Browsing by Author "Jones, Harry W."
Now showing 1 - 11 of 11
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item Comments on the MIT Assessment of the Mars One Plan(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.The MIT assessment of the Mars One mission plan reveals design assumptions that would cause significant difficulties. Growing crops in the crew chamber produces excessive oxygen levels. The assumed in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) equipment has too low a Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The required spare parts cause a large and increasing launch mass logistics burden. The assumed International Space Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) technologies were developed for microgravity and therefore are not suitable for Mars gravity. Growing food requires more mass than sending food from Earth. The large number of spares is due to the relatively low reliability of ECLS and the low TRL of ISRU. The Mars One habitat design is similar to past concepts but does not incorporate current knowledge. The MIT architecture analysis tool for long-term settlements on the Martian surface includes an ECLS system simulation, an ISRU sizing model, and an analysis of required spares. The MIT tool showed the need for separate crop and crew chambers, the large spare parts logistics, that crops require more mass than Earth food, and that more spares are needed if reliability is lower. That ISRU has low TRL and ISS ECLS was designed for microgravity are well known. Interestingly, the results produced by the architecture analysis tool - separate crop chamber, large spares mass, large crop chamber mass, and low reliability requiring more spares - were also well known. A common approach to ECLS architecture analysis is to build a complex model that is intended to be all-inclusive and is hoped will help solve all design problems. Such models can struggle to replicate obvious and well-known results and are often unable to answer unanticipated new questions. A better approach would be to survey the literature for background knowledge and then directly analyze the important problems.Item Diverse Redundant Systems for Reliable Space Life Support(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.Reliable life support systems are required for deep space missions. The probability of a fatal life support failure should be less than one in a thousand in a multi-year mission. It is far too expensive to develop a single system with such high reliability. Using three redundant units would require only that each have a failure probability of one in ten over the mission. Since the system development cost is inverse to the failure probability, this would cut cost by a factor of one hundred. Using replaceable subsystems instead of full systems would further cut cost. Using full sets of replaceable components improves reliability more than using complete systems as spares, since a set of components could repair many different failures instead of just one. Replaceable components would require more tools, space, and planning than full systems or replaceable subsystems. However, identical system redundancy cannot be relied on in practice. Common cause failures can disable all the identical redundant systems. Typical levels of common cause failures will defeat redundancy greater than two. Diverse redundant systems are required for reliable space life support. Three, four, or five diverse redundant systems could be needed for sufficient reliability. One system with lower level repair could be substituted for two diverse systems to save cost.Item Don’t Trust a Management Metric, Especially in Life Support(44th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2014-07-13) Jones, Harry W.Goodhart’s law states that metrics do not work. Metrics become distorted when used and they deflect effort away from more important goals. These well-known and unavoidable problems occurred when the closure and system mass metrics were used to manage life support research. The intent of life support research should be to develop flyable, operable, reliable systems, not merely to increase life support system closure or to reduce its total mass. It would be better to design life support systems to meet the anticipated mission requirements and user needs. Substituting the metrics of closure and total mass for these goals seems to have led life support research to solve the wrong problems.Item Estimating the Life Cycle Cost of Space Systems(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.A space system’s Life Cycle Cost (LCC) includes design and development, launch and emplacement, and operations and maintenance. Each of these cost factors is usually estimated separately. NASA uses three different parametric models for the design and development cost of crewed space systems; the commercial PRICE-H space hardware cost model, the NASA-Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM), and the Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM). System mass is an important parameter in all three models. System mass also determines the launch and emplacement cost, which directly depends on the cost per kilogram to launch mass to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The launch and emplacement cost is the cost to launch to LEO the system itself and also the rockets, propellant, and lander needed to emplace it. The ratio of the total launch mass to payload mass depends on the mission scenario and destination. The operations and maintenance costs include any material and spares provided, the ground control crew, and sustaining engineering. The Mission Operations Cost Model (MOCM) estimates these costs as a percentage of the system development cost per year.Item The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of Life Support Recycling and Resupply(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.Brief human space missions supply all the crew’s water and oxygen from Earth. The multiyear International Space Station (ISS) program instead uses physicochemical life support systems to recycle water and oxygen. This paper compares the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of recycling to the LCC of resupply for potential future long duration human space missions. Recycling systems have high initial development costs but relatively low duration- dependent support costs. This means that recycling is more cost effective for longer missions. Resupplying all the water and oxygen requires little initial development cost but has a much higher launch mass and launch cost. The cost of resupply increases as the mission duration increases. Resupply is therefore more cost effective than recycling for shorter missions. A recycling system pays for itself when the resupply LCC grows greater over time than the recycling LCC. The time when this occurs is called the recycling breakeven date. Recycling will cost very much less than resupply for long duration missions within the Earth-Moon system, such as a future space station or Moon base. But recycling would cost about the same as resupply for long duration deep space missions, such as a Mars trip. Because it is not possible to provide emergency supplies or quick return options on the way to Mars, more expensive redundant recycling systems will be needed.Item Reliability and Failure in NASA Missions: Blunders, Normal Accidents, High Reliability, Bad Luck(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.NASA emphasizes crew safety and system reliability but several unfortunate failures have occurred. The Apollo 1 fire was mistakenly unanticipated. After that tragedy, the Apollo program gave much more attention to safety. The Challenger accident revealed that NASA had neglected safety and that management underestimated the high risk of shuttle. Probabilistic Risk Assessment was adopted to provide more accurate failure probabilities for shuttle and other missions. NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” initiative and government procurement reform led to deliberately dismantling traditional reliability engineering. The Columbia tragedy and Mars mission failures followed. Failures can be attributed to blunders, normal accidents, or bad luck. Achieving high reliability is difficult but possible.Item Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems(44th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2014-07-13) Jones, Harry W.A hardware system’s failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.Item Space and Industrial Brine Drying Technologies(44th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2014-07-13) Jones, Harry W.; Wisniewski, Richard; Flynn, Michael; Shaw, HaliThis survey describes brine drying technologies that have been developed for use in space and industry. NASA has long considered developing a brine drying system for the International Space Station (ISS). Possible processes include conduction drying in many forms, spray drying, distillation, freezing and freeze drying, membrane filtration, and electrical processes. Commercial processes use similar technologies. Some proposed space systems combine several approaches. The current most promising candidates for use on the ISS use either conduction drying with membrane filtration or spray drying.Item Success Factors in Human Space Programs - Why Did Apollo Succeed Better Than Later Programs?(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.The Apollo Program reached the moon, but the Constellation Program (CxP) that planned to return to the moon and go on to Mars was cancelled. Apollo is NASA’s greatest achievement but its success is poorly understood. The usual explanation is that President Kennedy announced we were going to the moon, the scientific community and the public strongly supported it, and Congress provided the necessary funding. This is partially incorrect and does not actually explain Apollo’s success. The scientific community and the public did not support Apollo. Like Apollo, Constellation was announced by a president and funded by Congress, with elements that continued on even after it was cancelled. Two other factors account for Apollo’s success. Initially, the surprise event of Uri Gagarin’s first human space flight created political distress and a strong desire for the government to dramatically demonstrate American space capability. Options were considered and Apollo was found to be most effective and technically feasible. Political necessity overrode both the lack of popular and scientific support and the extremely high cost and risk. Other NASA human space programs were either canceled, such as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), repeatedly threatened with cancellation, such as International Space Station (ISS), or terminated while still operational, such as the space shuttle and even Apollo itself. Large crash programs such as Apollo are initiated and continued if and only if urgent political necessity produces the necessary political will. They succeed if and only if they are technically feasible within the provided resources. Future human space missions will probably require gradual step-by-step development in a more normal environment.Item Underestimation of Project Costs(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, over- optimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because “This time it’s different.” Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.Item Water System Architectures for Moon and Mars Bases(45th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2015-07-12) Jones, Harry W.; Hodgson, Edward W.; Kliss, Mark H.Water systems for human bases on the moon and Mars will recycle multiple sources of wastewater. Systems for both the moon and Mars will also store water to support and backup the recycling system. Most water system requirements, such as number of crew, quantity and quality of water supply, presence of gravity, and surface mission duration of 6 or 18 months, will be similar for the moon and Mars. If the water system fails, a crew on the moon can quickly receive spare parts and supplies or return to Earth, but a crew on Mars cannot. A recycling system on the moon can have a reasonable reliability goal, such as only one unrecoverable failure every five years, if there is enough stored water to allow time for attempted repairs and for the crew to return if repair fails. The water system that has been developed and successfully operated on the International Space Station (ISS) could be used on a moon base. To achieve the same high level of crew safety on Mars without an escape option, either the recycling system must have much higher reliability or enough water must be stored to allow the crew to survive the full duration of the Mars surface mission. A three loop water system architecture that separately recycles condensate, wash water, and urine and flush can improve reliability and reduce cost for a Mars base.