The Trial Court Abuses Its Discretion in Denying Motions for New Trial if the Defendant’s Affidavit Alleges Slight Evidence of Extenuating Circumstances

Date

1973

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Texas Tech Law Review

Abstract

Ward held that a petitioner successfully shows that his failure to answer, resulting in a default judgment, was excused because it was not intentional or due to conscious indifference. The author highlights the two major problems in Ward: (1) what must an affidavit contain to negate conscious indifference? And (2) what discretion is allowed the trial court to rule on a motion to set aside a default judgment and for a new trial? The author reasons that the ultimate effect of Ward is to reaffirm already existing requirements for setting aside a default judgment and granting a new trial set out in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus. Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939). Further, the author suggests that Ward indicates that the excuse necessary to rebut conscious indifference is slight, but without such an excuse courts will not grant a new trial.

Description

Keywords

Default judgment, Conscious indifference, Meritorious defense, Lack of prejudice to plaintiff, Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., New trial, Ward v. Nava, Case note

Citation

5 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 153