be carried on with the People's Republic.

With the opening of the Administration of John F. Kennedy there was a great deal of speculation that changes in United States policy toward China would be forthcoming. Early actions of the new Administration quickly made clear, however, that no substantial changes in policy were to be soon forthcoming. The policy was still basically one of containment and isolation of the People's Republic with a corresponding support of the Republic of China. Slight adjustments were necessary in some instances, such as the handling of the question
of the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations, but no real changes in policy were carried out during the first two years of the Kennedy Administration. This lack of action did not mean that there was no interest in the institution of some change of policy toward the People's Republic. In fact, there was a considerable amount of dissatisfaction with the hardness of United States policy toward China. A more flexible position was desired. This desire led to the initiation of steps which would eventually end in a changing of policy toward China. The first public step in that direction was a speech by Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, in late 1963, aimed at creating a more realistic public attitude toward China. This was the forerunner of a series of slight changes in United States China policy intended to replace the intransigence of the United States with a more flexible China policy.

The time table for changes in United States China policy was set back by the assassination of President Kennedy, but it was not cancelled. The Johnson Administration decided to go ahead with the Hilsman speech, indicating a basic flexibility on the part of President Johnson toward China policy. The address was given on December 13, 1963, and received, in general, a warm reception from the private sector. Hilsman called for such things as increased public understanding of the Chinese problem. The most important of his points, however, was the implication that the United States should begin active
efforts to adjust relations with present, and especially future, leaders of China. Such actions were not immediately possible and were not undertaken but the indications for the future were clear.

After some two years in office, during which the Johnson Administration made no significant changes in United States China policy, Washington began, in the Spring and Summer of 1966, a series of steps designed to eliminate the isolation of the People's Republic. This series constituted the first real thaw in United States China policy, since it had been frozen hard in the early 1950's. The changes started with an increase in the classes of people who could travel to the People's Republic. After only a short while this had been extended to include almost everyone except common tourists. Next, after a series of Congressional hearings upon China policy, many spokesmen for the Administration, including the Vice President and ultimately even the President, began calling for the containment, but not the isolation, of the People's Republic of China by the United States. There were indications that the United States was considering a change in its stand against the People's Republic in the United Nations. As it turned out the United States continued opposition to the admission of the People's Republic. A significant change in its stance upon this question was indicated by its support of an Italian resolution to establish a committee to study the China question of the United Nations. The potential importance
of this action was never realized due to the rejection of the resolution by the General Assembly. It nonetheless indicated a significant relaxation in what had been one of the United States most adamant positions against China. Another sign of a thaw in China policy which had never been explicitly stated before, was the announcement that Chinese scientists and scholars would be permitted to visit the United States. Another clear sign of a change in policy was the creation of a panel of advisers to the State Department on China policy, a substantial number of whose members were known critics of the old China policy. That interest in a change of policy was real and not just for appearance sake was indicated by the wide degree of range in the various proposals being put forth by the United States. These ranged from a suggestion that the two nations exchange seed samples to the recent hint at a relaxation of the long held stand against any trade with the People's Republic.

The obvious fact that none of these relaxations of policy came in connection with what had consistently been the major tenets of United States China policy— withholding of recognition of the People's Republic, opposition to United Nations membership for it, and restrictions upon trade with it— did not preclude that no change in policy had occurred. In fact there could be no question but that a detectable thaw in United States China policy had occurred. A change in policy was clearly indicated by the fact that a President of the United States could say:
We shall keep alive the hope for a free flow of ideas and people between mainland China and the United States. For only through such exchange can isolation be ended and suspicion give way to trust.¹

That the Vice President talked of ending the isolation of China and the building of bridges to it, was also a clear indication of a substantial thawing of United States policy toward the People's Republic of China. Such statements were unheard of during the 1950's and the early part of the 1960's.

The significance of the change in United States China policy has been somewhat obscured by the continued intransigence of the People's Republic and also, relatively recently, by a cessation of additional thaws on the part of the United States. This does not mean, however, that it was of no significance. The changes, in fact, held a great deal of significance in connection with the future of United States-Chinese relations. While the basic policies of nonrecognition, opposition to United Nations seating, and no trading continued, the stage had been set for a fairly rapid return to normal relations between the United States and China should the current regime in China, or a new group, decide to assume normal policies in the world community. Without the seemingly small and insignificant steps already undertaken by the United

States any reaction to such a change in China's attitude might take so long as to destroy a chance at normalization of relations. Having completed such steps the United States has achieved several desirable results. It is prepared for any changes to the better in the situation in China. It has shifted the onus of intransigence upon the China problem from itself to the People's Republic. Also it has gone a long way toward preparation of its people—something that would not have been necessary had it followed a more reasoned policy toward China in the 1950's--for acceptance of more normal relations with China. These achievements, while failing to provide normal relations between the two nations, must be recognized as holding considerable significance in that they have improved, by making more realistic, the position of the United States toward China.
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